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THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 



-X 



in 



THE BATTLE 



OF 



aETTTSBUEa: 



THE HISTOEY 



CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 



BY 

THE COMTE DE "PAEIS. — -^ P\..v.v.„4. 



PUBLISHED BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE AUTHOR. 




PHILADELPHIA: 

PORTER & COATES. 



-'..-f>T 






5 

i 



Copyright, 1886, 
BY PORTER & COATES. 



^ tj 



PUBLISHERS' PREFACE. 



The battle of Gettysburg was imdoubtedly one of the greatest 
conflicts of modern times, not only from the number of comba- 
tants engaged and the desperate nature of the struggle, but be- 
cause on the now classic heights of Cemetery Ridge, Gulp's Hill, 
and the Round Tops the future of the American Republic, for 
weal or for woe, was fought and won on those memorable July 
days. As decisive in its character and far-reaching results as the 
battle of Waterloo, like it, it has been the subject of endless con- 
troversy and military criticism, and has brought forth a multitude 
of books, pamphlets, and letters, most of which serve but to be- 
wilder and " darken visibly " the student of history. 

Fortunately, amid the din and confusion of bitter polemical 
warfare there is one historian to whom the general reader can turn 
with confidence — one who has devoted to this battle years of 
patient study and untiring research, has critically examined all 
the official and unofficial documents, reports, and publications to 
be obtained from reliable sources on either side of the controversy, 
has thoughtfully sifted the evidence for every statement made, has 
consulted with the surviving officers of either army, and then, 
" with malice toward none and charity for all," and with an im- 
partiality rare even in a foreigner of his exalted position and 
pre-eminent ability, has sought, and not in vain, to write truly 
the history of the greatest battle fought on American soil. The 
account of the battle of Gettysburg occupies three chapters in the 
Third Volume of the Comte de Paris' History of the Civil War in 
America, and is acknowledged to be the fairest and most graphic 



VI PUBLISHERS' PREFACE. 

description of tlic battle ever written, and in response to numerous 
demands is now published separately. 

To make the work still more complete, an Itinerary of the Army 
of the Potomac and co-operating forces in the Gettysburg cam- 
paign, June and «Tuly, 1863, which was a feature in the Appendix 
to the first edition of the comte's great work, has been carefully 
revised and enlarged from documents in the possession of the War 
Department, giving the most complete organization of the Army 
of the Potomac, and detailing the name of every general and sub- 
ordinate commander on the field, with a return showing the casu- 
alties by regiment and battery in the Union and Confederate 
armies, July 1-3, 1863, gives to this book an official character 
possessed by none other relating to the battle. 



I 



Extract from a letter of the Comfe dc Paris to his American Publishers, Porter & Coates. 

Gentlemen : — It has been agreed between my publishers, Messrs. Levy, and 
myself, to grant to the translation, since it is to be published by yourselves, the 
exclusive copyright in England, according to the forms prescril>ed by inter- 
national treaties, and in America the right of giving out your edition as the 
only one authorized by myself. .... 

Believe me, gentlemen, yours truly, 

L. P. D'ORLEAXS, Comte de Paris. 



EDITOR'S NOTE. 



In editing this volume I have endeavored to see that the 
translation conformed to the original and made clear the author's 
meiining, for it can be affirmed that he has sought to write with 
truth and without bias for eitiier side. 

The notes appended, I ho])e, will be understood as explanatory, 
not controversial. 

JOHN P. NICHOLSON. 
Phii.adei.phia. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 



BRANDY STATION. 
Lee moves forward on the 3d of June. — Reorganization of his array. — 
Ewell and A. P. Hill. — The artillery. — The cavalry. — Lee's plan. — 
Hooker's situation. — He finds out Lee's movement. — His plan not ap- 
proved of at Washington. — His hands are tied. — Howe crosses the Rappa- 
hannock — Pleasonton's positions. — Lee at Culpeper. — Stuart and his 
cavalry — Pleasonton's plan. — He crosses the Rapidan on the 9tli of 
June. — Fight at P>everly Ford. — Dispositions taken by Stuart. — His 
perilous situation. — The fight at Brandy Station. — Struggle at Fleetwood 
Hill. — Side-arms. — Stuart's resistance. — He evacuates Brandy Station. — 
Pleasonton's retreat. — Results obtaimd. — Hooker would attack Hill. — 
Advantages of that plan. — Consequences of a march of Hooker on 
Richmond and of Lee on Washington. — Halleck's orders. — Hooker's 
hard task. — Scattering of the Federals. — Harper's Ferry and Washing- 
ton. — Hooker marching on the 11th of June. — His uncertainty. — Lee 
moves toward the Valley of Virginia. — Ewell takes the lead. — The 
rapidity of his march. — Description of Winchester. — Milroy ignorant of 
Ewell's approach. — His positions on the 13th of June. — Ewell appears 
before Winchester. — :0n the 14th, Early carries Flint Hill. — Desjierate 
situation of Milroy. — He evacuates Winchester by night. — Disastrous 
retreat. — Results of Ewell's victory. — Hooker's movements. — Alarm in 
Pennsylvania. — ^Jenkins at Chambersburg. — Lee's and Smart's move- 
ments. — Encounter of tlie cavalry. — Position of Aldie. — Engagement at 
Middleburg on the 17th. — Hooker is marching westward. — Fight at 
Middleburg on the 19th. — Engagement of Cromwell Creek. — Fight at 
Upperville on the 21st.^Information collected by Pleasonton. — Results 
of these combats. — Pleasonton's retreat. — Lee on the banks of the Poto- 
mac. — His letter to Mr. Davis. — Ewell marching on the 22d toward 
Harrisburg. — Longstreet crosses the Potomac on the 2-5th. — Hill with 
him at Chambersburg on the 27th. — Cumberland Valley. — Early on the 
east of the Blue Ridge. — On the 26th he is at Gettysburg. — Burning 
of the bridge at Columbia. — Hooker's movements. — The authorities at 
Washington. — Hooker crosses the Potomac. — Lee is not informed of it. — 
Stuart's expedition. — His plan. — Lee's instructions. — Stuart's situation on 
the 26th. — He is separated from Lee. — He captures a Federal train on 
tiie 28th. — Engagement at Westminster on the 29th. — He encounters 
Kiii)atri(k. — Kilpatrick's movements. — Fight at Hanover on the oOth.— 
Stuart before Carlisle. — Lee recalls him. — Hooker is replaced by Meade 
on the 28th. — Halleck's conduct. — Meade's movements on the 29th. — 
Situation of Gettysburg. — Meade's plan. — His cavalry on the 30th. — 



viii CONTENTS. 

Biiford at Gettysburg. — Meade's orders for tlie 1st of July. — Tlie Pipe 
Creek line. — On the 2Sth Lee resolves to cro.ss the mountains.— Onlers 
of the 29tii. — Ewell's movement. — The Confederates are ont.stri])ped at 
Gettysburg. — Causes of the first encounter at Gettysburg. — The Tennsyl- 
vania militia. — Meade informed of Lee's movement. — Keyes' demon- 
strations on the Virginia peninsula Page 

CHAPTER II. 

OAK HILL. 
Lee's entire army is marching on the 1st of July on Gettysburg. — The 
battlefield of Gettysburg.— The three Jiills: Oak Hill, Cemetery Hill, 
the Itound Toys. — Peach Orchard. — The crossway. — Buford's iiold resolu- 
tion. — His fighting dispositions. — He is attacked by Heth. — Movements 
of Hill and Keynolds. — Meade's dispositions on the moi-ning of the 1st 
of July. — His orders to Reynolds. — The latter calls the First corps to 
Gettysburg. — Wadsworth's arrival. — He saves the cavalry. — Reynolds' 
death. — Rout of Archer's brigade. — Defeat of Butler's brigade. — Tho 
Confederates are stopped. — The Federals are reinforced. — Heth's new 
attack. — Howard at Clettysburg. — Position of the Eleventh corps. — Ewell 
approaches Gettysburg. — Rodes occupies Oak Hill. — Howard's impru- 
dent movement. — The First corps is attacked at the same time in front 
and on the right. — Sanguinary struggle. — Rodes is repulsed.— Pender 
comes to Heth's rescue. — Fight of the Eleventh corps and Ewell. — Easy 
defeat of Schinnn el pfennig. — Early attacks Barlow. — Struggle around the 
almshouse. — Barlow's defeat. — Rout of the Eleventh corps. — Perilous 
position of Doubleday. — His energetic resistance. — He retreats on Gettys- 
burg. — Position of the Federals on Cemetery Hill. — Meade's orders on 
July 1st. — Hancock at Gettysburg. — He re-forms the army. — Lee should 
have attacked Cemetery Hill without delay. — Ewell dares not attempt 
it. — Lee's orders. — Movements of the Army of the Potomac on the 1st 
of July. — Meade's orders on the night of the 1st. — Lee's plan. — Meade's 
arrival. — His situation. — Distribution of his forces on the morning of 
the 2d. — Distriljution of those of Lee. — Meade rectifi>.s his positions. — 
Descri])tion of the ground.— The strong and the weak points of the 
Unionist line. — Sickles' position pointed out by Meade. — Sickles wishes 
to rectify it. — The Federal right. — Various plans presented to Lee: re- 
treat on South ^Mountain; defensive battle; direct atiack; manoeuvres. — 
Discussion of these plans. — Lee chooses the direct attack.— Faults in the 
execution of that plan. — Loss of precious time. — Role assigned to Long- 
street. — Orders given to Ewell. — Excessive length of the Confederate 
line.^Delays in Longstreet's march. — Waiting of the two armies. — En- 
gagement in the morning at Warfield. — At eleven o'clock Sickles orders 
his corps to move forward. — Misunderstanding between Meade and him- 
self. — His new position. — Weakness of his line. — New delays of Long- 
street. — Lee's impatience. — Hood's movement. — At half-past three o'clock 
he is on the point of attacking the Round Tops Page 



CONTENTS. is. 



CHAPTER III. 

GETTYSBURG. 
Hood attacks Birney's division. — Struggle at Devil's Den. — Attack on Little 
Eound Top. — Fight in the corn-field. — Hood's success. — McLaws' move- 
ment. — Birney is reinforced. — New struggle. — Warren has Little Eound 
Top occupied. — Vincent arrives in time. — Fierce struggle. — The Con- 
federates are repulsed.— Losses on both sides. — Birney reinforced by 
. Caldwell. — Struggle against McLaws. — Fresh attack on Round Top. — 
It is repulsed. — McLaws attacks the orchard. — Sickles' line is broken. — 
Anderson attacks Humplireys. — The Conftderate left. — Humphreys' re- 
treat with the Unionist left. — Longstreet's victory. — New line formed by 
Hancock. — Combat on the Eound Tops. — Longstreet's advance. — The 
Federal artillery.— Concenti'ation of foi'ces on Meade's left. — Hill remains 
motionless. — Last eflbrt of McLaws and Anderson. — They are not sup- 
ported. — They are repulsed about eight o'clock at night. — Positions of the 
Federal riglit. — Meade unmans it.— It is attacked by Johnson. — Fierce 
struggle on Gulp's Hill. — .Johnson is repulsed at ten o'clock at night. — 
Early attacks Cemetery Hill. — His defeat. — Eodes' inaction. — Movements 
of the cavalry. — Situation of the Confederates. — Faults committed. — Forces 
engaged by Lee. — Grave situation of the Federals. — Council of war. — 
Preparations for the battle of the following day. — Dispositions of the 
Confederates. — Lee's orders. — At daybreak on the 3d the fight is resumed 
on Culp's Hill. — Sanguinary and fierce struggle. — Last effort of the Con- 
federates at eleven o'clock. — Success of the Federals. — Interruption of the 
battle. — Long preparations of the Southern right. — Pickett's position. — 
Farnsworth's fight on Plum Eun.-^Lee's dispositions to su|iport Pickett's 
attack. — General cannonading. — Positions of tlie Federal left. — Its artil- 
lery. — Results of the cannonading. — The Federals cease firing. — Pickett's 
movement. — He is supported right and left. — Description of the ground. — 
Strength of the Federal positions. — Pickett makes the assault. — He is 
isolated. — Fierce struggle with side-arms. — Mel^e on the hill. — Defeat of 
Trimble and Pettigrew on Pickett's left. — Pickett's division annihilated. — 
On the right Wilcox is repulsed. — Rout of the assailants. — Lee and 
Longstreet in their midst. — The Fedi^-rals' situation. — INIeade dares not 
take the ofiensive. — Eesults obtained. — Rtti'eat of Law and McLaws. — 
The latter alone is disturbed. — The cavalry forces. — Stuart's plan. — Fed- 
eral position. — Encounter of the cavalry forces. — Figlit of Cress' Ridge. — 
Charges and counter-charges. — Stuart's movement is interrupted. — General 
mel^e with side-arms. — The two parties are separated. — Lee's situalion 
on the 3d at night: he is defeated. — Necessity of the retreat. — Fortune 
deserts the Confederates' cause. — Concentration of the Soutiiern army. — 
The Federals' situation. — The two adversaries during the day of tlie 
4th. — Commencement of Lee's retreat. — Uncertainty and immobility of 
Meade. — Causes of Lee's defeat. — Meade's faults. — Strength of the two 
armies. — Their losses. — The news of the battle of Gettysburg in the 
North and the South Page 160 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 



CHAPTER I. 
BRANDY STATION. 



ON the 3d of June, 1863, Lee put his army in motion. The 
future of America was about to be decided for ever. 
Til is army bore but little raserablance to the brave but undis- 
ciplined troops that had defended the Manassas plains two years 
before. It had even become, through its organization and disci- 
pline, its experience in fighting and marching, much superior 
to what it was the preceding year, when its chieftain led it 
into Maryland for the first time. The extreme confidence that 
animated it, as we have observed, imparted to it immense strength 
on the field of battle, but it also inspired it with an imprudent 
contempt for its adversaries. From the day foUoMang the battle 
of Chancellorsville the government and the generals had applied 
themselves to the task of reinforcing and reorganizing it. The 
return of the three divisions that had been besieging Suifolk, the 
forwarding of new regiments which had been withdrawn from 
points of least importance for defence, and, finally, the arrival of 
a large number of recruits, had during the latter part of IMay 
carried its effective force to eighty thousand men, 68,352 of 
whom were infantry. The latter had been divided into three 
army corps, each comprising three divisions. Up to this time 
the nine divisions of the Army of Northern Virginia had been 
partitioned between Longstreet and Jackson, to whom Lee allowed 
srreat freedom of action over the whole extent of the battlefield 
where each happened to be in command. Being deprived of the 
services of him who, of his two lieutenants, was most accustomed 
to exercise independent command, and obliged thenceforth to give 
more personal attention to the management of battles, Lee felt 
that it was necessary to reduce the size of his army corps in 
order to render them more manageable. Longstreet retained the 

1 



2 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

First ; Ewell and A. P. Hill were placed at the head of the Sec 
ond and Third, and each of them had the rank of lieutenant- 
general conferred upon him. If these last two officers, to recall 
the comparison made after the death of Turenne, were the " small 
change " for Stonewall Jackson, it might be said with truth that 
the minor coins were of sterling value. 

No one could dispute to Ewell the honor of succeeding Jackson 
in the command of the Second corps. We have seen him at his 
l^rilliant debut charging the gate of INIexico in 1847 Avith 
Kearny's squadron. A Virginian by birth, like Lee and 
Jackson, he possessed on that soil, so fruitful in valiant soldiers, 
a beautiful residence near the city of AVilliamsburg, in the heart 
of the old colony of English Cavaliers. This dwelling, of brick 
and Avood, square built, with a lofty flight of steps, of sombre 
aspect, and standing alone in the centre of a vast clearing, sur- 
rounded by a magnificent forest, had been for a year in posses- 
sion of the Federals. After having almost invariably played the 
principal role in the operations directed by Jackson, Ewell, 
severely wounded at Gainesville, had not been able to look on 
liis domain for rest and health. Finally, after nine mouths' 
absence, he rejoined on crutches the army which had not for- 
gotten his services. JNlore fortunate than his old chief, he had, 
thanks to his robust and active temperament, successfully borne 
the sufferings consequent upon amputation, and seemed to be suf- 
ficiently restored to health to fight for the recovery of his patri- 
mony. Having lost one leg, he had himself fastened to his saddle 
and resumed his command. B[e had the required energy, firmness, 
and activity to be the leader of soldiers who, knowing their own 
value, were severe judges of the qualities possessed by their chiefs; 
but he lacked the unerring quickness of perception of his prede- 
cessor, Avhich could discover instantaneously the weak point of an 
adversary. 

A. P. Hill, like Ewell, Avas a Virginian. Having also partici- 
pated in all the labors of Jackson, he had been slightly wounded, 
almost at the same time as the latter, in the terrible affair of 
Dowdall's Tavern. Gifted with a degree of perseverance equal 
to any emergency, he M'as always ready to take charge of the 
most difficult undertakings, and inspired his chiefs, his comrades, 



BBAXDY STATION. 3 

and his subordinates with equal confidence. His force of will 
overcame the weakness of a shattered constitution, which had 
emaciated his manly face. He was never sick on the day of 
battle. We have stated that his name was the last uttered by 
Jackson's lips as he lay on his deathbed. He waited for the 
completion of his task to respond to this call and to join his 
chief* The latter had fallen in the midst of victory ; A. P. 
Hill perished in the last hour of the war, wlien all hope was 
lost save the privilege of dying like a soldier with SAvord in 
hand. 

The reorganization of the artillery completed the changes 
eifected by Lee in the distribution of his forces. Up to this 
time the batteries were divided between the divisions, sometimes 
even specially attached to some particular brigade : they had to 
be detached in order to employ them singly or unite them in 
groups, hence a miserable scattering on the battlefield. They 
were all now placed under the command of General Pendle- 
ton, a brave and energetic officer who had been tried under 
fire. Some of these batteries formed an independent reserve ; 
the rest, while still remaining under his control, were assigned 
temporarily to the army corps. The artillery consisted of fif- 
teen battalions, each composed of four batteries of four pieces — 
sixteen guns in all. These battalions, commanded by experienced 
officers, while remaining under the controlling direction of Gen- 
eral Pendleton, were divided between the three corps, each receiv- 
ing five — making eighty pieces of artillery. Three of the bat- 
talions were each specially attached to a division, while the other 
two formed a reserve. Five mounted batteries of six pieces each 
composed the light artillery of Stuart's cavalry division. 

The cavalry, reinforced and newly mounted under the super 
vision of Stuart, had, after Chancellorsville, taken up its old 
quartei*s at Culpeper, and occupied the triangle comprised between 
the Papidan and the Rappahannock, watching the right wing of 
the Federals along this latter river, and still menacing their lines 
of communication. In this position it covered the roads that the 
Confederate army had to follow if it desired to advance in the 
direction of the North. In fact, as Lee could not think of 
crossing the Rappahannock by main force in the face of 



4 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Hooker's army, he had only two plans of campaign to follow 
if he assumed the offensive : either to tui'n his right wing in 
order to forestall hira at Manassas and before Washington, or to 
push forward toward ]\Iaryland by the valley of the Shenandoah, 
masking liis movement behind the Blue Ridge. The first plan, 
wdiich had proved successful the preceding year against Pope, 
was too hazardous to be tried again a second time in the face of 
an adversary taught by experience. Lee adopted the second, 
which left the enemy in a state of uncertainty for a longer space 
of time and enabled him to outvie the latter in speed. 

This movement was not without danger, for it consisted in 
turning the right wing of the Federals ; and in order to accom- 
plish this the latter had to be detained before Fredericksburg by a 
large display of troops while Lee's heads of column reached the 
banks of the Shenandoah. His army was thus stretched along 
a line which throughout its entire length exposed its flank to the 
attaclvs of the enemy. The utmost secrecy could alone ward off 
the danger of these attacks. 

The forest of the Wilderness had resumed its wonted stillness, 
disturbed only by the footsteps of Confederate scouts ; the grass 
had covered the corpses and the debris of every kind which lay 
scattered among the woods ; the Federal trenches, the torn and 
shattered trees, and the vestiges of fires, alone recalled to mind 
the conflict of the 3d of ISIay. Precisely one month to a day 
had elapsed since this battle when Longstreet's First division, 
under McLaws, penetrated this henceforth historical Wilderness. 
Another division followed it closely ; the Third, under Hood, was 
already on the banks of the Rapidan, and the whole army corps, 
crossing this river, reached the neighborhood of Culpeper Court- 
house on the evening of the 7th. 

"~- A portion of Ewell's corps had started in the same direction 
on the 4th ; the remainder moved forward on the morning of the 
5th : Hill's corps, therefore, was the only one left to occupy the 
positions from Taylor's Hill to Hamilton's Crossing in which the 
army had passed the winter, and it had to be deployed along this, 
line in order to conceal the departure of two-thirds of the army. 
The vigilance of the outposts had, in fact, prevented Hooker's 
spies from reporting this departure to him : no one had been able 



BRANDY STATION. 

to cross the river for several days. But the movements of troops 
caused by the removal of Hill's divisions could not altogether 
avoid attracting the attention of the Federals. Besides, they 
knew their adversaries too well not to anticipate an attack the 
moment that they did not resume the aggressive themselves. 

A few words on the situation of the Army of the Potomac for 
the last mouth will enable the reader to understand why, contrary 
to its tactics of the preceding year, it lay waiting, inactive in its 
positions, for the Confederates to take the initiative of a new 
campaign. 

Whilst the latter saw their ranks filling up, those of the Union 
army were thinning out in an alarming manner. The expiration 
of their terms of service carried off five thousand well-tried men 
in the month of May, and ten thousand in June ; the fatigues of 
a short but distressing campaign and the first heats of summer 
increased the number of sick ; desertions had not been entirely 
stopped ; and the recruiting of regiments already organized was 
almost at a standstill. 

The active infantry force that Hooker had at his disposal was 
thus reduced to eighty thousand men. The artillery was tlience- 
forth too numerous, and out of proportion to the above figures. 
The cavalry, on the other hand, Avorn out by Stoneman's raid, 
needed a few weeks' rest to recuperate. The authorities at 
Washington might have reinforced the Army of the Potomac 
by discontinuing or reducing the number of useless posts and 
garrisons, but the most sad experience had failed to induce 
them to abandon this system of scattering the troops. At the 
very moment when all the Confederate forces were leaving the 
coast to join Johnston in the West or Lee in Virginia, a whole 
army corps was left at Port Royal, one division at New Berne, 
two at Suffolk, and one in the peninsula of Virginia, to waste 
away without a purpose, without any plan of campaign ; whilst 
in the district which the Army of the Potomac was called upon 
to defend, entire corps, such as the Washington garrison under 
Heintzelman, Stahel's six thousand cavalry in the neighborhood 
of Manassas, and Milroy's division in the Valley of Virginia, 
acted independently of Hooker and under the immediate direc- 
tion of Halleck; the commander-in-chief of the Army of the 



6 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Potomac not being even informed of the orders these officers 
received. Lee's projects could not have been more effectually 
subserved. 

Hooker no longer inspired his army with the same confidence 
as before Chancellorsville : the council of war that was held prior 
to the retreat had given rise to some painful retrospective discus- 
sions among some of his generals, the knowledge of whicih had 
reached Washington. Halleck, without daring to request Hook- 
er's removal, shared the opinion of those who believed that the 
burden of command was too heavy for his shoulders, and, far 
from being urged to act, it was recommended to him to wait 
for a favorable opportunity. 

It was during this state of expectancy, about the end of INIay, 
that vague rumors got afloat foreshadowing the impending move- 
ment of the Confederates. The Federals were not alone to suffer 
from the indiscretions of politicians and journalists : there were 
also men iu the South who, for the silly satisfaction of being 
considered well informed, worked incessantly in their endeavors 
to fathom military secrets, and hastened to divulge them. The 
Richmond papers published that Lee was about to undertake 
an aggressive movement, and it was openly announced in the 
streets of the capital that he would invade Maryland at the head 
of eighty-five thousand men. Hooker thought justly that his 
adversaries were not likely to come to attack him in his positions 
at Falmouth, and try to turn him ; but he was under the impres- 
sion that they were about to resume the campaign plan of the pre- 
ceding year, and proceed toward Manassas by crossing the Rappa- 
hannock near its source. He was confirmed in this opinion by the 
gathering of Stuart's cavalry at Culpeper and the increasing bold- 
ness of the guerillas who infested the country in his rear; for one 
of these bands even attempted, at Greenwich on the 31st of May, 
to capture a train intended for his army. It required, however, 
the removal of the encampments of Hill's corps on the 4t]i of 
June to induce him to suspect a serious movement on the part 
of the enemy, and to decide to emerge from his inactivity in 
order to make sure of the fiict. On the morning of the 5th 
the poutonniers were ordered to throw two bridges over the 
Rappahannock at the point known by the name of Franklin's 



"""'■'-'- 1 I 



BRANDY STATION. 7 

Crossing. The Sixth corps, which was encamped in the neighbor- 
hood, sustained them and held itself ready to cross the river. This 
movement might be only a simple demonstration ; it might also 
be the beginning of an operation which would have proved very 
dangerous for the enemy. Hooker, with the same sagacity he 
had shown in planning the battle of Chancellorsville, was fully 
convinced that an attack upon the weakened lines of Fredericks- 
burg while a portion of Lee's army was probably pushing forward 
along the Culpeper road was the best means for preventing the 
invasion projected by his adversary. If the movement of the 
latter was not yet fully defined, he could thus stop him. If, on 
the contrary, he allowed him time to advance farther toward the 
North and to further separate his columns, he could then make 
a sudden attack with superior forces upon the troops which his 
presence at Falmouth detained on the Lower Rappahannock, and 
crush in its isolation one of the army corps whose co-operation 
was indispensable to Lee for an aggressive campaign. 

Such a project was at once bold and well conceived : it had, in 
our opinion, great chances of success ; but there was one obstacle, 
more difficult to overcome than rivers, or even hostile batteries, 
which did not allow Hooker to execute it : this was the instruc- 
tions he had received along with the command of the army. 
These instructions formally directed him to cover Washington 
and Harper's Ferry. Washington, surrounded by formidable 
fortifications perfectly armed, had a numerous garrison, while 
Stahel's cavalry division, by clearing the approaches for a consid- 
erable distance, did not permit the enemy to attempt a surprise 
against the place. Harper's Ferry, we have already shown, had 
no strategic importance whatever ; nevertheless, if it was desired 
to preserve this position, which had been very unnecessarily forti- 
fied, there could have been brought to the place five or six thou- 
sand men who under Milroy occupied Winchester and the lower 
part of the Valley of Virginia. But the requirements of General 
Hal leek for the defence of these two points, after having fettered 
the movements of McClellan on the Chickahominy and in the 
Antietam campaign, were not likely to yield to Hooker's repre- 
sentations. On the 5th of June the latter had asked for permis- 
sion to act independently of these instructions, and to manoeuvre 

B 



8 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

his army as he thought proper, in order to be able to strike the 
enemy wherever he could fiud the occasion to fight him to advan- 
tage were he to let him advance northward, while he himself 
should menace the Confederate capital. This permission was re- 
fused. Halleck tried to prove to him that it would be better to 
follow in the wake of Lee's heads of column, whose direction no 
one could as yet exactly foresee ; while Mr. Lincoln, recapitulating 
the scientific demonstration of his military director by a homely 
comparison, gave the form of an apologue to a telegram addressed 
to the commander of the Army of the Potomac : " I would not 
take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox 
jum^jed half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs front 
and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the 
other." 

These instructions were positive and formal. Hooker had no 
other alternative than to conform to them. He had asked that all 
the forces which might have to operate against Lee should be 
united under one single command in order to combine their 
efforts. General Halleck deemed the superior control exercised 
by him from his office at Washington as quite sufficient for that 
purpose. The Army of the Potomac, doomed to act on the 
defensive, could not thenceforth prevent the enemy from accom- 
plishing his design. 

Hooker did his best not to allow himself to be surprised or 
forestalled by Lee. The bridges had been thrown over the river 
in the afternoon of June 5th, after a pretty sharp engagement 
with the Confederate skirmishers. As the latter were harassing 
the pontonniers a great deal, a Federal detachment had crossed 
the river in boats and dispersed them, after taking about one 
hundred prisoners. On the morning of the 6th, Hooker made 
Howe's division cross over to the right side of the Rappahannock. 
Lee, alarmed at this movement, caused a portion of Hill's corps 
to advance, holding himself ready to recall Ewell, who had been 
on the march since the day previous. But Hooker had his 
hands tied ; when he saw the display of forces HoAve provoked, 
he stopped the latter, without having been able to ascertain 
whether he had the enemy's whole army before him or only a 
portion of it. As to Lee, he soon discovered the weakness 



BRANDY STATION. 9 

of this demonstration. Perfectly at ease on the point, he made 
preparations to join Longstreet, instructing Hill to follow him as 
soon as the movements of which he was about to take the direc- 
tion had compelled the enemy to abandon the banks of the Rap- 
pahannock. — 
Hooker had determined to feel the enemy at both extremities 
of his line at once. Whilst Howe was crossing the river he 
made preparations for a large cavalry reconnoissance in the direc- 
tion of Culpeper. He was not aware, as we have remarked, that 
Lee's army was itself on the march toward this point. But he 
knew that the enemy's whole cavalry was gathered there; that 
Stuart, reinforced on all sides, had nearly ten thousand sabres 
at his command ; and, even if the signs and rumors had not 
informed him, he was too well acquainted with the character of 
this young general not to feel convinced that he would not remain 
long inactive with such forces at his disposal. In what direction 
w^ould he strike ? Was he about to undertake a simple raid or to 
cover the movements of the enemy's infantry ? It was necessary 
to make sure of this, and if possible to baffle his plans by a sud- 
den attack. Unfortunately, the Federal cavalry had not yet en- 
tirely recovered from the long march it had made in the begin- 
ning of ]May. In spite of the eiforts of its new chief. General 
Pleasonton, who had deserved this position by his brilliant beha- 
vior at Chancellorsville, the three divisions composing it scarcely 
numbered seven thousand five hundred sabres. In order to make 
up for Pleasonton's numerical inferiority, it became necessary to 
add to his command the two infantry brigades under Ames and 
Russell, detached from the Eleventh and Sixth corps, which 
counted about three thousand men under arms. Notwithstand- 
ing the excellent qualities of these foot-soldiers, their co-operation 
interfered with the mobility of the column of cavalry, and con- 
sequently destroyed part of its chances of success. The troops 
under Pleasonton's command were all scattered : in order to afford 
them time to concentrate. Hooker directed him not to cross the 
Rappahannock until nine in the morning. While he was pre- 
paring to strike a sudden blow in the direction of Culpeper, 
Longstreet, unknown to him, had reached this village with all 
his infantry on the evening of the 7th. The arrival of Lee, 



10 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

who joined him before evening, was hailed by eveiy one as sure 
proof that the hour for important operations had arrived. The 
general-in-chief found his cavahy thoroughly prepared for the 
rdle it was about to play. 

Stuart, justly proud of this splendid force, had some time 
before asked Lee to come with some friends and review it. 
" Here I am," said the general-in-chief to him, pointing with 
his finger to the bivouacs of the First corps, — " here I am with 
my friends, according to your invitation." It was agreed that 
on the following day I^ee and his " friends " — that is to say, all 
of Longstreet's soldiers — should witness the cavalry review. 

With the exception of some regiments detached on outpost- 
duty, all Stuart's cavalry was assembled on the 8th in a beau- 
tiful open plain between Culpeper and Brandy Station. Gene- 
ral Lee, motionless on his horse, his head covered with a broad- 
brimmed hat, occupied an elevated position near a pole upon 
which was flying a large Confederate flag. For the army 
assembled around him, this man with a long gray beard, as 
wise as he was brave, of dignified mien, whose profile stood out 
in fine relief under a dazzling sky, brought by his mere pres- 
ence a certain pledge of victory to the symbol of the Southern 
cause which floated by his side. The simplicity of attire, the 
immobility and serious countenance, of the general-in-chief, who 
no doubt was already revolving in his mind the chances of his 
new campaign, were in strong contrast with the brilliant uniform, 
the gay deportment, and cheerful looks of Stuart as he passed, 
sword in hand, with his troopers before their companions-in- 
arms. As if real war, with its sufferings and risks, had not 
been enough for him, Stuart omitted none of the features which 
in times of peace constitute a sham fight, with its conventions 
and improbabilities, such as dashing, headlong charges suddenly 
stopped, cannonading against a fictitious enemy — for even pow- 
der, so precious in warfare, was not spared — while the distant 
sounds of this pretended battle reached the very banks of the 
Rappahannock, to the astonishment of the Union scouts who 
were watching along the course of the river. 

The campaign was about to commence. Stuart was to menace 
the Federals in the vicinity of Warrenton in (H'der to conceal 



BRANDY STATION. 11 

from them the movements of the infantry, which was about to 
tuyn its back almost completely upon them as it proceeded north- 
westward, by way of Sperryvilie and Thornton's Gap, to reach 
the valley of the Shenandoah. On the evening of the 8th the 
Confederate cavalry bivouacked in the neighborhood of Brandy 
Station, halfway between Culpeper and the Rappahannock. 
Stuart established his head-quarters upon a barren hill of con- 
siderable height, which under the name of Fleetwood Hill 
stretches out north-east of Brandy Station perpendicularly to 
the railroad, and overlooks the wooded country surrounding it. 
Jones' brigade, composed of Virginia partisans recently attached 
to Stuart's corps, watched the fords of the Rappahannock, while 
Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, commanded by Colonel INIunford, its 
chief being sick, had gone to encamp at Oak Shade on the other 
side of Hazel River, along the road which all the cavalry had to 
follow. The other three brigades, under the respective commands 
of Generals Robertson, Hampton, and W. H, F. Lee, as well as 
the mounted artillery, were assembled at. Fleetwood. Never 
had Lee's young and brilliant lieutenant been in command of a 
finer or more numerous body of men : these brigades contained 
each from four to five regiments, almost equivalent to the Federal 
divisions, constituting a total effective force of more than nine 
thousand five hundred troopers, well mounted, v/ell accoutred, 
and accompanied by thirty pieces of artillery perfectly equipped 
and well served. 

This time, however, it was the Federals' turn to outspeed and 
surprise their adversaries. They had able and experienced com- 
manders to lead them. Unassuming in his deportment, reserved 
and reticent, Pleasonton possessed correct judgment, quickness 
of perception, decision of character, and great determination of 
purpose. The cavalry was divided into three divisions, under 
Generals Buford and Gregg and Colonel Duffie. The two first 
mentioned had already been accustomed to independent com- 
mands : being fully acquainted with the kind of warfare they 
were called upon to wage, they had succeeded in inspiring their 
soldiers with the fullest confidence. Since the battle of Kelly's 
Ford the Federal trooperg had ceased to believe in the superiority 
of their advei-saries. This was one great advantage in their favor. 



12 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Pleiisonton, although fully aware that the bulk of the enemy's 
forces was asseuibled at Brandy Station, knew nothing of the 
disposition that Stuart had made of his troops: he had therefore 
to c;lcar the principal movement directed against this point, and 
to hold himself ready either to push forward and disperse the 
hostile cavalry on every side if he should succeed in surprising 
it, or to fall back in case of his not being able to dishxlge it. 
He formed two columns : with the first, composed of Buford's 
division and Ames' infantry, he proposed to cross the Rappa- 
hannock at Beverly Ford, about two miles above Rappahannock 
Station, and march directly upon Brandy Station, situated at a 
distance of four and a half miles. The second column, com- 
prising the other two divisions of cavalry and Russell's brigade, 
under Gregg's command, was to cross the river at Kelly's Ford, 
much lower down, and to divide afterward. r>uffie, taking a 
south-westerly direction, was ordered to push as far as Stevens- 
burg, to find out whether the enemy occupied the road between 
Chancellorsville and Culpeper, and whether he had any troops 
on the march along that road, and to cover the left against any 
offensive movement on their part. In the mean while, Gregg, 
with his division, was to ]>roceed toward Brandy Station in order 
to strike the rear of the cavalry which Buford was to attack in 
front, while Russell, bearing to the right in order to make short 
work ^vith his infantr}^, would endeavor to assist the latter 
between the railroad and Beverly Ford. 

At daybreak on the 9th the two Federal columns crossed the 
river, which was enveloj^ed in a dense morning mist. The Con- 
federates, solely occupied with their own projects, had abandoned 
the Rappahannock below the railroad line, and Gregg was able 
to cross it not only without encountering any resistance, but even 
without Stuart being informed of his presence on the right bank. 
At Beverly Ford, Buford's head of column, formed by Colonel 
Grimes* Davis' brigade, took advantage of the fog to surprise 
and disperse Jones' outposts, stationed along the river. It came 
near capturing by the same stroke the whole of Stuart's artil- 
lery, four mounted batteries, which the latter, while preparing for 

* Colonel Benjamin F. Davis, Eighth New York cavalry. By his army asso- 
ciates he was familiarly called " Grimes" Davis. — Ed. 



BRANDY STATION. 13 

the projected passage of the river, had imprudently caused to be 
placed about half a mile in advance of the encampments occu- 
pied by the brigade of Virginia partisans. These encampments 
were located back of a wood, the edge of which extended twelve 
hundred yards from the ford. No one suspected the approach of 
the enemy : the horses were picketed, the men at work on fatigue- 
duty, and the entire troop would have been captured but for the 
protection of the wood, which enabled the skirmishers who had 
been driven from the bank to form again on foot and to pour 
a sharp fire into the Federals, which brought the foremost 
squadrons to a halt. Jumping quickly into the saddle, a por- 
tion of Jones' troopers come up at full gallop, and vigorously 
resume the oiFensive against the Eighth New York. The two 
bodies of troops become mixed up, a combat with sabre and pis- 
tol follows, and the Federals are repulsed. Colonel Davis, in 
trying to rally them, falls mortally wounded. This premature 
death deprived the Federal cavalry of one of its best and most 
brilliant officers. A captain in the regular army, highly esteemed 
by his superiors and comrades, Davis had already distinguished 
himself by his daring and sagacity in coming out of Harper's 
Ferry a few days* before Miles' capitulation, thus saving the 
brigade placed under his command. He is promptly avenged : 
the Eighth Illinois, coming up in its turn, throws the Confeder- 
ates into disorder, carries off a portion of Stuart's baggage, and 
drives the fugitives across the wood and the remainder of their 
bivouacs upon the main body of Jones' brigade, which the latter 
has been forming in haste about two miles from the river. The 
artillery, which, after the first discharge, has promptly fallen back, 
supports the line. This time Jones steadily waits for the assailants, 
for it is only a question of detaining them long enough to enable 
Stuart to come up with reinforcements. The Confederates are not 
accustomed to see their adversaries assume the offensive with so 
much spirit. Ames' brigade, which has crossed the river, is de- 
ployed along the edge of the wood and occupies it in front, while 
Buford's second brigade, inclining to the right, prepares to attack 
them in flank. But the fire of the Confederate artillery is imme- 

* Colonel Davis led the Union cavalry out of Harper's Ferry during the night 
immediately preceding the surrender. — Ed. 

\ 



14 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

diately directed against the latter. The Fifth and Sixth regulars 
succeed in relieving the rest of the brigade, without being able to 
recover their advantage; for Stuart, who has just arrived from 
Fleetwood with a portion of his forces, in his turn hurls two 
regiments upon its flank, which compel the Federals to beat a 
speedy retreat. 

At the first news of the passage of Beverly Ford by the enemy, 
the commander of the Confederate cavalry had hastened with most 
of the forces at his disposal, W, 11. F, Lee's and Hampton's bri- 
gades : Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, under Munford, was hastily recalled 
from Oak Shade, while Robertson remained watching Brandy 
Station. The forces so promptly gathered before Buford enabled 
Stuart to resume the offensive at once. It was about ten o'clock 
in the morning. But the Federals, strongly posted along the 
edge of the wood and sustained by the fire of infantry, kept 
him at a distance, while Munford vainly endeavored to turn 
them by menacing the river-crossing. The combatants, instead 
of coming to close quarters and crossing swords, remained thus 
watching each other and exchanging a fire of artillery and small- 
arjus. 

Pleasonton had already secured the information which Hooker 
had charged him to obtain on the right bank of the Rappahan- 
nock. He had found in Stuart's baggage certain instructions 
addressed to the latter which could admit of no doubt as to 
the movement of the enemy's whole army to^vard the Valley of 
Virginia ; he had learned from these that the Confederate cavalry 
was to attempt a descent upon the Manassas and Fredericksburg 
Railroad* in order to cover this movement. But, finding the 
occasion favorable, he determined to strike a blow which should 
paralyze this cavalry and prevent it from carrying out its 
projected plan. Besides, he could not forsake his other two 
divisions, and, seeing that he had to do with a strong force, he 
decided to wait for the termination of the manoeuvre they had 
commenced. 

Stuart, on his part, was preparing to attack him vigorously, 
when unexpected news was brought him which stopped him 
abruptly. The signal-station established on Fleetwood Hill 
* Orange and Alexandria Railroad. — Ed. 



BRANDY STATION. 15 

apprised him of the approach of a large Federal column which 
was coming up on his rear and was already menacing Brandy 
Station. This was Gregg, faithfully performing the task which 
had been assigned to him. Stuart's situation was a dangerous 
one : having a numerous and enterprising enemy before him, 
he saw himself threatened in his rear by a new adversary, who, 
finding but a single brigade in his way, would not fail to place 
him between two fires before long. It would soon be out of 
his power to prevent Gregg and Buford from joining their 
forces on the battlefield, and thus inflicting upon him a com- 
plete defeat. There was no time to be lost to prevent this 
junction. Following Lee's example at Chancellorsville, Stuart 
does not hesitate for a moment. Availing himself of a slis-ht 
advantage he has just obtained over Buford to leave only W. 
H. F. Lee's brigade and that of Fitzhugh Lee before him, he 
hastens with Hampton's and Jones' troops and a portion of his 
light artillery to meet Gregg. 

In the mean while, the latter liad become engaged in a despe- 
rate struggle, and if the contrary wind prevented the Federals near 
Beverly Ford from catching the sound of the combat that was 
raging in that direction, its echoes reached him the more distinctly 
and hastened his march. His scouts have penetrated unawares 
into Brandy Station, nearly capturing a train as it was entering 
the place. But Robertson, having formed his brigade, again 
takes possession of it: for a short time, however, for one of 
Gregg's two brigades, commanded by a brave English ojfiicer 
whom we have already had occasion to mention, Colonel Percy 
Wyndham, comes promptly to dispute it with him. While one 
section of the Federal artillery is cannonading some of the enemy's 
pieces posted back of Fleetwood Hill, Wyndham- hurls the First 
Maryland against the station on the left. The Federal troopers 
rush into it at a gallop, picking up a number of prisoners and dis- 
lodging the Confederates from it. Wyndham's wliole brigade, 
supported on the right by Kilpatrick's, then rapidly advances 
upon Fleetwood Hill. Robertson charges them in vain. After 
a brisk combat the Southern troopers are dispersed. Wyndham 
captures three of the enemy's guns, as also a cluster of buildings 
constituting Mr. Barbour's residence, which stands on the summit 
Vol. III.— 30 



16 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

of the hill where Stuart had passed the uiglit. It is at this crit- 
ical moment that the latter makes his appearance on this new bat- 
tlefield. He must, at any cost, recapture Fleetwood Hill from 
the enemy, who, master of this position, commands the whole 
country. He hurls all the troops under his command against 
Wyndhani, whose squadrons have been somewhat scattered dur- 
ing the fight. The Federals are at first driven back, but they 
form again, return to the charge, and recover their vantage- 
ground. 

The Confederate troopers are astonished at this unwonted 
display of audacity on the part of their adversaries, but they 
promptly recover themselves, and close upon them in their turn. 
Swords soon take the place of pistols, which the combatants have 
no time to reload. Wyndham, pressed by superior forces, has 
fallen back near the station, taking with him his two guns, 
together with the three pieces he has captured from the enemy. 
Gregg, in order to relieve him, orders Kilpatrick's brigade to fall 
upon the left flank of the Confederates. The latter, strong in 
numbers, do not yield one inch of ground. Their leaders per- 
form prodigies of valor, for this is a decisive moment. Along 
all the slopes of Fleetwood Hill and around Brandy Station the 
hostile lines are mixed in such a melee as was never before wit- 
nessed in America : cannon are wrenched from each other's pos- 
session, chauffino; hands several times. On both sides the losses 
are heavy ; Colonels Hampton, Butler, and Young are wounded 
on the Confederate side, and three superior officers in Wyndham 's 
brigade alone. 

Yet in the presence of forces twice as numerous as its own 
Gregg's division maintained itself with difficulty north of the 
railroad. There was no assistance within reach. On the left, 
Duffie, who had been sent in an opposite direction, had found 
one of rlie enemy's regiments at Stevcnsburg, and put it to flight 
after a sharp engagement, during which he made a number of 
prisoners ; but, although only within three or four miles of Brandy 
Station, it does not appear that he thought of going to take part 
in the combat which was fought by the Third division, and to whi'ih 
he might have secured victory : at all events, he did not join it 
in time, and only made his appearance in the evening on the 



BBANDY STATION. 17 

banks of the Rappahannock.* On the right, Russell's infautiy, 
notwithstanding their efforts to keep up with the cavalry, are still 
too far behind to be able to sustain it. Finally, still more to the 
right, Buford has indeed resumed the offensive, and is slowly 
driving AV. H. F. Lee before him, who, while exposing himself in 
order to conceal the weakness of his force, is seriously wounded. 
But Lee's efforts are not in vain, for he has delayed the march 
of Pleasouton, and the combat at Brandy Station will come to an 
end without the latter being cognizant of the fact. A final charge 
by General Young has driven Kilpatrick's brigade beyond the 
railroad, and almost at the same time Wyndhara, after having 
lost the five pieces of artillery so long disptited, has been obliged 
to abandon Brandy Station. Kilpatrick's regiments return sev- 
eral times to the charge, but this is only done to cover the move- 
ments of the rest of the division. The Federals, moreover, have 
soon cause to consider themselves fortunate in having got out of 
the struggle in which they were engaged. Just as they are leav- 
ing Brandy Station they see before them long trains of cars which 
stop to unload, first one battalion, then several others. Swarms 
of infantry, whose bayonets from afar are glistening in the sun, 
form into line close to the road, and soon present an imposing 
force. It is, in fact, the head of column of Ewell's corps, which 
at the first news of the battle Lee has sent in great haste from 
Culpeper to Brandy Station. Rodes' division is already de- 
ployed, Early's follows it close ; but Gregg does not allow them 
time to overtake him. He falls back by w^ay of his right in 
order to find Russell and assist Buford, whom he has not 
been able to meet in passing over the ground occupied by 
the enemy. 

During this time the forces of W. H. F. Lee had retired before 
Buford, who was pressing them closer and closer, abandoning all 

* Colonel Duffi^ arrived on the battlefield near Brandy Station about 4 o'clock 
in the afternoon, in time to cover with his division the return of the other two 
divisions to the nortli bank of the Rappahannock. In his report, dated June 
12, 1863, Colonel Duffie says : " Upon my arrival near Beverly Ford, General 
Pleasonton directed me to move with one brigade to support General Buford, 
and send the Second brigade on the road leading to Rappahannock Ford to 
cover the crossing of the Third division. My command crossed Beverly Ford 
at about five p. m."— Ed. 



18 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

the positions tliey had defoiidcd until tlien ; so tliat Plcasonron 
and himself soon united with both Russell's infantry and Kil- 
patrick's cavalry. Stuart, on his part, following the movement 
of the latter, had joined that portion of his forces which he had 
left in order to repair to Brandy Station. The two hostile army 
corps Avere therefore fronting each other, mutually watching and 
cannonading. But Pleasonton, satisfied with the results he had 
obtained and the ground he had gained, and not hearing anything 
from Duffi6, did not wish to renew the combat. He had proved 
to the Confederates that his cavalry were fully as good as theirs. 
His sudden attack, the close fighting with small-arms, and the 
losses he had inflicted upon the enemy, made Stuart relinquish 
his design, if he had entertained such, of attempting a raid upon 
the rear of the Federal army. On the other hand, Pleasontou's 
reconnoissance had not only revealed to him the strength of the 
Confederate cavalry, but also the presence of a numerous infantry 
force at Culpeper. This was the most important result for the 
future of the campaign : he was not, then, confronted by a mere 
squadron of cavalry, but by a portion of the Army of Northern 
Virginia. Lee's movement was unmasked. Pleasonton could 
not communicate to his chief more important or more reliable 
information : he hastened to forward it to him. It arrived in 
time to enlighten Hooker and decide him to follow his adver- 
sary. 

About five o'clock Pleasonton gave the order for retreat, which 
was effected without difficulty. Before dark all the troops had re- 
crossed the Rappahannock. The losses on both sides were serious, 
amounting to nearly six hundred men for each of the two adver- 
saries, between two hundred and fifty and three hundred of whom 
were prisoners, and most of them wounded. The Confederates 
had captured two dismounted guns ; the Federals carried off a 
stand of colors. But the importance of the battle of Brandy 
Station cannot be measured by those figures, for it opens a new 
era in the war we are describing. For the first time the Federal 
cavalry, confiding in its own resources, has gone en masse to 
attack that of the enemy. For the first time these two bodies of 
troops have fought a regular pitched battle, in which the infan- 
try and artillery have plaj^ed but an insigjiificant part; and, as a 



BRANDY STATION. 19 

natural consequence of this change of tactics, sabres and pistols 
have in these encounters taken the place of the musket ; for the 
first time the sabre has made a large number of victims. 

The conflict of the 9th of June could not thwart Lee's plans 
nor seriously embarrass Stuart as to the role which had been 
assigned to him, as it was his duty, above all, to cover the move- 
ments of the infantry ; but he foresaw that this r6le would be 
a difficult one in the presence of so stubborn an adversary. It 
was a serious warning to the Confederate cavalry to be on its 
guard and keep close together, in order that tlie veil which it 
was charged to draw between the two armies might not be 
pierced again. 

With regard to Hooker, he knew on the morning of the 10th 
that General Lee, with a portion of his infantry, was at Culpeper 
the day before. But the information obtained by his troopers at 
the cost of their blood not being under control like the news 
gathered by the enemy through their intercourse with the inhab- 
itants, all in sympathy with the cause of the South, was naturally 
very imperfect. ThuSj while the two army corps of Longstreet 
and Ewell were at Culpeper on the 9th, the Union general be- 
lieved that the latter was still on the right bank of the Rapidan 
in the neighborhood of Chancellorsville. Consequently, he could 
not yet fathom the designs of his adversary. Did the latter intend 
to make a descent into the A^alley of Virginia, supporting his 
cavalry with a corps of infantry, or did he propose to renew the 
movement which had secured him the victory of Manassas the 
previous year, by boldly throwing himself between Washington 
and the Army of the Potomac? Such were the two eventual- 
ities which Hooker asked his government to be prepared for. 
Without attempting to form an idea of the bold and brilliant 
conception by which Lee, with all his army, was going to slip 
through his hands in order to reach Pennsylvania before him, he 
had fully understood that the valley of the Shenandoah might 
be the scene of an expedition after Jackson's fashion. We have 
stated that he had notified his superiors of the fact since the 
5th : he renewed this warning on tlie 10th in announcing the 
battle of Brandy Station. No notice was taken of it at Wash- 
ington : we shall see presently the consequences of this neglect. 



20 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

It was evident that the enemy, whatever might be hisi ultf^rlor 
plan, had commenced an aggressive campaign, and that by extend- 
ing his left as far as Culpeper he weakened his right at Fredericks- 
burg, Hooker, being master of the Rappahannock lords, had 
only to march upon the positions at Hamilton's to capture all the 
famous defences of Murye's Hill, which he had already caused to 
be evacuated once by his manoeuvres. His army, admirably con- 
centrated, possessed every advantage over the Confederates, who 
were even more scattered than he had imagined. He would 
have had only Hill's single corps to fight. Ewell, although 
he was still unaware of the fact, was too far away to be able to 
harass him during this operation. It is true that Longstreet 
could have struck his rear from Culpeper and separated him 
from Washington, but such a desperate attempt could neither 
have afforded relief to Hill's corps, which a speedy retreat alone 
could save, nor have seriously menaced the true base of oper- 
ations of the Army of the Potomac, which was upon the river at 
Aquia Creek. 

Hill once dislodged, the road to Richmond was open. Hooker, 
with that unerring judgment for which, unfortunately, he was 
more distinguished in the council than on the battlefield, appre- 
ciated all the benefit that could be derived from the movement 
of his adversary. Why not march directly upon the capital of 
the enemy ? It was an almost infallible means of cutting short 
Lee's projects of invasion ; and if the latter, to use a comparison 
which it is said he had just employed in talking with his generals, 
should attempt to play " queen for queen," if he should sacrifice 
Richmond in order to march upon Washington, all the advan- 
tage would have redounded in favor of the Federals. In war, 
as well as at chess, such play always benefits him who has most 
resources. The game Avas not equal, for Washington with its 
immense -fortifications, its formidable artillery, its garrison of 
thirty-six thousand men, which Schenck's troops, coming from 
Harper^s Ferry and Baltimore, would have increased to fifty 
thousand, could have defied all Lee's efforts ; whilst without an 
army to cover Richmond, President Davis could not have de- 
fended his capital for five minutes, completely disgarnished as 
it was at that time. The fifteen thousand men that General 



BHANDY STATION. 21 

Halleck had unnecessarily left under Keyes' command in the 
peninsula of Virginia since the siege of Suffolk had been raised 
would then have swelled the ranks of the Army of the Potomac, 
while the latter, as Hooker himself said, would have been greatly 
the gainer by being farther away from Washington. 

But, putting the capture of Washington out of the question, 
the game would not have been equal. In fact, betAveen the 
invasion of the North by the Southern armies and that of the 
Soutli by the armies of the North there was a difference about 
which too much cannot be said M'hen all the features of the 
war are taken into consideration. The Federal armies could 
attempt the conquest of the Southern States systematically. In 
Virginia especially the coast afforded everywhere bases of ope- 
ration which enabled them to establish themselves with more 
or less strength throughout one-half of that State. The re- 
sources of the Confederacy were limited in men, material, and 
means of transportation. Being limited in men, Mr. Davis 
was not able to improvise any kind of defence if Lee's army, 
upon which the safety of the Confederacy depended, should be 
engaged in wasrino: war in the Northern States. Limited in 
material, there was not enough on hand to repair, as his adver- 
saries could do, the losses which he might have sustained in that 
region. Limited in means of transportation, these would have 
been found completely wanting on the first serious trouble caused 
by the enemy in the disarrangement of railroad lines, while the 
damage, which in the North would only have proved an insig- 
nificant trifle, would paralyze all the railroad service necessary 
to the continuation of the Avar. Lee's army, freed for a Avhile 
from the Army of the Potomac, could undoubtedly have caused 
incalculable injury to the Northern States; but there Avas too 
much to destroy, too many immense spaces of ground to traA'erse, 
a hostile population too numerous to get through, for such injury 
to compensate for the harm Avhich his adversaries Avould liaA'c 
been able to inflict upon the Confederacy during the same period 
of time. In order that the iuA^asion might produce decisiA^e results, 
Lee should have been able, by a brilliant A^ictory previously 
achieved, to cripple the Army of the Potomac for some time. 
We shall refer again to this subject, to show how much the 



22 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Confederates had cause to regret having believed for a moment 
that matters could have turned out dilferently. 

All that we propose to demonstrate at present is that Hooker's 
idea ^vas correct and suggestive. He did not succeed in convin- 
cing either the President or General Halleck. He was told in 
reply not to mind Richmond, but to attend to Lee's army, and to 
pursue or attack the latter either on the march or in its encamp- 
ments ; as if the movement against Hill was not the best way to 
strike at the weak point of this army and to thwart all the proj- 
ects of its chief ! 

Hooker had nothing to do but to manoeuvre so as to follow 
his adversary — to cover Washington and, if possible. Harper's 
Ferry. He had to avoid, on the one hand, being taken in 
the rear, as Pope had been ; on the other, not to allow him- 
self to be drawn too far from the capital in some position 
where the enemy might be able to concentrate all his forces 
against him. 

Such was, in fact, Lee's secret desire : his own report proves 
it ; and if Hooker had followed the advice of Halleck and Lin- 
coln, recommending him to try to cut the enemy's column in two, 
he would have done precisely what his adversary most earnestly 
wished. We will prove this when we shall have shown the posi- 
tions subsequently occupied by the Confederate army. Thence- 
forth, to accomplish this thankless and difficult task, Hooker 
had to use as much vigilance as prudence. Allowing Lee to 
assume the offensive role, he had to guess his movements, to fol- 
low him, to be everywhere on his guard, and to prepare for a 
great battle which circumstances might either hasten or delay; 
in short, he had to learn not to dispute any apparent advantages 
to the enemy, nor to allow himself to be disconcerted by the com- 
motion that such advantages might rouse in the North. 

Unfortunately, the position in which Hooker was placed by his 
government rendered this task still more difficult. The chieftain 
who had to hold such an adversary as Lee in check should have 
had direct and entire control of all the troops that could be called 
upon to take part in the campaign. Such was not Hooker's case. 
We have stated elsewhere that a small army occupied the mouths 
of the James and York Rivers. Since the raising; of the sieo;e of 



nUAXVY STATION. 23 

Suffolk this force should have been reduced to such garrisous as 
were necessary for the defence of strategic positions ; but whereas 
Longstreet had brought back his army corps to Fredericlvsburg, 
Keyes was left at Yorktown wdth forces too small to exercise 
any serious influence over military operations, and yet sufficiently 
numerous to make the Army of the Potomac bitterly regret their 
absence. We have seen that Keyes, besides the garrison, had 
a )0ut fifteen thousand available men : since the early part of 
June he had formed the project of marching them against Rich- 
mond, thinking that he would thus oblige the enemy to retain a 
portion of the reinforcements intended for Lee in that city, or 
that, finding the capital disgarnished, he might surprise and cap- 
ture it. The Washington authorities, who had encouraged this 
scheme, acknowledged that it was impracticable, but only after 
Keyes had returned to Yorktown without having encountered a 
solitary enemy or attempted aught against Richmond. As will 
be seen presently, this fruitless ex])edition was brought to an end 
on the very day wdien the fate of the nation was being decided 
in Pennsylvania. At the North a body of troops of the same 
strength found itself in a similar position : it consisted of INIil- 
roy's and Tyler's divisions — one about six thousand nine hundred 
strong, and the other numlx;ring nine thousand men — stationed 
at Winchester and Harper's Ferry. 

Since ]\IcClellan's departure for the Virginia peninsula in the 
month of !March, 1862, we have witnessed a continuation of the 
quarrel which broke ^out at that time between the commander of 
the Army of the Potomac and the authorities at Washington con- 
cerning the occupation of the Valley of Virginia : the latter still 
desired to keep a small independent army on the borders of the 
Shenandoah in order to close the outlet of this stream against the 
enemy, as it afforded the easiest way for invading the Northern 
States. 

Fremont's defeats and Miles' disaster, which had caused this 
valley to be dubbed in the North with the name of the " Val- 
ley of Humiliation," had not enlightened the Secretaiy of War 
regarding the danger of his plan. It was undoubtedly necessary 
to protect the rich counties of Western Maryland and Southern 
Pennsylvania against the incursions of Virginia partisans; the 

C 



24 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which possessed a vast sti-ategic im- 
portance, had to be secured against their depredations ; but these 
troopers, so swift in their movements, and yet so few in number, 
should have been opposed, as was done in the West, by small 
posts ecJieloned in block-houses connected by active and well- 
mounted regiments of cavalry. Amply sufficient for keeping 
partisans in check, the troops in these posts, instead of offering 
a temj)ting prey to the enemy, could have been withdrawn with- 
out loss whenever a real invasion took place. Instead of this. 
Harper's Ferry had been converted into a stronghold compri- 
sing a vast range of fortifications to defend this crossing of the 
Potomac, although the river was fordable in summer at various 
points a short distance higher up : then, in order to protect the 
railroad, Winchester had been fortified in the same manner. 
Large quantities of materiel had been subsequently deposited in 
these two places when it was found necessary to place strong 
garrisons in them ; so that the sixteen thousand men under Tyler 
and Milroy found themselves attached to two points which pos- 
sessed no strategic value whatever in themselves, and which were 
only thus guarded on account of their artificial importance. Of 
cavalry, Avhich alone could have been useful to him, Milroy had 
absolutely none : he could not clear his way for any distance 
along the road which had once led Jackson's soldiers to victory. 
Surrounded by a network of hostile partisans who defied capture, 
he did not extend his rule south beyond the junction of the two 
brandies of the Shenandoah. On the other hand, he exercised his 
power, it is said, with extreme severity : his exactions and rigor- 
ous measures against the inhabitants who refused to take the oath 
of allegiance had been made the subject of protests on the part 
of the Confederate government. 

Milroy, Tyler, the Baltimore garrison, and General Kelley's 
division, which occupied West Virginia, were subordinate to 
General Scheuck. In Washington itself General Heintzelman 
was in command, who, besides the depots, the regiments under 
instruction, and the artillery of the forts, had under his control 
several thousand infantry ready to take the field, and Stahel's 
division of cavalry, numbering six thousand horses, whose only 
task was to pursue Mosby and the few hundred partisans led by 



BRANDY STATION. 25 

this daring chief. Heintzelman's total forces araouuted to no 
less than thirty-six thousand men. 

Keves, Schenck, and Heintzelman acted under the immediate 
authority of Halleck, who sought thereby to add the command 
of these detached corps to the supreme direction of the various 
armies — a command which he did not relinquish even when he 
seemingly allowed Hooker to exercise its functions for a while. 
The latter, therefore, was in the same situation in which INIcClel- 
lan was placed one year previously. 

On the 11th of June the commander of the Army of the 
Potomac began the movement which was rendered necessary by 
that of his adversary. The presence of Lee with a portion of his 
army at Culpeper obliged Hooker to extend his right wing along 
the Upper Rappahannock, which his cavalry was no longer strong 
enough to defend. His army had to prepare to face westward, 
whether Lee's intention was to cross this river or to ascend it, in 
order to reach the valleys which stretch out along the two slopes 
of the Blue Ridge. 

On the 11th the Third corps was ordered to take a position 
along the Rappahannock between Beverly Ford and Rappahan- 
nock Station. On the 12th two other corps were sent to occupy 
positions whence they could aiford it speedy relief or dispute 
the passes of the Bull Run Mountains to the enemy if the latter 
should follow the road which Jackson had traced out the preced- 
ing year. The First corps proceeded to establish itself at Beale- 
t(5n Station, and the Second,* more in the rear, at Catlett's Station : 
they reached these points on the 13th. The right wing, thus com- 
posed of three corps, was placed under Reynolds, commanding the 
First corps, an officer in whom Hooker justly placed the utmost 
confidence. Echeloned along the railroad, this wing could easily 
concentrate itself either on the Rappahannock or at Warrenton, 
or at Manassas if Washington itself was menaced. Hooker re- 
mained with the left wing, composed of the other four corps, 
near Falmouth, facing south. 

Tn the mean while, Lee, being under no obligation to discuss 
his plan of campaign with his government, and exercising abso- 
lute authority over the various bodies of troops which had to 
* It was the Eleventh. — Ed. 



26 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

co-operate in its execution, pursued it with his wonted zeal. 
The invasion of the Northern States being his object, he had 
selected from the very outset the way he intended to follow, 
from which he did not deviate until he had reached the banks of 
the Susquehanna, We have described the valley of the Shenan- 
doah at sufficient length to obviate the necessity of pointing out 
in this place the advantages it oifered him. The ridges running 
parallel to the Blue Ridge and the Bull Run Mountains, inter- 
sected by a few defiles easily occupied, formed, at the east, a species 
of screen, which entirely masked his movements, while the valley 
itself, wide and possessing good roads, afforded him great facilities 
for the performance of those long marches which constituted the 
chief element of the superiority of his soldiers over their adver- 
saries. It is true that by following this valley he got away from 
Washington, but this was, in our opinion, the best reason for 
choosing this route. The position of Washington on the border of 
Virginia may at times have been a source of anxiety to the Fed- 
eral government : owing to this exaggerated and thoughtless anx- 
iety, it had proved a serious obstacle in all aggressive campaigns 
undertaken against Richmond, but at the same time it has been an 
incalculable advantage in a strategic point of view. Washington, 
barely defended, had prevented Johnston's victorious army from 
advancing as far as the Susquehanna in July, 1861, and enlisting 
the whole of Maryland in support of the Confederate cause. A 
few months later, the Federal capital, surrounded by powerful 
works, became an impregnable base of operations for the Army 
of the Potomac on the very boundary of the enemy's territory. 
When Lee had driven Pope's troops, conquered at Manassas, back 
into these works, he became convinced that his great victory did not 
open to him the gates of Washington, and the next day he tm-ned 
his back upon this city and pushed his way into Maryland. The 
position of the capital, located near the seaboard and connected with 
the coast by a line of railway to Annapolis and Baltimore, enabled 
the Federals to keep it as a base of operations, even though the 
invader should pass beyond it to the north : the latter could only 
invest it and isolate it by making a complete circuit in order to 
take a position along Chesapeake Bay. This manoeuvre exposed 
him to attack in flank by the Federal army, which, remaining near 



BRANDY STATION. 27 

the capital, occupied the interior of the circle he would have 
to describe. If, oil the other hand, he passed near Washington 
without stopping to lay siege to the place, he ran the risk of see- 
ing this army fall upon his rear. It was therefore in Lee's inter- 
est not to go near it, and to endeavor, while moving away from it, 
to draw his adversaries after him. In fact, the more he separated 
them from their base the more he weakened them, thereby increas- 
ing his chances in the decisive battle he had to deliver either south 
or north of the Potomac before he could make the free States 
seriously feel the weight of the invasion. 

We have stated elsewhere that the Blue Ridge and the Valley 
of Virginia extended from the left bank of the Potomac under 
the name of South INIountain and Cumberland Valley. From 
Chambereburg the waters of tlie last-mentioned valley flow south 
toward the Potomac : at about the same elevation as this village 
the general direction of the adjacent mountains inclines strongly 
to the north-eastward, while a slope trending in a contrary direction 
from the preceding one conducts the water-courses which lave its 
base toward the great Susquehanna River, into which they empty 
in the vicinity of Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania. The 
Virginia Valley route had also the advantage, therefore, of con- 
ducting the Confederates by the most direct route, enabling them 
to cross the Potomac where it is always fordable in summer, and 
masking their movements behind the South IMountain ridge, to 
the very heart of the powerful commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
Harrisburg, in fact, is not only the political superior of wealthy 
Philadelphia : it is also one of the capitals of the iron and coal 
trade, one of the centres of the large Carboniferous basin which 
supplies all the workshops, as well as all the steamships of the 
the United States, with anthracite coal. The destruction of the 
railway lines which radiate from this basin, of the machinery 
which extracts the combustible material, and of the forges that 
consume it, would have dealt a terrible blow to the aggressive 
power of the North. 

It was again the Second corps ■\\hich was ordered to precede 
the rest of the army into the Valley of Virginia, where nearly 
eveiy village reminded it of some glorious combat. The memory 
of Jackson sustained his old soldiers in this new campaign, and 



28 THE CIVIL WAE IN AMERICA. 

the brave officer who had the honor to succeed him was about to 
show himself worthy of being their leader. The Federals thought 
that the bloody conflict of Brandy Station would not allow Lee 
to extend his columns, and that he would hesitate to expose his 
flank to an adversary who had just crossed the Rappahannock 
in order to attack him near Culpcper, But he did not allow him- 
^If to be embarrassed for an instant by this demonstration. Stuart, 
with four of the brigades that had fought at Brandy Station, Avas 
directed to watch the euepiy's cavalry. If he had intended to 
cross the Rappahannock, that project was abandoned : the task 
of masking the movements of the infantry was sufficient occu- 
pation for him, preventing a thought of undertaking a raid on 
his own account. Longstreet remained at Culpeper with his 
corps, to form the centre of the long column which was to 
extend from Fredericksburg to within sight of the JVIaryland 
mountains ; and on the morning of the 10th, Ewell resumed his 
line of march. Two brigades of cavalry were ordered to clear 
his way. Imboden's brigade, which was already among the 
upper valleys of the Alleghanies above Romney, was instructed 
to cover his left and destroy the track of the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad, in order to prevent Milroy from receiving rein- 
forcements from the West. Jenkins' brigade preceded the 
infantry into the valley of the Shenandoah, which it had left 
only a few days before. These two brigades, which had but 
recently been really attached to the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia,* were admirably adapted for the performance of such a 
task : not only did every soldier know the ground he was about 
to travel over, but, as the event demonstrated, their presence 
caused no alarm to the Federals, who for many months past 
had been in the habit of coming in contact with them. 

Accustomed to marching, not burdened with heavy loads — for 
they carried only a blanket, some cartridges, and a little bread — 
sleeping in the open air, relying upon the resources of the country 
for food, Ewell's soldiers advanced rapidly toward the Valley of 
Virginia. His three divisions and 'twenty batteries, Avhich had 
left Culpeper on the 10th, passed through Sperryville, Gaines' 

* Jones' brigade is reported as " attached" in the returns of this army for the 
month of May. Imboden's brigade was never officially connected -vvitli it. 



BRANDY STATION. 29 

Cross-roads, and Flint Hill, crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester 
Gap, and, pushing beyond Front Royal, reached the banks of 
the Shenandoah at Cedarville on the evening of the 12th. Ewell 
immediately made all necessary arrangements for reaping the 
greatest possible benefit from the ignorance which his adver- 
saries were still laboring under in regard to his movements. 
Although he had already marched fifty miles since the day 
previous, Rodes led his division as far as Stone Ridge, five 
miles farther on the direct road to Berryville. It was, in fact, 
a question of surprising McReynolds' Federal brigade, which 
Milroy had posted in this village for the purpose of connecting 
Winchester with Harper's Ferry. Jenkins was directed to pre- 
cede Rodes in this- movement. Ewell, with the rest of his corps, 
proposed to gain the main road from Woodstock to Winchester 
at the west, in order to reach that city by the front. Thoroughly 
informed concerning the slightest details of the enemy's positions 
by partisans who were constantly penetrating the Federal lines, 
and particularly by an officer as bold as he was intelligent — Major 
Harry Gilmor, whose military career was full of adventures — 
Ewell was enabled to form his whole plan of attack in advance. 
We have already described the configuration of the neighbor- 
hood of Winchester on the occasion of the fight at Kernstown. 
Between this village and the town itself, south-east of the latter, 
stand the hills which the Federals occupied when Jackson received 
a check : the highest of them is called Bower's Hill. The posi- 
tion is covered by Abraham's Creek, which afterward turns north- 
eastward, encircling a portion of the town. Bower's Hill is only 
the extremity of a range of hillocks, similar to those to be found 
in that country, which, under the name of Applepie Ridge, ex- 
tends for a distance of about twelve miles in the direction of 
Martinsburg and the Potomac. North-west of Winchester, Apple- 
pie Ridge is composed of three parallel ridges, the farthest one 
commanding the other two, and the nearest being almost within 
a stone's throw of the city. It was upon this last-mentioned 
ridge that the Federals had erected their system of defences the 
preceding year. This consisted of a continuous enclosure and a 
fortification forming a large redoubt. The intervening ridge, 
called Flint Hill, had remained unoccupied during the whole 



30 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMEllICA. 

winter. It was only within the last few weeks that the Federals 
had begun to fortify it : the works, scarcely laid out, only mounted 
a few field-pieces. This new fortification was the only one of 
which Ewcll h:i(l no knowledge; consequently, his plan was to 
send the Third division, under Early, to take possession of Flint 
Hill, while llodes cut off the enemy's line of retreat toward the 
Potomac;, and Johnson, with one division, detained them on the 
old battlefield of Kernstown, so that they would find themselves 
invested in Winchester as Miles had been the year before at Har- 
per's Ferry. 

On the morning of the 13th, Early reached the main road near 
Newtown, and pushed on toward Winchester, whilst Johnson was 
marching in the same direction, following the Front Royal road 
on his right. Milroy did not as yet have the least suspicion that 
a force fully three times as large as his own, and composed of the 
6lite of the Confederate army, would make an attack upon him 
within a few hours. In order to obtain all available information 
he had taken every precaution which the nature of the task en- 
trusted to him required. He had organized a band of guerillas, 
known by the name of "Jessie Scouts," whose members, dis- 
guised as Confederate soldiers, overran the country and enacted 
the part of spies as much as that of warriors. On the 12th he 
sent out two strong reconnoissances on the Woodstock and Front 
Royal roads. The first encountered a portion of Jenkins' bri- 
gade in the vicinity of Newtown, and even succeeded in drawing 
these troopers into an ambush where they sustained serious losses ; 
but their presence in those localities was nothing unusual. The 
second expedition was not pushed far enough, and INIilroy com- 
mitted the error of attaching too little importance to the intelli- 
gence it brought him regarding the arrival at Front Royal of one 
of the enemy's corps. He could not imagine how a portion of 
Lee's array should have been able to leave the banks of the Rap- 
pahannock and come in search of him at Winchester without 
General Halleck being informed of the fact, and notifying him 
accordingly, with his instructions in regard to the matter. In 
fact, we have shown that the general-in-chief had been apprised 
since the 10th of the presence of Lee witli an army corps at Cul- 
pepei^ — that Hooker, after vainly requesting to be allowed the 



BliANDY STATION. 31 

control of all the troops in Virginia, had pointed out the valley 
of the Shenandoah, to the authorities at Washington, as being the 
point particularly menaced by this concentration of the enemy's 
forces ; and the reports that Pleasonton sent him from the Upper 
Rappahannock concerning the probable movements of the enemy, 
all of which contained the same information, were forwarded 
directly to Halleck. Yet the latter never gave the unfortunate 
Milroy any intimation of tliese facts, and left him in utter 
ignorance of the danger that menaced him. It is true that at a 
later period, the 11th, when he was better informed, he sent a 
despatch to General Schenck indicating Harper's Ferry as the 
only point to be defended, and directing him to leave nothing 
more in Winchester, either in material or troops, than he needed 
to watch the valley ; but, by a still stranger oversight, he issued 
his instructions in a general form, witliout alluding to the possible 
approach of an army corps of the enemy or particularizing in any 
way how those instructions were to be carried out. Consequently, 
Schenck did not deem it necessary to direct Milroy to evacuate 
Winchester. He revoked the order issued to that effect by his 
chief of staff, who had received the despatch during his absence, 
and, while prej)aring to leave the place himself, recommended 
his lieutenant to remain there and defend it until he received 
further instructions; which instructions were never destined to 
reach him. 

Such was the situation of tlie Federals on the morning of the 
13th. From daybreak, Milroy, conforming to his instructions, 
prepared to make a stand against what he believed to be a mere 
incursion of the enemy's cavalry. McReynolds was recalled 
from Berryville ; his two other brigades advanced south of Win- 
chester and took position — that of General Elliott on the right, 
and Colonel Ely's brigade on tlie left — on the battlefield of Kerns- 
town : being obliged to leave a portion of their effective force in 
the forts, these troops did not number altogether more than five 
thousand men. Notwithstanding their numerical weakness, they 
made a bold stand before the imposing forces which Ewcll de- 
ployed in front of them. 

Elliott occupied the hills on the other side of Abraham's Creek : 
Early had to bring his whole division into line and outflank his 
Vol. III.— 31 



32 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

right in order to dislodge him. The Federals, recrossing the 
stream, occupied ]3o\ver's Hill in great force. Night was ap- 
proaching; Early's soldiers, who had marched nearly seventy- 
five miles in three days, were fatigued, and did not molest them 
in this new position. On their right, Johnson encountered 
Colonel Ely's line about two miles and a half from Winches- 
ter, and after a brisk engagement drove it slowly before him. 

One may form an idea of the astonishment of Milroy and his 
officers on finding themselves attacked by such forces : the mys- 
tery was soon unravelled. The first prisoner who fell into their 
hands informed them that he belonged to Hays' brigade of the 
Second corjjs of Lee's army. INIilroy might have evacuated Win- 
chester during the night — he could undoubtedly have saved the 
largest portion of his division and his artillery — but the instruc- 
tions of his chief were explicit, and he was naturally ignorant of 
the fact that at the very moment when Jenkins cut ofl' his retreat 
in the afternoon of the 13th the telegraph was bringing him in- 
structions of a different character. He thought that the Army 
of the Potomac would follow close upon that of Lee, and that 
the defence of Winchester would not be without effect. Besides, 
his retreat would have seriously compromised the fate of Mc- 
Reynolds' brigade, which was then on the march, and which 
only joined him at ten o'clock in the evening. He decided to 
remain. It was a misfortune for him, but he should not be 
blamed for it. 

During this time Rodes had been marching upon Berryville, 
but the prey he had hoped to find there had escaped. McRey- 
nolds was on his way to Winchester, not by the direct road, which 
he knew to be too much exposed, except by making a large circuit 
to the north. The Confederate cavalry alone was able to follow 
him. Rodes, deceived as to the direction he had taken, and 
having entirely lost his track, went to look for him toward 
Martinsburg, and bivouacked on the evening of the 13th at 
Summit Station, between Winchester and Charlestown. 

The day of the 14th was to decide INIilroy 's fate and that of 
his troops. Daylight having appeared, he could no longer think 
of evacuating the place in the presence of the enemy's forces that 
were menacing him ; but he had taken advantage of the night 



BRANDY STATION, 33 

to abandon the positions he had occupied the day before, and to 
concentrate his small band among the forts and in the noitheru 
part of the city. Early in the morning Ewell had reconnoitred 
the ground from the heights of Bower's Hill : he had noticed the 
new works erected on Flint Hill. It was decided that Early 
should carry them by assault whilst Jolinson drew the enemy's 
attention in the direction of the south. The former started at 
once with three brigades, beginning with a retrograde movement 
in order the better to conceal his object, and by describing a large 
arc of a circle west of Winchester through devious roads which 
the inhabitants hastened to point out to him. 

In order to avoid the enemy's patrols, and to keep constantly 
hidden behind the swells in the ground, he thus retrograded 
three miles from Winchester, traversed the Romney road 
unperceived, and finally reached the foot of the third hillock, 
Applepie Ridge, the highest and most distant from Winchester, 
at four o'clock in the afternoon. The summit of this ridge, 
situated a little more than a mile from the works of Flint Hill, 
was crowned with a wood which admitted of its being secretly 
occupied. After having reconnoitred the place, the heat being 
intense. Early gave his troops some rest. In the mean time, 
Ewell was directing attacks upon the Federal positions from 
Bower's Hill — attacks which his numerical superiority rendered 
most effective — but, hobbling about on his crutches, without 
noticing the projectiles that were falling around him, he paid 
but little attention to these attacks, turning all the time his 
field-glass toward the heights which Early was to storm. As 
to ]\Iilroy, posted upon a kind of observatory which stood in 
the centre of the fort, he watched attentively the combat that 
was taking place at the south, and, turning his back upon Flint 
Hill, seemed to have no suspicion of the danger which menaced 
him on that side. He had sent out a reconnoitring party on the 
Pughtown and Romney roads, which, having no doubt gone a 
little ahead of Early's column, returned Avithout having encoun- 
tered a single enemy. Deceived by this report, he committed the 
error — the only one for which he could be severely blamed — of 
not clearing the approaches of Flint Hill and of not placing a 
single post upon the surrounding heights. In other respects he 



34 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

could do uotliing but wait passively for the moment wheu it 
should please the enemy to make a decisive attack. 

In the mean while, the day is lingering out slowly in the midst 
of partial engagements, though every one felt that some severe 
blow would soon be struck. Finally, at six o'clock a discharge 
of artillery is heard north-west of Flint Ilill. Ewell has recog- 
nized Early's twenty pieces of artillery, which had been hauled 
up the hill and placed in battery along the edge of the wood 
fronting the enemy's works, without the latter having noticed the 
circumstance. Milroy has only to turn round to see the unfinished 
works of Flint Hill covered with shells and the fire of tlicir guns 
speedily silenced : he issues an order to reinforce the garrison and 
to attack the enemy's batteries ; but too late. In less than half 
an hour after the latter have opened fire Hays' brigade, emerging 
from the wood, rushes forward to the assault, scales the acclivity 
of Flint Hill, and penetrates the works at the moment when 
the defenders, too few in number to offer any serious resistance, 
are falling back upon the place, protected by the fire from the 
fort. Hays immediately directs the fire of the guns he has just 
captured against this fort, and Milroy is compelled to acknow- 
ledge the impossibility of repairing this disaster by an aggressive 
return. 

The Confederates, on their part, satisfied with, the results 
obtained, and seeing night approaching, deemed it unnecessary 
to attack the forts in which Milroy had gathered his troops. 
From the position they occupied they could have demolished 
these forts and covered the Federals with shot wherever they 
might be looking for shelter : the latter, to fill up the measure 
of their misfortune, had neither provisions nor ammunition left. 
The investment of the place, therefore, could only result in an 
immediate capture. 

Fortunately, Milroy had the night before him to avoid — at the 
cost of painful sacrifices, it is true — the disgrace of a capitulation 
similar to that of Miles. Sustained by the advice of a council 
of war — quite superfluous, however — he made immediate prep- 
arations for evacuating the place. Leaving his sick, Avounded, 
artillery, and wagons behind him, he set out with his cavalry 
and infantry, avoiding the town of Winchester, whose inhabit- 



BRANDY STATION. 35 

ants would not have failed to betray his movements, and gained 
the jNIartinsburg road without being perceived by the enemy. 
The Confederates seemed to have somewhat slackened in their 
wonted vigilance, for the Union column had already marched 
five miles in the stillness and darkness of the night when, just 
as they were reaching Rocktown, General Elliott, who was at the 
head, was received by a sudden volley of musketry fired at close 
range from a wood and fields on the right of the road. This 
time the Federals were again unlucky, for they did not succeed in 
avoiding their adversaries. Ewell had wisely thought that they 
would probably make an effort to get away from him ; but as he 
was desirous, while barring their way to Harper's Ferry, to hold 
his forces ready to invest them if they should remain in the place, 
he directed Johnson to take position during the night, with three 
brigades, about two miles and a half east of Wincheikr. John- 
son, finding the road, which had been indicated to him as being 
very rough, made a wide detour in order to plant himself along the 
railroad at Stevenson's Depot, near Rocktown. He had reached 
this point about half-past three o'clock in the morning with two 
brigades — the third, under "Walker, having been delayed by some 
misunderstanding — when from the station he heard the Federal 
column passing along the Martinsburg road, only a few hundred 
yards from the railroad. He started at once to attack it in flank. 
But the Federals were sufficiently strong in numbers to hold him 
in check : they were stimulated by the necessity of forcing a pas- 
sage, and, the column having promptly closed up its lines at the 
point which had been attacked, Milroy assumed the offensive, try- 
ing at first to break the centre, then to effect a breach successively 
into both of the enemy's wings. The Confederates, being hard 
pressed, resisted with difficulty. This was the time for the Federals 
to have continued their march. Milroy gave orders to that effect : 
unfortunately, the darkness and confusion prevented their execu- 
tion. He waited in vain for McReynolds' brigade, which formed 
the rear-guard, and which had no doubt already been scattered. 
This delay was ruinous. In fact, it gave Walker's brigade time 
to join Johnson and to fall upon the left flank of his forces, whilst 
Gordon, with one of Early's brigades, hastened at the sound of 
battle toward the road they had just followed. Milroy, finding 



86 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

himself menaced on all sides, directed all the troops which yet 
remained under his control to follow the Martinsburg road, which 
was yet free, trying to delay the pursuit of the enemy in order 
that he might then push forward to the right in the direction 
of Harper's Ferry. But the column soon became divided. The 
largest portion gained the Alleghany ridges on the left in great 
disorder: it finally reached the Potomac at Hancock without 
being pursued, but still continued its precipitate retreat as far 
as Pennsylvania, where it caused consternation and alarm every- 
where. Other bands of fugitives, among whom was Milroy, arrived 
at Harper's Ferry without having been molested. They had thus 
avoided Podes, who, following an imaginary enemy, had pushed 
as far as Martinsburg, whence he had dislodged a detachment of 
Tyler's division in the evening. He had captured from the latter 
six guns and two hundred prisoners, but in consequence of this 
march he had not been able to receive Ewell's instructions in time 
to completely cut oif jNIilroy's retreat. The victory of Winches- 
ter delivered into the hands of the Confederates, according to their 
own reports, 3358 able-bodied prisoners, 700 sick and wounded, 
23 pieces of artillery, and 300 wagons : the small amount of 
provisions left behind by the Federals was seized by the fore- 
most soldiers who entered the forts. These various engagements 
cost the Second corps only 47 killed, 219 w^ounded, and 3 pris- 
oners. It was a brilliant commencement of the campaign which 
was about to open : it was tlie more fortunate because it struck 
the Federals at a point about which they were particularly 
sensitive. From the manner in which he had directed their 
marches, combined their attacks, and gathered the fruit of their 
manoeuvres, Ewell won the confidence of Jackson's old soldiers. 

No one, however, at the North, when telegraphic communica- 
tions with Winchester were cut oif in the afternoon of the 13th, 
suspected the fate which menaced this place, and the Washington 
authorities did not believe in the presence of Ewell in the Valley 
of Virginia until the 14th, when ]\Iilroy's fate had already l^een 
virtually settled. 

On the 12th, however. Hooker, always vigilant, having learned 
from a negro that Ewell's corps had passed by Sperryville, con- 
cluded that, not being able to attack Hill near Fredericksl)urg, 



BRANDY STATION. 37 

he ought not to allow himself to be detained any longer by him on 
the Lower Rappahannock, and that it was time to follow the 
movements of the enemy toward the North with all his forces. 
On the 13th the several corps of his army were on the march. 
The Second, Sixth and Twelfth corps, which he had kept within 
reach of Falmouth, were directed toward Dumfries, and thence 
to Fairfax Court-house, with the reserve artillery, the trains, and 
all the materiel which had not been shipped on the Potomac, it 
having been decided to abandon the Aquia Creek depot. The 
three corps stationed along the Upper Rappahannock, and Meade, 
who with the Fifth was watching the junction of the two rivers, 
being thus placed between the enemy and the route followed by 
the bulk of the army, were ordered to cover this movement, to 
follow it, and to halt at INIanassas. Once in these new positions, 
facing west. Hooker's right and left became inverted. It was a 
retreat which could not be disguised, but which circumstances 
rendered unavoidable : the initiative belonged thenceforth to the 
Confederates ; and without taking into consideration the marches 
he might have to perform, either forward or backward, nor the 
ground he might be obliged to relinquish, Hooker thought of no 
other duty but to hold himself ready to ward off the blows which 
Lee w^as about to strike against the most vulnerable points. 

The programme laid out by Lee was carried out in every par- 
ticular. On the 13th his army was deployed over a stretch of 
ground exceeding one hundred miles in length, or rather divided 
into three parts, separated by thirty-five miles on one side and 
about sixty-six on the other. In this disposition, apparently so 
dangerous. Hill's corps, as we have show^n, was the only one 
exposed. This corps, added to that of Longstreet, would have 
been sufficiently strong to fight a defensive battle against Hooker, 
but it would have found it difficult to resist long enough, sin- 
gle-handed, to allow the First corps time to return from Cul- 
peper. Longstreet, on the contrary, was not menaced as Hill, who 
was watching the movements of his adversaries along the left 
bank of the river, and holding himself ready to follow them; 
so that on the morning of the 14th, when he saw that the latter 
had abandoned the Falmouth heights, he promptly set out to 
join Longstreet. 



38 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

On the 15tli the situation of the two armies was therefore con- 
BiJorably changed. The movement of tlie Federals was being 
completed : the Army of the Potomac, concentrated at Manassas 
and at Fairfax, covered Washington, ready to fight the enemy if 
he sliould advance against the capitaL This movement was accom- 
plished very quietly. The Second and Sixth corps, which closed 
up the march, reached the positions assigned them in the evening. 
The army thus occupied the territory which up to that time had been 
under the surveillance of Stahel's division, which had been added to 
Hooker's cavalry : at this moment it was a useful reinforcement. 
Pleasonton was watching at the west, along the Rappahannock and 
near Warrenton, the point of contact with Jones' cavalry. 

The news of Milroy's disaster, spreading like wild-fire, had 
caused a profound sensation in the North. People saw in it the 
sure sign of an impending invasion. On being informed of the 
investment of Winchester the day before, the President, General 
Hal leek, and the Secretary of War, in a series of despatches 
bearing evidence of the confusion into which this news had 
thrown them, had asked Hooker either to go to the relief of 
Milroy or to adopt their favorite plan of cutting the enemy's 
column in two. " If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and 
the tail of it on the plank-road between Fredericksburg and Chan- 
cellorsville," said the President, " the animal must be very slim 
somewhere." On the 15th, Milroy's fate was known, and his con- 
duct more severely criticised than it deserved to be. This time, 
however, it was Harper's Ferry itself, the object of Halleck's pre- 
dilections, which was thought to be menaced by the larger portion 
of Lee's army, and the general-in-chief immediately advised Hooker 
to march upon Leesburg in order to prevent Lee from crossing the 
Potomac. North of this river, General Couch, having been ordered 
in great haste to Harrisburg, was trying to organize the Pennsylvania 
militia ; but the calls of the governor did not meet as yet with 
many responses, and Couch's zeal could not compensate for the 
ignorance of his recruits. Terror already prevailed throughout 
the wliole Cumberland Valley. In fact, Jenkins' troopers fol- 
lowed the fugitives so close that on the evening of the 14th 
he compelled them to cross the Potomac at Williamsport, after 
dislodging them from ISIartinsburg. The substantial population 



BRANDY STATTON. 39 

of all the neighboring towns in Maryland, remembering the 
incursions of the previous year, fled in crowds, with all they 
could carry off with them ; horses, mules, and especially cattle, 
which they knew the Confederates were greatly in need of, were 
driven northward in large herds, and these caravans, increasing- 
in size at every step by the fear they created on all sides, finally 
reached Plarrisburg. 

On the 16th the capital of Pennsylvania was in a great state 
of excitement, and while the people worked day and night in 
raising barricades and regular fortifications, which they would 
probably have had no means of defending, a solid mass of fugi- 
tives was hurrying along the left bank of the Susquehanna, think- 
ing there was no safety except north of that river. Never, it is 
stated, had the bridge-toll produced such heav}' receipts. It was 
precisely in the hope of not finding Cumberland Valley com- 
pletely deserted that Jenkins was pushing northward so rapidly. 
On the morning of the 16th he entered Greencastle, the first 
Pennsylvania village, and reached Chambersburg during the 
night. He seized all the horses, cattle, forage, provisions, and 
medical stores he found there, paying in Confederate paper for 
part, and confiscating the rest ; but his soldiers did not commit 
any act of plunder, and the inhabitants themselves were obliged 
to do justice to their discipline and good behavior. It is as- 
serted, however, that he took a number of free negroes, whom he 
sent South to be sold as slaves. On the 17th, while people were 
expecting to see him continue his raid, and the Federals already 
believed that the whole of Lee's army v/as at his back, he sud- 
denly retraced his steps and joined General Podes, %vho with three 
brigades had taken position at Williamsport on the left bank of 
the Potomac. In fact, Ewell's soldiers had to wait for the two 
other corps, which they had left so far behind. Lee was obliged 
to concentrate his forces before entering Pennsylvania, and to hold 
them always ready for battle. EwelFs three divisions, therefore, 
remained between AVilliamsport and Winchester until the 19th, 
the day of Longstreet's arrival within reacli of the latter city. 
Imboden, at the west, had made a movement on the 16th similar 
to that of Jenkins, and, occupying Cumberland on the 17th, had 
cut off General Kelley's communications with Maryland. 



40 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

As soon as Lee, who had remained at Culpeper, was apprised 
that Hill Avas on the way to join him, feeling thenceforth at ease on 
that point, he put all the troops about him in motion. To deceive 
the Federals and cover the march of Hill, who was to follow 
the route traced out by Ewell as far as Winchester, he ordered 
Lougstreet to cross the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge as if he 
was marching upon Leesburg, and not to return west of this 
chain except through Ashby's Gap and Snicker's Gap. The 
First corps — whose eifective force Pickett had raised to three 
divisions by his arrival from North Carolina with three brigades 
— took up the line of march on the 15th. Stuart was ordei-ed to 
cover this movement by keeping on his right. The cavalry divis- 
ion, reduced to four brigades by the departure of Imboden and 
Jenkins, had been watching the Upper Rappahannock since the 
combat of Brandy Station, carefully noting all the movements 
of the Federals on this side. Stuart left Hamj^ton's brigade 
alono; this river to continue watching it ; one regiment of W. H. 
F. Lee's brigade remained a little lower down to accompany Hill ; 
that of Fitzhugh Lee, commanded by Colonel Munford, clearing 
the route which Longstreet had to follow, proceeded toward Bar- 
bee's Cross-roads ; while Stuart, bearing more to the right, crossed 
the Rappahannock at Hinson's Mills with Robertson and Colonel 
Chambliss, the latter of whom commanded W. H. F. Lee's bri- 
gade since the latter had been wounded at Brandy Station. Jones 
was directed to watch Aestham River, and to join the rest of the 
division after the whole army had crossed this water-course. The 
next day Stuart struck the railroad from Manassas to Salem and 
Piedmont without having met the enemy. 

Pleasonton had followed the movement of the Federal infantry 
in the direction of Washington, while Longstreet quietly planted 
himself at the foot of the eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge, with- 
out having succeeded, as he had hoped, in drawing the attention 
of the Federals, who did not even suspect his presence in that 
locality. 

As we have stated, Milroy's defeat had alarmed General Hal- 
leck about the safety of Harper's Ferry. Believing every rumor 
that was set afloat among the frightened population along the 
left bank of the Potomac, he sent several despatches to Hooker, 



BRANDY STATION. 41 

urging hira to relieve that place, which he already fancied to be 
besieged and about to surrender. Consequently, the commander 
of the Army of the Potomac, who appreciated the danger of 
dividing his forces so near the enemy, issued the necessary orders 
on the 16th (a day of rest granted to his troops) for putting all 
his army corps in motion on the morning of the 17th, en echelon, 
by the right bank of the river which waters Washington, in the 
direction of Harper's Ferry, which place he expected to reach in 
tAvo forced marches. But as soon as General Halleck was apprised 
of this, being now enlightened in regard to Tyler's real position, 
he disapproved of this movement, and Hooker had to halt his 
army just as it was about to move. The Federals were not only 
ignorant of the projects, but also of the real position, of their 
adversaries. They knew that Lee's army was between Culpeper 
and Winchester, but was it preparing to march upon Manassas 
in order to compel the Army of the Potomac to resume the same 
position it had occupied in 1861, or did it contemplate the inva- 
sion of Pennsylvania? Nothing as yet foreshadowed the solu- 
tion of this question. 

Hooker wondered at the inactivity of the conquerors of Win- 
chester, and although he thought, justly, that Lee would probably 
march northward instead of eastward, he sometimes believed that 
the only object of all this great movement Avas to cover a cavalry 
raid beyond the Potomac. It is true that the government, far 
from aiding him to solve this mystery, worried him by making 
itself the echo of the most extravagant rumors, and by giving 
him orders — let us rather say vague and contradictory instruc- 
tions, as we have just seen. In Avhat concerned him, being ex- 
clusively occupied with the idea of not allowing himself to be 
cut off from Washington, he did wrong, in our opinion, in mov- 
ing away too quickly from the enemy by a divergent march, and 
by bringing back his cavalry as far as Manassas, rendering it 
impossible for him to follow and watch Lee's movements. A 
fortunate chance, ^'ithout relieving hira from this state of uncer- 
tainty, enabled him at last to obtain some knowledge regarding 
the positions of the enemy. 

During the night of the 16th and 17th he had decided to wait 
betAveen Manassas and Centre ville until Lee had defined his 



42 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

movements, thinking that as he could not prevent liim from 
crossinjr the Potomac, it was therefore better to wait to attack him 
until he had separated himself from his base of operations. In 
order to watch and thwart his movements he would have desired 
that Pleasonton, with his entire corps, had passed along the right 
bank of the Potomac, and that a column of fifteen thousand men, 
taken from the garrisons of Washington and Baltimore, might 
come to form a junction with him when, following Lee's marcli, 
he should have reached the eastern slope of South Mountain. 
The first project was not relished by the President ; the second 
met with all kinds of obstacles, which we will explain here- 
after. 

The counter-order issued to the army, however, did not reach 
Pleasonton in time, as he had set oif at daybreak for the purpose 
of clearing his march. He was already on his way to Aldie when 
ordered to come back. The country he was passing through M^as 
very rough, covered with woods, and consequently favorable to 
sudden attacks and any secret movements which the enemy might 
attempt : in front of him lay the range of high hills which Aldie 
Gap divides. Appreciating the importance of having the other 
slope reconnoitred, he asked and oljtained permission to continue 
his march as far as the foot of the Blue Ridge : if he did not 
encounter the enemy, he was to push forward, by way of Lees- 
burg, as far as the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry. Gregg's 
division was at the head, the Second brigade, under Kilpatrick, 
forming the advance. Three regiments of this brigade, followed 
very closely by a portion of the First, proceeded toward Aldie. 
Colonel Daffie, with the First Rhode Island, detached by Kil- 
patrick, had been at Thoroughfare Gap since morning, and was 
to join him at Middleburg. 

On the same day, Stuart, after receiving some detailed informa- 
tion from ISIosby regarding tlie positions which the Federals had 
occupied the day before, and believing them still far distant from 
the Bull Run Mountains, left his bivouacs along the Manassas 
Railroad to occupy the jxisses of these mountains. Chambliss, 
following the road which crosses Thoroughfore Gap, was ordered 
to post himself at Salem in order to watch this defile ; Munford 
to pass through IMiddleburg and occupy Aldie ; and Robertson to 



BRANDY STATION. 43 

stop at Rectortown, so as to be able to support either of them. 
Men and horses were alike worn out, and the generals, belie-^n'ng 
themselves to be far away from the enemy, abated somewhat of 
that vigilance for which they were ordinarily noted. Munford, 
who alone had a long road to travel, halted his column at Dover, 
and only sent a few squadrons to occupy the village of Aldie. 
Stuart had remained with his staff at Middleburg, where old 
friends and new admirers vied with each other in entertaining 
the young and brilliant general. 

About two o'clock, however, the Federal scouts suddenly en- 
countered those of ]\Iunford at a short distance from Aldie. Kil- 
patrick, with the Second New York, his old regiment, at once 
charges and pursues them, and takes possession of the village. 
But, having been Avarued in time of the approach of the enemy, 
Munford has hastened from Dover with his brigade. This en- 
counter was a complete surprise on both sides. Their forces were 
about equal, consisting of four regiments of cavalry and a battery 
of artillery to each party. While Kilpatrick, coming out of the 
village, deploys his brigade, Munford makes immediate prepara- 
tions for the fight. After traversing the village of Aldie, situated 
on a stream which flows through one of the gaps of the Bull 
Run Mountains, the road divides, one branch of it running west- 
ward toward JMiddleburg and Ashby's Gap, the other north-west- 
ward in the direction of Snicker's Gap. Between the two there 
is a hill, at the foot of which winds the JMiddleburg road, while 
the other ascends tlie northern slope : it is upon this barren hill 
that Munford plants himself, placing his artillery on the summit 
and filling an enclosure, composed of a fence and a ditch back of 
the dividing-point in the road, with dismounted cavalrymen. 

The Federals attack this strong position with wonderful vigor : 
the Second New York makes a rush against the enclosure, and, 
dismounting, sabre in hand drives in the line of skirmishers, 
taking a large number of prisoner, while the Federal artillery, 
without noticing that of the enemy, directs its fire upon the cav- 
alry reserve. But it is on the Snicker's Gap road that the strug- 
gle is to be decided, for this road, ascending the hill, leads to the 
culminating point of the position. Munford has fully under- 
stood this, and unites all his forces on this side to fall upon the 



44 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Federal right. Tlie latter offers resistance, the officers setting an 
example to tlieir soldiers : Colonel di Cesnola of the Fourth New 
York, who had been ])laced under ari'cst, charges vuiarnied at the 
head of his troo])s, and Kilpatrick, to reward him, hands liim his 
own sabre in the very nudst of the figlit. But, seriously wounded, 
he falls into the hands of the Confederates, and on this side the 
Union cavalry is brought back in disorder. In the mean while, 
the First INIaine, belonging to the First brigade, has been sent by 
Gregg to the relief of Kilpatrick. The latter, with the aid of 
this reinforcement, rallies his men and resumes the offensive on 
tlie right. The two forces become intermingled ; they fight with 
small-arms, and consideral)le losses are sustained on both sides. 
Finally, su])])orted by his battery, which is firing canister, Kil- 
patrick succeeds in making the enemy's column give way. The 
Confederates fall back : on seeing this, the Federals press them on 
all sides, taking possession of the position they have occupied. 
At the same time, Munford learns from a des])atcli sent by Stuart 
that he is menaced in the rear, and quickly falls back upon jNIid- 
dleburg. Kilpatrick, feeling satisfied, halts on the field of battle : 
he has lost a large number of soldiers and officers in this desperate 
conflict ; he has taken about one hundred prisoners, and left as 
many in the hands of the enemy. 

It is the movement of Colonel Duffie by way of Thoroughfare 
Gap, which was accomplished in the midst of the greatest dangers 
and with wonderful daring, but also with heavy loss, which finally 
led to the retreat of Munford. Duffie, with his two hundred and 
eighty men, had unexpectedly made his appearance in front of 
Chambliss' brigade, but he had succeeded in disguising his nu- 
merical weakness from the Confederates, who were entirely worn 
out and little desirous, undoubtedly, to bring on an action ; so 
that, while Chambliss was under the impression that he had a 
superior force to deal with, Duffie, stealing aw^ay in the night, Avas 
rapidly marching upon INIiddleburg. Stuart, who happened to be in 
this place, had barely time to make his escape and join Kobertson, 
sendino; Munford the information which determined him to o-ive 
up the game. Shortly after Duffie was in possession of Middle- 
burg, and hastened to barricade its approaches. The Confederates 
soon came to attack him. Stuart, burning with desire to revenge 



BRANDY STATION. 45 

himself for the precipitate race he had been compelled to run, at- 
tacked him at dusk with Robertson's entire brigade. After a 
strong resistance, Duffie's small band was obliged to retire by 
the same road it had come. Then it encountered Chambliss, and 
only succeeded in effecting its escape after having again sustained 
very serious loss. These two combats cost Duffie two-thirds of 
his effective force. During the night Munford joined Stuart at 
jMiddleburg, where the three Confederate brigades of cavalry 
found themselves united. 

At the news of these engagements, which clearly indicated the 
direction followed by the bulk of the enemy's forces, Hooker re- 
solved to cause his whole army, which he would not divide upon 
any consideration, to make a movement westward in order to hold 
it ready to cross either the defiles of the Blue Ridge or the fords 
of the Potomac as circumstances might require. He sent the 
Fifth corps to Aldie, with instructions to place Barnes' division 
at Pleasonton's disposal in order to sustain him in his operations 
against Stuart near the Blue Ridge. On the 18th the other army 
corps were directed to take the following positions, which they 
occupied that same evening or the next morning : the Twelfth 
corps in the vicinity of Leesburg ; the Eleventh in the rear, along 
the Aldie road, near Goose Creek ; the First near Herndon Station ; 
the Third at Gum Springs; the Second remained at Centreville, 
and the Sixth at Germantown. All these army corps were thus 
drawn within a sector of a circle resting on the Potomac, facing 
west, and all within mutual helping-distance. 

In the mean while, the two bodies of cavalry were preparing 
for a new conflict. Stuart, making Munford, whose troops had 
been much under fire, pass to the rear at Union, had, in con- 
junction with Robertson and Chambliss, taken position at Mid- 
dleburg, where he hoped to see Jones' brigade, coming from the 
Rappahannock, make its appearance during the day of the 18th. 
Pleasonton, on his part, while waiting for the infantry reinforce- 
ment promised, but which had not yet been able to join him, was 
preparing to attack Stuart with his two divisions. He made his 
appearance before Middleburg on the morning of the 18th : after 
a few skirmishes it was sufficient for him to menace Stuart's left 
flank to compel the latter to evacuate the village and retire west- 



46 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

ward toward Rector's Cross-roads. Jones not having yet arrived, 
and iJanipton being expected on tlie following day, the Confed- 
erate general did not wish to provoke a serious engagement. 
Pleasouton, on his part, being desirous of allowing the infantry 
time to join him, did not push matters to extremes. 

On the 19th, having deployed his divisions, Buford on the 
right and Gregg on the left, Pleasonton resumed his aggressive 
movement;. Stuart, although he had not yet received the rein- 
forcement he was expecting, determined to make a stand against 
him, and, Avhether he relied on the valor of his soldiers, or, en- 
couraged by the slowness of the enemy's movements during the 
preceding day, he underrated his strength, he even thought of 
attacking in his turn and planting himself in Middlcburg. He had 
taken position, with Chambliss and Robertson, about fifteen hun- 
dred yards back of IMiddleburg, resting his centre on an isolated 
wood in the middle of the plain : back of this wood rose a hill 
upon which he had posted his artillery. Gregg, with his two 
brigades deployed, makes a vigorous attack upon this position 
early in the morning. His dismounted troopers, outflanking the 
enemy's line, direct their fire upon that portion of the line which 
is unprotected, and make it give wa}^ : then the Federal centre 
rushes forward to charge the wood, dislodging the Southerners 
from it, who fly in disorder to the other side. Stuart's defeat 
"would have been com])lete if the Ninth Virginia, which had 
remained in reserve, had not rushed to the front to check the 
Union troops, while the Confederate artillery poured a cross-fire 
upon them. They are obliged to fall back into the wood ; but 
they take a strong position in it, and from this place of shelter 
deliver a severe fire upon the unprotected position of their adver- 
saries. The latter make fruitless efforts to recapture the wood. 
Stuart at last gives the signal of retreat, which is effected in good 
order, and comes to a halt within a short distance of Middleburg 
in a new and stronger position, where the Federals did not come 
to look for him on that day. The combat had been bloody, the 
heaviest losses being on Stuart's side. As usual when the situa- 
tion became critical, he performed prodigies of valor : his chief of 
staff. Major von Borcke, a Prussian officer, had been seriously 
wounded by his side. Fortunately, he recovered, as his death 



BRAND Y STATION. 47 

would have deprived us of one of the most interesting books 
that has been written about the war. 

In the course of this day, Munford, who was watching the 
road between Aldie and Snicker's Gap from the other side of 
Union, had been obliged to fall back toward the village before 
the superior forces brought on by Buford along that route. We 
have stated that in coming out of Aldie the road divides : both 
branches, after crossing Goose Creek Valley, the chain of the 
Blue E-idge, and the swift current of the Shenandoah, lead to 
Winchester. But, whereas the former crosses the defile of 
Snicker's Gap, the latter, more to the south, crosses Ash by 's 
Gap after having successively passed through Dover, INIiddle- 
burg. Rector's Cross-roads, Upperville, where several roads 
converge, and finally Paris, located in the very gorge of the 
mountain. It is this last-mentioned road that Stuart was fol- 
lowing. 

Jones' arrival on the 19th, and Hampton's on the following 
day, gave the latter a numerical superiority over the enemy's 
cavalry, of which he was fully determined to take advantage. 
The day of the 20th, however, passed without any serious 
encounter, because the last reinforcements that were expected 
on both sides did not arrive until evening. On the side of the 
Federals these reinforcements consisted of the infantry division 
of General Barnes. Stuart had sent Jones to support Muuford 
at Union, thus extending his left as far as the Snicker's Gap 
road, and had kept Hampton, with his other two brigades, near 
Rector's Cross-roads. 

The Federals did not allow him time to assume the offensive, 
most I'ortunately for him, for he has acknowledged since that he 
would thereby have been exposed to a serious disaster. Leav- 
ing Barnes with two brigades at Middleburg to cover his com- 
munications, Pleasouton only took along with him one brigade 
of infantry under General Vincent, which he added to Gregg's 
division. While the latter, supported by a battery of artillery 
under the immediate direction of the corps commander, was to 
push the enemy along the Ashby's Gap road, Buford, who was on 
the right, was ordered to menace his flank, so as to compel him to 
fall back ujDon the defile. Before eight o'clock, Vincent's bri- 

VoL. III.— 32 



48 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

glide mikI llic artilleiy, liikiiig tlic advance, attacked tlic })Osition8 
that Stuart had ()e(nipied with his three brigades for the hist two 
days oil a small stream called Cromwell Creek, rieasontou's 
artillery soon silenced the Confederate guns, and tlic latter, find- 
ing themselves attacked by infantry, abandoned their positions 
so |)recipilalely that they left two dismounted pieces in the hands 
t)f the assailants — trophies which wci-e the more precious to them 
as being the first that had thus been ca|)tured by main force from 
Stuart's batteries. Then Kilpatrick, with his fine brigade of cav- 
alry, pushing forward to the front, presses close n])on the enemy 
and takes possession of the bridge over Goose Creek before the 
latter has been able to destroy it. Stuart, w'lio has rallied his 
men, cliecks him a little farther olf in fn)nt of an excellent posi- 
tion ; but the Union infantry having soon made its appearance, 
lie giv(>s once iuoi(> the order of retreat, lie lias sent word 
to ,]{n\v<. and iMuulonl (ni his left, directing them to fall back 
upon Ui)perville, making the best resistance they could against 
the forces in front of them. His troops having lost all hope 
of success since thev found themselves confronting tlu; infan- 
try, his only care is to delay the march of the ,l\'dcrals long 
enough to give liis brigades on the left time to join him at 
Ui>perville before he has been driven back upon Ashby's Gap. 
A large o|k'u plain extends from Goose Creek to this village. 
Stuart, who has twelve or thirteen regiments under his control, 
makes them fall back by {•cJiclon — a man(euvre which the nature 
of the ground seldom admits of being ])erforme(l in America, and 
which was executed in order and coolness under the lire of the 
Federal guns. It is true that this maiKcuvre was made easy by 
the absence of the Union infantry, which was readily kejit at a 
distance, so that Pleasonton had only his two cavalry brigades 
left to follow an enemy su])erior in numbers. 

In the mean while, l>uford with his division had attacked both 
' JNtunford and Jones, and, although both ])arties were nearly of 
equal strength, the Federals soon obtained a marked advantage. 
AVheu the Conlederates were ordered to fall back u]>on Ujiper- 
villc, their retreat once more emboldened the assailants, while 
Gamble's brigade, returning constantly to the charge, inflicted 
upon them severe losses. It pressed them so closely that 



BRANDY STATION. 49 

Stuart, dreading to see Buford's column come up after them 
between Upperville and Paris, and thus cut off liis retreat in 
the direction of the defile, determined to continue it at once, 
without stopping at Upperville. 

As his head of column was leaving this village, Hampton, aIio 
liad just entered it with the rear-guard, waa again attacked by 
Kilpatrick. He immediately wheeled about, charged the enemy, 
and drove him back so vigorously that the Union general came 
near being captured. But the rest of his brigade soon comes to 
his assistance. A combat with small-arms follows between the 
two forces, that are becoming more and more mixed up. They 
push and jostle each other along a road bordered by fences, behind 
which are posted Confederate skirmishers on the Upperville side, 
while the other side also presents an array of dismounted Federal 
troopers. Hampton finally falls back, and, rapidly pushing for- 
ward in advance of Ilobertson's brigade, leaves to the latter the 
task of covering the retreat. This brigade is soon attacked by 
the Federals, who are emerging from Upperville, and is obliged 
to gain the approaches of Paris in great haste. The efforts it 
makes to delay the march of the enemy cost it dear, one of its 
colonels being left wounded on the field. Chambliss, who has 
come to its assistance on the left, also loses one of his colonels, 
Lewis, who two days before had so valiantly led tlie charge of 
the Ninth Virginia. 

By thus falling back Stuart had lost about eight miles of 
ground : he could not retrograde farther without abandoning 
the defile and exposing Jones and Munford to be surrounded 
and captured. Fortunately, the positions where he had placed 
his artillery were good. Pleasonton's infjintry was far away and 
his cavalry worn out. He halted and installed himself in the 
village of Upperville. On his right, Buford had continued his 
hot pursuit of Munford and Jones, who joined Stuart at Paris. 
While the former was skirting the foot of the Blue Bidge slopes 
with his division, his scouts climbed up the ridges. From the 
summit of this natural observatory they had a full view of the 
whole lo^fer valley of the Shenandoah : from Winchester to the 
Bolivar Heights near Harper's Ferry nothing escaped their 
observation. They saw long columns of infantry marching 



50 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

nortlnviird in tlio clirection of the PotomaCj while others weix 
approuchiug Ashby's Gap. The former, as we shall explain 
presently, comprised E well's corps, Avhich was on the march 
toward Pennsylvania, the others being- the reinforcements sent 
by Lougstreet to Stuart. The information that Pleasouton had 
gathered was thus confirmed : the movements of the enemy's 
infantry, Avhicli Stuart had, up to this time, so successfully con- 
cealed, stood revealed. The success of the Union cavalry was 
now complete, the moral advantages being as great as the mate- 
rial results. It had attacked the enemy's cavalry wherever it was 
found, and always came out victorious in the end. The highest 
praise bestowed on the new attributes it had just displayed is to 
be found in the rejjorts of its adversaries, who were all the time 
under the impression that they had to cope with forces double 
their own, whereas, in reality, the number of combatants was 
about equal. The Federal troopers, after being taught expe- 
rience in the hard school of defeat, feel thenceforth their own 
worth, and, thanks to the confidence which these latter successes 
have inspired them with, they will hereafter be a match for their 
adversaries. 

The combats fought between Aldie and xLshby's Gap cost the 
Confederates 510 men, aud the Unionists about the same number. 

While Stuart was engaged at Middlebui-g, Lougstreet had fol- 
lowed the route which Lee had traced out for him. On the 19th 
he passed through Upperville, while his columns occupied defiles 
of the Blue Ridge — McLaws at Ashby's Gap, Hood at Snicker's 
Gap, a connection being formed between them by Pickett, who 
was posted on the summit of the ridge. On the 20th, Long- 
street, having been ordered to hold himself in readiness to cross 
the Potomac, deemed it expedient to draw near this river, and, 
abandoning the Blue E,idge, he crossed the Shenandoah, The 
next day, on learning that Stuart was in full retreat and pressed 
on every sid.e by the enemy, he hastened to send McLaws back 
to Ashby's Gap. The latter arrived toward evening, aud took 
the place of Stuart's troopers, who fell back to the second line in 
search of that rest of which they stood greatly in need,* Besides, 
they had no longer any cause for trouble in that direction. 
Unwillino; to allow himself to be drawn too far OAvav from 



BRANDY STATION. 51 

"Washington, Hooker's instructions to Pleasonton were explicit. 
The latter, satisfied with the information he had obtained, fell 
back upon Aldie the following day, followed, or rather watched, 
by some of the enemy's scouts. 

The moment had arrived for Lee to give his impatient soldiers 
the order of invasion. His forces were assembled along both 
banlvs of the Potomac, and, since he could not draw Hooker 
toward him in the Valley of Virginia, it was necessary for him 
to march boldly northward in order to compel the Army of the 
Potomac to change its tactics or make the free States pay heavily 
for its wariness. He was at the head of an army even more 
numerous, better disciplined and equipped, than that with which 
he had penetrated into Maryland the preceding year ; but, on the 
other hand, the enemy was also much more formidable than then. 
Instead of having only to cope with the vanquished troops of 
Manassas, driven back helter-skelter into Washington, he felt 
that he was watched by an army ready for battle which a vig- 
ilant chieftain handled with ease. Consequently, he could not 
altogether get rid of many apprehensions on leaving the soil of 
Virginia, in whose defence he had hitherto met only with success. 
The proof of this will be found in the letter he wrote to Mr. 
Davis on the 23d, just as he was ordering his army to cross the 
Potomac. He was asking him earnestly to send on the last avail- 
able man that could be spared, and to assemble at Culjjeper, under 
Beauregard's command, all the forces that were to remain in Vir- 
ginia : the army thus formed, more formidable on account of its 
chieftain's name than for its numerical strength, would have made 
a show of menacing Wasliington and effected a useful diversion 
in favor of that other army which was about to invade the North- 
ern States. Lee's idea Avas correct : it could not be realized for 
want of troops, as all the generals of the Confederacy were ask- 
ing for reinforcements at the same time ; and the reply of the 
President, Avhich was intercepted in the early part of July by the 
Federals, revealed to them this scarcity of men at the very mo- 
ment when iif would have been of the utmost importance to the 
Confederates to have been able to conceal the fact. 

In the mean while, Ewell was already in full march toward the 
North. Lee, believing himself still strong enough, with the rest 



52 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

of his troops, to hold Hooker's army in clicck if tlie latter should 
attack him upon ground of his o\vn selection, had caused a por- 
tion of the Second corps to cross to the left bank of the Potomac, 
Avithout, however, moving it away from the river. On the 20th 
of June, Early, leaving Winchester, took position along the right 
bank at Shepherdstown, as if for the purpose of menacing Har- 
per's Ferry and watching its garrison ; Johnson, crossing the 
river, had posted himself at Sharpsburg, on that bloody battle- 
field which contained the bones of so many Confederate soldiers ; 
while Rodes, who was already on the other side, had advanced as 
far as Hagerstown. This time Maryland was effectually occu- 
pied, and the uneasiness which took possession of the public in 
the North was justified. On the 21st, before knowing the result of 
the battle of Ashby's Gap, Lee, wishing to take advantage of this 
uneasiness in order to throw confusion in the ranks of his adver- 
saries, adopted a bold resolve. He ordered Ewell to march as far 
as Harrisljurg and take possession of this capital if possible. By 
striking Harrisburg his object was to reach the White House and 
disturb the deliberations of the Federal government. Rodes arrived 
on the 22d,aud Johnson on the 23d, at Greencastle, whilst Jenkins, 
preceding them, entered Chambersburg, and Early, bearing to the 
right, occupied Cavetown at the foot of South Mountain. It was 
on this same day, the 23d, that Lee, being apprised of Pleasonton's 
retreat, issued marching orders to his other two army corps. 

Hill, crossing the Potomac first, reached C-hambersburg on the 
27th ; Longstreet, moving toward the Williamsport ford, and 
forming the rear-guard on this occasion, crossed the river on the 
25th and 26th, and on the evening of the 27th brought his three 
divisions together a little south of Chambersburg. Lee, therefore, 
had two-thirds of his army massed near this village, while Ewell 
was pushing rapidly forward, covering as much ground as possible, 
driving his troops across the rich section of open country before 
him with a degree of audacity which was justified by the weak- 
ness of the small number of adversaries he was likely to encounter 
in that direction. 

Imboden, who had extended his lines westward as far as the 
Cumberland Mountains, returned to Hancock to operate on his 
left and lay other districts in Pennsylvania under contribution : 



BRANDY STATION. 53 

he occupied McConuellsburg, then brought his booty to Cham- 
bersburg, a central point, whence it was forwarded south with 
that of the rest of the army. Jenkins, on his part, w^as raid- 
ing along the Harrisburg road. Ewell, having given one day's 
rest to his troops at Chambersburg, had resumed his march, with 
Johnson and Rodes, in the direction of this latter city; Early, on 
the other hand, after rounding the west side of the mountains from 
Cavetown to Greenwood, turned abruptly to the right to cross 
them and descend upon Gettysburg, so as to fill Stuart's place, 
whose absence we will soon explain. 

The section of country thus invaded by Ewell was one of the 
richest agricultural districts in Pennsylvania, and consequently in 
the United States. For the first time the Confederate soldiers 
found themselves in the enemy's open country. This country 
had known nothing of the war except through the visits of pur- 
chasing agents and the departure of large bodies of volunteers 
who responded to Mr. Lincoln's call. Abundance reigned every- 
where, striking the Southern troops with astonishment, wlio had 
been accustomed to all sorts of privations in the valleys of Vir- 
ginia, so long since devastated. 

The requisitions of their chiefs, regularly imposed upon the 
villages they occupied, soon satisfied their wants. They now 
made the Northern population pay largely toward the cost of the 
war which had so long weighed upon them and their families, 
but no disorder was added to these exactions in the country thus 
occupied : there was neither plundering nor incendiarism. Most 
of the Southern papers, ho■\^'ever, forgetting the good behavior 
of the Army of the Potomac in Virginia, exaggerating the un- 
avoidable sufferings which the war had entailed upon the Southern 
States, and magnifying the excesses committed under the Federal 
uniform (for the most part b}^ partisans or isolated detachments), 
demanded that Pennsylvania should be laid in ashes and blood. 
But the Confederate generals, understanding much better the true 
interests of the policy they were subserving, and not wishing to 
exasperate the people of the North, were desirous of confront- 
ing them under the most favorable auspices. The strictest orders 
were issued by the commander-in-chief, prohibiting pillage un- 
der any form wdiatever : his injunctions were even too rigorous 



54 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

to be scrupulously carried out. In fact, government officers were 
alone authorized to make such requisitions upon the inhabitants 
of the country as were necessary to the sustenance of the soldiers 
— requisitions which were paid in Confederate bonds or notes: 
the regimental officers, who, under certain restrictions, should 
have been invested with this privilege, only exercised it with iso- 
lated detachments. Following the same idea, the sale of spirit- 
ous liquors was prohibited in all the towns occupied by the Con- 
federates. Finally, his orders having been occasionally violated 
or criticised, General Lee, when he saw his whole army gathered 
together on the soil of Pennsylvania, issued a proclamation from 
Chambersburg on the 27th recommending moderation, respect for 
non-combatants, and the discarding of all thoughts of revenge — 
a proclamation teeming with the loftiest sentiments, which the 
biographers of this Christian soldier may always quote as a 
model for such chieftains as may be called upon to lead an 
army of invasion. 

These injunctions did not prevent the Southern generals from 
going in search of and collecting all the resources that could be 
useful to the army : requisitions, laying all the small towns of 
that part of Pennsylvania under contribution, supplied them with 
shoes, hats, and goods of all kinds to replace their wornout habil- 
iments ; large supply-trains filled with provisions and cattle were 
sent into Virginia ; finally, in a few days, Jenkins and Imbodeu 
had supplied all their troopers with fresh horses. It is said that 
the latter found that Pennsylvania horses, much larger and better 
fed, had less blood, and consequently less stamina, than those of 
Virginia, which are so remarkable for their docility and powers 
of endurance. 

The mountains, a continuation of the Blue Ridge, which 
border the Cumberland Valley at the east, incline, as we have 
observed, north-eastward from Chambersburg, terminating at the 
elevation of the town of Carlisle before reaching the Susquehanna. 
A parallel chain of less importance, which is a continuation of 
the Bull Run and Catoctin Mountains, extends east of the former, 
forming between the Potomac and the Susquehanna a much larger 
valley than the Cumberland. It is watered at the north by a 
large number of small tributaries of the Susquehanna, and at 



BRA ND Y STA TION. 55 

the south by the Monocacv, which rises in the vicinity of Gettys- 
burg, and which, after passing near Frederick, empties into 
the Potomac at Nolan's Ferry, below Point of Rocks. These 
two valleys, which Nature had fashioned like those of Virginia, 
have been greatly improved by man, especially in the northern 
section of Pennsylvania. They are in a high state of cultiva- 
tion : neither impenetrable forests, like those of the Wilderness, 
nor even large wooded areas, such as surround Washington, are 
to be met with ; villages abound ; the roads are numerous and 
generally well kept. Two lines of railroad traverse this section 
of country — one, that of the Cumberland Valley, between Harris- 
burg, Chambersburg, apd Shippensburg, by way of Carlisle ; the 
other, the Northern Central, connecting Baltimore with Harris- 
barg, with two branches — one running west from Hanover Junc- 
tion, by way of Hanover, to Gettysburg; the other eastward, 
from York to Wrightsville, where it crosses the Susquehanna 
over an immense wooden bridge about one mile and a quarter 
long, to connect again with the Philadelphia line. This bridge, 
available for vehicles, was the only one to be found at that time 
on the river below Harrisburg. A third line of railroad passes 
through the lower part of the valley of the Monocacy : it is a 
part of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which, passing close 
by Frederick, runs down to Point of Pocks and thence follows 
the course of the Potomac as far as Harper's Ferry. 

Ewell, by a forced march, reached Carlisle with his two divis- 
ions on the 27th : the next day a band of scouts, M^th some officers, 
proceeded to reconnoitre the approaches of Harrisburg. Despite 
all the efforts of the inhabitants of this city to put it in a state of 
defence, the Confederates could probably have easily taken pos- 
session of the suburbs on the left bank. Ewell was preparing 
for this operation when an order from Lee suddenly put a stop 
to his movement. 

Early had been sent east of the mountains to cover the right 
wing of the army and to watch the roads north of Baltimore 
and w^est of Philadelphia. A glance at the map will show that 
the Confederate army assembled in the Cumberland Valley in 
jiroportion as it advanced northward moved farther away from 
AYashington, and finally turned its back entirely upon the base 

E 



56 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

of operations on wliicli the Federal army rested : it therefore 
behooved Lee to cause all the avenues through which detach- 
ments of the enemy's troops might fall upon his flank, from 
either Washington or Baltimore, to be carefully reconnoitred. 
It was for the cavalry to perform this duty, but Stuart having 
remained in Virginia to keep a close watch over Hooker's 
movements, this task w^as assigned to Early. Lee had not been 
able to add more than one regiment to his division, comprising 
a few hundred sabres, and his infantry, long inured to forced 
mai-ches, had to make up for tlie absence of cavaliy by their 
own activity. They left Greenwood on the 26th of June in two 
columns, and reaching Gettysburg in the evening dislodged from 
it, after a slight skirmish, about a thousand Pennsylvania militia,* 
brought there in haste, who could not offer any serious resistance. 
The division, after having bivouacked at Gettysburg and Mum- 
masburo^, reached the neio;:hborhood of Berlin on the 27th and 
York on the 28th. Gordon's brigade, following the railroad, had 
marched with greater speed than the others, and arrived at York 
at an early hour. Early immediately directed it to j^roceed to 
Wrightsville, where the great bridge of the Susquehanna crossed 
that stream, Lee had ordered Early to buru it, but the latter 
general, meeting with no resistance, conceived the bold plan of 
crossing the river by this bridge and ascending the left bank 
in order to assist Ewell at Harrisburg. Consequently, Gordon 
was instructed to take possession of it if possible. When within 
a short distance of the village he encountered a detachment of 
Unionists, which a few shells sufficed to disperse; but his sol- 
diers, worn out with fatigue, could not vie with the enemy in 
speed, and they had scarcely started in pursuit over the bridge 
when they were driven back by the flames. The Federals, not 
having succeeded in cutting the bridge, had determined to burn it : 
in a few hours it was entirely destroyed, together with a portion 
of the village, and the flames from this immense blazing pile, 
lighting up the atmosphere on the evening of the 28th of June, 
announced to the alarmed population on the right bank of the 
Susquehanna that the enemy had reached the river. In the 
mean time. Early Avas levying contributions upon York and 
* The Twenty-sixth militia regiment, under Colonel Jennings. — Ed. 



BRANDY STATION. 57 

gending detachments to destroy the Northern Central Railroad 
and its branches to the largest practicable extent. 

We shall leave him now to return to Virginia, wherCj on the 
22d, we left the Federal army and Stuart's cavalry, which is 
watching it, along the line of the Bull Run Mountains. On his 
arrival at Fairfax, Hooker, foreseeing that he would have to go 
through a campaign in Maiyland, had sent two bridge-equipages, 
under proper escort, to the mouth of the INIonocacy, and on the 
18th everything was ready for throwing these bridges over the 
Potomac at Nolan's Ferry. The Second corps,* in taking position 
at Leesburg the next day, as we have stated, was only within ten 
miles of this point. Hooker, however, was yet ignorant whether 
I^ee, by not marching either upon Manassas or Washington, 
would decide to push northward ; and as he intended to assume 
the offensive against his line of retreat if the occasion offered, 
he did not wish to be drawn to the left bank of the Potomac 
before being fully convinced that the whole Confederate army 
had left the soil of Virginia. Consequently, he was waiting in 
the positions taken on the 19th for positive information upon this 
point, without allowing himself to be disturbed by the cries of 
distress coming from Pennsylvania blaming him for his inaction. 
He took advantage of this waiting to organize reinforcements 
destined to join his army as soon as it had entered INIaryland : 
in fact, from this moment it covered Washington and Baltimore 
so completely that the garrisons of these two places could have 
been safely reduced so as to form a column which would have 
increased the effective force of the Army of the Potomac. 

The authorities at Washington threw obstacles in the way of 
this project: Butterfield who had been sent to organize this 
column, could only secure tw^enty-five hundred men that Lock- 
wood brought from Baltimore,t instead of fifteen thousand upon 
whom he had counted ; and Hooker having sent for a brigade of 
Crawford's division which had been assigned to him. General 
Slough, military governor of Alexandria, where this brigade was 

* The Twelfth corps took position at Leesburg on the 38th. The Second 
corps was then at Sangster's Station, whence it moved on the 20th to Centre- 
ville, and thence toward Thoroughfare Gap. — Ed. 

f Lockwood's brigade was brought from the lower counties of Maryland, bor- 
dering on Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac Eiver. — Ed. 



68 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

uselessly stationed, detained it in defiance of the order, and was 
sustained by Hallcck in this act of insubordination. 

The raoveincnts of the Southern cavalry north of the Potomac 
had given rise, as we have stated, to the most extravagant rumors, 
and the Federal autliorities had o;reat difficulty in distini^-uishino; 
truth from fiction. As soon as Lee's battalions had set foot on 
the soil of Maryland the Southern general experienced in his 
turn some of those difficulties against which his adversaries had 
hitherto to struggle. Instead of being wrapped up, thanks to 
the connivance of an entire population, in an impenetrable veil, 
through whi(;h he could perceive all the movements of his oppo- 
nents, he found himself surrounded with voluntary spies, who, 
after counting his regiments and talking with his soldiers, who 
were constantly asking for something to drink, proceeded, as soon 
as the latter had departed, to report to the enemy all they had 
seen and heard. On the other hand, soldiers disgusted with the 
profession of arms, who in Virginia would not have dared to 
leave the ranks for fear of being betrayed by the inhabitants, 
finding now a good opportunity for deserting, carried much valu- 
able information to the enemy ; so that Ewell's movement upon 
Hagerstown, which was executed on the 22d, was known to 
Hooker on the 23d, and on the 25th the latter was fully informed 
of the passage of the Potomac by Hill's corps at Sliepherdstown. 

Two bridges had been thrown over the river by the Union 
general at Edwards' Ferry, near the mouth of Goose Creek, and 
in rear of the positions occupied by the Second corps at Leesburg.* 
On learning of the arrival of Ewell at Hagerstown, he at once 
despatched three army corps to hold the left bank of the Potomac 
and to cover Washington. These were the First, the Third, and 
the Eleventh, which happened to be nearest the bridges, and 
which Hooker had placed temporarily under Reynolds' com- 
mand. On the 25th they stationed themselves around Poolesville, 
a village in Maryland situated not far from the river, at the inter- 
section of several roads, and at an equal distance from Washing- 
ton, Harper's Feriy, and Frederick. 

That same day, on receipt of fresh intelligence, the commander- 
in-chief determined to follow the Confederates into INIaryland 
with the remainder of his army. Peynolds led his three army 
* The Twelfth, not the Second, corps was at Leesburg. — Ed. 



BRANDY STATION. 59 

corps toward the defiles of South Mountain, making some detach- 
ments occupy Turner's Gap and Crampton's Gap, while the bull< 
of his forces took position in the village of Middletown, on the 
road between Frederick and Boonesboro'. The reader, by bear- 
ing in mind the campaign of 1862, will appreciate the import- 
ance of this movement, which shut out Lee from all access to 
Eastern INIaryland, while it opened to the Unionists a passage lead- 
ing to the communications of the Confederate army with Yirginia. 

During this time the other four army corps, the reserve artil- 
lery, and the cavalry,* converging in their turn toward Edwards' 
Ferry, crossed the Potomac during the day of the 26th : the 
Sixth corps, which had arrived from Centreville, having bivou- 
acked at Dranesville, was the last to cross during the morning 
of the 27th, and entered the valley of the Monocacy en echelon 
near its mouth and below Frederick ; the Twelfth corps, which 
had arrived from Leesburg, pushed farther on in the direction of 
Harper's Ferry. The Army of the Potomac thus took, in June, 
1863, the same position it had occupied under McClellan before 
the battle of Antietam. Hooker could not have made a better 
choice to harass his adversary. The operation had been well 
conceived and admirably executed. The seven army corps, 
with the artillery, cavalry, and the immense supply-trains, had 
effected the passage of the Potomac over two bridges of boats in 
two days and a half: thanks to their celerity, the movement 
ordered upon receipt of the news that Lee's army had begun 
crossing the river was accomplished in twenty-four hours after 
the last of the enemy's battalions had left the Virginia shore. 
The two adversaries, although separated by more than forty 
miles, followed each other very closely. 

From the first day the Confederates experienced all the dif- 
ficulties to which an army of invasion is necessarily exposed — 
difficulties that were new to them, for in the preceding year they 
had not advanced far enough into the hostile country to encounter 
them. On the one hand, being obliged to extend their lines in 
order to occupy the country, destroy the resources of the enemy, 
and gather provisions, they had nevertheless to be always ready 
to concentrate for battle ; on the other hand, they were not sc 
well informed as their adversaries. In fact, whilst Hooker, as 
* Buford and Gregg, covering the rear, crossed into Maryland on the 27th. — Ed. 



60 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

we have sceu, was fully posted as to their march, Lee was com- 
pletely ijjjnorant of the crossing of the Potomac by the Federal 
army. On the 27tli of Jiiue, when this passage had been in 
operation for two days, and the Federal army was already massed 
at the foot of South Mountain, he believed it to be still in Vir- 
ginia, lie trusted to Stuart's vigilance to apprise him of the 
movements of the enemy, and if he had received from the latter 
the information he was expecting, he would certainly not have 
committed the imj)rudence of despatching Ewell's corps in the 
direction of the Susquehanna. But the vigor with which Pleas- 
outon had driven the Confederate cavalry beyond the Blue liidge 
had completely masked the passage of the Unionists to the 
left bank of the river. To make up for lost time, Stuart should 
have thrown himself between the two armies, and thus dispelled 
the uncertainty under which Lee had been laboring for some 
days. It was at this moment that an unfortunate misunderstand- 
ing deprived the general-in-chief of the useful co-operation of 
his too-zealous lieutenant. 

Stuart was burning with desire to avenge the checks that Pleas- 
onton had just made him suifer. He could not think of attacking 
the Federals, firmly posted as they were along the Bull Run jMouu- 
tains, whence they overlooked the plains and watched all his move- 
ments. The Second army corps having arrived from Ceutreville 
on the 20th to take position at Thoroughfare Gap, he thought 
that the whole Federal army was stretched behind this range of 
hills, and that between it and Washington there were only some 
storehouses, depots, and detached posts. He conceived the idea of 
repeating the manoeuvre which had twice proved successful in the 
precediug year, and to make a complete circuit of this army by 
passing between it and Washington. He intended, by following 
a southern direction, to outflank its left wing, then to proceed 
northward, leaving Centreville on his right, reach Dranesville, 
cross the Potomac, and join Lee in Maryland. This plan had 
one serious defect : it was like an intermediate act in a play with- 
out any connection with the principal piece. The two operations 
of this kind performed by Stuart the year previous on the Chick- 
ahominy and along the Potomac were undertaken while the two 
armies were both stationary : they consequently partook of the 



BRANDY STATION. 61 

character of extensive recounoissances. Uutil then, during the 
active campaigns, Stuart's 7-6le had been either to cover or to clear 
the army. This time he was undertaking a dangerous movement 
at a moment when he must have expected to find the enemy on the 
march ; consequently, he could not foresee what detours he w^ould 
have to make to avoid him, and from the very first he started in 
a contrary direction to that followed by the Confederate army. 
He submitted his plan to Lee, and has stated in his report that 
the latter authorized him to execute it, even pointing out to him 
the contemplated movements of Swell's corps, that he might join 
Early's division between Gettysburg and the Susquehanna. The 
official account of the general-in-chicf, no less positive, is directly 
at variance with this statement. According to this account, Stuart 
did not propose the movement on the enemy's rear except as a 
means for delaying his passage over to the left bank of the 
Potomac. This consideration alone influenced Lee in allowing 
him to penetrate into Maryland east of the Blue Ridge, but 
upon the express condition that the cavalry should resume its 
natural place on the right flank of the army as soon as the enemy 
had started for the North. This, as it will be seen, was a conces- 
sion made by Lee to the views of his lieutenant, and, as almost 
always happens in such cases, the somewhat vague terms used by 
the former were no doubt interpreted by the latter in a sense most 
suitable to his wishes. Hence a misunderstanding which raised a 
question of veracity between them, the consequences of which 
proved fatal to their cause. In fact, when Lee alluded to the 
rear of the Federal army as he was talking to his lieutenant, the 
latter did not suppose that he meant the rear of his columns on 
the march northward, but rather his base of operations at the 
east ; when he mentioned York as the point near which he might 
encounter Early and join the head of the Confederate army by 
following its right flank without ceasing to cover it, Stuart looked 
upon this last-mentioned city as a mere point of rendezvous to be 
reached after he had accomplished the raid he contemplated. 

Lee thought that he should only be deprived for a few days of 
the important services such as his cavalry had rendered him since 
the beginning of the campaign ; consequently, he had soon cause 
to regret the authority he had too easily given to Stuart. The 



62 THE CrVIL WAR IX AMERICA. 

latter lost not a single iiioniont in takint^ advantage of it. He 
left about four thousand cavalry with Generals Robertson and 
Jones, with the charge of watching the Blue Ilidgc and the 
front of the enemy's array : then, without paying the least atten- 
tion to Longstreet's directions, who had requested him to remain 
within his reach, he set off during the night of the 24tli with 
the brigades of Fitzhugh Lee and VI. H. F. Lee, commanded 
by Colonels Munford and Chambliss, together with Hampton's 
brigade. The troopers carried three days' rations for themselves 
and one day's forage for the horses : six guns and a few- am- 
bulances were the only vehicles that accompanied the division. 
In coming out of Salem, where the latter had assembled, Stuart, 
who headed the column in person, took the northern route ; then, 
darting suddenly across the fields, he struck the eastern route 
and reached one of the mountain-passes south of Thoroughfare 
Gap, called Glascock's Gap. Turning north-eastward, he pro- 
ceeded toward Haymarket. But here commenced the difficul- 
ties he had not foreseen. Before reaching Haymarket he found 
a whole Federal army corps on the march along the road he had 
proposed to follow. It was the Second, on its way from Thor- 
oughfare Gap to Gum Springs to relieve the Third, on the march 
toward Maryland. Stuart, placing his artillery in position, had 
the satisfaction of cannonading the column and of throwing con- 
siderable disorder into the ranks ; but he did it no harm, and to 
disguise his movement he was obliged to make a large circuit 
southward. His horses having but little to eat, he had to halt 
and let them graze. A single brigade pushed on as far as Gaines- 
ville. Centreville was occupied : the whole section of country 
which separated this point from the front of the enemy's array 
was overrun by columns of troops which he might meet at any 
moment. The plan he had formed could not therefore be car- 
ried out : if he had relinquished it and retraced his steps, he 
would have returned in time to discover the passage of the 
Federals into Maryland, apprise Lee of the fact, and join Early 
in Pennsylvania. He persisted in his project, and, not being able 
to effect a passage west of Centreville, determined to force his 
way at the east. Delayed by the necessity of letting his horses 
graze again, he was unable to get beyond the Occoquan, which 



BBAADY STATION. 63 

he reached at Wolf Euu Shoals on the 26th, and arrived in 
two columns on the 27th at Burke's and Fairfax Stations. 
He found everyAvhere traces of the departure of the Federal 
army, gathered some provisions that had been left behind, and 
had no encounter except with a regiment of cavalry, which he 
quickly drove back into Washington after capturing two hun- 
dred men. Pursuing his route in the track of the Unionists, 
he arrived at Dranesville, which place the Sixth corps had 
left in the morning. He had not succeeded, therefore, in turn- 
ing the Federal army, which had crossed the Potomac before 
him, and he simply found himself in its rear. He had only to 
push on as far as Leesburg to ascertain the fact, and by ascend- 
ing the right bank of the Potomac he could, without encounter- 
ing any obstacle, have promptly carried the news of this passage 
to Lee, with the valuable co-operation of his cavalry. But, mis- 
takenly, he thought that the w^hole Federal army was march- 
ing upon Leesburg along this bank, and fancied that he could 
quietly join his chief by passing through Maryland. A ford 
which was not watched by any of the enemy's posts was pointed 
out to him near Dranesville : he determined at once to avail him- 
self of it. 

It was at a short distance from the magnificent falls of the 
Potomac, at a place where the river, rushing down a precipitous 
declivity, spreads out among stones and rocks which break the 
force of its current. But this ford, which was easy for horees, 
seemed impassable for artillery. Stuart did not allow himself to 
be thwarted. The caissons were emptied ; the gun-cartridges 
and shells were divided among the troopers, and the submerged 
cannon and wagons were dragged across the river. Night had 
supervened, and the watery moon' threw but a faint and uncertain 
light over the agitated surface of the stream : the long line of 
horses, sunk up to their breasts in the water, oscillated to and fro 
under the pressure of the current and kept on their course with 
difficulty. Nevertheless, at the end of a few hours the huge 
shadows that were silently flitting across the river had all climbed 
up to the other side. Thus, without firing a single shot, did 
Stuart enter Maryland, and he hastened to destroy the canal adja- 
cent to the river. On the 28th, after a few hours' rest, he re- 

VoL. III.— 33 



64 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

sumed his march in two cohimns, in the direction of Rockville. 
He had, in fact, been informed of the movement of the Army of 
the Potomac, the whole of which lay between himself and that 
of Lee, and was marching northAvard, being greatly in advance 
of his own troops. It will thus be seen that Lee, Hooker, and 
Stuart were all three pursuing a parallel course, the second being 
between the two bodies of the enemy and separated from each of 
them by ranges of hills. There was no means of conveying any 
intelligence to Lee : the passes by which Stuart had calculated to 
join him were blocked; there was nothing else to be done but to 
beat the Federals in speed in order to find Early along the Sus- 
quehanna. The Southern troopers were undoubtedly able to 
throw the rear of the enemy's army into some confusion, but 
these ephemeral and barren successes could not compensate for 
the injury which their absence from the flank of the Confederate 
army caused the latter at such a critical moment. 

From their first entrance into Maryland, Stuart's men had 
picked up isolated soldiers and wagons belonging to the adminis- 
trative departments of the enemy, putting some small detachments 
to flight, and, after trifling a while with one of them, entered the 
town of Eockville, situated on the direct road connecting the Fed- 
eral capital with Hooker's head-quarters at Poolesville,* with- 
out striking a blow. They had scarcely dismounted when they 
were informed of the approach of a supply-train loaded with 
forage, coming from Washington. Chambliss, with his brigade, 
in order to capture this rich prey, immediately gets back into 
the saddle ; Stuart, who would not have missed such a feast for 
anything in the world, leads the chase at a gall<')p. The supply- 
train, composed of one hundred and fifty wagons, extends a dis- 
tance of nearly two miles, and is within only one mile of Rock- 
ville when the troopers who are clearing its march, rushing sud- 
denly to the rear with the cry, " The enemy is upon us !" scatter 
alarm and confusion through the long line of wagons. Each 
driver is endeavoring to turn his team around : some get en- 
tangled, others are upset across the road ; those who have been 
able to recover the track leading straight to Washington dash 

* At this time Meade was in command, with head-quarters at Frederick. 
Rockville is on the main road from Washington to Frederick — Ed. 



BRANDY STATION. 65 

forward at a frantic rate of speed, each trying to outstrip his 
fellow-teamster in the race. The Confederates, flourishing their 
sabres, arrive in the midst of this panic, and, cutting their way 
through the wagons, reach those farthest off, which they stop 
almost within sight of the forts of Washington. From this 
moment the whole train is in their power : the wagons already 
broken are burned ; about one hundred of them are carried off. 
The troopers who accompanied the train never stopped until 
they had reached the capital. For a moment Stuart was tempt- 
ed to follow them, and by a bold dash between the forts heighten 
the commotion which his presence at Rockville could not fail 
to create. But night was approaching, his horses were tired, and 
the necessity of speedily rejoining his chief prevailed over every 
other consideration. 

In spite of the exhaustion of both men and animals, it became 
therefore necessary to resume the march during the night, and on 
the morning of the 29th the two columns struck the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad at Hood's Mill and Sykesville. They had 
thus followed the eastern slope of the hills which form the 
bouudai'y of the Mouocacy basin at the east. The occupation of 
the railroad connecting Washington and Baltimore with the town 
of Frederick, where the centre of the enemy's army was located, 
might have proved a serious source of trouble to the latter if 
it had intended to remain there, and if Stuart had had time to 
destroy the track entirely. He only set fire to two small bridges, 
being unable to capture any train, and having gathered new 
information regarding the movement of the enemy toward the 
north, he gave up the idea of continuing his Avork of destruction 
to concentrate his thoughts in finding means of joining Early. 
In the afternoon of the 29th he was on the march, pursuing a 
north-westerly course toward Westminster, where he intended 
to cross the hills and take the Gettysburg road. His advance- 
guard met with a hot reception in this town from a squadi-on of 
the First Delaware, and did not succeed in taking possession of 
it until after an engagement in which it sustained some lo.sses. 

On the morning of the 30th of June the whole division was 
marching in the direction of Hanover, where Stuart hoped tc 
find Early, or at least some reliable information concerning his 



6Q THE CIVIL WAR IX AMERICA. 

position, and to be able to conunnnieate with head-quarters. 
Six days of constant marching, nearly all that time without 
sleep, food, or news from the rest of the army, were beginning 
to impair the strength of this fine l)ody of troops. 

The last night had to be employed in distributing hay to 
the horses, which until then had eaten scarcely anything except 
green grass : there were to be escoi'ted four hundred prisoners 
and more than two hundred wagons picked up on the road. 
This train was a great encumbrance, but Stuart would not be 
separated from it. The ammunition was rapidly diminishing, 
and finally it was known that a division of the enemy's cav- 
alry * had encamped the night before at Littlestown. The leaders 
felt uneasy on finding that, no matter how rapidly they pushed 
northward, they could not succeed in getting ahead of that 
enemy in whose rear they had so imprudently slipped. Cham- 
bliss led the march with his brigade, followed by all the artil- 
lery; Hampton formed the rear-guard, separated from the first 
by a space of about two miles and a half, which was occupied 
by teams ; Fitzhugh Lee covered the left flank of the route 
traversed. 

On reaching the hillocks which overlook Hanover, the Con- 
federates perceived coming from Littlestown a long column of 
the enemy's cavalry, which was iias^ing through the village in a 
northerly direction, and thus occupying the road ^\'llich they were 
themselves so anxious to follow. The situation was a trying one : 
retreat was becoming impossible ; audacity was the only resort. 
Chambliss began the attack. A few words will suffice to explain 
this new encounter between Kilpatrick and Stuart, as unexpected 
to them as was that of Aldie two weeks before. Stahel's cavalry, 
added to Pleasonton's corps, had been reorganized and divided 
mto two brigades under the command of two officers of great 
distinction — Farnsworth, a man who had already acquired much 
experience, and who perished within a few days without an 
opportunity to show the full measTire of his worth ; and young 
Custer, who, after having successfnlly passed through all the 
perils of the great war, fell a victim thirteen years later to the 
tomahawk of the red-skins. Kilpatrick, whom the late con- 
flicts had brought conspicuously to the front, was assigned to 
* Kilpatrick's. — Ed. 



BRANDY STATION. 67 

the command. This new division was at Frederick when, on 
the 28th, the news of Stuart's arrival at Rockville was promul- 
gated. Pleasontou, who had unsuccessfully hunted the latter 
the preceding year, adopted different tactics on this occasion 
against him. Instead of sending his cavalry on his track in 
order to harass him, he resolved to let him load himself with 
booty, which could not fail to slacken his movements, and to 
manoeuvre between him and the Confederate army, so as to 
keep him away from it as long as possible. He could not 
have adopted a better plan. This task was entrusted to Kil- 
patrick. The new division commander set off on the same 
day, and, following the Middleburg and Taueytowu road, he 
encamped at Littlestown on the 29th, while Stuart, as we have 
remarked, had brought his head of column to a halt a few 
miles from this village. Whether it was that Kilj^atrick had 
been too quick in his movements for the inhabitants to come 
forward and supply him with information, or that they had 
been struck with terror by the arrival of the Confederates, he was 
not apprised of the proximity of the enemy's cavalry. Think- 
ing only of maintaining his position on the right flank of Early, 
who, as we have seen, was at York the day before, he started 
for the latter place. Custer bore to the left with his brigade 
toward Abbottsville, while Farnsworth followed the direct route 
by way of Hanover. It was at this place that the two antag- 
onists, marching in a different direction, found themselves face 
to face about ten o'clock in the morning. 

On perceiving the enemy the Federals sent a detachment 
forward to reconnoitre; but Chambliss came up at a gallop, 
drove it before him, penetrated into the town, and cut the 
Unionist column in two before it had time to form again. If 
the length of the train behind which Hampton was marching 
had not detained the latter at too great a distance for him to 
join his comrade in time, the Federal brigade would have been 
annihilated. But the prompt arrival of help soon extricated 
it from the dangerous situation in which it was placed. Kil- 
patrick and Farnsworth, returning with the Fifth New York, 
charge the Confederates in turn, who are occupied in picking 
up prisoners, and after a sanguinary engagement drive them 



68 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

out of the town. Colonel Payne, at the head of the Second 
North Carolina, tries in vain to resume the offensive by a flank 
movement : this attack is repulsed, and he is taken prisoner. 
Stuart takes position on a height south of the town, whence 
his artillery keeps the enemy at a distance, and waits for his 
other two brigades — not for the purpose of forcing a passage, 
but to cover the movement by means of which he wishes to 
get away, with his train, from a struggle which he considers 
unequal. 

Fitzhugh Lee is the first to arrive, and attacks the rear of 
the enemy's column, which, by its formation in line of battle, 
has become Kilpatrick's right. But the latter, who wishes, 
above all, to cut off his adversaries from the Gettysburg road, 
concentrates his forces upon this point, while Custer, coming 
to his assistance, soon gains ground over the Southerners. 
Stuart, on his part, hoping to find Early on the Susquehanna, 
and not daring to venture between the bulk of the enemy's 
infantry and cavalry, has decided to proceed eastward, by way 
of Jefferson, in order to reach the neighborhood of York. 
This is precisely the direction that Kilpatrick is most anxious 
to see him take, so that he is not at all uneasy on account of 
this movement. Hampton, who with scarcely any opposition, 
has entered the town, which the Federals have abandoned for 
the purpose of strengthening their right, covers once more 
the march of the train. AVhile Kilpak'ick is giving some rest 
to his worn-out troops, deferring till next day their departure 
for Heidlersburg, Avhere he hopes to intercept Stuart, the latter 
has not lost a moment's time in getting in advance of him. It 
was indispensable, in fact, that by one of those extraordinary 
efforts which select troops alone are capable of making he 
should succeed in passing between his adversary and the insur- 
mountable barrier of the Susquehanna before daylight. This 
night-march was terrible : whole regiments, says Stuart, were 
dozing on horseback, and men, tottering in their saddles, fell 
off like so many masses of inert matter. Finally, at day- 
bi'eak on the 1st of July, the column reaches Dover, but only 
to experience a new and bitter disappointment. Stuart learns 
that Early, after having occupied that whole section of country, 



BRANDY STATION. 69 

has left it suddenly for the east. It becomes therefore necessary 
to take up the line of march once more, in pursuit, not of the 
enemy, but of that friendly infantry which seems the more 
rapidly to vanish like a phantom as the efforts that are made 
to approach it increase. Finally, in the afternoon of July 1st., 
Stuart arrives at Carlisle with one brigade, after having ridden 
more than one hundred and twenty-five miles since the previous 
morning, having halted only long enough to fight the battle of 
Hanover. There, again, instead of Swell's soldiers, he merely 
finds traces of their march, without any cue to aid him in fath- 
oming the mystery of their precipitate retreat. In the mean 
time, his provisions are giving out, his ammunition is nearly 
exhausted, and the town of Carlisle refuses to receive him. 
Uneasy, irritated, having only a portion of his forces about 
him, and deprived of his supply-train, which has remained 
far in the rear, Stuart, in order to compel the town to yield, 
fires into it the last shells which remain in the caissons ; but 
to no purpose. Besides, new anxieties soon demand his atten- 
tion and occupy his thoughts. 

He receives at last instructions from his chief, from Avhom he 
had been separated seven whole days. The information he was 
able to give him taught him nothing, for the damages he had 
caused to Hooker's rear had been of no assistance to the Con- 
federate army. Instead of bringing news, it was he who was 
coming in search of it, and that which reached him Mas of a 
serious character. A battle was imminent; he had failed to per- 
form the proper role of the cavalry toward the infantry before 
the encounter; he must at least be near it at the critical moment. 
The three brigades were immediately ordered to march sej)arately 
upon Gettysburg. 

We have left Hooker on the 27th of June concentrating his 
army along the left bank of the Potomac between the ]\Ionocacy 
and the slopes of South Mountain. Reynolds is at the head of 
three army corps at the foot of these slopes, near INIiddletown ; 
three other corps are in the rear, stationed around the town of 
Frederick ; while Slocum, with the Twelfth, following the course 
of the Potomac, has already reached Knoxville, and is within 
only three miles of Harper's Ferry, Avhere there are nearly 



70 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

twelve tliousand men under General French ; the mountain- 
defiles which had cost McClellan so dear the year previously 
are under Hooker's control. lie can therefore either repeat the 
manoeuvre of the latter, and, marching upon Harper's Ferry 
and Sharpsburg, menace Lee's line of communication, or follow 
still the movement of this general toward the North, and by 
keeping him as much as possible west of the mountains oblige 
him to extend his line still farther. The first of these two plans 
is the boldest and most effective. It is, in fact, calculated to put 
a stop to the invasion at once, and restores to the Federals the 
double advantage of strategic aggression and the choice of ground 
upon which they can compel their adversaries to come and fight 
them. Slocum, having once reached Harper's Ferry, will find 
his army corps increased by the addition of twelve thousand men, 
whom he can lead into the Cumberland Valley by way of Sharps- 
burg, while Reynolds has only a day's march to accomplish to 
enter this valley by way of Boonesboro'. Finally, the bridges 
which Lee may have on the Potomac, the supply-trains he is 
sending South, the ammunition he must be expecting, will all Ml 
into Hooker's hands by the same blow. Consequently, this is the 
plan he has adopted, at least until fuller information regarding 
the movements of the enemy can be obtained : he has even begun 
to put it into execution by sending Slocum to Harper's Ferry, 
and by going there himself on the 27th, when an unforeseen 
occurrence suddenly puts a stop to this delicate operation. 

The troops gathered at Harper's Ferry, as w^e have just stated, 
were placed under his command. Thinking, very properly, that 
the safety of the army and the cause he w^as defending might 
depend upon the presence of an additional division on the field 
of battle, he determined to sacrifice all secondary considerations 
to the concentration of active forces, and was therefore desirous 
of taking French with his army. In pursuit of this idea he 
had ordered preparations to be made for carrying off all the 
materiel at Harper's Ferry and in the fortifications on Maryland 
Heights. We have already stated hoAV greatly General Halleck 
had exaggerated in 1862 the importance of this point, which 
guarded neither the Potomac fords nor the entrance into Mary- 
land : Miles' disaster, brought on by his obstinacy in not evac- 



BRANDY STATION. 71 

uating the place at that time, had not enlightened him in the 
least. Conse(][uently, when, on the evening of the 26th, Hooker 
telegraphed him that he intended to abandon this post, whose 
garrison, wanted elsewhere, was only a useless bait for the enemy, 
and asked him if he had any objection to this plan, he replied at 
once, formally refusing his consent except in a case of absolute 
necessity. This refusal was not prompted alone by military con- 
siderations more or less plausible. Inasmuch as Hal leek imme- 
diately granted to Hooker's successor what he had refused to the 
former, we have a right to believe that the commandiCr-in-chief 
had seized this opportunity to compel the commander of the Army 
of the Potomac to resign by depriving him of all freedom of 
action, without which he could not continue to perform the ardu- 
ous task imposed upon him. Halleck's mistrust of Hooker was 
"indeed no secret. The latter was fully aware of it, and, being 
unwilling that the personal animosity of which he was the vic- 
tim should again compromise the fate of the army, on receipt of 
Halleck's reply — which he found at Frederick on his return from 
Harper's Ferry — he requested to be relieved of his command. 

While waiting for the President's decision he made the new- 
dispositions which Halleck's instructions rendered necessary. 
Unable to take French along with him, he relinquished his 
project of attacking Lee's rear in the Cumberland Valley. 
Slocum was recalled to INIiddletown,* and all marching orders 
prepared so as to put the army on the march toward the 
North, following the eastern slopes of the mountains. 

On the morning of the 28th, General Hardie arrived at Fred- 
erick with an order appointing General Meade to the command 
of the Army of the Potomac in place of Hooker. For the sec- 
ond time within the space of a year President Lincoln had 
selected the worst possible moment for making a change in the 
chief command of this army. This change might have been 
reasonable on the day following the battle of Chancellorsville ; 
it was singularly inopportune at present, when the two armies 
were about to be engaged in a decisive conflict. 

Far from justifying it, the manner in which Hooker had 
handled his army for the last fortnight deserved nothing l)ut 
* Slocum was ordered to Frederick (not Middletown) by Hooker. — Ed. 



72 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

praise : if the relations of the latter with some of the corps 
coraraanclers were unpleasant, they had never done any injury 
to the service ; and, on the other hand, the confidence with which 
he inspired the soldiers was of itself a power for his army. More 
fortunate than McClellan, Hooker was afforded new opportunities 
to serve his country, and we shall soon again find this brave sol- 
dier upon other battlefields. 

General Meade, who is to command the Army of the Potomac 
until the close of the war, was an officer of the engineer corps. 
Quiet, modest, reticent, but possessing a correct judgment, a mind 
clear and precise, together with a coolness which never faltered 
in the midst of danger, he had risen by his own merit from 
the grade of brigadier-general in. the Pennsylvania Reserves 
to the command of the Fifth army corps. Pie was but little 
known except to his subordinates and some other generals, for 
neither his deliberate and methodical mind nor his tall, slender 
figure, with eyes whose somewhat sad expression his glasses 
but half concealed, was calculated to make a strong impression 
on the masses and inspire enthusiasm. But he was esteemed by 
his companions-in-arms and respected by his adversaries : when 
his old comrades Avho wore the Confederate uniform, and who, 
since the battle of Chancellorsville, professed a profound contempt 
for Hooker, were told of his appointment, they said to each other 
that they would have to look sharp after their new adversary. 

The day Hooker transferred the Army of the Potomac to his 
successor, this army, comprising French's forces, Lockwood's 
brigade, which had arrived at Frederick on the 26th*, and all 
available detachments, numbered little less than one hundred 
and five thousand men under arms. Meade, who had not 
aspired to his new position, was himself conscious how ill-timed 
was the displacement of Hooker, and had the good sense to 
make no changes in the personnel of his head-quarters, even 
retaining his chief of staff. General Butterfield. With his 
appointment he received the most unlimited power to dispose 
of all the troops assembled in INIaryland, without taking into 
consideration those imaginary divisions in departments which had 

* Lockwood's brigade reached the vicinity of Frederick on the evening of 
June 27th. — Ed. 



BRANDY STATION. 73 

SO frequently embarrassed his predecessors. The first despatch he 
received from Halleck authorized him to remove at his pleasure 
the garrison of Harper's Ferry: the forces of Schenck and Couch 
were also placed under his command. 

His successor at the head of the Fifth corps was General 
Sykes, an energetic officer who had particularly distinguished 
himself at Gaines' Mill. Meade set to work at once on the 
28th, without allowing the army time to feel the interregnum. 
Hooker had informed him that Lee, not having brought along 
his bridge-equipage, could certainly not think of crossing the 
Susquehanna with his army, and that, consequently, after having 
reached that river, his design must be to follow the right bank, 
so as to cut off Baltimore and Washington from the Northern 
States. While the enemy was describing this large arc of a 
circle, the Federal army could, by keeping within an interior 
arc, follow him, fall upon his flank whenever it pleased, and 
at the same time cover these two cities without having to fight 
a battle at their gates. Meade did not agree with Hooker on 
this point ; and very justly, for it now appears that I.iee, taking 
advantage of the shallow waters of the Susquehanna, was ready 
to make a portion of his army cross to the other side of the 
river to seize Harrisburg : the possession of this city would in 
fact have secured him a permanent pass, together with the means 
of penetrating to the very heart of Pennsylvania. But, although 
he could freely dispose of French's troops, Meade did not dare 
to follow out the bolder and more promising plan his predeces- 
sor had conceived, the execution of which Halleck had prevented. 
He had no intention of crossing South Mountain for the purpose 
of placing himself between Lee and Virginia, for fear, no doubt, 
of leaving Baltimore unprotected and Philadelphia itself exposed. 
Whatever might have been the plans of the enemy, he thought 
it necessary, before all, to follow Lee northward, and to harass 
him sufficiently to oblige him to come and engage the battle him- 
self. He had nothing to do, therefore, but to indorse and carry 
out the orders issued by Hooker for the march of the 29th.* 

AYe have stated that the valley situated east of South Moun- 
tain parallel with the Cumberland Valley enlarges at the north, 
* Hooker issued no orders for the marcli of the 29th. — Ed. 



74 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMEIlICA. 

and almost assumes the form of a triangle wliose base lies on 
the Susquehanna and the upper part at the mouth of the 
Monocacy on the Potomac. From Frederick, whicli is situated 
in the narrow section, several roads diverging from this point 
follow a northerly and north-easterly direction : the main roads 
are the Plarrisburg road, by way of Emmettsburg, Gettysburg, 
and Ileidlersburg, at the north ; the York road, by way of ]Mid- 
dleburg, Taneytown, Littlestown, and Hanover, at the north- 
east, whicli separate in coming out of Frederick ; and the turn- 
pike, already mentioned, which at Gettysburg branches off from 
the first to the eastward to form a junction with the second at 
York. These roads are intersected almost perpendicularly by 
a large number of other roads, forming something like the 
radius of a sector whose arc is tlie railroad of Cumberland 
Valley, with Baltimore for its centre. All the roads in which 
we are now interested start from Westminster. In 1863 this 
village formetl the extremity of a branch railroad running 
from Baltimore as far as the foot of the hills of which we 
have spoken. The various roads starting from this point form 
each a connection with one of the South Mountain passes : the 
one running farthest south, by way of New Windsor and Fred- 
erick, reaches Cramptou's Gap ; the next one, by way of Union, 
JSIiddleburg, and Mechanicstown, the pass of Cavetown ; the 
third, by way of Frizzellburg, Tane}i:own, and Emmettsburg, 
that of Waynesboro' ; finally, the last, passing by Littlestown, 
Two Taverns, and Gettysburg, crosses the mountains west of 
Cashtown and descends to\A'ard Chambersburg by way of Green- 
wood and Fayetteville. A glance at the map will show mucli 
better than this explanation that the two centres of communi- 
cation in this valley are Gettysburg and Westminster : each 
of these two villages forms the terminus of a railway line, and 
the former, besides the roads already enumerated, possesses four 
or five others of less innx)rtance, which lead to Hanover at the 
eastward, south-westward to Fairfield, north-westward to IMum- 
masburg, and thence to Shippensburg by way of the mountain, 
and north-eastward to Hunterstown. The to^vn of Gettysburg, as 
we have shown, is situated almost at the dividing-point between 
the waters' of the Susquehanna and those of the Potomac, but 



BRAND Y STATION. 75 

it still belongs to the basin of the latter river. The small 
streams of Rock Creek and Marsh Creek, which flow from 
north to south within a few miles west and east of the town, 
imite to form one of the branches of the Mouocacy ; a third 
is the Big Pipe Creek, which, descending from the INIanch es- 
ter hills, passing between Taney town and Frizzellburg and 
watering Middleburg, flows west-south-west as far as its con- 
fluence with INIarsh Creek. The rich valley which is intersected 
by so many roads presents at the centre a compact layer of fer- 
tile land ; on approaching South Mountain one finds an undu- 
lating ground with a substratum of slate, the roughness of which 
has been smoothed away by the action of time. Still nearer the 
mountain, along a line which passes by Emmetttiburg and Gettys- 
burg, there rises a long range of ridges running parallel with the 
general direction of the chain. The very hard rocks of which 
they are composed, having resisted the ravages of time better 
than the slaty material which was their original covering, form 
a series of groups of abrupt ridges and isolated peaks • which 
frequently assume the most fantastic shapes, and present alter- 
nately, as in the vicinity of Gettysburg, actual strongholds con- 
structed by Nature, or, as at Emmettsburg, a confused mixture, 
a veritable chaos, of natural ruins. 

AVhen Meade assumed command, his first idea, while waiting 
for the enemy's intentions to be more clearly developed, was to 
prevent him from crossing the Susquehanna and marching upon 
Baltimore. With this view he put his troops on the march in 
three columns, pursuing divergent routes. The army was there- 
by to be so distributed as to be able to deploy rapidly along 
the line from Westminster to Waynesboro', and hold the Avhole 
breadth of the valley by resting on South Mountain on the left, 
whose passes it would guard, and with the right on the hills, 
across which it would communicate with Baltimore and Wash- 
ington. Two forced marches, which left too many stragglers 
behind, brought him into these positions, some of which were 
only occupied late in the evening of the 30th of June. 

The left column,* under Reynolds, was composed of the First 

* By the change of front executed after leaving the line of the Eappahannock 
the right wing of the army, under Reynolds, had become the left wing. — Ed. 



76 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

and Eleventh corps : the former reached Emmettsburg on the 
29th, and encamped the next day a few miles beyond the Gettys- 
burg road on jNlarsh Creek, while the Eleventh took its place at 
Emmettsburg. The Third and Twelfth army coi'ps formed the 
central column : the latter established itself, with general head- 
quarters, at Tancytown ; the former, leaving this point in the after- 
noon of the 30th, on receiving intelligence of the appearance of the 
enemy at Fairfield turned round to the left and proceeded to take 
position near Emmettsburg, in order to strengthen the wing com- 
manded by Reynolds. Finally, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth army 
corps, composing the right, encamped at Frizzellburg, Union, and 
New Windsor : the long distance they had to travel not allowing 
the two last-mentioned corps to strike the road from Westminster 
to Waynesboro', this wing found itself a little out of range. 
Gregg's division of cavalry, which was to clear the way, was not 
even able to reach the first of these last two villages, through 
which, as we have stated, Stuart had passed the day before. 

Meade's plan being once adopted, these dispositions were wise ; 
but it is difficult to account for the instructions given by him to 
French, whom a strange caprice of Halleck had just restored 
to the Army of the Potomac with his eleven thousand men. It 
seems that a reinforcement of so much importance should have 
been immediately incorporated into this army : Meade did not 
decide either to take it with him or to leave it at Harper's Ferry. 
He ordered French to evacuate this position, to send all the mate- 
rial found in it, with four thousand men as escort, to Washington, 
and to plant himself with his other seven thousand men at 
Fredericlv. This half measure was a great mistake : if its ob- 
ject was to avoid displeasing Halleck, it was taken in vain, for 
the evacuation of Harper's Ferry caused much excitement at 
Washington, and deprived the Army of the Potomac of a fine 
division which might have played an important role on the 
field of battle.* 

Pleasonton had distributed his cavalry very judiciously for the 
purpose of covering the movement of the army and clearing it 
on all sides, without following Stuart's example, who, through 

* For instructions from ]Meade to French relative to the movements of the 
latter, see despatches of June 29 and July 1, in Addenda, by Ed. 



BRANDY STATION. 77 

his indiscreet zeal, had put it out of his power to render the 
same service to his chief. It has been stated that Meade 
wished Pleasonton to undertake an expedition of the same cha- 
racter, and that the latter had pointed out its dangers : if such 
was the case, he had no great difficulty in persuading him. His 
real merit consisted in handling his cavalry during the few days 
intervening between the passage of the Potomac and the close 
of the battle of Gettysburg with a degree of skill, foresight, 
and decision which contributed largely to the victory of the 
Federals. 

Whilst Gregg was bearing to the right, and Kilpatrick per- 
forming the double task of keeping Stuart at the east and clear- 
ing the advance, Pleasonton had placed Buford's division on his 
left. It was the strongest of the three, and its chief, a thorough 
soldier, justly inspired it with entire confidence. Kilpatrick, as 
we have stated, after having pushed rapidly as far as Littlestown 
on the 29th, had on the oOth remained at Hanover, the scene of 
the bloody combat he had fought with Stuart. Buford, on his 
part, after having sent General Merritt, with his new command 
(the regular cavalry brigade) to watch the outlet of the Hagers- 
town road in the valley of the INIonocacy at INIechanicstown, made 
a bold dash along the western slope of South Mountain in order 
to ascertain if the enemy had lingered on the borders of the An- 
tietam on the left flank of the Army of the Potomac. Leaving 
Middletown* at daybreak on the 29th, and descending toward 
Boonesboro', he followed the range of the mountains in a north- 
erly direction as far as Waynesboro', and, crossing them again at 
the Monterey defile without having encountered the enemy, halted 
at Fountain Dale, situated halfway. It was scarcely dark when 
this vigilant chief perceived in the distance, along the Fairfield 
road, the bivouac-fires of a hostile body of troops, probably 
Davis' brigade of Heth's division. Before daylight on the 
3Gth he bore down upon Fairfield for the purpose of attacking 
it, but after a few shots he became convinced that he could not 
accomplish his object without artillery; and while the enemy 
was falling back toward the north, Buford, not daring to engage 
in an artillery-fight whose echoes might arouse the Confederate 
* With Gamble's and Devin's brigades. — Ed. 



78 , THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

columns, left the direct Gettysburg road, and, following his 
instructions, overtook Pleasonton* at Emmettsburg. 

Several indications made the latter believe that the enemy 
was preparing a movement against the Army of the Potomac, 
and being aware that it was to push its left wing as far as 
Gettysburg the next day, he could not allow the Confederates 
to establish themselves in the place. He therefore ordered 
Buford to repair speedily to that city, take possession of it, and 
maintain himself in it until the arrival of the First corps. This 
order was executed in the afternoon. On reaching Gettysburg, 
Buford learned that a brigade of the enemy, coming from Cash- 
town, had appeared in front of the place one hour before him, 
but that at his approach it had suddenly retired in the same 
direction. 

Information of a somewhat va2;ue character p;atliered bv 
Meade seemed to show that for the last two days Ewell had 
made no farther advance northward, and that the rest of the 
Southern army lay between Chambersburg and Cashtown, The 
speedy retreat of the enemy corroborated this intelligence in 
the mind of the general-in-chief, leading him to think that 
Lee, apprised of his movement, was about to give up the 
invasion m order to devote his attention exclusively to the 
Army of the Potomac. He did not know, however, upon 
which of the mountain-slopes, and with what intentions, Lee 
was going to concentrate his forces. Buford 's encounter seemed 
of itself to indicate that this concentration would take place 
on the eastern slope. From this moment, thinking that Harris- 
burg and Philadelphia were no longer in danger, and that 
the first object of his rapid march northward was conse- 
quently attained, he determined not to manoeuvre any fur- 
ther except in preparing for the battle which was thenceforth 
inevitable. His troops were tired ; some army corps of new 
formation had been unable to keep up with the pace of the 
soldiers experienced in marching for the last year oi" two ; the 
regular supplies had failed in consequence of the interruption 
of travel on the Baltimore and Ohio Pailroad ; it was neces- 
s;iry to re-establish communications with Baltimore, first by 

* Reynolds. — Ed. 



BRANDY STATION. 79 

the "Westminster line, then by that of Hanover. For all these 
reasons combined, Meade decided upon continuing to advance 
slowly until he was fully jjosted in regard to the designs of 
the enemy, and, in case the latter should come to meet him, to 
take a defensive position which might secure him all tactical 
advantages in the fight, either by speedily concentrating his 
forces upon the point most menaced, or by bringing his columns 
one day's march to the rear. His marching-orders were issued 
to this effect on the evening of June 30th, to be executed the 
following day at daybreak. They directed Reynolds to pro- 
ceed with the left column to Gettysburg, making the First 
corps occupy this village, ^^^hile the Eleventh remained some- 
what in the rear, leaving tlie Third at Emmettsburg for the 
purpose of covering his rear along the Greencastle road. The 
Twelfth, which alone has remained in the centre at Taney- 
town, is to march toward Two Taverns in order to connect 
Reynolds with the right, whilst the Second will leave Frizzell- 
burg to form, in conjunction with the latter, the central column, 
and relieve him at TaneytoAvn. Finally, the Fifth and Sixth 
have each a long march to perform — the one from Union to 
Hanover, where it will form the first line on the right ; the other 
from New Windsor to jNIanchester, where it will occupy the 
second line, within supporting-distance oY the latter. The army 
will thus present a broken line to the enemy — who may be sta- 
tioned either west or north — facing in both these directions, the 
upper part of the angle resting upon Gettysburg. The posi- 
tion of the roads converging upon this town makes it especially 
the capital point of this line, and INIeade has very judiciously 
stationed throe army corps out of seven in the neighborhood. 
This movement, however, is only 'ordered as a new step in 
the advance which he is pursuing cautiously, intending to 
push as far as the Susquehanna if necessary. He does not 
know at this hour that the larger portion of Lee's army 
has crossed South Mountain, and if he occupies Gettysburg 
it is not with the intention of blocking the principal outlets 
along the eastern slope of this chain against him. In fact, 
foreseeing the possibility of the enemy coming to attack him 
on this slope, he advises Reynolds to assemble all his forces 
Vol. III.— 34 



80 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

either at Gettysburg or at Emmcttsburg, in order to delay 
his march ; but he h9lds himself ready, by a rapid concentration 
in the rear, to take a position, selected in advance, which will 
enable him to cover Washington and Baltimore, and to wait 
steadily for the assaults of the Confederate army. The occu- 
pation of Emmettsburg, Gettysburg, and Hanover has no other 
object than to cover this concentration and to detain the enemy 
until it is accomjjlished. The position thus selected extends 
along the left bank of Pipe Creek from Manchester to Middle- 
burg. Having no knowledge of the topogra])hic details of 
the country, nor of the remarkable position to which chance 
was about to lead him at Gettysburg, he makes a judicious 
choice upon a simple examination of the map. 

On the morning of the 1st of July he addressed detailed 
instructions to his corps commanders, indicating the positions 
they were to take along Pipe Creek in case circumstances should 
oblige him to remain on the defensive. Some of them objected 
to this backward movement on the first encounter with the en- 
emy, alleging that it might have the eifect of demoralizing the 
soldiers; others, wdth more plausibility, remarked that the posi- 
tion was too exclusively defensive, that Lee w^ould certainly not 
come in search of the Army of the Potomac, and that the only 
way to compel Lee to fight an aggressive battle was to throw 
themselves boldly across his path. The fortune of war cut short 
all these discussions by bringing the two combatants into a field 
which neither of them had chosen. 

We will therefore leave the various Federal columns Vvhich on 
the 1st of July were occupied in executing the movements that 
had been prescribed to them, in order to show w^hat were the 
movements of the Confederate army at the same time. We have 
mentioned the positions it occupied during the 28th. In the 
evening a spy brought Longstreet news of the passage of the 
Potomac by the enemy's army : it was the first intelligence the 
Confederates had received of such an important movement 
executed behind them during the last two days. Lee, know- 
ing nothing of Stuart's imprudent venture, believed him to be 
still occupied in watching Hooker, and concluded from his silence 
that the latter had not stirred since the battle of Ashl)y's Gap. 



BRANDY STATION. 81 

Tlie pi'eseuoe of the Federal army in the valley of the Monocacy 
cut short his invading march northward : he understood, as well 
as his adversary, the danger to which he was exposed if this 
army crossed South Mountain to fall upon his rear in the Cum- 
berland Valley and cut him oif from Virginia. Ewell, being 
already near the banks of the Susquehanna, could not come 
back quick enough to defend his communications directly. He 
adopted a course which was both daring and wise (the merit of 
which Lougstreet in his report arrogated to himself), and decided 
either to forestall or to impede this manoeuvre of the enemy by 
crossing the eastern slope of the mountain himself. In this way 
he menaced Baltimore, and even Washington, by way of the 
north, making it impossible for the Federals to move westward 
away from their capital, and obliging them to come back to 
defend the communications of the latter city with the free States. 
The Army of the Potomac being once brought back in pursuit 
of him, he hoped to be able to draw it northward behind him, 
and probably not be obliged to fight it except within sight of 
Philadelphia. Therefore, on the 29th, just as Meade was taking 
up his line of march, he ordered his several army corps to assem- 
ble between Cashtown and Gettysburg. 

An examination of the map will show that this latter town, 
being at about an equal distance from York, Chambersburg, and 
Carlisle, and located at the intersection of nearly all the roads 
traversing South Mountain, was the point around which the Con- 
federate army would naturally concentrate itself. It presented, it 
is true, the serious inconvenience of being outside of the territory 
the army then occupied, but this inconvenience was the almost 
inevitable consequence of the relative positions of the two armies. 
Indeed, the Confederates in pushing their invasion northward 
almost turned their backs upon their adversaries, and conse- 
quently, if they faced about in order to concentrate by getting 
near their base of operations, they were forcibly taken out of this 
territory. Besides, Lee, not knowing the direction that Meade 
had just given to his columns, could not foresee that the latter 
was going to Gettysburg for the precise purpose of intercepting 
the road from Chambersburg to York. Early had passed over it 
two days before without encountering any serious resistance ; con- 



82 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

sequently, the goueral-in-chief, attaching no importance at that 
time to the occupation of this town, gave no positive instructions 
to his generals in regard to the matter : intcniding to concentrate 
his forces a little nearer the niountaii!s, he gave them no precise 
directions either for taking possession of it or to come to a halt 
before reaching the place. Lee's instructions reached Ewell early 
on the 29th, just as he was preparing to attack Harrisburg. In 
order to gather all his troops in front of the capital of Pennsylva- 
nia, he had called Early back to Carlisle; and the latter, promptly 
obeying orders, encamped on the 30th about three miles east of 
Heidlersburg. A fortunate chance made him fall in with his 
chief, who had arrived with Rodes' division, near this village. 
This and Johnson's division had started on the 29th for the pur- 
pose of reaching the neighborhood of Cashtown and Gettysburg 
in pursuance of instructions from the geueral-in-chief : while the 
former marched directly southward, leaving South Mountain on 
the right, the latter was retracing its steps along the Cumberland 
Valley from Carlisle to the vicinity of Chambersburg, and, turn- 
ing to the left at Green Village, halted on the evening of the 
30th not far from Scotland, at the foot of the western slope of 
the mountain, on a road connecting Avith the Gettysburg turnpike 
at the entrance of the Cashtown defile. Johnson intended to 
cross this defile the next morning, in order to join the remain- 
der of the Second corps near the sources of the IMonocacy. 

The movements prescribed to the rest of the army were much 
slower. The whole of Longstreet's corps being at Chambersburg, 
and Hill's a few miles farther east, near Fayctteville, Lee deter- 
mined to make both of them debouch through the same pass upon 
Cashtown and Gettysburg by placing them en echelon along the 
road w^liieh Johnson was looking for on his side. In order to 
avoid throwing this enormous column of more than sixty thou- 
sand men into confusion, it was necessary to regulate and shorten 
the stages of the march, and to advance with the greater precau- 
tion because there was not a single regiment of cavalry left to 
clear the march. Heth'sclivision of Hill's corps took the lead, 
and encamped at Cashtown on the 29th ; on the 30th, Heth 
ordered Pettigrew's brigade to push on as far as Gett}^sburg, in 
order to make a requisition for shoes, of which, it was said, 



BRANDY STATION. 83 

this town still possessed large supplies, notwithstanding Early's 
recent visit. 

This brigade, having no suspicion of the proximity of the 
Federals, was about to enter the place with the numerous wagons 
that followed in its wake, and was preparing quietly to take pos- 
session of it, when its scouts signalled the approach of Buford's 
column. The latter, after the interruption to his march, as we 
have seen, liad quickened the pace of his horses in order to make 
up for lost time, and entered Gettysburg before eleven o'clock in 
the morning. Pettigrew had not looked for him : surprised at 
this unexpected encounter, ignorant of the enemy's forces, and 
finding himself too much exposed eight miles away from the rest 
of his division, he fell back upon Marsh Creek, halfway to Cash- 
town. He' halted his troops near this stream, and hastened to 
apprise his chiefs of the presence of the enemy in Gettysburg; 
so that the two parties, which had an equal interest in being first 
to take possession of this town, had successively neglected to do so 
during the morning of the 30th of June ; but, thanks to Buford's 
promptness, the Federals still retained the advantage. Pettigrew's 
forces were too small numerically for him to take advantage of 
his position on JSIarsh Creek and attack the Union cavalry at 
Gettysburg without waiting for the arrival of Heth's division, 
which had remained at Cash town. 

Pender, on his part, had reached this village during the even- 
ing of the 30th. Anderson, who was following h'nii, did not 
arrive till the next day. Finally, Longstreet, leaving Pickett's 
division at Charabersburg, made a march with the other two, and 
halted at Greenwood at the entrance of the mountains. The 
march of the column, therefore, had been very slow, and on the 
evening of the 30th, forty-eight hours after Lee had determined 
upon his movement, he was not yet master of the point of con- 
centration he had chosen. It was even a strange circumstance, at 
variance wdth his instructions, which put on the march the troops 
that were to dispute the possession of the place with the Federals. 
In fact. General Hill, having received Pettigrew's report, under- 
stood at once that the latter had encountered a mounted advance- 
guard, not infantry troops, and thought it would be easy to dis- 
lodge it. Being obliged, on the one hand, in tlie absence of 



84 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Stuart, to employ infantry to clear his march, and desirous, on 
the other hand, to secure the distribution of shoes to his men, of 
wliich they stood so much in want, he ordered Heth to march 
upon Gettysburg at daybreak on the 1st of July "svith his whole 
division — a remarkable instance of the influence which the most 
trifling incidents frequently exercise over the fate of war. Lee, 
in his turn, as soon as he was informed of the presence at Gettys- 
burg of Meade's cavalry in force, without suspecting as yet that 
he was going to encounter his infantry there, felt the importance 
of this point. He ordered Hill with his Second division, under 
Pender, and the eight batteries of the Third corps, to follow Heth. 
Anderson, Hood, and McLaws, posted en echelon behind him, were 
directed to follow his movement. Ewell, on his part, knowing 
Hill to be at Cashtown, and not having been informed in time of 
the movement of his entire corps upon Gettysburg, led his col- 
umns, according to the instructions he had received on the 29th, 
toward the first mentioned of these two villages. Rodes took the 
most direct route, while Early was ordered to make a detour south- 
eastward, in order to strike a road passing by Hunterstown and 
Mummasburg, a village situated only about five miles north of 
Gettysburg. With regard to Johnson, separated from his chief 
by the massive proportions of the mountains, he could not receive 
his instructions ; and, besides, he had no choice as to the route to 
be followed : he had to come to Greenwood to take his place in 
the rear of the rest of the army along the turnpike. Ewell bit- 
terly regretted the detour he had caused it to make in order to 
reach this route, instead of taking it along with him over the 
eastern slope of the mountains. He would thus have reached 
the battlefield half a day's march sooner, in time to decide the 
victory. 

This summary, which the reader may find somewhat long, was 
necessary to show how the two armies, each marching in ignorance 
of the movements of the other, both suddenly changing their direc- 
tion, while their cavalry crossed their paths, alternately missing 
each other or meeting unexpectedly, had finally on the 1st of 
July taken a direction which brought them f;ice to face at Gettys- 
bnro;. The recital of the battle thev are about to fight will form 
the subject of the next two chapters. Before closing the present 



BRANDY STATION. 85 

one we will mention in a few words what was done during those 
few days by the detachments of Federal troops which, without 
belonging directly to the Army of the Potomac, were neverthe- 
less within its sphere of action. 

We left General Couch at Harrisburg, busy in preparing, to the 
best of his ability, for the defence of that city, and endeavoring, 
with the aid of another general whose name is equally familiar to 
us (W. F. Smith), to organize the Pennsylvania militia. He did 
not pretend to oppose the march of the Confederates with these 
troops, but by pressing them and watching them closely wherever 
they went he could, without ever being drawn into a fight, keep 
the run of their movements and furnish the Federal authorities 
with valuable information. This is what he did. On the 29th 
he apprised Halleck of the time when the stoppage in Ewell's 
march occurred ; on the morning of the 30th, as soon as the latter 
had commenced his backward movement, he also sent word to the 
authorities at Washington, and despatched Smith at the same time 
in pursuit with all the cavalry he could muster. It is this 
detachment, following Ewell's track, which had just occupied 
Carlisle when Stuart made his appearance before that city on 
the 1st of July. Through his firmness and excellent defensive 
arrangement Smith succeeded in organizing a resistance which, 
as we have stated, deceived the Confederate general : after 
having withstood the fire of the enemy's artillery without being 
able to reply to it, he managed with his raw troops to hold the 
Slite of the Southern cavalry in check. 

The communications between Halleck and Meade, frequently 
interrupted by Stuart, were often slow and difficult ; nevertheless, 
on the evening of the 30th the cliief of the Army of the Potomac 
received the first intelligence of Ewell's movement. Chambers- 
burg was mentioned as the probable point of concentration of the 
Confederates. Upon this information, Meade, thinking that they 
M'ould assemble west of South Mountain, made all his arrange- 
ments for the 1st of July. In the mean time, a dii'eetor of tlie 
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, INIr. Scott, who subsequently 
became Assistant Secretary of War,* and who had organized a 

* Thomas A. Scott was appointed Assistant Secretary of War by Secretary 
Cameron in 1861. — Ed. 



86 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

thorough system for gaining information in the country oepu})icd 
by the Confederates, told Couch on the night of the 3{jtli that 
they were concentrating on Gettysburg instead of Chambers- 
burg. It Avas impossible to be more promptly or more correctly 
informed. Unfortunately, this intelligence, forwarded by a courier 
from Frederick, did not reach Meade until the evening of the 1st, 
when it was no longer of any value, for the events of that day 
had but too clearly revealed the intentions of the enemy. 

While preparations were thus being made for the decisive 
conflict in Pennsylvania, and all the forces that the Federals 
were able to raise north of the Potomac were at last animated 
by a common impulse, and while French himself, abandoning 
Harper's Ferry on the 30th with all its garrison,* was pro- 
ceeding toward Frederick to take an active part in Meade's 
opei-atious, the troops that Halleck had so improperly left in the 
peninsula of Virginia had likewise taken the field. The Fourth 
army corps, assembled at Yorktown and Williamsburg under 
Keyes, was transported by water about the 20th of June to 
White House, where a brigade of cavalry had preceded it by 
land. The instructions given to Keyes directed him to start 
from this point for the purpose of cutting the railroads running 
from Richmond northward, and to menace the enemy's capital. 
Many people had hoped that by a bold stroke the Fourtli army 
corps might be placed in possession of this city. The Confederate 
government had sent all the troops it could dispose of to Lee, 
reducing those which guarded the capital and the coast to a figure 
which, compared with the garrison of Washington, was indeed 
insignificant, but less so than the clamors of the inhabitants of 
Richmond had led the Federals to suppose. Only three brigades 
had been left in North Carolina : Clingmau at Washington, Col- 
quitt at Kinston, and Martin at Weldon. But five brigades 
were stationed at Richmond and in its vicinity : Ransom and 
Jenkins, at the south, extended their lines as far as Petersburg ; 
Wise and Cook along the suburbs of the city ; finally. Corse at 
Hanover Junction. It is true that on the 24th the latter was 

* French moved to Frederick with only two brigades (Kenly's and Morris'), 
while the others (Elliott's and Smith's) guarded the materiel taken from the 
fortifications of Maryland Heights to Washington. — Ed. 



BRANDY STATION. 87 

sent to Gordonsville, leaving only one regiment behind him ; but 
notwithstanding his departure the Confederates could yet muster 
eight or nine thousand men in the works which surrounded the 
capital : it was more than was necessary to protect it from any 
sudden attack. 

On the 25th, Colonel Spear was sent by Keyes, with about one 
thousand cavalry, to destroy the railroad-bridge over the South 
Anna near Hanover, to which allusion has already frequently 
been made. Crossing the river by fording, he attacked at once, 
on both sides, the regiment that Corse had left to guard the 
crossing : dispersing it, after having inflicted upon it some heavy 
losses, he burned the bridge and returned to White House on the 
28th. This operation, well conducted, but without any. import- 
ance, inasmuch as Lee w^as no longer at Fredericksburg or Cul- 
peper at the end of the railroad line, was the only incident of 
the campaign. After Spear's return Keyes despatched General 
Getty on the 1st of July, wdtli eight thousand men, to Hanover 
Court-house, and on the same day he started himself, with five 
thousand, in the direction of Kichmond as far as Baltimore 
Cross-roads. But these two columns advanced very cautiously. 
While the city of Richmond was in a state of excitement, Keyes, 
after a skirmish in which he lost about. twenty men, seeing the 
uselessness of the campaign he had been made to undertake, fell 
back upon AVhite House on the od. Here he found Getty, whose 
venture had been productive of no other result than the capture 
of the Confederate general W. H. F. Lee, wounded at Brandy Sta- 
tion, in a farm-house w'here he was being cared for. After this 
expedition the Federal government did at last what it should 
have done before : the largest portion of the Fourth army corps 
w^as incorporated with the Army of the Potomac. 

Q 



CHAPTER II. 

OAK HILL. 

O'N the 1st of July, 1863, the whole Southern army, as we 
have seen, was on the march since morning to concentrate 
itself at" Gettysburg. Ewell, who had at first proceeded in the 
direction of Cashtown by cross-roads, having learned that Hill 
was going beyond this village, immediately took the direct roads 
converging upon Gettysburg, where he intended to assist the 
Third corps. Lee's army, Avhich had been divided for the last 
eight days, was then about to be massed, either on that or the 
next day, east of South Mountain, thus menacing Baltimore and 
Washington : its chief relied upon this demonstration to bring 
back the Army of the Potomac, which he believed to be yet at 
a considerable distance in pursuit of him, and oblige it to attack 
him in a defensive position which he thought he had ample 
time to select and occupy. It is stated that he had assured his 
lieutenants that he should not take the offensive on the field of 
battle. 

The Federal array Avas arrayed en echelon at greater distances, 
and Meade, equally desirous of securing the advantages of a 
defensive position, held himself ready to assemble it by a con- 
centrating movement in the rear; but, whatever might have 
been his final determination, it was necessary for him to occupy 
Gettysburg, either for the purpose of covering this movement 
or for advancing. We have seen that his cavalry, forestalling 
the enemy, had established itself in this village on the previous 
evening, while the First and Eleventh army corps, starting at the 
same hour with Hill's and Ewell's soldiers, were marching, like 
them, toward this point. Fortunately, being fully acquainted 
with the character of liis former comrades, who had become 



OAK HILL. 89 

his subordinates within the last three days, Meade entrusted the 
task of clearing and directing his left to two men equally noted 
for quickness of perception, promptness of decision, and gal- 
lantry on the battlefield — Buford and Reynolds. So that, by 
one of those singular chances which play so important a part 
in war, at the very moment when the Southern general, believ- 
ing that he was mustering his army at a considerable distance 
from the enemy, had selected for this purpose a point which one 
of his army corps had just crossed without difficulty, this point 
was precisely the one selected by his adversary, while the latter, 
who did not wish to expose himself to the dangers of a concen- 
tration in front of his lines, had so conducted the march of his 
troops that his left wing was about to rush unexpectedly against 
the heads of column of the whole Confederate army. 

The end of June had been rainy, with frequent storms, which, 
while imparting the freshness of spring to the leaves of the forest 
and the grass of the meadows, had at the same time brolceu up 
the roads over which the combatants of both armies were march- 
ing in close column. Before bringing them face to face in hostile 
array Ave will leave them for a while, pursuing their way with 
the carelessness of the soldier, who is too familiar with the mul- 
titudinous risks of war to ponder over them, and devote a few 
lines to the description of the surroundings of Gettysburg, a rich 
and beautiful country, whose atmosphere at this early morning 
hour was so strongly surcharged with warm vapors that the 
sun found it difficult to dispel them, while its slanting rays, 
piercing through heavy, opaque clouds, flashed over the long 
and solid wall of South Mountain, a lofty barrier which shuts 
out the whole horizon at the west. 

The irregularities of the ground, as we had occasion to remark 
in regard to the entire region of country adjoining this chain, are 
due to the prevalence of rocky ridges lying parallel to its general 
direction, sometimes emerging from the soil in steep, ragged 
notches resembling ruined castles or fantastic pyramids. A 
hard-working population settled upon this fertile land has 
almost entirely cleared it, so that the woods, much more scarce 
than in Maryland, and the rocks, less numerous than at Em- 
niettsburg, only constitute isolated points of support in the 



90 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

centre of a territoiy adapted for deploying armies and the 
evolutions of artillery. 

The streams which traverse this section of country were at this 
season altogether insignificant. The principal ones, Willoughby 
Run and Rock Creek, pursue a parallel coui'se from north to 
south, one west and the other east of Gettysburg, emptying 
themselves lower down into Marsh Creek. The banks of 
these two resemble each other. Covered with woods, those 
of Rock Creek, as its name implies, are bristling with rocks, 
which, rising as high as one hundred and twenty, and even 
one hundred and fifty feet, above its bed, have prevented the 
woods from being cleared. Those of Willoughby Run are not 
so high nor so steep, and are less wooded. The battlefield is 
comprised between the right bank of the former and the left 
bank of the latter. The hills that are met on this ground may 
be divided into two groups, disposed in analogous fashion, whose 
formation reveals a geological law which is common to the whole 
section of this country. Each group forms a combination of 
three ridges starting from a common point, alike in elevation and 
abruptness. The central ridge, the highest and longest, follows 
a southerly direction ; another, equally straight, but less elevated, 
south-south-westward ; the third, extending east-south-eastward, 
is short, and split into two sections, as if, by the general direc- 
tion in the upheaving of the ground, it had been thwarted in 
its formation. The starting-point of the first group is a ridge 
situated one and a quarter miles north-west of Gettysburg, in 
the direction of jNIummasburg, called Oak Hill, on account of 
the thick forest of oaks which covered it. Its central ridge 
is about two miles long and very narrow, with considerable ele- 
vation for two-thirds of that distance, being throughout inter- 
spersed with small woods, farms, and couutry-houses. Among 
these habitations there is a Lutheran seminary (which has given 
it the appellation of Seminary Hill), the belfry of which, located 
on the culminating-point, overlooks the whole surrounding coun- 
try. The south-western ridge is, at first, only separated from the 
one last mentioned by a narrow strip of land which deepens in 
proportion as they diverge. It borders the course of Willoughby 
Run. The third consists of several round hillocks which grad- 



OAK HILL. 91 

ually decrease in size as far as Rock Creek. Amid the vast 
cultivated iiekls covering these hinocks thei'e may be seen a few 
farm-houses, the Crawford farm-house among the rest, and at 
six hundred feet from Rock Creek the almshouse. The second 
group is situated south-east of the first; its starting-point is 
twenty-eight hundred yards from Oak Hill. It was well knoAvn 
before the battle by the name of Cemetery Hill, on account of 
the cemetery which crowns the summit, as if in advance, by 
some ominous forethought, it had been placed there upon a point 
where so many victims were to perish at once. This rock-girded 
pinnacle rises abruptly about eighty feet above a large valley 
Mhieh is watered by Ste^'ens' Run, a small stream that flows 
from -west to east and connects with Rock Creek after havinar 
wound around the foot of the hillock occupied by the Craw- 
ford farm-house. The small town of Gettysburg is situated in 
this valley on the south side of Stevens' Run, and its streets, 
lined with houses behind which some fine orchards are seen 
stretching out, rise in gentle acclivities to the base of Ceme- 
tery Hill. The principal ridge, which starts from this point 
with a southerly direction, soon decreases in size; the rocks 
disappear ; the slopes, bare at the west, became less rugged on 
this side : at the east, on the contrary, the bed of Rock Creek 
deepens still more rapidly between declivities that are covered 
with thick forests. At a distance of sixteen hundred yards 
from the extremity of Cemetery Hill the line of elevation has 
lessened by about twenty yards ; then it rises again to the length 
of two-thirds of a mile, to terminate at last in the shape of two 
hills with bold outlines which proudly command all the neigh- 
boring localities, and whose fantastic rocks seem, from a distance, 
absolutely inaccessible to man. That farthest south, which is the 
highest, rises to a height of not less than two hundred and ten 
feet above Gettysburg ; it is known by the name of Round Top ; 
the other called-Little Round Top, separated from the first by a 
distance of five hundred and fifty yards, is less in height by one 
hundred and five feet. Both of them, connected by a- narrow 
defile, form at the west a declivity, at the foot of which flows a 
small marshy stream. Plum Run, whose bed is more than three 
hundred feet below the summit of Round Top. The opposite 



92 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

bank of this stream, although not so high, is as wild and steep as 
the sides of the Round Tops, and the colonists, jealous, no doubt, 
of the legends of the mother-country, in the middle of the eight- 
eenth century gave the name of Devil's Den to one of the numer- 
ous caverns that are to be found there. On both sides a strong 
ven-etation, which derives its sustenance from the fertile soil that 
is fed by the decomposition of syenite rocks, penetrates through 
the blocks of stone that are piled up in every direction, while 
gnarled and knotty oaks cover the irregularities of the ground 
with their thick foliage. This wood extends westward as far as 
the undulating plateau, where it stretches out, zigzag fashion, to 
the very centre of the cultivated fields. The eastern ridge, very 
short, as in the other group, and terminating likewise on the banks 
of Hock Creek at a distance of about seventeen hundred yards 
south of the almshouse, presents the same features as the heights 
of the Round Tops. It is a ridge wdiich, possessing steep accliv- 
ities at the north, connects Cemetery Hill with the wood-covered 
rocks of Culp's Hill, then, suddenly decreasing in altitude with- 
out losing any of its steepness, inclines toward the south by 
following the course of Rock Creek, which the equally wooded 
slopes of Wolf's Hill command from the opposite side. A large 
o-ap separates Culp's Hill from an eminence situated tw^o-thirds 
of a mile fiirther south, called Power's Hill. The third ridge, 
still resembling that of the other group by its direction and 
paucity of elevation, detaches itself from the first at a distance 
of about five hundred and fifty yards from the central point, and 
pursuing a south-westerly course, gradually diminishes in size and 
spreads out like the latter. At about one thousand or fifteen hun- 
dred yards from this place these ridges are reduced to an almost 
imperceptible rise in the ground, the one at the west attaining a' 
height of from forty to fifty feet, and the other from twenty to 
thirty, above the depression w'hich separates them, and in which 
Plum Run takes its source. The first, therefore, commands the 
second for a distance of about seven or eight hundred yards; 
which is not enough, in an artillerist's point of view, to impart to 
it a tangible superiority in an open country. It is in the midst 
of these slight undulations that the link of connection between 
the two groups is to be found : the central section of the first, 



OAK HILL. 93 

which prolongs the ridge of Seminary Hill by its depression, 
becomes amalgamated with the eastern section of the second near 
the point where the latter has less elevation. Eight or nine hun- 
dred yards more to the south, at a point which has become histor- 
ical under the name of Peach Orchard — which we will call " the 
Orchard " — the line of altitude turns suddenly westward, form- 
ing a slight gap, and at the end of four hundred yards pursues 
a southerly direction by following a narrow ridge almost entirely 
covered with w^oods, the eastern slope of which commands Wil- 
loughby Run as far as its confluence with Marsh Creek. 

The town of Gettysburg is naturally the centre of all the roads 
traversing this section of country. At the north three roads 
become separated even before having crossed Stevens' Run : the 
first, at the north-west, leads to Mummasburg by crossing the 
prolongation of Oak Hill ridge ; the second, at the north, leads 
to Carlisle, leaving the almshouse on the right ; the third, at the 
north-east, which passes in front of this institution and crosses 
Rock Creek shortly after, bears toward Harrisburg. The Han- 
over railroad approaches the town from the east, following 
the right bank of Stevens' Creek: it was not running beyond 
Gettysburg, but the work intended for its extension toward 
Chambersburg was progressing outside of the town, w-est-north- 
westward, intersecting, by means of deep trenches, the two ridges 
which descend from Oak Hill toward the south and south-west. 
Two roads also cross these two ridges: the first is the turnpike, 
which follows the unfinished railroad-track very closely ; the other 
is a common cross-road, which at the west-south-west runs in the 
direction of Fairfield and Hagerstown, crossing Marsh Creek at 
the ford called Black Horse Tavern. The seminary stands be- 
tween the two, above their dividing-line. As at the north and 
west, three roads start south and two east of Gettysburg. The 
latter are those of Hunterstown, north-eastward, and of Hanover, 
south-eastward, which Early had followed in his march upon 
York. The highw^ays southward are, in the first place, the Bal- 
timore turnpike, south-south-east, wliich on leaving Gettysbm-g 
ascends the summit of Cemetery Hill, leaving Gulp's Hill on 
tlie left, and descends upon Rock Creek between the base of 
this hill and the slopes of Power's Hill ; then, at the south, the 



94 THE CIVIL WAB IN AMERICA. 

Tanoytown road, which crosses the main section of the second 
group above Cemetery Hill, and follows halfway the eastern slope 
of this section, leaving the summits of the Round Tops on its 
right; finally, at the south-south-west, the Emmettsburg road, 
which follows precisely the line of elevation of the third ridge 
across vast cultivated fields only divided by fences, and inter- 
spersed with farms as far as the Orchard, where it pursues its 
original direction by crossing a ravine which connects with Plum 
Creek below Devil's Den. 

This enumeration would not suffice to make the reader under- 
stand the importance which so many converging roads must have 
given to Gettysburg if we were not to add that in times of war 
in the United States the turnpikes play a role similar to that of 
the highways which traversed France and the Flemish provinces 
during the wars of the seventeenth century ; in fact, the other 
roads, being miserably constructed and poorly kept, are not avail- 
able for heavy transportation, and the macadamized highways 
necessarily attract armies, which in order to move with rapidity 
are obliged to follow them ; therefore, as we have seen, three of 
these highways — those of Chambersburg, Baltimore, and York — ■ 
centred at Gettysburg. 

Such is the ground upon which unforeseen circumstances were 
about to bring the two armies in hostile contact. Neither Meade 
nor Lee had any personal knowledge of it ; and if, by examining 
the maps, they had some idea of the importance which the com- 
bination of ten roads and one railway imparted to Gettysburg, 
they had no information concerning the strong positions that 
Nature had created at will, as it were, all around this town. 
Early, who had passed through it a few days before, did not appear 
to have made any report to his chief on the subject. Buford, who, 
when he arrived on the evening of the 30th, had perceived at one 
glance the advantage to be derived from these positions, did not 
have time to give a description of them to ]\Ieade and receive his 
instructions. 

The unfailing indications to an officer of so much experience, 
however, revealed to Buford the approach of the enemy. Know- 
ing that Reynolds was within supporting-distance of him, he 
boldly resolved to risk everything in order to allow the latter 



OAK HILL. 95 

time to reach Gettysburg in advance of the Confederate army. 
This first inspiration of a cavahy officer and a true soldier 
decided in every respect the fate of the camj)aigu. It was 
Buford who selected the battlefield where the two armies were 
about to measure their strength : it must be granted that he was 
sure of the approbation of his two immediate commanders, both 
being animated by the same zeal which prompted his own action — 
Pleasonton, who had sent him from Emmettsburg to Gettysburg 
at the first news of the enemy's appearance on the Cashtown road, 
and Reynolds, whom he knew to be determined to provoke the 
conflict as soon as he should find an opportunity. Buford did 
not deceive himself in regard to the perils of his situation. The 
unexpected encounter he had with Pettigrew's brigade the day 
before in sight of Gettysburg, the information obtained from 
stragglers who had been left in his hands by the latter, convinced 
him that he stood in the presence not of detached parties, but of 
infantry columns of the enemy marching with the confidence 
imparted by superiority of numbers. It was easy to arrive at the 
conclusion that at least a large portion of the Confederate army 
was about to concentrate at Gettysburg. This is Avhat made it at 
once so important and difficult for him to retain possession of this 
point with the two brigades of cavalry which constituted all his 
force. " Rest assured," he said in the evening to General Devin, 
who commanded one of his brigades, " that the enemy will attack 
us in the morning. Their skirmishers will come thundering along 
three lines deep, and we shall have to fight like devils to main- 
tain ourselves until the arrival of the infantry." 

It was with this forethought that Buford took advantage of the 
last hours of daylight to post his small force in such a manner as 
to conceal his weakness as much as possible. He had not at that 
time more than forty-two hundred mounted men with him : to 
cope with the enemy's infantry these had to be fought on 
foot, while the necessity of holding the led horses necessarily 
reduced by one-fourth his effective force on the battlefield. Dis- 
posing of his troops in a circular arc from west to north-east of 
Gettysburg, Gamble's brigade on the left, Devin's on the right, 
he pushed his scouts far ahead along all the roads the intersection 
of which he held. After having apprised Meade and Reynolds 



96 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

of the dispositions he had made and of the supposed movements 
of the enemy, he waited for dayliglit, Avhosc dawn was to mark 
the great battle for whieh preparations were being made on both 
sides. 

His anticipations were soon realized, and from six o'clock in 
the morning his scouts along the Cashtown road reported the 
presence of the heads of column of Heth's division, which, after 
overtaking Pcttigrew's brigade, was rapidly advancing upon Get- 
tysburg. Buford hastened to make the final arrangements for 
the battle. Devin, having uo one before him at the north, left 
only a few patrols on that side, and took position between the 
Mummasburg road and the railway-cut. Gamble, on his left, 
pushed his first line to the banks of Willoughby Run, extend- 
ing his lines as far as the Hagerstowu road ; the reserve troops, 
dismounted like the rest and ready to take part in the combat, 
were massed along the ridge which descends from Oak Hill at 
the west, and consequently in advance of Seminary Hill. The 
mounted artillery which accompanies the division has taken a 
position so as to enfilade three roads : it opens fire a little before 
nine o'clock. Heth immediately deploys his two advance bri- 
gades, Davis' on the left and Archer's on the right, both of them 
south of the Chambersburg road. About eight o'clock in the 
morning this first line, preceded by a close column of skirmish- 
ers, openly descends the slopes of the right bank of Willoughby 
Run, confirming Buford's prediction by the vigor with which its 
attack is made. The Federal cavalry, well ambushed, rejily by a 
well-sustained fire, which stops the assailants, making their lead- 
ers believe that they have an infantry corps to cope with. This is 
the first serious encounter of the two armies upon the soil of the 
free States. A murderous struggle takes place at once on the 
banks of the stream. The Union cavalry is less numerous than 
that of their adversaries, for tliey have to deal with two strong 
brigades ; but they are as solid and determined, with carbine iu 
hand, as well-trained as infantry, while their artillery, perfectly 
well served, sustains them by means of a most effective fire. In the 
mean time, Buford, who is aware that Hill's whole corps has 
encamped at Cashtown, and who perceives in the distance the 
long columns of the enemy along the road, calculates with anx- 



OAK HILL. 97 

iety tlie length of time during wliich his small band may be able 
to check the march of the enemy. Fortunately, the latter has 
no idea of the immense advantages he might secure at a small 
cost by taking possession of the town of Gettysburg and the 
heights that command it before the arrival of the Federal infan- 
try. Heth has been ordered by Lee not to press the enemy if he 
finds him in force, in order to give the other divisions time to 
come up : in view of the unexpected resistance he has encountered, 
he leaves Archer and Davis fighting with the Federals, unwilling 
to engage the rest of his division until Pender's troops are within 
supporting-distance of him. Buford, on his part, causes his last 
reserves to advance up to the first line, which is beginning to suffer 
seriously from the enemy's fire : he directs the fire of his artillery 
in person and encourages the combatants by his example, thus 
prolonging the struggle while preparing to lead back his small 
band to the natural citadel of Cemetery Hill whenever the con- 
flict becomes too unequal. This moment is dravriug near : A. P. 
Hill, although sick, has hastened forward at the sound of the 
cannon. Pender's column follows him close ; the combat is about 
to assume a new aspect. 

It is, however, at the very moment when the sacrifices made by 
Buford in order to preserve his position appear to be useless that 
he reaps the reward of his tenacity. Reynolds' soldiers have 
marched as rapidly as those of Hill, and the officer of the signal 
corps, who, stationed in the belfry of the seminary, turns his 
anxious looks from the Cashtown road, which is covered with 
hostile troops, to that of Emmettsburg, finally discovers in the 
distance a large column of infantry. In that direction none but 
friendly troops could be expected. Buford, having come up in 
full haste in order to verify this glorious news, which will pre- 
clude him from giving the order of retreat, has scarcely reached 
the observatory when he hears his name called by a well-known 
voice. It is Reynolds, who, having been informed of the enemy's 
attack half an hour before, proceeded in advance of his columns, 
and following the sound of battle has come at full gallop to 
bring the assurance of speedy relief to the Federal cavalry and 
its valiant cliieftain. Wadsworth's division, encamped upon 
Marsh Creek, about five miles from Gettysburg, had been the 



98 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

first to start at eight o'clock in the morning on receiving the 
news forwarded by Buford to Pleasonton the previous evening : 
the two other divisions of the First corps, commanded by Row- 
ley and Robinson, got under way half an hour later, under the 
direction of Doubleday, making a forced march to join him. 
The Federal soldiers and their leaders arc fired by extraor- 
dinary zeal : like Antaeus, who gathered new strength whenever 
he touched the earth, it seems that the idea of fighting on the 
soil of the free States, in the midst of a friendly population threat- 
ened with a terrible invasion, doubles their energy and their 
activity. The hesitations, the delays, and the frequent discour- 
agements which seemed to paralyze the best-conceived plans in 
Virginia have given place to a noble emulation which urges them 
to dispute with each other the honor of dealing the swiftest and 
heaviest blows to the enemy. "Without taking any account of 
their numbers, Reynolds himself, notwithstanding the immense 
responsibility weighing upon him, gives them an example of this 
zeal by contributing more than any one else to inspire them with 
it. Sad and dejected, it is said, before the meeting of the two 
armies, he has become invigorated Jis soon as he has felt his 
proximity to the adversaries with whom he desired to come to 
blows since the opening of the campaign. 

We have already mentioned what were INIeade's intentions and 
the instructions he had sent to his lieutenants on the evening of 
the 30tli. Before beginning a naj'rative which Ave shall not again 
be able to interrupt before the close of the day, we must say a 
word about the dispositions he made on the morning of the 1st 
of July, although they were speedily modified by subsequent 
events. The news of the encounter between Buford and Petti- 
grew's brigade at Gettysburg, which had been sent by the former 
on the evening of the 30th to Reynolds, his immediate chief, had 
not yet reached head-quarters. Buford in his despatch conveyed 
positive information regarding the positions of the enemy's three 
corps, which no longer admitted of any doubt that their concen- 
tration was to be effected at Gettysburg by way of the northern 
and western routes. The information his army had picked up to 
the present hour, and the advices which Couch had forwarded 
from Harrisburg, already clearly revealed to Meade the move- 



OAK HILL. ' 99 

inent by which Lee, collecting his scattered columns in the val- 
ley of the Susquehanna, was preparing to fight the Army of the 
Potomac; but the bloody conflict in which Stuart had just been 
engaged with Kilpatrick in the village of Hanover induced him 
to think that the concentration would take place in the district 
occupied by Ewell, north-east of Gettysburg, which would render 
it impossible for his army to sustain itself in this latter position. 
He felt, therefore, that the formidable adversary who had already 
so frequently snatched the victory from his predecessors was ap- 
proaching him, without being able to guess on which side his 
blows would fall. Having only been invested with the supreme 
command within the last three days, he felt disposed to act with 
the utmost circumspection. He had already obtained an import- 
ant result. Lee, had he been able to ignore the Army of the 
Potomac, would hitherto haxe preferred an aggressive campaign 
in the free States rather than a veritable invasion. Adopting 
the latter course, he now finds himself menaced by this army, 
and comes to a halt, forced to preserve on the field of battle the 
role of assailant which he had assumed in crossing the Potomac. 
Meade, extremely perplexed, feared that he had advanced too far 
by pusliing his left to Gettysburg and his right to Planover. He 
would not, however, countermand the movement already in prog- 
ress, nor order a retrograde march for the morrow upon Bal- 
timore. He confined himself, therefore, to the task -of sending 
detailed instructions to his corps commanders regarding the manner 
of performing, as soon as he should order it, this march as far as 
the line of Pipe Creek. Believing the enemy to be far more dis- 
tant than he was in reality, he thought that he had time to make 
his choice and to determine either upon a retrograde movement or 
an aggressive manoeuvre. His despatch to Reynolds especially 
showed distiiactly the state of uncertainty he was laboring under, 
manifesting at the same time the confidence he had in the judg- 
ment of his old comrade,* to whom he allowed great latitude in 
the direction of the left wing. It is probable that Reynolds did 
not receive this last despatch, which was forwarded too late to 

* At tlie breaking out of the war Meade and Keynolds each commanded a 
brigade in McCall's division, where the author had the good fortune to make 
their acquaintance. 



100 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

reach liini before his departure from Marsli Creek. He had start- 
ed, therefore, in compliance with the ordci'S received the day pre- 
vious. These orders directed him to station himself at Gettys- 
burg or in its vicinity with the Fii'st and Eleventh corps, but 
contained no instructions as to what he should do in the presence 
of the enemy. Meade merely told him that he did not contem- 
plate advancing beyond the positions indicated for the march of 
July 1st, and that he should wait for the movements of the enemy 
to determine his own. In view of the intelligence which Rey- 
nolds had received from Bnford in the morning, these indications 
w^ere no longer of any account to him, for it was evident that 
hostilities would commence at some point or other before Meade 
would be able to accomplish all the movements he had projected. 
But his cavalry was menaced on the very ground he had been 
formally ordered to occupy. All hesitation, therefore, was im- 
possible for him : he must reach Gettysburg in advance of the 
Confederate column which had been reported by Buford, compel 
his adversaries to show their strength, and, if possible, preserve 
the important strategic position he had been ordered to occupy, 
until JNIeade should otherwise determine. It appears that on 
approaching Gettysburg he immediately noticed the magnificent 
position of Cemetery Hill, which has been described above : it 
could not, in ftict, have escaped his trained military eye, and 
it may be that, on seeing it, he understood that by maintaining 
himself there he would secure for the Army of the Potomac 
the most favorable battlefield that it could have possibly desired. 
The confidence reposed in him by IMeade and the absence of 
any positive instructions justified him in making the attempt. 
Although death did not allow him time to explain his views to 
his chief, we may be permitted to believe that this idea prompted 
the dispositions he adopted on his arrival. 

It is three-quarters past nine : wdiile rapidly descending the 
stairs of the belfry to go meet Reynolds, Buford cries out to him, 
" The devil is to pay ;" — " But we can hold on till the arrival 
of the First corps ;" and the two chieftains, starting at a gallop, 
rush into the midst of a shower of balls to revive the zeal of 
Gamble's men, who have been struggling on foot for the last hour 
and a half. Finding their position a good one, Reynolds sends 



OAK HILL. 101 

au order to Wadsworth's division to come up and relieve them. 
At the same time he sends a message to the other two divisions 
of the First corps, urging them to push forward, and also to 
Howard, who has left Emmettsburg with the Eleventh corps 
after the latter, requesting him not to stop on the road, as he 
had been directed, but to come and take* position near them at 
Gettysburg.* In a few hours two army corps will therefore be 
assembled at Gettysburg. In the mean time, the enemy must 
be imposed upon and held in check with the few troops that are 
already on the ground. The First division of the First corps, 
commanded by Wadsworth, following the direction that Reynolds 
had marked out before leaving it, has not entered Gettysburg. 
It has turned to the left, and at ten o'clock has ascended the 
eastern slope of Seminary Hill. Wadsworth, who at an advanced 
age had joined McDowell's staff as a volunteer, and whom we 
shall see fill gloriously in the "Wilderness the following year, has 
acquired through practice some of the necessary qualities for the 
command he is exercising. Doubleday, to whom Reynolds has 
transferred the command of the First corps, and who in the 
course of this day will exhibit as much tenacity as presence of 
mind, has come to join him, leaving behind him the other two 
divisions, which are making a forced march. But Wadsworth 
has only two small brigades under him — one commanded by 
Cutler; the other, called the "Iron Brigade," by jSIeredith. 

The Federal cavalry still occupy the slopes bordering Wil- 
loughby Run on the west between the two roads to Hagerstown 
and Cashtown : north of the latter they maintain their posi- 
tion on horseback along the cutting of the unfinished railroad, 
about fifty yards back of the stream, along the ridge which 
descends south-west of Oak Hill. This ridge, of which we have 
already spoken, and which will play an important part in the 
battle, extends far beyond the Hagerstown road : being entirely 
bare and only interspersed here and there with fences, it is not so 

* One of Eeynolds' aides-de-camp, Captain Kosengarten, has even asserted 
that Eeynolds had designnted Cemetery Hill as the point which Howard was 
to occupy, but the latter has formally denied it, claiming all the honor of 
having selected this historical plateau for the purpose of placing his reserves 
thei-e. 



102 THE CIVIL WAR IX AMERICA. 

high as the ridge of Seiiiiiiuiy Hill, and forms somethiug like a 
first line of defence in advance of the latter, from which it is 
only separated by a strip of land sufficiently deep to afford shel- 
ter to reserves. There is but a single obstacle to be met with 
along its western slope: it is a small wood, triangularly shaped, 
whose base rests upon Willoughby Run, and rises, by following 
a slight depression in the ground, almost to the summit of the 
ridge, the extremity of which, on this side, is about one hundred 
yards south of the Cashtown road. It is called McPhersou's 
Wood, after the name of the owner of the adjacent farm. The 
infantry has not a moment to lose, for, north of this road and the 
railway, Davis' Confederate brigade is advancing in good order, 
and its well-sustained fire is having a crushing effect upon the 
weak line of Federal skirmishers, who can find no shelter in this 
direction. South of the road Archer has crossed the stream with his 
brigade, the larger portion of which rushes' into the wood in order 
to reach under its cover the summit of the slope it has to carry. 
Cutler's brigade is at the head of the Federal column. Reynolds 
leads it in person on the Cashtown road, which must be abso- 
lutely barred against the enemy, advising Doubleday to j^lace 
Meredith's brigade, which is following the first, on the left, and 
to extend his line as far as the Hagerstown road. The division 
artillery, relieving Calef's mounted battery, takes a position along 
the Cashtown road, which it enfilades, while Cutler deploys his 
brigade to the right under the very fire of the enemy.* The 
infantry finds itself engaged along the whole line even before it 
has got into position, for on the left Doubleday, understanding 
at a single glance the importance of the wood into which Archer 
has just penetrated, has ordered jSIeredith to take possession of it. 
This wood, in fact, if it remains in the hands of the assailants, 
gives them a foothold in the centre of the Union line, wdiich it 
cuts in two ; whereas if the Federals are masters of it they will 
find in it a point of support which, like a bastion, will flank 
this line both nortli and south. At the moment that ]\feredith 

* General Cutler, writing November 5, 1863, to the governor of Pennsylvania, 
accords the honor of the opening infantry-tire to tlie Fifty-sixtli Pennsylvania, 
Colonel J. Wm. Hofmann commanding, and requests that the fact be recorded 
in the archives of the State. — Ed. 



OAK HILL. 103 

begins his attack, Reynolds, leaving to Wadsworth the task of 
leading the right, recrosses the road, and, seeing the extreme 
right of the Iron brigade approach the point of the wood, 
advances with its chief under the well-sustained fire of the 
enemy's skirmishers hidden in the bushes. While he is encour- 
aging his soldiers by his own example, at a distance of less than 
sixty paces from the latter he is struck in the head by a ball, and 
expires without uttering a word. 

Reynolds was undoubtedly the most remarkable man among all 
the officers that the Army of the Potomac saw fall on the battle- 
field during the four years of its existence ; and Meade could say 
of him that he was the noblest and bravest of them all. A grad- 
uate of AYest Point, he had early distinguished himself in that 
ISIexican army which was destined to become the nursery of staif 
officers both North and South. His former comrades, who had 
become either his colleagues or his adversaries, held him in the 
greatest estimation on account of his military talents, for under 
a cold exterior he concealed an ardent soul ; and it was not the 
slowness, but rather the clearness, of his judgment that enabled 
him to preserve his coolness at the most critical moments. The 
confidence he inspired, alike in his inferiors, his equals, and his 
commanders, would no doubt soon have designated him for the 
command of one of the Union armies. It would have been a 
fortunate thing for the cause he was serving with devotion and 
earnestness without having ever sought to elicit appreciation of 
his merits. His untimely death — he was forty-three years old 
— was not without some benefit to that cause, for by making a 
vigorous fiffht in the battle which cost him his life he secured 
the possession of Cemetery Hill to the Army of the Potomac, 
against which the full tide of Southern invasion broke. We 
will cite, in conclusion, as the most beautiful homage paid to his 
character, the unanimous regrets of the inhabitants of Frede- 
ricksburg, of which town he had been the military governor, who, 
although passionately devoted to the cause of the South, mourned 
him as if he had been one of their own people. 

Reynolds is struck at a quarter-past ten. Fortunately, the 
Federal soldiers, carried away by the excitement of battle, do not 
perceive the loss they have just sustained. ISIeredith has pushed 



104 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

forward into the wood at the liead of his first regiment, without 
even waiting for the rest ; the latter follow him en echelon. His 
soldiers push forward with a dash which astonishes the Con- 
federates, and, breaking their line, capture more than one thou- 
sand prisoners — among whom is General Archer himself — drive 
the remnants of the enemy's brigade beyond the stream, and, 
pushing these disorganized troops at the bayonet's point, plant 
themselves along the slopes bordering the opposite bank. 

This is a brilliant beginning for the Federals, but this success 
is counterbalanced by the check Avhich Cutler, at the same time, 
has just experienced at the other extremity of the line. In fact, 
Wadsworth has scarcely placed three regiments* of this brigade 
to the right of the railroad, when the latter are obliged to sustain 
Davis' entire effort on ground, which, as we have stated, affords 
them no support at all. Consequently, in a very short space of 
time they are obliged to abandon the first line of the heights to 
Davis, and to fall back from two to three hundred yards on the 
main ridge which connects Oak Hill with Seminary Hill. They 
find shelter in a thick wood, which at this point covers the two 
acclivities of the ridge ; their retreat, however, has been effected 
with so much haste that one of these regiments, the One-hun- 
dred-and-forty-seventh New York, which was nearest to the rail- 
way-cut, delayed by the death of its colouel,t finds itself almost 
surrounded ; the other two regiments, the Fourteenth| and 
Ninety-fifth New York, which Reynolds had posted between 
the Cashtown road and the wood, remain isolated, while the 
battery stationed on the road cannot be withdrawn except by 
sacrificing one of its pieces. This retreat, however, does not stop 
here, and a portion of Cutler's soldiers are brought back to the 
rear, almost to the very outskirts of Gettysburg. Doubleday, on 
being informed of Reynolds' death, which throws all the responsi- 
bility of the command on his own shoulders, hastens in this direc- 
tion in order to redeem the fortunes of the day. The Sixth Wis- 
consin, which has been left by Meredith in reserve at the seminary, 

* The Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania, Seventy-sixth and One-hundred-and-forty- 
seventh New York. — Ed. 

t Lieutenant-colonel Francis C. Miller, commanding the One-hundred-and- 
fbrty-seventh New York, was severely wounded, not killed. — Ed. 

X State mi\itia (Fourteenth Brooklyn).— Ed. 



OAK HILL. 105 

> 

eagerly rushes to the front, bears to the right, overtakes that por- 
tion of Cutler's brigade which has remained on the left of the rail- 
road, and Mdth the aid of a piece of artillery opens a murderous 
fire upon Davis' brigade. The latter, which is advancing in line 
against the wood where the Fourteenth and Ninety-fifth New 
York have taken refuge, is thrown into confusion by his enfila- 
ding fire. The Confederates try to front about to the right and 
cross the railway-track, in order to face this new enemy, biit they 
are driven back into the cut, almost two entire regiments being 
surrounded and captured with their colors. This new success might 
have been still more complete if Cutler's whole ])rigade had re- 
mained within reach. However that may be, the debris of the 
One-hundred -an d-forty-seventh New York are freed and the en- 
emy driven back in the direction of Willoughby Run. 

It is about eleven o'clock. The combined attacks of Davis 
and Archer have completely failed. These two brigades have 
lost more than one-half of their effective force. Heth has come 
to a halt in order to replace these vanquished troops with his 
two other brigades, under Pettigrew and Brockenbrough, which, 
being deployed to the right, have not, up to the present time, 
been much under fire. The energy of the Federals and the 
losses they have inflicted upon him have led him to exaggerate 
their numbers and to act with greater circumspection. 

The Confederates are bcQ-innino- to find out that their sudden 
attacks en masse are more dangerous and more difficult of execu- 
tion along the open, hilly country of Pennsylvania than among 
the thickly- wooded settlements of Virginia, where they did not 
stand in dread of slanting fires. Doubleday avails himself of 
this respite to rectify and strengthen his line ; Meredith, under 
the orders of the latter, resumes his position east of the stream, 
and occupies the edge of INIcPherson's Wood ; Cutler is brought 
back by him to his former position, and he causes the division bat- 
tery to be relieved by a mounted battery. He knows thatthe remain- 
der of his corps is approaching, and impatiently waits its arrival. 

Fortunately, while the Confederates are contenting themselves 
with a very fruitless cannonade, Doubleday, about half-past eleven 
o'clock, at last sees in the distance Rowley's and Robinson's 
divisions, each containing two brigades and presenting a total 



106 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

of between five and six thousand men. For tlie purpose of rein- 
forcing the line of battle, the first is divided and posted on both 
sides of the wood conquered by IMcredith — Stone's brigade on 
the right, and Biddle's on the left, with a portion of the corps 
artillery. The other division remains in reserve near the Sem- 
inary, around which it hastily digs a few trenches. The arrival 
of this reinforcement is opportune, for Heth will soon renew the 
attack, and tliis time with all his forces combined. While 
Brockenbrough is trying to outflank Biddle's left and to 
capture the Herbst farm, where the latter has stationed an 
advance detachment, Pettigrew, taking with him all that is left 
of Davis' brigade, makes an impetuous assault upon Stone's sol- 
diers : the latter, recruited from among the sturdy lumbermen 
of the great forests of Pennsylvania, form one of the finest 
brigades in the Federal army, and are known by the name of 
" Bucktails," in consequence of tlie ornament appended to their 
caps. Animated by the idea that they are defending the soil of 
their native State, they all cry out with one accord in planting 
themselves in the position to which they have been assigned, 
" We have come to stay !" "And," adds General Doubleday 
while narrating this incident of the battle, "they kept their 
word ; for the ground was open, the position extremely exposed, 
and a large number of them fdl upon that spot, never to leave it 
again." 

Their first check has deprived the Confederates of some of 
their daring, and after an hour's fighting they give up the idea 
of carrying the Unionists' positions. Hill has Pender's division 
of four brigades under his control, which, with Heth's other 
four, would secure him a considerable numerical superiority 
over the six brigades of the Fu'st Federal corps. He is sup- 
ported by a formidable artillery, for, besides the two division 
battalions, he brings with him all his reserve pieces — ten bat- 
teries in all. The battle, however, has been brought on in so 
strange and unusual a manner that Hill, kuoAving nothing of the 
strength of his adversary and the designs of his chief, hesitates, 
no doubt, to bring all his troops into line, and merely concentrates 
the fire of his eighty guns upon the positions of the Federals, on 
whom he inflicts some heavy losses. 



OAK HILL. 107 

The latter, however, soon receive new reinforcements. How- 
a]"d, with Barlow's division, has left Emmettsburg soon after the 
First corps, sending his other two divisions, under Schurz and 
Steinwehr, by way of the Taneytown road, in order to expe- 
dite the movement. On receipt of Eeynolds' first message he 
ordered each of these divisions to press forward, and, following 
the example of those who have preceded him, he hastens to 
Gettysburg in person. At half-past eleven we find him on the 
top of one of the houses of the town observing the localities in 
order to select positions for his troops, when he hears of Rey- 
nolds' death, and finds himself by right of seniority called upon 
to succeed him in the command of all the forces assembled on 
the battlefield. 

It was a heavy task for an officer who had not even yet made 
his appearance on that battlefield, and who possessed no informa- 
tion regarding the movements of the enemy and the preliminaries 
of the fight. But from his observatory he perceives a number 
of roads converging toward him from every point in the horizon, 
and may therefore arrive at the conclusion that these roads will 
soon be crowxled with a large portion of Lee's army marching 
upon him, whilst no other corps from the Union army can, 
according to given orders, come to join him at Gettysburg. 
Seeing that the First corps keeps the enemy well in check, he 
very wisely allows Doubleday to complete the task in the per- 
formance of which he has been so successful up to this moment, 
and occupies himself with the measures to be taken in order to 
support him. He has no more hesitation than Buford and 
Reynolds regarding the necessity of defending Gettysburg as 
long as possible, and of bringing together for that purpose all 
the forces within reach. As Buford called upon Reynolds, and 
he upon Howard, so the latter calls in his turn upon Sickles, 
who is to reach Emmettsburg in the morning with the Third 
corps, and to stop there, for Reynolds has been killed before 
sending him any message, intending no doubt to have done 
so at a later period. Now urgent instructions are forwarded to 
the division commanders of the Eleventh corps, with a verbal 
report addressed to ISIeade. The combatants of the First corps 
are unacquainted with these details, but soon the occupant of the 



108 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

observatory, precisely as he bad signalled the opporlime arrival 
of llcyuolds, informs Buford of the approach of the Eleventh 
corps, the corps flags which bear its distinguishing mark having 
enabled him to recognize it with certainty. In fact, at a quarter 
before one Schurz enters Gettysburg with his division. Howard, 
who leaves hira in command of the Eleventh corps, directs him 
to take this division, henceforth under the command of Schim- 
melpfennig, and Barlow's, by the Mummasburg road to the right 
of Doubleday, and to leave Steinwehr's division, with the corps' 
artillery, on the heights of Cemetery Hill. 

But the approach of a new adversary does not allow Schurz to 
afford the assistance to the First corps which he was preparing 
to bring it. Devin's cavalry, who are clearing the roads at the 
north for a considerable distance, see looming in sight several 
columns of the enemy, but find it difficult to delay the march of 
their advance-guard. It is Kodes' division, which, after having 
marched during the morning in the direction of Cash town, has 
received instructions from Hill at Middletown directing it to pro- 
ceed to Gettysburg. This detour has caused Rodes to lose two 
precious hours. Ewell, who accompanies him, astonished at 
finding the enemy at Gettysburg, becomes still slower and more 
circumspect in his movements than Hill, and allows himself to 
be detained for a while by the Federal cavalry. He does not 
wish to be drawn fully into the fight before hearing from Early, 
whom he has directed to march upon Gettysburg from Heidlers- 
burg. Nevertheless, at the first glance he has recognized the 
importance of the position of Oak Hill, and has directed Hodes 
to plant himself there. N( thing could have been more danger- 
ous for the Unionists, and the arrival of Ewell by way of the 
northern routes, changing as it does all the conditions of the 
fight, is in no way equalized by the reinforcement which Howard 
has just brought upon the ground. 

Two parallel ridges which intersect west of Gettysburg the Mum- 
masburg, Cashtown, and Hagerstown roads offer, it is true, some 
excellent defensive positions against any enemy coming from that 
direction ; and the number of combatants with which Hill attacks 
Doubleday might be doubled if Howard could hold them in check 
by extending his line to the right as far as the culminating height 



OAK HILL. 109 

of Oak Hill. But the roads followed by Ewell take the whole of 
this line precisely in flank and in the rear, and would lead him to 
Gettysburg in the rear of Doubleday while the latter would be 
engaged in front by Hill. In order to avoid this danger the two 
Federal corps should either be taken back to the rear of Gettys- 
burg and led to the summit of Cemetery Hill, where they will 
present a formidable front on every side without the risk of 
being turned, or form a line sufficiently strong to stop Ewell 
before Gettysburg, and en potenoe above Doubleday. The first 
manoeuvre would be premature, for Ploward cannot yet foresee 
Avhat forces he is about to encounter, and, knowing that Sickles 
is on the way to join him, he must try to maintain his position 
until the arrival of this important reinforcement. The second 
alternative does not yet occupy his mind, for at the moment when 
Rodes is preparing to take position on Oak Hill he is ignorant of 
the danger that threatens him on the north side, believing that 
he has only to contend with the troops that are fighting on Double- 
day's right near the Cashtown road. Consequently, he has ordered 
Schurz to post Schimmelpfennig's division among the oak-coppices 
from which Oak Hill derives its name, and two batteries of artil- 
lery between this division and the extremity of the line of the 
First corps. As to Barlow, he no doubt intends to leave him on 
the second line, or place him on the right along the prolongation 
of Schimmelpfennig's line. After having taken his measures and 
addressed, an urgent request for assistance to Slocum, he finally 
leaves the height on which he had tarried back of Gettysburg, 
and toward two o'clock visits the line formed by the First corps ; 
but his only instructions consisted in recommending Doubleday 
to hold fast in his positions, assuring him that the Eleventh corps 
would take care to repulse all the attacks of the enemy on the 
right. This encouraging promise will not be so easily carried 
out as Howard imagines. 

In fact, Bodes is already advancing to occupy Oak Hill. It is 
a quarter-past two o'clock. In order to seize upon this position 
with more certainty, and to command the whole of the enemy's 
line, he has left the Newville road and deployed his division 
across the ridge whose direction he is following. O'Neal's bri- 
gade is in the centre; Doles' line extends to the left as far as 



110 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

the road ; Iverson is on the right, sustained in the second line by 
Raraseur and Daniel, who are ready to prolong his front in order 
to give assistance to Hill's left. The five batteries of this division, 
having gone into position at once, concentrate the fire of one hun- 
dred guns upon the battle-front of the Federals. Oak Hill is thus 
occupied at the very moment that Schimmelpfennig's skirmishers 
are starting in the direction of this hill. Howard, returning from 
the left, learns at this juncture that the enemy is reported as 
almost on his rear in the direction of Heidlersburg. Whether it 
is fear of this new danger or that he deems the position naturally 
too strong, he does not venture to attack it with his infantry. He 
merely causes his two batteries to open a not very eifective fire 
from a distance against Ewell's artillery, which has taken imme- 
diate possession of the most commanding point and is beginning 
to rake Doubleday's line by a slanting fire. Since he declined to 
occupy Oak Hill, Howard should have brought back the Eleventh 
corps to the rear in order to form a strong connection between his 
left and the right of the First corps. He could thus on this side 
have rested it upon the railway-cut, and by keeping his right 
more and more disengaged as far as Rock Creek have covered it 
by the stream which flows at the foot of the almshouse. Instead 
of this, he leaves unoccupied between these two corps a space 
battered by the guns of Oak Hill, to which his two batteries 
cannot reply effectively, and instead of closing up his line 
by a retrograde movement of Schimmelpfeunig, divides it by 
carrying forward his extreme right, formed by Barlow's divis- 
ion. Being no longer able, as he had at first intended, to place 
it in position along the extension of Doubleday's front, he tries 
to post it perpendicularly . to the latter. This manoeuvre has 
become necessary in order to check the march of Doles, who is 
making his appearance on the eastern slope of Oak Hill, But 
the ground he has to defend, comprised between this ridge and 
the course of Rock Creek, presents no strong position to which 
he can cling; it slopes down in gentle undulations from the hills 
to the stream, while the character of the soil, thoroughly open, 
under excellent cultivation, and traversed by numerous roads, 
will favor whichever of the two adversaries has the superiority 
of numbers and ffuns. Seeing but few enemies before him. 



OAK HILL. Ill 

inasmuch as Doles' brigade is the only one that hajipens to be 
on this side at the moment, and entirely forgetting the danger 
that threatens him in the direction of Heidlersburg, Schurz 
endeavors to push his line as far as the border of a small stream 
which derives its source from Oak Hill, intersects the Carlisle 
road near the dividing-line, of the Newville road, and empties 
into Rock Creek below Blocker's farm. This position is marked 
on the right by a small wood which commands the last-mentioned 
water-course, but it has no real strength, and, being more than 
thirteen hundred yards distant from Gettysburg, it has the incon- 
venience of being exposed on both sides : taken in flank on the 
left by the extremity. Oak Hill and the Mummasburg road, it is 
equally liable to be turned on the right by way of the Heidlers- 
burg road, which passes back of the wood, and along \vhich the 
enemy has already been reported to Howard. 

But before Schurz has completed his movements a new and 
violent attack on the part of the Confederates against all Double- 
day's positions invites our attention to this point. It is half-past 
two : four of Rodes' five brigades and five batteries of artillery 
posted along the summit and the western slope of Oak Hill 
menace, not the Eleventh corps, but rather the flank of the 
Fu'st. At the sight of this reinforcement Hill determines to 
renew the fight with Heth's soldiers, who have had time to 
recover breath, while Pender's troops are ready to support them. 
Rodes, on his part, deploys his right in order to form connection 
with him. Iverson, Ramseur, and Daniel, crossing the Mum- 
masburg road, make a semi-diversion to the left for the purpose 
of attacking Cutler's troops in front. These troops, in fact, are 
facing west along the edge of the coppice situated north of the 
railway, in which they have taken refuge early in the day. This 
manoeuvre is almost entirely accomplished under shelter of the 
woods Avhich for a long distance extend along the western slope 
of Oak Hill. During this time Rodes' artillery is crushing with 
its projectiles the guns that Doubleday has posted along the Cash- 
town road, and, after having compelled them to take refuge near 
the seminary, he opens fire upon Cutler's right flank. 

Doubleday, finding his line menaced on this side, and the enemy 
about to penetrate within the space which separates him from the 



112 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Eleventh corps, calls for liis reserves, and scuds one of the two bri- 
gades of Robinson's division, which has remained on the Seminary 
heights up to the present moment, to prolong this line on Cutler's 
right. Those troops, under General Baxter's command, proceeded 
beyond the wood, and, following the ridge of the hill, reached the 
Mumraasburg road at its culminating point despite the fire of the 
enemy's artillery. Rodes, who sees them thus advancing openly, 
deems the occasion favorable for driving them back, and hurls 
O'Neal's brigade upon their flank. But this body of troops, under 
bad management, and already shattered by the fire of Howard's 
two batteries, ventures, while in a disordered state, to attack the 
Federals, who, making a rapid change of front to the right, wait 
for it steadily behind a stone wall running parallel to the road. 
The Confederates are repulsed with heavy loss, and the remnants 
of O'Neal's brigade, thrown into the greatest confusion, find it 
very difficult to rally beyond reach of the Unionists' fire. Nev- 
ertheless, the movement of Ilodes' right is accomplished, and 
Iverson comes in his turn to assail Cutler's and Baxter's positions 
from the west. If these manoeuvres had been less desultory and 
unconnected, the simultaneous attack of Rodes' troops would cer- 
tainly have been crowned with success ; but on this occasion he 
seems to have been very poorly supported by his subordinates. 
Baxter, who sees Iverson coming, has had time to face about to 
the left again, and he fortunately finds another wall perpendicular 
to the first, which affords his soldiers a solid protection. Double- 
day, who is attentively watching the much-contested battlefield, 
sends him at this moment a timely reinforcement. By his order 
General Robinson pushes his second brigade, under General Paul, 
to the right, and takes a position with Baxter in the angle of the 
two ^valls. South of the Cashtown road Doubleday has main- 
tained the positions conquered in the early part of the day on 
Willoughby Run. Meredith, covered on the left by Biddle, still 
occupies McPherson's wood, and Stone, more to the north, extends 
his lines as far as the Cashtown road ; and, as his right at this 
point is placed at about two hundred and fifty yards in advance of 
Cutler's left, he has drawn up this right triangularly, or en potence, 
making it face Oak Hill. Cooper's battery, posted behind the 
ridge occupied by Meredith so as to enfilade the entire slopes of 



OAK HILL. 113 

Seminary Ridge from south to north, batters Cutler's front from 
a distance of about one thousand yards. 

Iverson's attack falls upon Robinson's two brigades ; but, whilst 
the latter check him in front. Cutler, sui)ported by Stone's fire and 
Cooper's guns, emerges from the wood and takes him in flank. 
The small Confederate force makes a vigorous defence, but is 
almost annihilated, leaving a large number of men upon the fatal 
threshold of the wood where it had become engaged, together 
with about one thousand prisoners — that is to say, two-thirds of 
its effective force — in the hands of the Unionists. Daniel, who 
has a larger space of ground to traverse, arrives too late to save 
Iverson. He pushes forward, however, toward Stone, whose sa- 
lient position is more exposed, approaching him by way of the 
north. A desperate combat takes place near the railway-cut: 
Daniel takes possession of it, for Stone, who has only three regi- 
ments in hand, is menaced at the same time on his left by Pet- 
tigrew, whom Heth has posted in front of him for several hours. 
Daniel, however, gains but a small space of ground, and the two 
antagonistic forces continue to fire at each other, without being 
able to eifect a break into each other's lines. 

It is about a quarter to three. The three brigades, engaged 
without concert of action by Rodes, have not been successful. 
INIore to the right, Heth, taking advantage of the renewal of the 
conflict, has made a fresh attempt against McPherson's wood, but 
Brockenbrough's brigade, to which he entrusted the execution of 
this task, has been, after a vigorous attack, repulsed with losses 
by Meredith. 

The combat, however, is soon to assume a diflPerent aspect. 
Ramseur comes up to Daniel's assistance, and Hill determines at 
last to support the hitherto fruitless efforts of Heth with three 
brigades of Pender's division, which has not as yet been under 
fire, keeping only Thomas' in reserve. 

While the Confederates are thus preparing for a concerted 
movement which their numerical superiority renders certain of 
success, they obtain an easily-achieved advantage on their left 
which renders the situation of the First corps more and more 
dangerous. 

In fact, the two brigades of Schimmelpfennig's division, as 



114 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

they are advancing between tlie Oak Hill slopes and the Carlisle 
road, are taken in flank by llodes' artillery, and so fearfully 
shaken by the fire that Doles has only to push forward against 
the first, comnaandcd by Colonel von Amsberg, to drive it back 
upon the second. He thus compels the whole division to fall back 
as far as a cross-road connecting the Carlisle road with that of 
Muramasburg — a road lined with fences, which enable Schim- 
melpfennig momentarily to re-form his troops. To the right of 
the Carlisle road Von Gilsa's Federal brigade has promptly dis- 
lodged the enemy's skirmishers from a small wood upon which 
Barlow has to rest, and the latter loses no time in sustaining him 
\w\i\\ his second brigade. But the decisive moment has arrived ; 
the battle, which began at the west, then reached the north, is 
now about to extend north-eastward. While Ewell, from the 
summit of the ridge w^hence he overlooks the whole country, is 
watching Eodes' brigades wasting their energies in vain efforts 
against Doubleday's right, he finally discovers eastward Early's 
division coming up by way of the Heidlersburg road, and deploy- 
ing along the slightly wooded hills whose bases are washed by the 
waters of Rock Creek. Three brigades are drawn up in front 
line — Hays in the centre, along the road ; Hoke on the left ; 
Gordon on the right ; the fourth brigade, under Smith, is held 
in reserve. The division artillery opens fire against Barlow, who 
at this moment is manoeuvring to relieve Schimmelpfennig by 
taking Doles in flank. Gordon, on his part, is advancing for the 
purpose of crossing Rock Creek, and attacks the position which 
Gilsa has just occupied. His Georgian soldiers, marching in bat- 
tle-array and in perfect order, disappear for an instant among the 
large scroves of willow trees which line the banks of the stream : 
the firing of musketry follows, but this does not prevent tJiem 
from reappearing, still in the same order, on the other side of the 
stream. Their bayonets form a dazzling line amid the sheaves 
of golden wheat which they trample under foot in their passage. 
At last they fire a volley and rush to the assault. After an ener- 
getic resistance the Federals, finding themselves about to be sur- 
rounded by Doles on one side and Early's troops on the other, 
are obliged to yield ground, leaving a large number of killed 
and wounded behind them, the valiant Barlow among the rest. 



OAK HILL. 115 

Notwitlistanding this reverse, his division forms again upon his 
reserves, at about four or five hundred yards distance. His left, 
reaching as far as the Carlisle road, is endeavoring to form con- 
nection with Schimmelpfennig ; his right is drawn across the Hei- 
dlersburg road, while its centre rests upon the massive masonry of 
the almshouse buildings. 

This position, better than the former one, might have been 
defended for a greater length of time if the Eleventh corps had 
intrenched itself within it at once ; but the already vanquished 
troops which sought a tardy refuge there could not hope to pre- 
serve it long in the presence of the superior forces of the enemy. 
In fact, Hays and Hoke have crossed Rock Creek in their turn, 
and take the defenders of the almshouse in flank, while Gordon 
attacks them in front. Everything gives way before them. 
Doles, following Early's movement and encouraged by his 
example, drives before him the whole of Schimmelpfennig's 
division, which has not been able to withstand the attack of 
this single brigade, and which in its precipitate flight outvies 
in speed the runaways of the other division. It is about half- 
past three o'clock, and it is only at this moment that Howard 
thinks of ordering the retreat of the Eleventh corps. If he 
had not delayed so long in giving this order, the retrograde 
movement in the presence of an enemy who had shown but 
little enterprise could have been executed without difficulty or 
any serious loss, and consequently the position of Cemetery Hill 
would have been more strongly occupied. 

The Eleventh corps, already so unfortunate at Chancellorsville, 
was once more completely routed, so that the order of retreat in 
its present existing condition must have appeared to those who 
received it a perfect mockery. Such was not the case with the 
First corps, which could have executed this movement in good 
order, and thus have avoided useless loss, if the notice had been 
forwarded to it a little sooner. Unfortunately, this notice did 
not reach Doubleday, who sent to Howard for instructions several 
times, but in- vain. The officer despatched by the latter either 
lost his way or did not properly deliver the verbal message with 
which he had been entrusted, probably confounding the two almost 
homonymous elevations of Seminary and Cemeteiy Hill. 



no THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Be that as it may, at half-past three o'clock, when the Eleventh 
corps was already completely routed, the First was still continuing 
the struggle in the positions it had been defending since morning. 
But Doubleday, who appreciated the new danger to whi(th he was 
about to be exposed, sent his chief of staff to Howard to ask 
either for an immediate reinforcement or the order of retreat. 
Howard, who fronr the summit of Cemetery. Hill beheld all the 
phases of the conflict at a glance, and saw the enemy's battal- 
ions on all sides preparing to surround the First corps was not 
willing, it is said, to issue this necessary order,* at the risk of sacri- 
ficing all that yet remained of Reynolds' brave soldiers ; and the 
only reinforcement he offered to Doubleday was Buford's cavalry. 
He knew, however, that a portion of this division was already en- 
gaged on the left of the First corps, and that the remainder, under 
Devin, was covering with difficulty the retreat of his own corps on 
the extreme right. The task of the Union cavalry in this direction 
Avas the more hard because they were not only exposed to the fire 
of the enemy's artillery, but also to the Federal guns posted on 
Cemetery Hill, whose projectiles fell into their midst. Buford 
— Avho, like Howard, was surveying the whole battlefield, but 
whose quick and energetic mind was not hampered in its judgment 
by the weight of responsibility — had much sooner recognized the 
magnitude of the danger, and was at that very moment addressing 
a despatch to Meade urging him to send reinforcements, adding 
that, in his opinion, the troops were without leaders. Howard 
himself, however, was soon made to realize the perilous condition 
of the First corps. 

In fact, whilst Pender, after having replaced the exhausted 
and discouraged troops of Heth, falls with his whole division 
upon the three small brigades of Stone, Meredith, and Biddle, 
now reduced to less than five hundred men each, Rodes, finding 
his left disengaged by Schurz's defeat, gives the order for a 
general attack. The remnants of Iverson's and O'Neal's brigades 

* See Bates' Baitk of Gettyahurff, pp. 87, 88. Some persons have thought that, 
seeing from a distance the line of the Second Confederate corps advancing in 
good order, and having lost sight of iiis own troops, he mistook the enemy's line 
for that of tiie Eleventli corps in retreat, believing that the First was sufficienllji- 
protected to obviate the necessity of its immediate recall. 



OAK HILL. 117 

form again upon that of Ramseur, and these troops, supported by 
the fire of more than thirty pieces of artiller}', make a rapid 
descent upon the stone wall behind which Robinson's division 
is posted. The latter defends itself to the best of its ability : its 
chiefs — one of whom, General Paul, is seriously wounded — set 
the men a good example ; but the retreat of the Eleventh corps 
has left Robinson completely isolated. Consequently, it is unjust 
on the part of Howard, after having neglected to assume the 
proper direction of the First corps, to have accused it, in his 
first despatch to Meade, of having allowed its left to be turned, 
and by yielding ground to have forced the Eleventh to a prem- 
ature retreat. On the contrary, it was the disorderly disbanding 
of this latter corps, and especially of Schimmelpfennig's division, 
which compelled Robinson to abandon the position which until 
then he had so bravely defended, thereby involving the loss of 
Doubleday's ■ position. In fact, Robinson, hemmed in on three 
sides, is obliged to fall back upon the wood occupied by Cutler. 
This retreat is executed in good order, and, although sorely 
pressed, the Federals succeed in maintaining their position in 
the wood. But the conflict sustained by his right against supe- 
rior forces having exhausted all his reserves, Doubleday can 
no longer advantageously resist the new assault which Hill has 
just directed against his centre and left. At four o'clock the 
three brigades which Pender has pushed forward occupy the first 
line, leaving Heth's worn-out troops behind them. These are 
deployed south of the Chambersburg road — Lane on the right; 
McGowan's brigade, commanded by Colonel Perrin, in the cen- 
tre ; Scales on the left, near the road. The latter, after having 
relieved Brockenbrough's brigade, boldly descends the slopes 
facing McPherson's wood, in the direction of Willoughby Run. 
But Meredith's soldiers, hidden in the bush, receive the assailants 
at eighty paces with a fire which carries consternation into their 
ranks. Pender and Scales are slightly wounded ; the soldiers of 
the latter retreat in disorder, their chiefs being unable to bring 
them back to the combat. On the right Lane has allowed him- 
self to be intimidated by the fire of a Union detachment of 
cavalry which General Gamble has caused to dismount : he has 
halted, thus leaving Perrin to continue the movement alone. 



118 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

But the latter is more fortunate tlian tlie rest of Pender's divis- 
ion. Biddle's Federal brigade, which is opposed to hira, has not, 
like Meredith, found a wood to rest upon so as to disguise its 
weakness. Exposed in an open country without any reserve, in 
vain it riddles the assailants with bullets, sustaining an equal 
amount of losses with them and utterly unable to check them. 
Perriu, after having re-formed his line on the other side of Wil- 
loughby Run, advances against it without paying the least atten- 
tion either to Lane or Scales. Biddle is obliged to fall back in 
great haste before him, and to find a refuge among the slopes 
of Seminary Hill. The defenders of ISIcPherson's wood, finding 
themselves taken in flank, evacuate a portion of the wood in 
order to face the enemy who is threatening to turn their lines. 
On perceiving this movement Scales' soldiers gather fresh cour- 
age : throwing themselves upon Meredith and Stone with renewed 
eagerness, the latter are taken between two fires, and sustain ter- 
rible losses, for Perrin's left is already manoeuvring to cut off their 
retreat. 

Fortunately, Doubleday, although he has not yet received any 
instructions, understands that he has not a moment to lose in 
v^^ithdrawing if he does not wish to see th^ retreat degenerate into 
a rout. He hastily recalls Meredith and Stone to Seminary Hill, 
which affords him an excellent support for covering this retreat. 
While Robinson occupied the seminary he surrounded it with 
improvised trenches. Doubleday gathers the decimated battal- 
ions of Meredith, Stone, and Biddle behind these defences, 
although these troops have lost two-thirds of their effective 
force, and places a few cannon near them : he thus, by a well- 
directed fire of infantry and artillery, succeeds in checking the 
enemy, who is cautiously advancing. The energetic defence of 
Robinson and Cutler in the wood north of the railroad has 
enabled all the Federal batteries, which were in extremely 
exposed positions, to Avithdraw, leaving behind them only a 
dismounted piece. On the extreme left, south of the Hagers- 
town road. Gamble still holds Lane in check, who is trying to 
turn Doubleday's line by way of the south ; but the stalwart 
resistance around the seminary cannot be prolonged before the 
united efforts of Pender's division : it could have no effect but 



OAK HILL. 119 

to facilitate the retreat. It is near four o'clock when the 
extremely attenuated lines of the First corps descend the eastern 
slopes of Seminary Hill, the possession of which is abandoned, 
it being deemed useless to make any further sacrifices to retain 
it. Hill, after having taken possession of it, has no serious 
intention of going in pursuit of the Federals, whose excellent 
behavior brings Perrin to a halt, he alone having ventured to 
follow in their track. Doubleday thus succeeds in crossing 
Stevens' Run by following the convergent roads of Cashtown 
and Hagerstown, and he soon finds himself inside of Gettys- 
burg. The disorderly crowd of the two divisions under Barlow 
and Schimmelpfennig has preceded him, and is crowding the 
streets of this little town, which are fortunately both wide and 
straight. E well, more enterprising than Hill, has closely followed 
his adversaries. Ramseur and Doles have kept pace with the 
movements of the First corps ; Hays and Hoke, driving before 
them Devin's troopers, who are vainly endeavoring to check 
their course, approach the city on the eastern side. Fortunately, 
Howard, who is performing feats of valor at this critical moment, 
has caused Costar's brigade of Steinwehr's division to come down 
from Cemetery Hill, posting it in front of the J:own. He thus 
succeeds, with the aid of a few troops of the First corps, in 
holding the enemy in check for a short time. But at last, not- 
withstanding all their eiforts, Floward and Doubleday are obliged 
to abandon the place, where they are in great danger of being 
hemmed in. All the troops that have preserved good order fall 
back on Cemetery Hill. The whole of the First corps reaches 
the place, w^ith the exception of Stone's brigade — which has wit- 
nessed successively the fall of two commanders and a large number 
of its officers — the remnants of which, being the last to penetrate 
the streets of Gettysburg, are lost among the crowd of fugitives 
with which they are encumbered. The Confederates, who enter 
the town by two sides at once, fall in the midst of this crowd, 
picking up nearly four thousand prisoners. The remainder scatter 
about the country, reaching the Federal bivouacs the best way 
they can. General Schimmelpfennig himself, mixed up with the 
crowd, had barely time to conceal himself under a load of wood, 
and kept out of 'sight in Gettysburg for three days before he was 

I 



120 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

able to join his corps. Two oaunon were abandoned in the streets 
and fell into Swell's possession. 

The situation of the Federals was critical in the extreme. 
They had brought into action ten brigades of infantry, two of 
cavalry, and ten batteries, about sixteen thousand five hundred 
men in all, against fourteen brigades of the enemy's infantry and 
twenty batteries of artillery, aggregating more than twenty-two 
thousand men, for the Confederate brigades were much stronger 
than those of the Federals. Of these they had no more than 
five thousand men left in a fighting condition. The First corps 
was reduced to twenty-four hundred and fifty men. Out of the 
eleven thousand missing, nearly four thousand had been left on 
the field of battle and about five thousand were taken prisoners ; 
the rest had scattered. The fugitives crowded the road leading 
out of Gettysburg for the purpose of scaling the slopes situated 
south of the city, and without pausing near their leaders along 
the ridge of Cemetery Hill they hurried in the direction of 
Taneytown and Westminster, carrying confusion and discourage- 
ment into the ranks of the regiments that were coming to their 
assistance. It is true that on the heights of Cemetery Hill there 
was a nucleus of troops still fresh which would not have aban- 
doned this position without a fight, and which could have served 
as a rallying-poiut to the debris of the First and Eleventh corps. 
These were Von Steiuwehr's two brigades and a few reserve bat- 
teries of the latter corps. While in the occupancy of Cemetery 
Hill, General von Steinwehr had not allowed himself to be dis- 
tracted by the grand and thrilling spectacle of the battle which 
he witnessed from a distance : taught in the thoroughly practical 
school of the Prussian army, he had understood that this position 
would soon afford a last rallying-point to his comrades fighting in 
front, and he had applied himself to the study of its strength and 
weakness. Slopes of considerable ruggedness, overtopped here 
and there by sharp acclivities, rendered this position easy to 
defend against any direct attack from infantry; but the open 
plateau which these slopes encompassed on three sides was visible 
to and dominated by the neighboring heights within reach of 
cannon-shot; consequently, he had made good use of his sol- 
diers in constructina; bastions and earth'\\ orks, behind Avhi(!h he 



OAK HILL. 121 

had posted his artillery. Despite these wise precautions, how- 
ever, there were still wanting sufficient forces to occupy the 
position thus prepared, and troops determined to defend it. 

The reinforcements that could be relied upon were yet far 
away. But sometimes at a critical moment a single individual 
may bring a moral force on the battlefield worth a multitude of 
battalions. This individual arrived opportunely, just as How- 
ard, after performing prodigies of valor, was slowly leaving Get- 
tysburg. This was General Hancock. It was, we believe, a few 
ininutes to four o'clock; according to Hancock's testimony, it 
was only half-past three; Howard, in his despatch to Meade, 
written on that very day, and consequently more autheutic than 
the articles published by him since, says that it was four o'clock. 
There is but little difference in the affirmations of the two most 
important witnesses thereon. It was one o'clock in the afternoon 
when Meade, at his head-quarters in Taneytown, was successively 
informed of the battles fought by Buford against Hill's corps, of 
Keynolds' arrival on the battlefield, and of his death. During 
the entire morning he had received numerous despatches appris- 
ing him in a positive manner of the approach of the enemy, and, 
not knowing as yet on which side he would make his appearance, 
he had made every preparation for bringing back his various col- 
umns to Pipe Creek. In the event of Reynolds coming back to 
Taneytown with the three corps under his command, which were 
the most exposed, positive instructions had been given to the 
Second and Twelfth, directing them to support him in his retreat 
by advancing toward Gettysburg. The route to be followed by 
each corps had been designated. This early news, therefore, 
had decided Meade to fall back upon the line selected by him a 
few days previously. But presently, on being made acquainted 
with the gravity of the struggle going on at Seminary Hill, he 
saw that it was too late to draw back. His concentrative move- 
ment upon Pipe Creek was greatly compromised by the sudden 
appearance of the enemy at a point which his left was to occupy 
before beginning the movement. The strategic position of Get- 
tysburg had to be defended by a whole army, or simply occupied 
by a squad of soldiers ready to retire at the first serious attack. 
From the moment that INIeade hesitated about taking the ad- 



122 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

vance against Lee with all bis forces, the despatch of two army 
corps to near this town was an error which could only be ex- 
cused on the score of his ignorance of the latest movements of 
the enemy. Buford and Reynolds, in provoking the battle for 
the possession of Gettysburg, had obeyed the spirit of the instruc- 
tions he had given them, but they would certainly not have done 
so if they had not found ground admirably suited for delivering 
the decisive battle which was impending, Meade, although a 
native of Pennsylvania, was not aware of the advantages of this 
ground, which he had never visited. It was, however, necessary 
for him to decide at once either to bring back the troops that 
were engaged, and concentrate all the other corps upon Pipe 
Creek or some adjacent position, or, as he had himself intimated 
to Reynolds in a despatch written the day previous, take the 
whole army to Gettysburg, concentrating his forces upon the 
point of attack selected by the enemy. In order to take so 
serious a step, Meade should have gone in person to reconnoitre 
the localities around which the conflict was carried on, being 
only separated from it by about thirteen miles. But, as we have 
already stated, the Union generals-in-chief, notwithstanding their 
activity and courage, left their head-quarters reluctantly, for, 
making constant use of the telegraph for the transmission of 
their orders, they found it inconvenient to be at any great dis- 
tance from the office. Unwilling to go to Gettysburg himself, 
Meade sent General Hancock in his place. The latter had just 
arrived at Taneytown with the Second corps from Frizzcllburg, 
where he had passed the night. INIeade, who rejiosed a Avell- 
deserved confidence in this cliieftain, had just explained all his 
plans to him : he had selected him, although the junior of Howard 
and Sickles, to replace Reynolds in the command of the left Aving, 
requesting him to decide, after an inspection of the ground, 
whether it was expedient to deliver a battle either at Gettysburg 
or at some neighboring point back of the town, or to fall back 
upon Pipe Creek. From the moment that Meade declined as- 
suming the responsibility of this decision he could not have 
selected a more competent officer to act in his place than Han- 
cock. Howard was no doubt endowed with as much coolness as 



OAK HILL. 123 

courage, but he had not yet exhibited all those military qualities 
which at a later period distinguished him as Sherman's lieutenant. 
He had almost always been unlucky : the remembrances of the 
recent rout of the Eleventh corps — a rout for which he alone 
was wrongfully held responsible — still weighed heavily upon 
him ; in short, he did not possess that indescribable gift, that 
ardor and contagious self-reliance, wdiich imparts to a chieftain 
a boundless authority over those surrounding him — qualities for 
which General Hancock was especially distinguished. 

The latter as soon as he arrived assumed the command and 
applied himself to the task of restoring order among the troops 
who were hurrying in great confusion toward Cemetery Hill. 
The Eleventh corps, under the personal direction of Howard, re- 
forms around Von Steinwehr, ^vhose forces are drawn up across the 
Taneytown and Baltimore roads : the fugitives who cover these 
roads are brought back into the ranks. Howard had ordered 
Doubleday to place himself on his left; Hancock points out to 
him with precision the position which two of his divisions are to 
occupy on the heights at the foot of which the Emmettsburg 
road winds, taking from him Wadsworth's division in order to 
place it over the dominating hillock of Gulp's Hill. As we have 
already mentioned, this wooded hill commands the valley of Rock 
Creek, faces the heights of Wolf's Hill and Benner's Hill, and 
completely flanks the plateau of Cemetery Hill, with which it is 
connected by a ridge with steep acclivities. About five o'clock 
\Yadsworth Avas taking possession of this important position. 
Order had gradually been restored in the Federal lines. The 
soldiers, encouraged by the sight of a powerful artillery firmly 
planted, got back to their ranks. They were again ready to 
wait for the enemy without flinching and to make an energetic 
defence. 

But it had taken them one hour thus to re-form under the eyes 
of the Confederates ; and the historian will now ask, as the Union- 
ists themselves were then asking each other in astonishment. How 
is it that these adversaries, generally so prompt in striking blow 
after blow and to take advantage of the first success, have allowed 
them this precious respite, instead of gathering by a final effort 
the fruits of their victory ? When Ewell entered Gettysburg in 



124 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

the midst of a mass of fugitives disarmed by fear, and was ])ick- 
ing up prisoners by tlie thousand, the sun, which was still high 
in the heavens, promised liim more than three hours of daylight: 
he had time, therefore, to deliver and to win a new battle. The 
two divisions of Early and Pender — that is to say, one-half of 
the Confederate forces — had not been in action more than one 
hour ; two of their brigades had not been at all engaged ; vic- 
tory, moreover, imparted strength and confidence to the most 
exhausted. In short, more fortunate than their adversaries, the 
Confederates had in their midst the respected chieftain whose 
slightest wishes had hitherto been eagerly obeyed. Lee was on 
the ridge of Seminary Hill before half-past four, whence he sur- 
veyed the battlefield around him so stubbornly disputed by Hill — 
at his feet i\\Q town of Gettysburg, which Ewell had just entered, 
and in front of him the slojies of Cemetery Hill, which the Fed- 
erals were scaling in great confusion. Hill and Longstreet were 
at his side, Ewell only two-thirds of a mile from his post of 
observation. Hill's corps, as we have stated, had not seriously 
harassed Doubleday's retreat. Lee did not order him to cross 
the wide and open valley which separates the heights of Seminary 
Hill from those of Cemetery Hill in order to attack the Federals 
in the position along which they were forming with so much dif- 
ficulty. This valley and the opposite slopes, which the next day 
were to be so thoroughly drenched in blood, did not, however, 
present any formidable obstacle. It is true that the Southern 
general, on perceiving that Ewell was pressing the enemy closer, 
sent him an order by Colonel Taylor to attack the hill, if he 
could do so with any chance of success, as soon as he saw his 
troops in the town ; but he had himself very serious doubts on 
the subject. Colonel Long, whom he had charged to make as 
thorough an examination of the enemy's positions as possible, 
having reported that they were very strong. So that, while 
ordering Ewell to make the attack, he recommended him at the 
same time, according to the language of his report, to avoid a 
general engagement so long as the army had not arrived on the 
ground. According to Colonel Taylor, who was the bearer of 
the despatch, the order to attack the enemy was much more per- 
emptory, and Johnson has since stated to the latter that he did 



OAK HILL. 125 

not Tiuderstaud why it was not carried out. Lee would seem to 
have been disposed to aim at a partial success by dislodging the 
Federals from their last retreat, but in order to achieve this result 
he did not wish at this moment to risk a new battle with the only 
forces under his control. It was for this reason that he had not 
pushed the Third corps forward. This extreme caution may be 
condemned, but the motives can be easily understood. 

Lee had not in the heart of Pennsylvania the same freedom of 
movement as in Virginia. He had to think of his communica- 
tions and a possible retreat. Stuart, from whom he had not heard 
for the last eight days, was no longer at his side to keep him 
acquainted with the strength of the enemy's forces and to trace 
out the route for his battalions to follow. The latter had so sud- 
denly come in contact with the enemy in the morning that the 
Confederate generals were in constant expectation of some new 
surprises. They perceived, along the ridge of Cemetery Hill, by 
the side of the fugitives who were still in great confusion, other 
soldiers in serried ranks supported by heavy artillery, and sup- 
posed that Howard had just been reinforced on coming out of 
Gettysburg. Good order having been fully restored in all the 
Union ranks completed the deception. 

It has been said, and very justly, we think, that if Jackson had 
been alive and in command of his army corps on the 1st of July, 
he would not on that day have left Cemetery Hill in the hands 
of the Federals. The fact is, that Lee, having the utmost con- 
fidence in his lieutenant, would not have hesitated to risk a great 
deal in order to afford him the means of striking a decisiv^e blow: 
he would not probably have waited for Jackson to ask him to 
direct Hill to make a useful diversion to the direct attack on 
Cemetery Hill. 

Early, however, who had penetrated into Gettysburg at the 
head of Hays' brigade, had an idea of undertaking this attack as 
soon as he found himself master of the town ; but, notwithstand- 
ing Hays' solicitations, he did not dare to take the responsibility. 
He referred the matter to Ewell, sending at the same time a 
message to Hill requesting the latter to sustain him ; which mes- 
sage, being received in Lee's presence, did not naturally deter- 
mine any serious movement of the Third corps. But while he 



126 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

wiis waiting for instructions froni liis ininicJiate chief his atten- 
tion was directed elsewhere. General Smith, whose brigade had 
not been in action, and who, consequently, should have passed to 
the first line, had halted on the left in the rear, close to the York 
road, upon the mere rumor that a nc^v corps of the enemy was 
coming up by way of that road. Although he did not put much 
faith in this news. Early sent Gordon with a second brigade in 
that direction, less for the purpose of stopping this imaginary 
enemy than to take command of the two united brigades. Thus 
deprived of one-half of his division. Early by himself could 
no longer attempt anything against Cemetery Hill. Matters 
would not have proceeded thus under Jackson. Ewell did not 
exercise the same influence over his lieutenants as Jackson did, 
and on this occasion was poorly served by some of them. O'Neal 
had allowed his brigade .to take part in the fight without his per- 
sonal direction. Iverson, in the heat of the struggle, had caused 
his chief to be informed that he had seen one of his OM^n regi- 
ments i^ass over to the enemy : finally. Smith, through his cre- 
dulity, paralyzed Early's movements. 

Rodes' troops having suifered fearfully, and his artillery not 
being yet in position, Ewell had really only two brigades at his 
disposal ; consequently, he thought he was acting in conformity 
with Lee's instructions by waiting for Johnson's arrival with the 
Third division to make the attack. Hill's immobility and the 
very text of his own instructions convinced him that Lee was 
less anxious to take possession of Cemetery Hill than to avoid a 
general engagement at that time. Johnson, who had passed the 
night with the corps artillery, not far from Chambersburg, between 
Scotland and Greenwood, had had about eighteen miles to travel 
over a road encumbered with vehicles of every description, and 
notwithstanding his speed he only reached Gettysburg a little 
before sunset. He had been preceded on this road by Ander- 
son's division of the Third corps, which being hastily sent for in 
the morning by Hill from Fayetteville, where it had bivouacked, 
reached the borders of Willoughby Run before six o'clock, when 
it was brought to a halt by an order from its chief. 

Lee, having determined not to provoke a decisive battle until 
the concentration of his army was accomplished, must naturally 



OAK HILL. 127 

have resorted to every device in order to complete this concentra- 
tion before that of his adversary. This was easy for him to do ; 
for, as we perceive, two of his three army corps were entirely 
under his control at the close of the day. Longstreet was still 
absent. Pickett's division had remained at Chambersburg for the 
purpose of covering the defiles of South Mountain : an order to 
join the army was forwarded to him, but it could not reach him 
before the next day. The other two divisions, under INIcLaws and 
Hood, had started from Greenwood in the morning, after having 
successively aided in the passage of Johnson's division, all the 
supply-trains of the Third corps, which occupied a space of no 
less than thirteen miles, together with Anderson's troops. They 
followed the same road as the latter at a certain distance from 
each other. Messengers were sent to expedite their movements, 
but the extraordinary order which had directed the supply-train 
to pass before them had caused a great loss of time which could 
not be repaired ; in fact, the road, muddy and broken up, was 
encumbered by vehicles loaded with provisions and ammunition 
that were proceeding in the direction of the battlefield, and by 
others that were already returning with some of the wounded. 
Consequently, McLaws' head of column did not reach Marsh 
Creek till nine o'clock in the evening, when it halted, while 
Hood's division was unable to establish its bivouac near it until 
midnight. 

From five o'clock in the evening the position of the Federals 
had been greatly improved ; Culp's Hill, which Early could have 
taken possession of without striking a blow, and whence he could 
have struck them in the rear, was occupied by Wadsworth. A 
quarter of an hour later the arrival of the first fresh troops, so 
impatiently looked for, was finally communicated to Hancock. 
It was Sickles and Birney, who were coming from Emmetts- 
burg with a brigade of the Third corps. The urgent call that 
Howard had addressed him about half-past twelve o'clock was 
the first intimation that Sickles had received of the battle that 
was being fought at Gettysburg. His marching orders, dated 
the day previous, directed him to make preparations to occupy 
this town; Meade's instructions, on the contrary, forwarded in 
the morning, marked out for him a retrograde march toward Pipe 



128 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA: 

Creek. In short, he learned that subsequently to the sending of 
these instructions a battle had commenced in which two corps 
might have to struggle against the whole of the enemy's army. 
Among so many contradictory directions, Sickles, always eager 
for a fight, could not hesitate : he determined to hasten to the 
assistance of his comrades. The corps, the command of which 
he had resumed during the last three days, was only two divisions 
strong. Leaving one brigade from each division at Emmettsburg 
under De Trobriaud and Burling to cover the outlet of tlie moun- 
tains, he set out about three o'clock. He brought along Bir- 
ney's, Graliam's, and Ward's brigades, sending Humphreys, who 
was then engaged in reconnoitring, an order to follow with the 
rest of the Second division. The latter, without waiting for its 
chief, started before four o'clock, but it was delayed by the sup- 
ply-trains of the First and Eleventh corps, and, taking the wrong 
road, came near falling in with the rear of the Confederates near 
Marsh Creek at Black-Horse Tavern, and, in short, only reached 
Cemetery Hill about one o'clock in the morning. But scarcely 
had Graham fallen into position on the left of the First corps 
when a new reinforcement — a most important one this time — 
enabled Hancock to give more extension and solidity to his line. 
Slocum, according to the general plan, had led the Twelfth corps 
from Taueytown to Two Taverns since morning. He had hardly 
reached this point, which is only five miles from Gettysburg, when 
he received Howard's despatch asking for assistance, and had im- 
mediately made his whole corps resume the line of march in the 
direction of Gettysburg. Reaching the borders of Rock Creek 
about half-past four o'clock, he had noticed the wooded heights 
along the left bank of this stream, which, under the name of 
Wolf's Hill, dominate all the neighboring localities; and not 
knowing on which side the battle was rasfino^, the sound of 
whose cannon he heard, he had ordered his First division, under 
Williams, to take possession of it. The latter, ascending the left 
bank of the stream, soon fell in with Ewell's scouts, and was 
preparing for an attack when he was informed that the enemy 
being master of Gettysburg, the possession of Wolf Hill w;is no 
longer of any importance. He halted on the banks of the 
stream a little below Gulp's Hill, the slopes of which Wads- 



OAK HILL. 129 

worth had just occupied. In the mean while, Geary's divis- 
ion, which was following Williams, had continued its march 
upon Gettysburg, arriving near Cemetery Hill at about half-past 
five. In compliance with Hancock's directions, it occupied the 
immense space extending between Graham's small brigade and 
the lofty hillock of Round Top, whose importance had not failed 
to attract the notice of the commander of the Second corps. Half 
an hour later, Slocum, who had left Williams as soon as he under- 
stood the situation of the combatants, arrived in person at Ceme- 
tery Hill. Hancock, in compliance with Meade's orders, turned 
over the command to him. His task Was accomplished. From 
the moment of his arrival on the ground he saw that the position 
of Cemetery Hill, completed, in a tactical point of view, the 
strategic advantages presented by Gettysburg : it commanded the 
town and all the roads adjoining it. Instead, therefore, of fall- 
ing back, at the risk of greatly discouraging the soldiers, for the 
purpose of taking a defensive position before which Lee would 
probably not appear, another and much better position was found, 
inasmuch as it M^as more compact and that this time the enemy 
could not avoid making an attack without acknowledging him- 
self vanquished. About half-past four o'clock Hancock sent a 
message to Meade, telling him that he believed the position easy 
to defend with good troops, although on the left it was not very 
strong. At a quarter past five he sent him the same message in 
writing ; finally, at seven o'clock he started himself for Taney town 
in order to give him a verbal account of the situation. 

Meade had not waited for his arrival to determine what course 
to pursue. At last clearly divining the play of his adversary, he 
had not allowed himself to be disconcerted about the unforeseen 
incidents of that day ; and as soon as he had been able to ap- 
preciate the gravity of the situation, toward five o'clock — that 
is to say, even before receiving Hancock's first report — he had 
deliberately adopted the simplest course of action, whicli was 
also most in conformity with the principles of war : this was to 
concentrate his army between Gettysburg and Taneytown. He 
had at once sent for the Sixth corps, which was entering IMan- 
chester at that very moment. From very proper prudential rea- 
sons he had merely directed Sedgwick, who was in command 



130 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMimiCA. 

of this corps, to halt on the borders of Willoway Creek, a strong 
intermediate position between Pipe Creek and Gettysburg, if he 
shoukl hear tluit the troops engaged at that point had been obliged 
to beat a retreat. About half-past six he received Hancock's two 
messages, and decided at once in favor of Gettysburg. Since two 
o'clock in the afternoon the Second cor})s had been on the march 
toward this point, so that Hancock met it only a few miles from 
the battlefield : he brought it to a halt, in order that his troops 
might protect, in case of need, the rear of the army against any 
flank movement on the part of the enemy. Tiiere was no neces- 
sity of making any changes in the orders already issued to enable 
the whole army to march upon Gettysburg, exce})t in two instances: 
the Fifth and the Sixth corps. One had left U,nion in the morn- 
ing, and could not fail to be in the neighborhood of Hanover ; 
the other must already have left Manchester. The concentration 
tlius commenced by the initiative action of the several chiefs, even 
before it had been decided upon by IMeade, was then much easier 
to accomplish than a retrograde movement of any kind. 

As will be seen, the night-time was considered on both sides 
as the favorable moment, not for rest, but for preparing for the 
great struggle that was to take place the next day. If darkness 
had prevented Johnson from delivering the assault on Cemetery 
Hill, it could, on the other hand, aid him in taking possession of 
a position flivorable to the projected attack. This position was 
Gulp's Hill, which some Confederate officers had ascended when it 
was not yet occupied by Wadsworth. He was desirous of planting 
himself upon it before daylight, but the detachment which recon- 
noitred the place having fallen among Federals and been almost 
entirely captured, he gave up his project. These incidents exer- 
cised a powerful influence over the battle of the folloAviug day. 

In fact, Lee, finding a portion of the Federal army in front of 
him, and arriving on a battlefield that had been gained in a man- 
ner which was as glorious as it was unexpected, had no idea either 
of planting himself in a defensive position or of manoeuvring so as 
to compel his adversary to attack him. He had discarded the plan 
— a most dangerous one in our opinion — which Longstreet had 
suggested to him, of turning the left of the Federals: lie held 
his adversary before him, and was anxious to strike him. It was 



OAK HILL. 131 

upon the right of the latter that he proposed to direct his decisive 
blow. The obstacles were greater than on the other side, but the 
wooded country was also much more favorable to a bold manoeuvre 
and a sudden attack like that of Jackson at Chancellorsville : the 
wood neutralized the superiority of the Federal artillery. Lee, 
however, having visited Ewell during the evening, the latter 
explained to his chief that the principal forces of the enemy 
were massed in front of him, and that he should certainly avail 
himself of the niglit to intrench on that side. Lee, not impressed 
by these arguments, determined to look out for a point of attack 
along the Federal left. He even thought for a moment of aban- 
doning Gettysburg, in order to bring back the Second corps to 
his right and concentrate all his forces in that direction ; it would 
have been the wisest and most skilful course to pursue. He dis- 
carded this idea upon the assurances given by Ewell that his 
troops could attack and carry Cemetery Hill as soon as Longstreet 
had broken the lines of the Federal left. He moreover attached 
great importance to the capture of this height, which seemed to 
him to be the key to all the enemy's positions. The objective 
point was all marked out and designated to his soldiers on the 
right. It was the Round Tops, whose uneven summits were seen 
rising like two dark towers over the valley lighted by the rays 
of the moon, which was then at her full. 

This light favored the march of the Federal soldiers, who were 
hastening by every road in the direction of the town (almost un- 
known till then) where the destinies of America were about to be 
decided. It threw a lurid glare over the cemetery, surrounded 
by tall pines, which the vanquished of the previous day occupied 
around Hancock, and which Meade, arriving at last from Taney- 
town to assume the direction of the battle, was traversing with 
his numerous staff about one o'clock in the morning. The cold 
rays of the moon, flitting playfully through the trees, whitened the 
large tombstones in the shadow of which the living, oppressed by 
fatigue, were lying like dead men for whom a powerful magical 
influence had, by the waving of a wand, conjured these mournful 
monuments into existence. Occasionally a soldier would rise up, 
his eyes haggard, abruptly wakened by the tramping of horses' 
feet, or some wounded man turned on his side with a groan on 



132 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

the damp ground which was absorbing his blood. Then every- 
thing was still again, waiting for the sun to revive the energies 
of the combatants, a large number of whom were destined to see 
it rise for the last time. 

The critical hour had arrived. The battle was about to be 
fought under different conditions from any of those that had 
preceded it; and, if it sliould accrue to the advantage of the 
Confederates a new phase of the war would be inaugurated. 
For the first time the Federals found themselves reduced to 
play a purely defensive rdle north of tlie Potomac River. 
When, during the preceding year, the clashing of arms 
had ten heard along this bank, it was McClellan attack- 
ing his adversary, already driven back to the river and ready 
to recross it. This time, on tlie contrary, the Army of the 
Potomac was the only barrier which still interposed obstacles 
between the large Northern cities and an invader stimulated by 
the hope of seizing so rich a prey. Everything seemed to con- 
spire against it, even the government whose last hope it w^as. 
The chieftain that the government had just given to this army 
had only been in command for the last three days: how could 
one expect of him that quickness of perception, that precision in 
his orders, and from his subordinates that blind confidence so 
necessary on the battlefield ? Lee, who had exercised the su- 
preme command for the last thirteen months, and had already 
won four great victories, possessed on that very account a supe- 
riority which was worth many battalions to him. The supe- 
riority of numbers was undoubtedly on the side of the Fed- 
erals, but it was not sufficient to guarantee them success; and 
INIeade, deceived by exaggerated reports regarding the strength 
of his adversaries, was even ignorant of this advantage. Con- 
sequently, during this night, full of anxiety, how much must 
he have regretted the scattering of the Federal forces against 
which all his predecessors had vainly protested ! Out of the 
sixty thousand men, more or less well organized, who were in 
Washington, the Federal government could easily have detached 
ten thousand to reinforce the Army of the Potomac: the same 
thing may be said of the fourteen thousand under Peck, who 
since the 1st of JNIay had scarcely had an enemy before them 



OAK HILL. 133 

at Suffolk, and from eight to ten thousand of the twelve thousand 
who under Keyes were occupying their leisure hours in the lines 
of Yorktown in projecting a sudden descent upon Richmond. 
In short, by leaving in Baltimore the thirty-five hundred men 
charged with holding the Secession element in check, and by 
employing a thousand men in escorting the materiel of Har- 
per's Ferry as far as Washington, General Halleck might have 
ordered French to join Meade, instead of leaving him at Fred- 
erick, where his presence would have been henceforth purposeless. 
Out of the ninety -seven thousand men thus divided, there were at 
least sixty thousand in a condition to take part in the campaign, 
thirty-eight or forty thousand of whom, perfectly useless where 
they were stationed, could have been added to the Army of the 
Potomac before the 1st of July. Thus reinforced, the Union 
general would have been certain of conquering his adversary, 
who was too much compromised to fall back, and even to inflict 
upon him an irreparable disaster. But Lee was right in rely- 
ing upon the military sluggishness of the Federal government. 
Meade, without wasting his time in vain regrets, had not a mo- 
ment to lose in preparing, with the resources placed in his hands, 
for the supreme struggle, of which the battle of the 1st of July 
was only the prelude. 

Let us see what was, on the morning of the 2d of July, the 
distribution of these forces., of which only a portion, as we have 
seen, was collected near Gettysburg when INIeade reached Ceme- 
tery Hill before midnight. The Eleventh corps occupied this 
hill, along which it had rallied — Schurz's division across the 
Baltimore road ; Steinwehr's on the left ; on the right and 
rear that of Barlow, then commanded by Ames. The First 
corps was divided : Wadsworth, on the right of Ames, held 
Gulp's Hill ; Robinson, on the left of Steinwehr and across the 
Taneytown road, extended as far as a clump of trees called Zieg- 
ler's Grove; Doubleday, who had transferred the command of 
the corps to General Newton, was in reserve with his division in 
the rear of Schurz. The combined artillery of these two corps 
covered their front, sheltered to a great extent by the light earth- 
works constructed on Cemetery Hill the previous day. South of 
Ziegler's Grove, Hancock had, since the evening of the 1st, pro- 



134 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

longed the Federal left with the troojrs he had at liis disposal as 
far a.s the sugar-loaves of the lloiiiid Tops, so as to present a solid 
line to the enemy's troops, M^iich he then perceived on Seminary 
Hill. Birney, with Graham's and Ward's brigades of the Third 
corps, Ijearing to the left of Robinson, extended along the ridge 
which prolongs Cemetery Hill as far as the depression where the 
latter seems to lose itself for a while, to rise again afterward 
toward the Round Tops. Geary, in this direction, with a divis- 
ion of the Twelfth corps, was developing on Birney's left as far 
as the smallest of these two hills, which he liad caused to be 
occupied by two regiments.* Williams, with the other division 
of the same corps, had halted within a mile and a quarter in the 
rear of Cemetery Hill, on the left bank of Rock Creek, near the 
point where the Baltimore road crosses this stream. Finally, 
Humphreys, who had been on the march since four o'clock in 
the afternoon, arrived on the ground, and the darkness not 
allowing him to select his place, he massed his two brigades a 
little in the rear and to the left of Birney 's line. 

In the mean while, after a long conference with Hancock, 
Howard, and some generals of his staff, INIeade had not waited 
for daylight to reconnoitre i\\Q position where the fortune of war 
had just brought him. Being very near-sighted, he required 
considerable time to study the ground. The moonlight enabled 
him to visit the positions of his soldiers with ease, but it was 
only toward four o'clock, when the early rays of the sun imparted 
to the objects around their natural appearance, that he could form 
a correct idea of the whole. He was at once struck with the weak 
points they presented : being convinced, however, that it was too 
late to look for others, he thought only of drawing the best pos- 
sible advantage from those which circumstances had placed within 
his reach. At this moment, in fact, all the troops that had not 
already gathered around him were about to start for the purpose 
of joining him. 

The Second corps, which had halted a few miles from Gettys- 
burg, on the Taneytown road, resumed its march ; De Trobriand's 
and Burling's brigades left Emmettsburg ; and the Fifth corps had 
arrived the day before at Bonaughtown, a village about six miles 
* Fifth Ohio and One-hundred-and-forty-seventh Pennsylvania, — Ed. 



OAK HILL. 135 

from Gettysburg, ou the Hanover turnpike. In the course of three 
consecutive days, from the 29th of June to the 1st of July, this 
corps had marched over sixty-two miles from Frederick, Maryland, 
but notwithstanding the fatigue of his men, General Sykes had 
pushed them forward in the direction of Gettysburg since break 
of day. The Sixth corps, which, on the 1st of July, was station- 
ed at Manchester, more than thirty miles from Gettysburg, had 
been on the march since seven o'clock in the evening, and, owing 
to this forced march, was expected to arrive in the afternoon. The 
cavalry, ou its part, was preparing to cover the positions which 
the ariuy had first occupied : Buford, with Gamble's brigade, 
cleared it on the left, along the Emmettsburg road ; but on the 
right Devin's brigade, not being able to maintain its ground be- 
fore Ewell, near Gettysburg, had passed to the second line on the 
Taneytown road. Merritt, with the regular cavalry brigade, had 
been hastily called from JNIechanicstown ; Kilpatrick, who fol- 
lowed Stuart as far as the neighborhood of Heidlersburg, had 
been ordered to fall back on Two Taverns ; Gregg, who was at 
"Westminster with his division, had left Huey's brigade to protect 
the depots and the line of the railway, and was advancing with 
the other two brigades in order to take position on the right of 
the army. The reserve artillery, which had halted at Taneytown 
oil the morning of the 1st of July, had been placed on the march 
by Meade, and was to join him on the morning of the 2d. 

These night-marches were extremely trying to the soldiers, 
reducing, to a great extent, the bodies of troops that were 
dragging along in the rear, the darkness of the night crowding 
the roads W"ith stragglers. Those who had halted during the 
night had, for the most part, as will be seen, long distances to 
travel. Consequently, the troops reached Gettysburg very much 
exhausted — a bad condition to be in for fighting ; but the first 
thing to be done was to reach the place, and it was not paying too 
dear for such an important result. Thanks to these forced marches, 
the whole army was assembled by nine o'clock in the morning, 
with the exception of fifteen thousand men of the Sixth corps, 
and even the latter were sure to arrive in time if the conflict lasted 
a few hours. This concentration, effected with so much rapidity, 

was as creditable to INIeade as to his soldiers. 

K 



136 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Lee, on his part, was also gathering liis forces, the following 
being the positions they occupied at daybreak : Swell's entire 
corps was drawn up on the battlefield, with Johnson on the left, 
resting on Rock Creek, upon lienner's Hill; Early, in the centi-e, 
facing the ridge which cpnuects Gulp's Hill with Cemetery Hill; 
Eodes, on the right, at the foot of the last-mentioned hill, his 
main force occupying the town of Gettysburg, while his right 
formed a connection with the Third corps on Seminary Hill. 
The two divisions of the latter corps, which had fought on 
the previous day, retained the positions that had been taken before 
sunset. Pender was on the left, above the seminary; I loth, on 
the right, along the ridge ; Hill's third division, under Ander- 
son, was posted about one and a half miles in the rear, on the 
Cash town road, between Marsh Creek and Willoughby Run. A 
large portion of the First corps — that is to say, McLaws' and 
Hood's divisions, with the exception of Law's brigade — had fol- 
lowed close upon Anderson along the same road, and had halted 
three-quarters of a mile on the right bank of Marsh Creek; 
before four o'clock Anderson was proceeding toward Seminary 
Hill; Hood and McLaws, after giving their soldiers only two 
hours' rest, had, like Andei'son, put their columns in motion 
also, and were advancing toward Gettysburg while waiting for 
orders assigning them their proper place on the battlefield. At 
the same time, Pickett was leaving Chambersburg, and Law 
the village of New Guilford, where Longstreet had sent him the 
day before. We have seen that Stuart, having at last received 
his instructions, was leaving the neighborhood of Carlisle in great 
haste for the purpose of joining his chief at Gettysburg. By 
nine o'clock in the morning the whole Confederate army was 
therefore assembled around the town, with the exception of Stu- 
art's cavalry and the six thousand infantry which Pickett and 
Law could bring into line. The opportunity of attacking the 
Federal army while still divided had vanished with the last 
glimmer of daylight on the 1st of July ; but in resuming the 
battle on the morning of the 2d, Lee had the great advantage of 
finding his adversaries scarcely recovered from the combat of the 
previous day and the rapid marches they had undergone — of sur- 
prising soldiers worn out by fatigue, and officers utterly unac- 



OAK HILL. 137 

quainted with the ground, within lines still wretchedly formed, 
and in positions miserably selected, and deprived of the support 
of a large portion of their own artillery. In bringing his troops 
into action at nine o'clock in the morning he could hardly have 
exacted an effort equal to those he had obtained from them at 
Manassas and Chancellorsville. 

We must pause at the juncture when Meade, after examining 
the ground, has issued his orders. The Federals are beginning 
to rectify their positions. The First and the Eleventh corps have 
not altered theirs, but the Second, having arrived at seven o'clock, 
has been placed by Hancock, in pursuance of Meade's instruc- 
tions, to the left of the First ; Hays' division, on the right, is 
resting upon Ziegler's Grove ; Gibbon's division is in the centre ; 
on the left Caldwell's reaches out alono- the dividino; water-line 
between Plum Run and Kock Creek, as far as the height on which 
stood the Humelbaugh house, his skirmishers occupying the Co- 
dori house on the Emmettsburg road : each of these three divisions 
possesses a front of two deployed brigades, the third being kept in 
reserve. In order to make room for them, the Third corps has closed 
its ranks, and is bearing to the left. The ground upon which it is 
about to take position will be the scene of so important and des- 
perate a struggle that it is necessary to complete the general de- 
scription we have heretofore given by details the usefulness of 
which the reader will at once acknowledge. 

We have stated that a line from the upper strata of rocks formed 
by a slight convulsion of the earth eight hundred feet in length, 
much less elevated than the ridge of which it is the continuation, 
rises gradually as far as the commanding point occupied by the 
farms of Want and Sherfy — to which we have given the appella- 
tion of "orchard " — where it is suddenly interrupted by declivities 
of considerable steepness. The line of rocks, broken at the west, 
becomes again united, through a depression in the ground of only a 
few yards, to a new ridge which, by its direction, its declivity to the 
eastward, and the wooded character of its western front, resembles 
that of Seminary Hill. The culminating point of this ridge is 
occupied by a few houses which Ave shall designate by the name 
of Warfield, one of their proprietors. Willoughby Run waters 
the foot of the hill at the west. The road from Gettysburg to 



138 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

EmmcttsLurg, after passing below Ziegler's Grove as far as the 
Want liouse, with the exception of a strip of huid about nine 
liundred yards in length between the houses of Codori and 
Smith, inclines to the westward and intersects directly the head 
of the little valley where it has its source. The hillock, as its 
English name of " Peach Orchard " implies, is thickly covered 
with peach trees, wdiich are largely cultivated in that country, 
where the fruit is distilled. It is a commanding position, possess- 
ing extensive views, but was covered by the position of Seminary 
Hill ; consequently, strong at the east, weak at the west, and com- 
manded for a distance of over five hundred yards by the Warfield 
ridge, behind which the enemy could make preparations for his 
attacks with impunity. A road, called the Millerstown road, 
branching off from the Hagerstown road near IMarsh Run, at the 
Black Horse Tavern, crosses Willoughby Run, ascends the left 
bank until it strikes an isolated schoolhouse, when, winding up 
to the Warfield farm, it intersects the Emmettsburg road at the 
Peach Orchard, and subsequently pursues a south-easterly course 
to cross Plum Run, and finally to connect with the Taney town 
road north of the Little Round Top ; the road skirts the Peach 
Orchard hillock by following the base as far as Plum Run. This 
sti-eam, after taking its source near the Trostle brick house, runs 
from north to south through a valley interspersed with isolated trees 
and bushes : before striking the road it passes between two woods, 
one of which, at the east, rests upon the AYeikert house, wdiile the 
other, at the w'est, triangularly shaped, skirting the north side of 
the road, runs as far as the Trostle house. Below the crossing the 
stream, being marshy, rushes into the wild gorge comprised between 
the Round Tops and the rocky hill of the Devil's Den. This 
hill forms the continuation, at the south, of the rocky line which 
the road follows after leaving Peach Orchard, and which it aban- 
dons to cross Plum Run. The woods by which it is covered are 
separated from this road by a large field of wheat, adjoining on one 
side the wood of the Trostle house, which stretches down as far as 
a little valley where an insignificant tributary of Plum Run flows 
from north-west to south-east. That portion of the Devil's Den 
facing this valley is more woody and less rocky than that fronting 
Round Tops. At the extreme end of the wheat-field two 



OAK HILL. 139 

branches of the small tributary form a junction, one of them 
rnmiing through the field itself; the other, taking its source 
west of tlie Emmettsburg road and following the base of the 
Peach Orchard, leaves the Rose farm on the right and crosses, 
before reaching the above-mentioned wheat-field, a wood which 
covers both its sides. This wood, bounded at the east by the 
wheat-field, at the west by these slopes, extends, at the point of 
its longest distance, from the borders of the road above mentioned 
as far as the neighborhood of the Timber farm ; south of this trib- 
utary of Plum Run there i^re open fields and fenced-in meadows 
sloping down by gentle gradations in front of Round Top, and 
which a by-road traverses, forming a junction between the Slyder 
farm on the borders of the stream and the Emmettsburg: road 
near the point -SN'here the latter intersects the Warfield ridge, 
below the gorge by means of which Plum Run works out a 
passage through tlr^ rocks just mentioned — a country easy of 
access and under general cultivation, stretching out as far as 
the Taneytown road, completely enveloping tliis rocky section 
on the south side. 

By following this description on the map it will be seen that 
the Round Tops were to serve as a resting-point for the left of the 
Federal army, like Gulp's Hill on its right and Cemetery Hill in 
its centre. The direct line connecting them with this last hill 
passed through the lower flat country, and was but little adapted 
to artillery manoeuvres. The commanding hillock of the orchard 
seemed from its very position to invite the Federals to plant 
themselves there. It covered their left, preventing the enemy 
from approaching them in front or from disguising any flank 
movement ; in short, the stream which watered the base of the 
hill towards the south constituted a strong^ line as far as 
the Devil's Den. But, notwithstanding these apparent advan- 
tages, the occupation of the orchard presented many inconveni- 
ences to the Federals ; it allured them through the collective at- 
tractions of positions which they could not dispute to the enemy 
without endangering the whole battlefield. 

Entirely isolated at the north and north-west from the line adopt- 
ed by Meade, indifferently connected with the latter at the w^est, the 
orchard presented a salient angle which was the more difficult to 



140 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

defend, being commanded on one side, while its elevatiou on the 
other side rendered it impossible for the Federals to recapture it 
when they had once lost it. It would have been necessary, there- 
fore, in order to take practical possession of the place, either to 
occupy it with a considerable portion of the army, and surround 
it with iutrenchmcnts, as Steinwehr had done at Cemetery Hill, or 
simply to place a few troops with instructions to fall back as soon 
as they had compelled the enemy to disclose his forces. 

At four o'clock in the morning, Meade, being desirous of rein- 
forcing his right, which, being nearer the enemy, seemed to him 
destined to play the principal part, had ordered Geary to abandon 
his position near Sickles in order to occupy the eastern slopes of 
Gulp's Hill to the right of Wadsworth. AVilliams being already 
at Rock Creek, the whole of the Twelfth corps was to be thus 
assembled on this side. Geary had taken up the line of march 
at five o'clock, leaving vacant all that portion of the line he had 
occupied, from Sickles' left to the Little Round Top. The ar- 
rival of the Second corps, which came to take position between 
the First and the Third, enabled the latter to bear to the left in 
this direction. Between six and seven o'clock in the morning 
Meade sent his sou to Sickles with orders to take the position 
which Geaiy had just left. This position, as we have stated, 
extended as far as the slopes of the Little Round Top, which 
Geary had strongly occupied since the previous evening. The 
order was most positive, and Meade has been blamed for not 
having attended to the execution of said order in person ; 
nor did he endeavor to ascertain if the occupation of the 
summit of Gulp's Hill had been . effected, relying upon Slocum 
and Wadsworth to do that ; besides, the commanding aspect of 
this hill indicated it sufficiently as the most important point to 
hold along the Federal left. But, Geary having started at an 
early hour, Sickles, entirely occupied with his own troops, had 
no knowledge of the position held by Geary, nor of the extent 
of his line, and, as no one had been left behind to supply the 
necessary explanations, JNIeade's order no longer possessed the 
same clearness in his estimation that it did when received. The 
Little Round Top, which he- perceived at a consideral)le distance, 
was separated from him by low grounds which offered no ad van- 



OAK HILL. 141 

tage for posting his four brigades, no commanding point for pla- 
cing his artillery. Consequently, when Colonel Meade arrived, 
between eight and nine o'clock, to ascertain if the order which 
he had brought from his father had been executed. Sickles 
answered him that he could not distinguish the position in 
which he was to replace Geary. Nevertheless, like an obedient 
lieutenant, he had not waited for fresh orders to extend his 
line to the left, and before nine o'clock Birney was deploying 
Graham's and Ward's brigades in the direction of Little Round 
Top. At the same time, he saw the two other brigades of his 
own corps arriving. De Trobriand and Burling, who had left 
Emmettsburg at daybreak, being still ignorant of the situation 
of the two armies near Gettysburg, had followed the direct road 
leading to this town, and thus passed between the lines of skir- 
mishers of both armies over the hillock of the orchard ; they had 
exchanged a few shots with the Confederate skirmishers, leaving 
in their hands a certain number of stragglers, who had not been 
able to keep up with their pace; but they arrived without encoun- 
tering any serious resistance. De Trobriand took position be- 
tween Graham on the right and Ward, who had been resting 
upon the base of the Little Round Top, on his left. Bur- 
ling joined Humphreys' division, which had remained massed 
with the artillery of the Third corps on the left and a little in 
the rear of the Second, which was posted on the hill of Ziegler's 
Grove. So that, toward nine o'clock, Sickles occupied the posi- 
tion designated by Meade ; but, as he had only deployed one 
of his two divisions, he could not reach beyond the base 
of the Little Round Top, and did not set foot upon the hill 
itself. The blame which may be attached to the Union general- 
in-chief does not consist in his having designated in an insufficient 
manner a position which the character of this hill clearly indi- 
cated, but in having entrusted a line of too great extent to a sin- 
gle corps. In fact, this line, which required a stronger force in 
consequence of its presenting points extremely vulnerable, should 
have possessed a development of at least one and a quarter miles, 
even if the Little Round Top had been occupied ; whilst on the 
right of Sickles the Second corps had only a front of a little over 
twelve hundred yards to defend. But Meade, believing that the 



142 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

decisive struggle would take place on his right, was not disposed 
to Aveaken cither this wing or his centre for the benefit of the 
left, and did not seem to attach sufficient importance to the de- 
fensive dispositions which the latter might adopt. Sickles, how- 
ever, after having deployed Birncy's troops, sought to complete 
the formation of his corps from the moment that the arrivaLof 
Burling's brigade had filled up the ranks of Humphreys' divis- 
ion : not being entirely satisfied with the position where the latter 
was massed, although it was sufficiently flanked both on the right 
and left, he only left Burling in it, and caused the other brigades 
to advance about four hundred yards along the direct prolongation 
of the Second corps. This new jDOsition was much worse thau the 
preceding one ; for Humphreys was located at the very extremity 
of the valley of Plum Run, and was commanded still closer by the 
ridge ^vhich the Emmettsburg road follows. Leaving a second 
line, composed of five regiments massed, at an equal distance be- 
tween Burling and his first line, he formed the latter by deploy- 
ing the seven regiments which were left him, and pushed forward 
his advance-posts at once as far as this road, which he was anxious 
to clear. The Federal skirmishers, after having occupied the 
Rogers mansion, pulled down all the fences which covered the 
ground on that side — a precaution which, at a later period, facili- 
tated the movements of the division. 

During this time the Federal right was taking a firm position 
and receiving important reinforcements. The Fifth corps, hav- 
ing arrived before six o'clock in the morning on Rock Creek, 
had temporarily taken position on the right of Williams' divis- 
ion ; but at eight o'clock, when Geary came to post his troops 
on Gulp's Hill, Slocum, who was in command of these two corps, 
brought back all his forces on the west bank of the stream. 
Geary planted himself upon the wooded flank of Gulp's Hill, 
which commanded this side of the creek as far as the streamlet 
flowing from Spangler's Spring. AVilliams prolonged his line 
in the same direction by resting his right on the conical hillock 
called McAllister's Hill, taking advantage of the natural rough- 
ness of the ground, which we will describe in detail presently. 
These two divisions speedily made intrenchments along their front. 
The Fifth corps took position near the main road, in sight of 



OAK HILL. 143 

the bridge of Eoek Creek, thus forming a reserve which, while 
su])porting the right, could, by means of direct paths, hasten with 
equal rapidity to the assistance of the left or the centre of the 
line. Finally, the reserve artillery, which arrived at the same 
time, was parked, by Meade's orders, in a position not less central 
between the Taneytown and the Baltimore roads. 

By nine o'clock in the morning the Federal line was there- 
fore rectified. All the corps save one had arrived, and, not- 
withstanding their exhausted condition, each had taken the 
positions assigned by the general-in-chief. Through the one 
which he had designated for the Fifth corps he was already 
prepared to take great advantage of the very form of this 
line, the two extremities of which had fallen to the rear. The 
enemy had not, during these first five important hours of the day, 
fired a single cannon-shot to annoy the Federals or to interrupt 
their preparations. Astonished at this inexplicable silence on 
the part of an adversary ordinarily so active, Meade concluded 
that Lee had not finished his concentration, and had only the 
forces engaged the previous day about him. He at once con- 
ceived the idea of taking the offensive in his turn, and of antici- 
pating him by attacking the positions of Ewell on Benner's Hill 
with the Twelfth and Fifth corps. This bold project was justi- 
fied by appearances, and the point of attack well chosen : the 
Confederate Second corps was, in fact, the easiest of approach, 
the open country extending between the rest of the Southern 
army and the Federal positions being an obstacle in the way of 
such an attack, the importance of which Lee was soon to experi- 
ence in turn. But appearances alone were favorable ; for Long- 
street's two divisions, being at that moment within reach of Get- 
tysburg along the Cashtown road, could have formed a junction 
with Hill in order to defend Ewell. Fortunately for Meade, 
Generals Slocum and Warren having deemed the country very 
difficult to be traversed, he decided to wait for the arrival of the 
Sixth corps. The enemy did not allow him to resume his 
project. 

Lee, in fact, has the greatest interest in striking quickly and 
heavily. We must now see how he is employing the morning 
of the 2d of July, during which the Federals are preparing to 



144 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

receive him, to present the various pliins he can adopt, and examine 
the motives which determine his choice. We have shown that 
before continuing his march northward he had been obliged to 
measure strength with the Federal army. In order to preserve 
his communications, to receive ammunition, to send back his 
booty and sick, and to transform his movement into a positive 
invasion, it was necessary as soon as practicable to render it impos- 
sible for this army to attack him. He has drawn it into a pursuit, 
and then has suddenly turned against it, while the simultaneous 
arrival of Hill and Ewell before Gettysburg has enabled him to 
crush two Federal corps. Lee, however, was not able to gather 
the fruits of his victory that same evening, and on the morning 
of the 2d of July he found the greater portion of the Union 
army in front of him. He has four alternatives to select from : 
he has the choice to retire into the gaps of the South IMouutaiu 
in order to compel Meade to come after him ; or to wait steadily 
in his present positions for the attack of the Federals ; or, again, 
to manoeuvre in order to dislodge them from those they occupy 
by menacing their communications by the right or the left; 
or, finally, to storm these positions in front, in the hope of carry- 
iu<>- thorn by main force. The best plan would undoubtedly have 
been the first, because by preserving the strategic oifensive Lee 
would thus secure all the advantages of the tactical defensive. 
Once master of the mountain-passes, he may cover his retreat upon 
Hagerstown or Hancock on the one side, v/hile still menacing the 
very heart of Pennsylvania on the other. Meade, being hard 
pressed by public opinion, will be compelled to attack him in as 
formidable positions as those of Crarapton's and Turner's Graps, 
where the preceding year a handful of men so long resisted Mc- 
Clellan's assaults. Lee, by way of excuse for not having adopted 
this plan, has alleged the impossibility of bringing to the rear in 
time the supply-trains which were crow^ding ou the road from 
Chambersburg to Gettysburg : this excuse does not seem to us to 
be admissible, for the same trains were able to retrograde, with- 
out obstruction, during the night of the 4th and 5tli, and such a 
movement wcmld have been less dangerous after the victory of 
the 1st than after the defeat of the 3d. The truth is, that the 
ardor and assurance of the Confederate army, the mutual confi- 



OAK HILL. 145 

deuce of the chieftains and soldiers, together with their contempt 
for their adversaries, do not allow Lee to take a step backward 
which would have the appearance of a retreat. To wait unflinch- 
ingly for Meade's attack in the position which the chances of war 
have just afforded to the Confederates is a middle course, full of 
inconveniences and without any advantages. The position of Sem- 
inary Hill is a very strong one, it is true, but it is isolated ; it can- 
not mask a movement either toward the Potomac or the Susque- 
hanna, and may be easily turned. Besides, Lee could not remain 
motionless upon these hills, for, drawing as he does his resources 
from the country, he cannot supply his army with rations except 
by scattering it : to wait would therefore be fatal to him ; it 
would redound entirely to Meade's advantage, who can promptly 
receive the supplies he requires, and the reinforcements which 
are increasing daily his numerical superiority. In short, in the 
midst of an offensive campaign suddenly interrupted the temper 
of the Confederate army would not brook inaction any more 
than retreat. It is expedient, therefore, either to manoeuvre for 
the purpose of dislodging the enemy or to attack him in his posi- 
tions. He adopts the second of these plans : he will fail, but 
that is not a sufficient reason for believing that he has made a bad 
choice. The principal survivors among Lee's lieutenants have 
publicly made known their opinions regarding the advantages 
and disadvantages of these two plans, and are divided in their 
preferences. In order to carry out the first, so as to compel Meade 
to abandon his positions without wrenching them from him by 
main force, it would have been necessary to menace his base of 
operations at Westminster, east-south-east of Gettysburg; but. 
this cannot be done in turning it by way of the north without 
becoming absolutely isolated and abandoning the entire line of 
retreat, and consequently without encountering more dangers than 
the Federals would be subjected to. It is therefore by way of 
the south that the Confederates are obliged to manoeuvre ; but on 
this side the difficulties are equally great. In order to strike the 
Westminster line it is necessary, first of all, to deliver the town 
of Gettysburg to the enemy — an important position and dearly 
bought ; afterward a change of base must be effected in order to 
rest upon the Fairfield and Emmettsburg roads, and to describe 



146 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

at least one-third of a complete circuit around the Federal army — 
a flank march the more dangerous because it would be undertaken 
in a hostile and open country ; finally, it is necessary to wait for 
the cavalry, whose co-operation is indispensable. It is true that 
Meade, who must be acquainted with his weak points, greatly 
dreads this movement, but it is also true that he has taken every 
necessary measure to avert the most serious consequences to him- 
self. In fact, if the positions he occupies near Gettysburg are 
impregnable, everytiiing should be tried to drive him out of them, 
rather than to storm them in front ; but they are not better than 
those of Willoway and Pipe Creeks, upon which he is ready to 
fall back. Lee therefore cannot be blamed for having preferred 
a direct attack. His whole army, with the exception of some of 
his generals, demands that this attack shall be made ; a resistless 
impulse seems to spur it on to battle. It believes itself iuvin- 
\ cible — a powerful element of success when this blind confidence, 
^ which makes it forget all thoughts of retreat, neglect all cal- 
culations of numerical force, and scorn the adversary, is not 
shared by the leaders. But in the Confederate army nearly 
all these generals have undergone the contagion. Lee himself, 
the grave and impassive man, will some day acknowledge that 
he has allowed himself to be influenced by these common illu- 
sions. It seems that the God of armies has designated for the 
Confederates the lists where the supreme conflict must take place : 
they cheerfully accept the alternative, without seeking for any 
other. 

If Lee cannot be blamed for the decision he has adopted, it 
is impossible not to recognize the faults he commits when tliis 
determination has once been settled. We have seen how import- 
ant it is for him to carry out this determination without delay ; 
yet when he returns from his conference M'ith Ewell on the even- 
ing of the 1st of July he docs not appear to have as yet clearly 
decided upon his plan of battle for the following day. He no 
doubt desires to wait for daylight in order to reconnoitre the 
ground, but this uncertainty causes him to lose much precious 
time. At daybreak of the 2d he is in the saddle : he has de- 
cided to make the attack on the right, and orders Lougstreet to 
place his two divisions on that side, along the prolongation of 



OAK HILL. 147 

Hill's line, so as to be able to begin it at once. But lie does 
not appear to have as yet determined either upon the hour 
when it is to be made, the point against which it is to be 
directed, or the number of troops to take part in it. Accus- 
tomed to find in Jackson a lieutenant to whom it was not neces- 
•sary to give any precise instructions — ^who upon a mere sugges- 
tion would adopt all necessary measures for striking the point 
designated for his attack with the greatest rapidity and ,with 
the utmost possible vigor — Lee on this occasion did not take 
into consideration Longstreet's character, with whose strong and 
weak points, his energy and tardiness, he must, however, have 
been well acquainted. It is evident to us that from the evening 
of the 1st of July there was a misunderstanding between these 
two generals. On his return from his conference with Ewell, 
Lee, having decided to entrust the main attack to Longstreet, 
had made him some suggestions, but had given him no orders. 

Instead of making himself thoroughly acquainted with the 
^\isl^es of his chief, and preparing for making the attack at an 
early hour, the commander of the First corps only thinks of sug- 
gesting a new plan of battle. At dawn, with this object in view, 
he has hastily repaired to head-quarters. This time he has re- 
ceived orders, although still of a very vague character; Lee did 
not give his instructions the precise and peremptory form which 
should characterize all that emanates from a general-in-chief. 
Consequently Longstreet, not seeing any advantage in pressing 
the attack, loses much precious time, either through design or 
mental sluggishness, while his chief, relying entirely upon his 
promptness, proceeds to examine in person the Federal right, 
which Ewell is still preparing to attack. 

Lee does not return from this errand until nine o'clock in 
the morning, and we must believe that he finds Longstreet still 
delayed in his preparations by difficulties of execution Avhich 
add to his own reluctance, for the rest of the morning is devoted 
to reconnoitring with him the ground upon which the First 
corps is to advance, as far as the Warfield ridge. It is not until 
eleven o'clock, therefore, that he gives him formal instructions. 
He, however, merely directs Longstreet, according to a statement 
of the latter, to envelop the enemy's left, and to begin the attack 



148 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

against this point by following as much as possible the Emmetts- 
burg road. If these assertions are correct, he must have been 
enlightened by means of verbal explanations, because the Em- 
mettsburg road runs almost parallel with the front of the two 
armies, and it was then only occupied by a few Federal pickets; 
consequently, we shall find Lougstreet deviating in a singular 
manner from the letter of his instructions. It is evident, how- 
ever, that Lee, convinced of how much the position of the orchard 
will be useful for the decisiv^e attack, has been under the impres- 
sion that he should begin by taking possession of it, inasmuch as 
it Avould be the first point to be met on the Emmettsburg road. 
The Kound Tops are no doubt too prominent for the general- 
in-chief to deem it necessary to call the attention of his lieu- 
tenant to this double sugar-loaf, the profile of which Ewell had 
shown him by moonlight the day before, where on the tops the 
flags of Meade's signal corps were seen flying ; but he had not 
the least suspicion that such a position was at that moment only 
occupied by a dozen men, and what an easy prey it would be for 
Longstreet to seize if he could reach the place unnoticed. 

By directing the First corps to storm the extreme left of the 
enemy, Lee assigns Longstreet, therefore, a role analogous to that 
which Jackson had so well performed at Chancellorsville. But the 
ground being more open than in the forest of the Wilderness, ren- 
ders the manoeuvre more difficult and less effective, inasmuch as it 
cannot altogether escape the enemy's notice. Besides, Lee has not 
placed in the hands of Longstreet the means of action which two 
months previously had secured Jackson's success. In fact, having 
at that time only five divisions with him, he gave his lieutenant 
three of them, and kept but two to hold Hooker in check. There 
is no doubt that in order to occupy the attention of the adversary 
a larger display of force is required on the cultivated hills of 
Gettysburg than around Chancellorsville; but it must also be said 
that, owing to the nature of the ground, the artillery could supply 
the absence of a numerous force of infantry. The very disposi- 
tion of the two lines of the enemy ought to decide Lee to concen- 
trate all his means of action upon a single point in order to strike 
a decisive blow, should he be obliged even to strip the rest of his 
front to accomplish this purpose. In fact, from Benner's Hill, 



OAK HILL. 149 

along the left bank of Rock Creek, as far as the extremity of 
Seminary Hill, the Confederates form an extensive and concave 
line, which will be still further lengthened when Longstreet, de- 
ploying beyond the Emmettsburg road, shall try to outflank the 
Federal left : this line will possess a development of about five and 
a half miles, and its extremities, placed face to face at a distance of 
about three miles, will be separated by the whole mass of the enemy's 
army. This army occupies, therefore, an inverse and convex posi- 
tion along an arc of little less than four miles, the chord of which 
is only two thousand two hundred yards in length. If it be 
always dangerous for the smallest army to approach the adver- 
sary by two Avings at once, the form of the Union line renders the 
execution of such a plan particularly difficult for the Confeder- 
ates. Yet Lee has not dared to diminish the too-extended front 
occupied by his left wing, and still less to strip it under the very 
eyes of the enemy in order to reinforce his right. He has there- 
fore left three divisions of the Confederate Second corps on this 
side, although he has declined to assign it the first role in this 
day's work. He cannot, however, doom the entire corps to 
absolute inaction, and before leaving Ewell has directed him to 
attack the enemy with vigor when the sound of cannon shall 
announce the commencement of the battle on the right wing. 
The Confederate Third corps, placed in the centre, will have to 
support its two neighbors as soon as the Federal lines shall appear 
to be shaken by either attack. So that, by a train of errors inti- 
mately connected with each other, Lee deploys his army upon a 
more extended front than that of Meade, without concentrating 
anywhere the necessary force for breaking up the enemy's lines. 
The first attack is to be made on the right with only two divis- 
ions; then, without any other notification than the clashing of 
arms in this battle — a sign always unreliable — three divisions will 
undertake the second attack at the other extremity of the line ; 
Inally, if success appears to favor them, the right centre, by con- 
necting these two attacks, shall take part in the battle. Shall ^^^e 
find in these dispositions a proof of Lee's hesitation regarding the 
point where it is expedient for him to strike his adversary, or 
should we rather think that he does not dare to entrust to any- 
body a mission fully as important as those which Jackson had 



150 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

so well performed at JNIaiiassas aud ChanccUorsville ? This 
last supposition is justified by the part which Lee will take iu 
the direction of the battle, and Avhicli we should be tempted to 
designate as insignificant, if we could do so without intending to 
cast blame upon him. Once the game opened, he continues to 
leave an extraordinary latitude to his lieutenaats, just as if Jack- 
son were still living : the absence of a sufficient general staff — the 
great defect of American armies — made this, perhaps, a matter of 
necessity on his part. After having allotted to each man his 
separate role in the action which is about to take place, he will 
remain, so to speak, a spectator of the struggle, receiving hai'dly 
any message and scarcely issuing any order. The intricacies of 
the machine he has to manoeuvre make it too difficult for him 
to guide it properly wdien it is on the march. 

The plan adopted by Lee has the inconvenience of increasing 
this very defect by making success dependent upon the com- 
bined action of several corps between which there is absolutely 
no connection ; thus he commits, in his turn, the fault he made 
Hooker and Sedgwick pay so dearly for on the banks of the 
Rappahannock; and this fault, the consequences of which we 
shall see developed during each phase of the battle, will be ag- 
gravated, as it frequently happens, by the hesitations of his lieu- 
tenants, who are obliged, for the first time, to manoeuvre in sight 
and under the fire of the enemy : this will prove to be the prin- 
cipal cause of his defeat. 

Longstreet, as we have stated, did not approve of the plan of 
attack which he was charged to execute, and, before receiving 
detailed instructions, did not display much alacrity in preparing 
himself for it : he found his forces reduced, at that time, to six 
brigades, altogether insufficient for such a task, and he was in 
hopes that the attack would be deferred till next day, in order to 
allow time for Pickett's division and Law's brigade to join him. If 
Lee had given him a formal order, or if he had himself felt the 
necessity of beginning the action as soon as possible, he could 
have brought seven brigades into line by nine o'clock in the 
morning. At this hour, indeed, the sixteen pieces of artillery 
of his artillery corps, which had left Greenwood under the 
direction of Colonel Alexander, arrived at Seminary Hill, while 



OAK HILL. 151 

"Wilcox's brigade, which had been left by Hill on Marsh Creek, 
behind the bivouacs of the First corps, had reached the adjoining 
woods of Warfield without being seen by the enemy, where Mc- 
Laws came to relieve it toward four o'clock in the afternoon. 
Longstreet preferred to wait, finding, no doubt, that through one 
of those long days of July he had no need of hurrying in order 
to conquer and gather the fruits of victory. It is true that Lee, 
beginning to be impatient, directs him to attack without Law's 
brigade, which can only arrive at noon ; but the general-in-chief 
soon yields to his pressing request, and allows him to wait for 
Law. Three-quarters of an hour have scarcely elapsed when 
Law joins Hood's other brigades, which are massed back of Sem- 
inary Hill at the west, behind the right of the Third corps. The 
latter, as well as Alexander's batteries, lias long been in position : 
Ewell is waiting for the signal agreed upon. 

The sun, the burning sun of July, has already crossed the zen- 
ith, and the same silence continues to prevail along both armies. 
Meade, becoming more and more astonished at the inaction of 
the enemy, tries in vain to guess the cause. The post of obser- 
vation on little Round Top signals the movements of troops 
toward the south. The Union general suspects, not without some 
cause, that the Confederates are seeking to disguise a flank march, 
their object being to turn his position between Taneytown and 
Gettysburg ; for he cannot otherwise account for their delay in 
making the attack. Having abandoned the idea of taking the 
offensive, he must foresee all that can tempt the enemy. If the 
latter succeeds in turning him, it will be necessary to make the 
army fall back, either upon Willoway or Pipe Creek. He there- 
fore directs his staif to examine the position of each corps and 
the roads by which they can fall back ; the chief of staiF, Gen- 
eral Butterfield, is preparing at the same time a general order 
indicating the direction which each of these corps will have to 
take. Finally, wishing to be informed by his lieutenants regard- 
ing the condition of his troops, and the character of the ground 
which each of them will have to defend, as well as the various 
measures to be adopted according to what the enemy may do, Meade, 
who is still treating them as confidants, summons them to meet in 

council at his head-quarters near Ziegler's Grove. It has been 

L 



152 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

since attempted to find in these measures a proof that Meade 
was preparing to abandon the positions of Gettysburg, and also 
pretended that ou that very day he would have executed this proj- 
ect, which was already settled in his miud, if he had not been 
prevented by the attack of which we shall speak presently. 
Meade, on the other hand, has asserted that the order, drawn up 
by Butterfield and shown to several officers, had been written 
without his knowledge. But if the reverse had been the fact, we 
could only see in these preparations the proof of an extremely wise 
forethought : the measures adopted on the ground by the Union 
general-in-chief formally contradict the idea attributed to him. 
Nevertheless, one of those blunders that frequently occur on 
the battlefield was the means of compromising the safety of the 
Federal line just in that part which will be the first to be men- 
aced. Meade, believing that Gregg's division of cavalry had 
joined him and was clearing his left flank, had authorized Pleas- 
onton to send back to Westminster Buford's two brigades, which 
had been so severely tried the day before. He had been wrongly 
informed : Buford alone covered this flank. Meade only learned 
this fact at one o'clock ; he immediately directed Pleasonton not 
to strip him entirely ; but it is too late. Buford is gone ; Merritt, 
who is coming from Emmettsburg, is still far away, and Sickles 
has therefore only the skirmishers of his infantry to watch the 
movements of the enemy, whose numerous indications reveal his 
presence in force on that side. In fact, since nine o'clock in the 
morning Birney's skirmishers have been attacked by those of Wil- 
cox from among the trees with which the Warfield farm is cov- 
ered at the east, and the whole Confederate brigade comes forward 
for the purpose of supporting them. When, shortly after. Sickles, 
being apprised of the untimely departure of Buford, decided, 
in order to ward off all surprise, to replace him, by causing 
his whole line of skirmishers to advance as far as the Emmetts- 
burg road. This general, whose military instinct has fathomed 
the enemy's intentions, justly suspecting that Lee's maiu efibrt 
would shortly be directed against that portion of the Federal line 
which has been entrusted to him, is not satisfied with this move- 
ment. In order to protect the important position of the orchard, 
he has charged Colonel Berdan to push forward a reconnoissance 



OAK HILL. 153 

with two regiments along the Millerstown road as far as the small 
wood, where musket-shots have been exchanged with the enemy. 
Toward noon he penetrates into the midst of these clusters of trees, 
but being soon attacked by Wilcox's brigade and badly punished 
by Poague's battery of Hill's corps, he is obliged to fall back 
upon the orchard. This engagement cost him severely, but it has 
revealed the presence of a numerous enemy, who is masking his 
movements and seems disposed to turn the Federal left. 

INIeanwhile, Sickles, thinking only of the attack with which he 
believes himself menaced, has requested Meade to send him fresh 
instructions : finally, about eleven o'clock, receiving no reply, he 
rei^airs to head-quarters for the purpose of obtaining them. He 
informs Meade that Geary has left him no clearly-defined position 
to defend : not finding any standpoint along the line which he 
occupies, he M'ould desire to advance with all his forces as far as 
the Emmettsburg road ; and he immediately requests his chief 
either to ascertain for himself the necessity for making this move- 
ment or to send General Warren to settle the matter in his place. 
]\Ieade, being under the impression, no doubt, that the attack of 
the enemy would not be aimed at his left, and probably also kept 
back by the vicinity of the telegraph-office, declined either to 
leave his head-quarters or to separate himself from General War- 
ren. He merely repeated to Sickles the order to remain in the 
positions taken the day before by Geary, and, according to an eye- 
witness; he even pointed out to him with his finger the hillocks 
of the Round Tops as the point on which he should align himself. 
This was an error on his part, for if he entertained any confi- 
dence in Sickles' sagacity he should have taken his objections into 
consideration, and, in the contrary case, to control them without 
delay. In fact, whether the commander of the Third corps was 
or was not mistaken in his estimates, he simply desired to receive 
positive instructions, instead of mere suggestions which allowed 
him a latitude the limits of which seemed to him very vague. 
Finally, he obtains permission to take along with him General 
Hunt, chief of artillery, and, quickly returning, makes a recon- 
noissance of the line along which he would have liked to place his 
troops. Hunt points out the positions which appear to him the 
best for his arm of the service, but, in consideration of the plan 



154 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

of the general-in-chief, lie refuses to prouounee a formal opinion 
regarding the occupation of this new line, which modifies the 
entire order of battle. He returns to head-quarters, com])letiug 
the examination of the ground as far as the Little Round Top, 
and requests Meade to go himself to the left before approving the 
proposed movement. Several hours have thus elapsed ; INIeade, 
who has summoned -all his corps commanders, and is waiting for 
Sickles among the rest, expects, no doubt, to have then a better 
understanding with him. But the latter, on learning the result 
of Berdan's reconnoissance, has no longer any doubt regard- 
ing the projects of the enemy, and becomes more and more 
uneasy at having to receive his attack upon the ground which he 
actually occupies. Being left in a state of uncertainty by Hunt's 
departure, he determines at last to take possession of the Emmetts- 
burg road as far as the orchard with his whole corps a little before 
two o'clock. 

He thus finds himself, as we have stated, in a more command- 
ing position than if he had remained within the line from Ziegler's 
Grove to Little Round Top, especially if he had left Humphreys 
in the low grounds Avhicli descend toward Plum Run. Never- 
theless, it presents such serious difficulties that one cannot approve 
of the initiative steps taken by General Sickles in planting him- 
self there. On one side, in fact, the Emmettsburg road plung- 
ing into a piece of ground between the Codori and Smith houses, 
it would be necessary to reach out as far as the ridge within two 
hundred yards more to the west in order to. prevent the line from 
being commanded at this point ; on the other side, the position of 
the orchard presents a very salient angle, easy to attack on both 
sides, having no morasses, and being situated about four hundred 
yards from a wooded ridge a little more elevated, behind which the 
enemy can prepare for his attacks ; finally, this curved line, run- 
ning from Ziegler's Grove to the Little Round Top by way of the 
orchard, has a development nearly double the preceding one, which 
is already too long : the result will be that the front of the Third 
corps, thus extended, will lose its power of resistance, while it 
will be impossible to fall back sufficiently with the two Avings in 
order to reach their natural resting-points both on the right and 
left. If the enemy, as there is reason to fear, attempts a flank 



OAK HILL. 155 

movement by way of the south, and seeks to conceal his march 
behind the Warfield ridge, it is this very ridge that should be 
occupied, because it completely masks the view of the orchard. 
But it is on his front, and not on his extreme left, that Sickles 
seems to have anticipated an attack. Consequently, he causes the 
line of battle of Birney's division to advance about five hundred 
yards, thus abandoning the left bank of Plum Run and the slopes 
of the Little Round Top, the importance of which he does not 
appear to have then fully appreciated, in order to place himself 
on a line with Humphreys : subsequently, he makes the whole 
division perform a left half-wheel by taking Ward as a pivot, so that 
Graham with the marching wing may come to occupy the orchard; 
the three brigades, with the exception of the extreme right of the 
latter, find themselves facing south. It is not without regret that 
the soldiers of Birney's left give up the positions they occupy to 
go into action upon ground which affords much greater facilities to 
the enemy for approaching them. This general, wishing to occupy 
the line of the stream running from the Rose house to Plum Run, 
pushes them forward without allowing them to complete the con- 
version entirely. Ward takes position in the wood which covers 
the flank of Devil's Den above this stream ; his left rests upon 
the left of Plum Run, thus finding itself separated from the 
Little Round Top, which remains exposed without means of 
defence to a surprise on the part of the enemy ; his right extends 
as far as the summit of the triangular wheat-field of which we 
have already spoken. De Trobriand, coming to his assistance in 
this field, forms his line across the w^ood situated up the stream, 
along the slope adjoining the left bank of the tributary, prolong- 
ing it through the fields by ascending in the direction of the 
Peach Orchard hillock, upon which Graham is posted ; but in 
order to connect with this position he is obliged to deploy a whole 
regiment, the Third Michigan, as skirmishers. Birney's division, 
thus formed, presents its right flank to the enemy along the 
Emmettsburg road : in order to cover it as much as possible, 
Humphreys, by Sickles' order, proceeds in the direction of this 
same road, with all his force, a little before three o'clock. But 
the position which is thus assigned to him presents serious dangers 
in its turn. In fact, to strengthen the too-extended line of Bir- 



156 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

uey, Sickles takes from him Burling's brigade, wliicli he places 
iu reserve in the rear of \\^ard and De Trobriand ; Humphreys, 
leaving to his two other brigades the formation which he has given 
them ill the morning, rests his left on Graham, near the Sherfy 
house, his right resting, without any connection, on the patch of 
ground where the road is commanded from the enemy's side, while 
his line having already nearly eight hundred and fifty yards of 
development, he cannot even extend it as far as the Codori house 
on the other side of the valley. Gibbon, who commands the divis- 
ion on the left of the Second corps, finding himself thus separated 
from Humphreys' right by a space of over five hundred yards, 
naturally does not follow this movement, the object of which he 
cannot understand. This break in the battle-front of the Federals 
is the more dangerous because the Codori house and the surround- 
ing fiirms situated upon a commanding point are easily accessible to 
the enemy, owing to a large cluster of trees adjacent thereto within 
a few hundred yards. Gibbon, feeling the danger, and yet unable 
to prolong his line as far as the road without exposing it to be 
enfiladed, directs two regiments to occupy the house, so as to serve 
as a connecting-link between the two corps. Humphreys, on 
his part, sends his skirmishers to free the ground in his front 
of the fences and trunks of trees which might intercept his fire 
and harass his movements. Finally, the five batteries of the 
Third corps, soon reinforced by three others taken from the 
reserve artillery, are placed in such a manner as to cover the weak 
points of the line as much as possible. On the right Seeley's bat- 
tery is posted near the Smith house, commanding the valley into 
which the Emniettsburg road descends ; Turnbull comes shortly 
after to take position on the left. Randolph occupies the front 
of the western angle itself, behind the Slierfy house, while the 
south front bristles with the batteries of Clark and Bigelow, that 
are posted over an intrenchment dug out along the road which 
runs in the direction of Plum R,un : thirty pieces of cannon thus 
defend the position of the orchard. Wiuslow, with twelve how- 
itzers, very formidable at short range, is planted in the wheat- 
field behind De Trobriand ; finally. Smith has succeeded in scal- 
ing the hill of Devil's Den with his battery, whence he commands 
tl\e gorge of Plum Run and all the wooded slopes extending as 



OAK HILL. 157 

far as the Emmettsburg road. Sickles, having been summoned 
to head-quarters, has left the command of his troops to Birney. 
But at the very moment when the generals are about to assemble, 
the cannon's voice, which is heard on the left, calls each of them 
to his post. Sickles has had no time to dismount from his horse. 
Meade on this occasion does not hesitate to follow him. It is 
half-past three o'clock : the battle is at last about to commence. 
The interminable preparations of the Confederates are now 
completed. We have seen how much precious time has been lost 
up to noon. At this hour Law joins Hood and McLaws, who 
have stacked arms and are waiting for him on the right bank of 
Willoughby Run, between the roads to Chambersburg and 
Hagerstown, fronting the battlefield of the previous day. The 
two divisions take up the line of march. McLaws at the head, 
under the lead of Colonel Johnston of the general staff, proceeds 
toward the schoolhouse on Willoughby Run. Thence a road wind- 
ing through the woods will lead him to the Emmettsburg road 
beyond the orchard, thus enabling him to surround the Federal 
left. But, having reached a halfway point, the Confederates per- 
ceive the summit of the Little Round Top between two hills, as 
also the flags that are being waved by the Federals on the look- 
out who occupy it. As Lee has given formal instructions to dis- 
guise the march of the First corps, INIcLaws is brought to a halt 
while M'aiting for orders ; finally, the column makes a retrograde 
movement in the direction of the Hagerstown road, to follow it 
as far as the Black Horse Tavern, and there to take the Millers- 
town road, in order to reach the schoolhouse by a deviation of 
about five miles.* 

* Longstreet has blamed Colonel Johnston for having caused his first division 
to make tliis hmg and useless detour. McLaws and Johnston assert, on the con- 
trary, that the direction of the Black PTorse Tavern was given by Longstreet 
himself. We cannot reconcile these diflierent allegations; but we will observe 
that, in either case, the responsibility belongs to the commander of the First 
corps, who should have been near the head of his column in order to direct its 
movements. Johnston adds that the detour imposed upon McLaws' division 
was an insignificant one, which did not cause him to lose much time. An exam- 
ination of the map is sufficient to prove that this assertion is inadmissible. But 
the consequences of the delay in Longstreet's attack were so serious that we 
have not desired to withhold any of the excuses alleged by the various inter- 
ested parties. 



158 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Tills countermarch causes McLaws to lose more than two hours. 
Lee, who for the hist hour lias been expecting to see him emerge 
every moment, does not understand the cause for this delay, and 
becomes impatient to no purpose. On his own part, Ewell, who 
receives no instructions, wishing to make the most of his time, 
plants his artillery upon Benner's Hill, fires a few shots against 
Gulp's Plill, and sends forward reconnoissauces to feel the Fed- 
eral jjositions. I^ongstreet, who has proceeded by a more direct 
road with his columns to the spot where they are to form, finally 
shares this impatience on the part of his chief, and repairs to the 
front of his troops in order to accelerate their march. He can 
cause McLaws to turn back from the road which he has so un- 
fortunately taken, but he still finds Hood at the point where the 
latter has been brought to a halt. The commander of the First 
corps, finding that there is no longer any reason for concealing his 
march, inasmuch as the whole column must have been signalled a 
long time since from the summit of the Little Round Top, orders 
Hood to strike the Emmettsburg road direct by passing behind 
the War field ridge. Hood thus precedes McLaws along this 
road, and by taking his right wing he may begin the attack even 
before the latter has fallen into line. Lee, to whom Longstreet 
has hastened to announce his speedy entrance into line, has caused 
Ewell to be told to hold himself in readiness to support him 
about four o'clock. Hood, on his own part, leaving on his 
left the wood which Wilcox occupies in front of the orchard, where 
McLaws will have to form, has drawn up his four brigades in 
line of battle west of the Emmettsburg road. Law on the right, 
with Benning behind him ; Robertson on the left in the first line, 
with Anderson in the second line. At three o'clock he receives 
the order to attack in conformity with Lee's instructions ; that is to 
say, by keeping his left near the road. But the reports of his skir- 
mishers make known to Hood the difficulties of the road he has 
been directed to follow. It is known, in fact, that the left of the 
Federals, instead of terminating, as the Southern general-iu-chief 
had thought, in the neighborhood of the orchard, was prolonged 
in return from this point as far as Plum Run, thus forming a con- 
vex line of great strength and difficult of access. More to the 
south the open fields which extend from the Emmettsburg road. 



OAK HILL. 159 

by winding around the rocky base of the Round Tops as far as the 
Taueytown road, where the enemy's supply-trains are parked, 
seemed to invite the Confederates to surround tlie extremity of 
the Union line on that side. The ground is favorable for a flank 
movement of this limited character, which would not compromise 
the whole army into making a flank march. Hood has been ask- 
ing from his immediate chief permission to make the attempt. But 
Lee's order is peremptory : the plan of battle cannot be changed 
without his consent; and Longstreet has already lost so much 
time that he dares not assume the responsibility of further delay. 
Althougli it is not witliin the conditions foreseen by Lee, he 
applies himself to cause the instructions given by the latter to be 
executed literally, and comes to show Hood the direction he is to 
follow. The objective point is the Devil's Den hill, and the 
task of attacking the orchard both in front and in flank falls 
again upon McLaws. At half-past three o'clock the four bri- 
gades of the former talce up the line of march by descending 
toward Plum Run, their right extending in the direction of the 
road connecting the Slyder house with the Emmettsburg road. 
The two armies facing each other are about coming to blows at 
last. 



CHAPTEK III. 
GETTYSBURG. 

THE importance of tlie battle of Gettysburg has compelled us 
to divide its narrative into two chapters, but this second part 
is only a continuation of the first. The great struggle has been 
going on since the morning of the 1st of July, uotwithstaudiug the 
temporary cessation which occurred during the earlier part of the 2d. 
The movements of Lougstreet's corps which we have just described 
have been noticed by the Federals posted at the orchard ; their 
artillery opens fire upon the adjoining woods of Warfield ; several 
batteries of I^ongstreet's which have taken position near this farm 
reply to them ; Wilcox on one side, Graham on the other, cause skir- 
mishers to advance, and the musketry-fire becomes rapidly intense. 
It is at this moment that ISIeade, accompanied by Sickles, reaches 
the new line -which the latter has caused his troops to occupy. Struck 
with its extension, he sees that a single corps is not sufficient to 
defend it ; he prepares at once to reinforce it, and sends General 
Warren, whose quickness of perception inspires him with the 
utmost confidence, to select the points which stand most in need 
of assistance. Sickles, finding that his chief does not approve of 
his recent movement, proposes to fall back. But INIeade, showing 
him the woods on their left, answers that it is too late : in fact, 
while the artillery-fire against the orchard is increasing, the vol- 
leys of musketry announce that more to eastward Hood has 
opened the fight. The latter was to have caused his front to 
make a half-wheel to the left in order to attack that portion of 
the Federal line occupied by De Trobriaud and Ward; but 
while advancing beyond the Emmettsburg road he has at once 
recognized the importance of Little Round Top, and, direct- 
ing Law to bear no longer to the left, but to the right, he orders 

ICO 



rl jjj~j.v^ ys- JBigtaiaw ;:-'ii:|i; ^jj piiaYtrJa«a aaaai>a gi»v * 'a.- " 



/ 



GETTYSBURG. 161 

him toward this point. Robertson, perceiving this movement, 
imitates it at ouee iu order not to break up tlie line, and, crossing 
the tributary of Phira Run in front of the western part of the 
Devil's Den, he dashes forward to attack this position a few 
minutes before four o'clock, preceded by a swarm of skirmishers. 
The Federals, who have seen on the opposite slopes the serried 
lines of the assailants advancing with their flags flying and shout- 
ing their war-cry, are ready to receive them. "Ward waits for 
their attack in good positions and without flinching, but as he 
has sent Berdan with the Third Maine to the orchard, his brigade 
is reduced to five regiments. A desperate struggle takes place 
along the rocky slopes which the Confederates are beginning to 
climb : fortunately for Ward, Robertson, in extending his left for 
the purpose of surrounding him, exposes his flank to De Tro- 
briaud, and on this side his soldiers begin to fall back. He is 
obliged to take the remainder of his force to their assistance, and 
Ward, thus freed, recovers the ground he has just lost. The 
First Texas, which was trying to seize the nearest guns of Smith's 
battery, redeems the combat on the left, but the Federal guns, 
being thenceforth free, inflict severe losses upon the assailants, 
who are trying in vain to capture them. During this time, Ander- 
son, who was to support Robertson, has not followed his move- 
ment on the right, and is about to strike the centre of De Tro- 
briand's line, which is its strongest part. Being obliged to cross 
the ravine under the enemy's fire, he has been repulsed with great 
loss. Besides, two regiments having become separated from 
Robertson's brigade, and continuing to march with Law's troops, 
this brigade would find itself isolated and in a most critical posi- 
tion but for the timely arrival of Benning. This general, hav- 
ing, like Anderson, adhered to his original direction, thus finds 
himself in the rear of Robertson. These three brigades at the 
same time renew the attack. De Trobriand and Ward offer the 
most desperate resistance ; Smith's and Winslow's batteries sup- 
port them as much as the nature of the ground will allow. The 
woods, the rocks, and the slopes give the defenders great advan- 
tage, but they are much weaker numerically than the Southern- 
ers, who rush to the attack with desperate energy ; consequently, 
their losses follow in quick succession, and their line is speedily 



162 THE CIVIL WAR iN AMERICA. 

thinned, there being no reserve to reinforce it. The combat tlius 
begun does not cause Hood to lose sight of the Kound Tops. 
The higliest seems inacccssilile, and, moreover, the view of the 
enfilading Federal line is hidden from him by the smallest; it is 
this one, together with the surrounding slopes, that it is necessary 
to take possession of. Law, entrusted with this task, penetrates 
into the small valley of Plum Run, to ascend it again between 
the slopes of Devil's Den and those of the Round Tops ; his bri- 
gade is reinforced by the two regiments that have been detached 
from that of Robertson ; he has under his command soldiers from 
Texas and Alabama, tried in various combats, ardent as the sun 
under which they were born, indefatigable and insensible to dan- 
ger, — resembling, in one word, the brilliant Hood, who has long 
been training them and is encouraging them by his presence. 
Ward had only placed a single regiment, the Fourth ]Maine, 
before Little Round Top in the bottom of the valley where the 
Plum Run flows, but he has had time to reinforce it with the 
Fortieth New York, which De Trpbriand has sent to his assist- 
ance when attacked by Robertson, and the Sixth New Jersey, 
detached from Burling's brigade. The three regiments, soon 
increased to four by a new contribution from this brigade, go 
into ambuscade behind the rocks and resist Law's furious attack ; 
nevertheless, they lose ground and uncover the approaches of the 
Little Round Top. In order to support their retreat. Ward is 
obliged to strip his right ; De Trobriand, compelled, in his turn, 
to extend his left in order to fill up the space thus formed, places 
the Seventeenth Maine in the wheat-field behind the wall which 
at the south separates this field from that portion of the wood 
abandoned by Ward. AViuslow fires his guns against this w^ood. 
By thus increasing the length of his line De Trobriand only 
keeps two small regiments in the centre, for he cannot call in the 
Third Michigan without breaking all connection with Graham. 
He, however, holds out against Anderson's second assault ; the 
latter is wounded and his troops are repulsed. But Benning's 
arrival has dealt a fatal blosv at Ward. The Confederates once 
more climb the hill, driving the Federals, who defend them- 
selves foot by foot, ending by taking possession of three pieces 
of Smith's artillery. The Federal infantry in falling back leaves 



GETTYSBURG. 163 

almost without support the rest of the battery, posted more in 
the rear upon a steep hillock ■\vheuce it commauds the Plum 
Run gorge. 

At the same time, a portion of McLaws' division falls into 
line. Longstreet's orders directed this division, once out of the 
wood it occupied, to deploy in two lines across the Eramettsburg 
road, with Kershaw, then Semmes, on the right, Barksdale on the 
left, and Wofford behind him : it was thus to follow this road 
in order to attack the position of the orchard as soon as Hood 
had turned it. But the latter, having extended his line to the 
right at a great distance from the road, McLaws cannot follow 
this direction without exposing his own flank. After waiting for 
some time, he decides to modify his dispositions. About five 
o'clock Kershaw is ordered to cross the Emmettsburg road, 
instead of following it in a northerly direction, to support Hood's 
left ; Semmes is to march in his wake. Kershaw soon reaches 
the Rose house, but from this point forward the nature of the 
ground retards his movements; fiually, he crosses the upper part 
of the tributary of Plum Run, and shortly after half-past five 
o'clock he attacks the wooded hill occupied by De Trobriand's 
centre ; he extends his left against the weak line connecting the 
latter with Graham and covering Clark's and Bigelow's batteries. 
Near the Emmettsburg road the Confederates, not having yet 
brought their infantry into action, direct the fire of all the guns 
which they can place on the Warfield ridge against Humphreys' 
two brigades and that of Graham. Finally, a portion of the ar- 
tillery of Hill's corps cannonades the positions of the Second 
corps of the Army of the Potomac. The Union batteries reply 
to them with great vigor. 

As we have stated, Meade, being convinced since his arrival 
upon the ground that Sickles could not defend his position single- 
handed, had promised him immediate reinforcements. He had 
authorized him to ask Hancock for a division from his right, 
and had informed him of the approaching arrival of the Fifth 
corps. In fact, before leaving his head-quarters he had ordered 
Sykcs to come with this corps to the support of the left of the 
Third, which seemed to him thenceforth to be especially men- 
aced. Sykes, going in search of his troops to a distance of over 



164 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

one mile back of the Round Tops, had put them at once on the 
march. He was ordered to place them on the extreme left, along 
the prolongation of Biruey's line ; so that when the latter, seeing 
Hood's attack foreshadowed, asked him with great earnestness 
for some immediate help, he would not at first allow any of his 
regiments to be turned from the direction he had given them. 
But having crossed Plum Run with Barnes' division, he was 
able to reconnoitre the ground in person : soon after, about half- 
past four o'clock, he proposed to Birney to have the centre of his 
line reinforced by Barnes, provided that this line, extending to 
the left, should cover Smith's battery, which was at the time 
greatly exposed, and the valley of Plum Run. Birney readily 
accepts the proposition, and sends Burling's two regiments, with 
that of De Trobriand, which Ave have seen opportunely arrive in 
this new position. Sykes, on his part, pushes forward Tilton's 
and Sweitzer's brigades of Barnes' division, which he had halted 
in the rear of De Trobriand. Sweitzer takes position on the 
right of the latter in the wood where the combat is going on, 
his left adjoining the ravine and facing south, the rest of the 
line forming a right angle and facing west ; Tilton prolongs his 
front in this direction along the cleared slope which rises as far 
as the orchard. 

While this movement is being executed, Kershaw, crossing the 
ravine, as we have mentioned, advances against these very posi- 
tions. His attack is at first directed against Sweitzer, but the 
latter, being posted on fiivorable ground, offers resistance. He 
then turns against Tilton's brigade, which is much more exposed. 
It has no support, its right is unprotected, and it fulls back. 
Its retreat is followed by that of Sweitzer, despite the energy 
with which it defends itself in the wood. The troops of the 
Third corps that are fighting on the left of these two brigades, 
whose arrival had brought them assistance, are again compro- 
mised, ^till farther on the extreme left the combat has extended 
its area and assumed greater importance ; all the troops at Sykes' 
disposal are successively directed toward that portion of the line 
which Meade has entrusted to his care. 

In order to show how the slopes of Little Round Top, but 
lately stripped, are rapidly swarming with defenders, Ave must 



GETTYSBURG. 165 

go back to the condition of affairs two hours before. About a 
quarter to four o'clock, Warren, following Meade's instructions, 
had reached this hill, and was climbing it for the purpose of sur- 
veying the country. The officers of the signal corps stationed on 
the top having informed him that they thought they had seen 
the enemy's lines in the woods between Plum Run and the 
Emraettsburg road, he had ordered Smith's battery to fire a shot 
in that direction. Just as the projectile passed whistling above 
the trees all the Confederate soldiers had instinctively raised their 
heads, and this simultaneous movement being communicated to 
the polished arms they held in their hands, Warren had caught 
their reflection, like a streak of lightning, winding with a 
long trail among the leaves. This momentary apparition had 
been a revelation to him; he had divined the danger which 
menaced Little Round Top, and understood, by the same token, 
the importance of this position. It was necessary to hasten in 
order to find defenders for it. Following in the wake of Sykes, 
who had just crossed the hill on foot with Barnes' division, he 
had found him near the wheat-field completing the rccoimoissance 
of which we have spoken. The commander of the Fifth corps 
had immediately ordered Colonel Vincent, who was in command 
of Barnes' Third brigade, to proceed to occupy the foot of Lit- 
tle Round Top ; Hazlett's battery was to co-operate with him. 
AVarren, going in advance of them, had reached his post of 
observation to witness the first attack of Law against the four 
regiments which alone are defending the gorge of Plum Run. 
One moment later the bulk of these troops was falling back upon 
the flank of the Devil's Den hill, while a party of sharpshooters 
was trying to find shelter among the rocks scattered along the 
"western flank of Little Round Top. The Confederates were 
hastening in pursuit of them ; their projectiles already reached 
the elevated post whence Warren was watching this exciting 
scene. He could not, however, see Vincent's brigacTe, which, 
encompassing the hill at the west, had disappeared in the woods. 
This position, easy to defend and impossible to recapture, whose 
importance Warren alone seems to have then understood, was 
therefore about to fall into the hands of the enemy without 
striking a blow. The young general of engineers makes a last 



166 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

effort to save it. He directs the officers of the signal corps, who 
are preparing to abandon a post without defenders, tq continue 
waving their flags, in spite of the enemy's fire, in order to 
deceive him and detain liim for a few moments while he is 
going to ask for assistance from a body of troops whose col- 
umn he sees moving along the road followed a short time since 
by Barnes. It is the Third brigade of Ayres' division of the 
Fifth corps, under command of General Weed, and is preced- 
ina: the rest of the division at a considerable distance. Weed 
has gone forward in advance to ask for instructions from Sickles ; 
but the first regiment that Warren encounters is commanded 
by Colonel O'Rorke, his friend, and during a certain period 
of time his subordinate, Avho does not hesitate to respond to 
the pressing demands of his former chief. While the rest of 
the brigade is continuing its march, O'Rorke causes the column 
of the One-huudred-and-fortieth New York, which, fortunately, 
is of considerable strength, to scale directly the acclivities of 
Little Round Top. 

During this time, Vincent, hastening the pace of his soldiers, has 
reached the southern extremity of this same hill. On this side 
it is not so steep as on the other sides, being prolonged by a ridge 
which about halfway presents a horizontal stretch of nearly one 
hundred yards in length, descending thence by gentle gradations 
as far as the foot of the large Round Top. This ridge affords an 
excellent position to Vincent for barring the passage to Law's 
soldiers, who are rapidly advancing in his direction. He posts 
himself along the western slope, with the Sixteenth Michigan on 
the right, below the very summit of the hill, the Forty-fourth 
New York and the Eighty-third Pennsylvania in the centre, and 
the Twentieth INIaine, under Colonel Chamberlain, on the left, along 
the extremity of the ridge. These troops could not have arrived 
more opportunely. Hood, after being for some time held station- 
ary by the difficulty of keeping his soldiers in the ranks under the 
fire of a Federal battery posted at the bottom of the gorge, has 
at last reached the foot of Little Round Top, which lie points 
out to them as a prey thenceforth easily captured. A great yell 
goes up from the ranks of the assailants, who rush with impet- 
uosity upon the centre of Vincent's brigade. But upon this 



GETTYSBURG. 167 

ground all the advantages are in favor of the defence, while the 
fire of the Unionists, sheltered among its inaccessible recesses, 
stops the Confederates, who stumble at every step they take in 
their efforts to reach them. They do not turn back on that 
account, but, posting themselves in their turn behind the rocks, 
engage in a murderous encounter with Vincent's brigade, which 
defends itself almost at the point of the muzzle. Law, seeing the 
resistance which this small band makes in front of him, determines 
to turn it. He extends his left for the purpose of outflanking the 
Sixteenth Michigan, and attacks it with so much vigor that it can- 
not resist the onslaught. The situation is becoming serious for the 
Federals: Vincent is entirely isolated from the rest of the army, 
and no longer protects the principal point of the position, the 
summit of Little Round Top, on M'hich the officers of the signal 
corps are bravely continuing to wave their flags. 

At the very moment when the Sixteenth Michigan is succumb- 
ing, 0'E,orke's soldiers, by a really providential coincidence, reach 
at a full run this summit, which Warren points out to them as 
the citadel to be preserved at any cost. At their feet lies the 
vast battlefield, whence are heard vague noises and savage 
cries, the rattling of musketry, the cannon's roar, and where 
all the incidents of the combat are seen through a cloud of 
smoke; but they have no leisure to contemplate this spectacle, 
for they find themselves face to face with Law's soldiers, who 
are climbing the hill on the opposite side. A few minutes' delay 
among the Federals would have sufficed to put the Confederates 
in possession of the summit. Never perhaps was seen the win- 
ner of a race secure such a prize at so little cost. The Unionists, 
although surprised, do not, however, hesitate. They have time 
neither to form in line of battle nor even to load their guns or 
fix bayonets. O'Eorke calls them and pushes them forward. A 
large number of them fall at the first fire of the enemy ; the rest 
rush down upon the latter at a run, brandishing their muskets 
aloft ; and this movement suffices to stop the Confederates. The 
Federals take prisoners those among the assailants who had been 
ibremost in the race, and open a brisk fire of musketiy upon the 
others. Vincent's right, having recovered from its check, comes 
to their assistance. Hazlett's battery has scaled Little Round 

M 



168 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Top with the One-hundrcd-and-fortieth New York ; the most 
extraordinary efforts, together with the co-operatiou of a portion 
of the regiment, have been required to liaul the pieces of artil- 
lery as far as the summit. Although the position is very danger- 
ous, for showers of bullets are falling around the guns, which 
cannot be depressed enough te reach the enemy along the slope 
which he is scaling, Hazlctt boldly takes his position and 
directs his fire against the Confederate reserve in the valley : 
he knows that the presence of his guns encourages the Union 
infantry. The Federal line, thus strengthened, presents an im- 
pregnable front to Hood's assaults ; the position of Little Round 
Top is safe for the present. But this advantage has been dearly 
bought : in a few minutes the One-hundred-and-fortieth New 
York has lost more than one hundred men, a large number of 
officers being wounded. The valiant O'Rorke has paid with his 
life for the example of bravery which he set to his soldiers. Hav- 
ing left West Point two years previously with the highest honors, 
he had been destined, in the judgment of all his comrades, for the 
most elevated positions in the army. 

A personal and desperate struggle takes place along the 
whole front of the two bodies of troops. They watch each other, 
and aim from behind the rocks and bushes ; some of the com- 
batants are seen here and there climbing trees in order to secure 
better shots ; the balls whistle in every direction ; two pieces 
of Smith's Federal battery take the line of the assailants 
obliquely, throwing shells into their midst. The dead and 
wounded disappear among the rocks. On both sides the officers 
perform prodigies of valor, for they feel the importance of the 
disputed position. Law is not satisfied with musketry-fire, 
which may be prolonged withoj^ any decisive success : he 
wishes to pierce the enemy's line, and brings back against the 
One-hundred-and-fortieth New York the soldiers of his com- 
mand who had been stopped by the unexpected arrival of this 
regiment ; but Vincent, who had assumed command of the whole 
line, hastens with a few reinforcements, and the attack is re- 
pulsed. The combatants are beginning to be exhausted on both 
sides ; the Federals have seen Vincent fall gloriously with a large 
number of his men : the losses of the Confederates are also 



GETTYSBURG. 169 

heavy ; the most serious one is that of Hood, who, being always 
at the post of danger, has been badly wounded in the arm. 

AVe have reached a period when, on the other side of Plum Eun. 
K{!rshaw's arrival causes Barnes' two brigades to lose the ground 
they had recovered, and compromises once more the positions 
so stubbornly defended by Ward and De Trobriand. The for- 
mer, weakened by his struggle with Robertson, can no longer 
resist Beuning, who is pressing him on the right and left at the 
same time; Smith with great difficulty saves the three guns 
remaining in his possession; the entire hil] of Devil's Den is aban- 
doned by the remnant of Ward's brigade and the three regiments 
that had joined it. The Confederates, crowding the wood, take 
the Seventeenth Maine, posted behind the wall, in flank, and, 
proceeding to the wheat-field, force Winslow to remove his 
guns to the rear, and menace the flank of De Trobriand's weak 
line. The latter is assailed at the same time in front by An- 
derson's troops, and outflanked on the right by Kershaw, who, 
driving back Tilton and Sweitzer, advances in the wood until 
close upon their rear. De Trobriand is compelled to give ground 
in turn, his brigade being reduced to a handful of men. The 
troops posted on his right, near the orchard, cannot aiford him 
any assistance, for the artillery which they defend, long exposed 
to the fire of Longstreet's batteries, which take him almost in flank, 
is seriously threatened by Kershaw's left. On this side the Eighth 
South Carolina bravely advances against the guns of Clark and 
Bigelow, who appear to be poorly supported ; but just as it 
approaches, the One-hundred-and-forty-first Pennsylvania, which 
was hidden in a sunken road, rises suddenly and stops it by a 
murderous fire. Notwithstanding this success, the Unionists, 
anxious about their artillery, take it back beyond the sunken 
road, thus still further uncovering De Trobriand's right. For- 
tunately, Caldwell's strong division, which Meade has detached 
from the Second corps as soon as he had realized the importance 
of Longstreet's attack, arrives in time to relieve the soldiers of 
Birney and Barnes. One of his brigades, commanded by the 
valiant Cross, supports the remnants of De Trobriand's com- 
mand. Another, under Kelly, which forms the left of the divis- 
ion, and has crossed Plum Run near the road, supports Ward 



170 THE CTVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

along the slopes bordering on the right bank of this stream a 
litlle lower down. It is the Irish brigade, which, organized by 
]\Ieagher, has already followed through many a battlefield the 
old golden harp embroidered on the green flag of Erin. It will 
fight with its wonted gallantry, for each soldier is ready to sacri- 
fice his life with the more readiness that he has been prepared to 
die as a Christian. As the moment is drawing near for marching 
against the enemy all the ranks are kneeling, and the chaplain, 
mounted uptJn a rock which affords him a natural pulpit, has pro- 
nounced a general absolution to the whole brigade in the midst of 
a religious silence only interrupted by the fire of artillery. The 
command " Forward !" immediately follows the sacred word of 
the priest, and the Irish have at once rushed into the thickest of 
the fight. They suddenly stop Anderson's brigade in its advance. 
In the mean while, Biruey, rallying around Cross a portion of 
De Trobriand's soldiers and Burling's two regiments, which have 
been driven back on that side, })laces himself at their head and 
leads them against Kershaw, whose long line cannot sustain this 
shock. It is forcibly driven back upon Semmes' brigade, which 
has followed Kershaw very closely, and, fortunately for him, is 
within one hundred and fifty yards in the rear of his right. These 
fresh troops advance against the first line of Caldwell's division, 
which has only achieved this success against Kershaw and Ander- 
son at a great sacrifice. Cross being among the first to be killed. 
But they soon encounter new adversaries ; for Caldwell, seeing 
the losses of his 'first line, has caused the second, composed of 
Zook's and Brooke's brigades, to advance. Semmes' troops are 
driven back to the other side of the ravine before they have been 
able to set foot upon the hill, whence Kershaw^, on the left, is 
likewise dislodged. The latter, persisting in not giving the 
order of retreat, sees his brigade divided into squads fighting 
isolated on a rough and wooded ground ; the Confederates, almost 
surrounded in their turn, retire toward the Rose house, where 
Kershaw is rallying the largest portion of his brigade : his left 
wing maintains its ground and has not been shaken. Reinforce- 
ments, equally needful, arrive about the same time on the extreme 
Federal left, in front of Little Round Top. Before the combat 
had begun at this point Sykes had directed Ayres' division 



GETTYSBURG. 171 

toward this position : Weed's l)ri<^;ide, which preceded the otlier 
two at a considerable distance, had been turned aside, without tlic 
knowledge of the commander of the Fifth corps, by a pressing 
call from Sickles, and it was going to the assistance of the Third 
corps wlien Warren went to seek O'Rorke and his regiment. 
As soon as Sykes was informed of this fact, he ordered Weed, 
who had not yet fallen into line, to return with all possible haste 
to take the position already occupied by the One-hundred-and- 
fortieth New York. This order was promptly executed. Weed 
reached Little Round Toj) at the moment when Vincent was mor- 
tally wounded, and when both sides were preparing to renew the 
struggle which had been temporarily suspended. Pie takes posi- 
tion on the right of Vincent's brigade, of which Colonel Rice 
has assumed the command, thus enabling him to reinforce his 
left. Chamberlain, on his part, in order to keep the enemy in 
check, has been obliged to ])lace a portion of the Twentieth 
Maine en poterwc above the defile which separates the two summits. 
It is, in, fact, against this point that LaNt directs all his efforts, 
and the cond^at is resumed with fresh vigor, without allowing 
Weed time to deploy his battalions. His soldiers, having speed- 
ily recovered, rush to the assault with the earnestness of men who 
have never encounteivd an obsta(!le without breaking it down. He 
strives to outflank the Federal line in order to reach Little Round 
Top by way of the eastern side of the ridge : his troops have 
been under less fire on this side, but they have to do with the 
Twentieth Maine, which defends its position with all the vigor 
of the strong race of backwoodsmen from whom it has been re- 
cruited : again they fight hand to hand, the assailants still try- 
ing to turn their adversaries during the combat, the latter pro- 
longing their line and bringing it more and more to the rear iu 
order to frustrate this manoeuvre. 

In the mean while, the battle, confined up to this moment to 
the ground comprised between Plum Run and its tributary, rap- 
idly assumes extensive dimensions. Meade has ordcj-ed all the 
force at his disposal to take position on his left. The Sixth corps, 
whose heads of column have arrived at about two o'clock at the 
Rock Creek bridge, and are resting after a long and fatiguing 
march, has relieved the Fifth in this position. V^'e have already 



172 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

seen Sykes hastening to throw four brigades of this latter corps 
into the light ; the other five brigades, under Ayres and Craw- 
ford, are on the way to join them. From the left his position 
fortunately approaches the extreme Federal right, which in its 
turn is stripped for his benefit. At five o'clock Williams' division 
has moved from the banks of Rock Creek, and is following in 
the tracks of the Fifth corps ; half an hour later a despatch to Geary 
also puts him in motion with the brigades of Kane and Candy, leav- 
ing only Greene's brigade to cover the front which was lately occu- 
pied by the Twelfth corps. Humphreys has long since sent Bur- 
ling to the left; Sickles takes away from hiiu two more regiments, 
and borrows one from De Trobriand, in order to reinforce the 
position of the orchard, which the enemy's artillery and Barks- 
dale's skirmishers are riddling with balls. The Second, corps has 
furnished Caldwell's division to defend the line occupied by Ward 
and De Trobriand. The latter, by making so long a resistance, 
have thus enabled Meade finally to place on his left much more 
numerous forces than those of the assailants. 

In fact. Hood's division has for a long time alone sustained the 
burden of the attack. It is exhausted. Robertson has been 
wounded, together with all the superior officers of his brigade ; 
Benning, menaced in flank by Caldwell, dares not go beyond the 
summit of Devil's Den; McLaws, who has been in position 
since four o'clock, has as yet only brought into action in front of 
the orchard two of his brigades to support Hood, and one of them 
only within the last quarter of an hour. The other two have not 
attacked the orchard, expecting that the defenders of this posi- 
tion had either been turned or that Colonel Alexander's artillery 
had broken their lines by his fire. It is six o'clock, and Hill, 
in order to follow, is waiting in vain for the troops posted on 
his right to take up the line of march : the large open space 
which separates him from the enemy will not permit him to 
advance except by a collective movement, when his right flank 
would be protected. Besides, as we have stated, McLaws, who 
is to follow Hood's movement, must, on the contrary, accord- 
ing to Lee's orders, determine that of Anderson;* and the 

* The reader must not confound Anderson's division of Hill's corps with An- 
derson's brigade of Hood's division. 



GETTYSBURG. 173 

latter will be followed by Pender if the opportunity is favor- 
able, Heth, with Hill's third division, remaining then alone in 
reserve. 

At last, McLaws, seeing Semnies and Kershaw forced back in 
disorder by Caldwell, decides to attack the orchard. Sickles has 
given to Graham the eifectives of two brigades to defend it, 
but it would require strong intrenchments to cover a position so 
destitute of natural shelter on its two flanks. The Confederates 
slacken the fire of their artillery; the infantry is in motion. 
Barksdale advances against that one of these two flanks which 
lies opposite to the west. Woiford, placed in the rear of his 
right, comes by a half-wheel to attack the south front by assist- 
ing some of the battalions of Kershaw's brigade Avhich have not 
joined in his retreat. Graham, Avrapped in a vortex of fire, sees his 
troops rapidly diminish around him. It is in vain that a regular 
battery has come to relieve that of Ames at the point most exposed 
— that Randolph has silenced some of the enemy's guns — that all 
the Federal guns are firing canister into the ranks of the assail- 
ants, for the Confederate infantry penetrates into the orchard and 
takes possession of it ; Graham is wounded and taken prisoner ; 
his soldiers share his fate or are dispersed along the slopes of the 
hillock, which they rapidly descend ; Sickles hastens from the 
Trostle house, but a bullet breaks his leg, and he is obliged to 
transfer the command to Birney. The batteries posted on the 
right along the Emmettsburg road abandon positions which it is 
no longer possible to defend. Those on the left continue to fire 
almost at short range, causing the guns after each fire to be drawn 
back a few paces. But nothing can prevent the defeat of Birney's 
division, Avhich, out of scarcely five thousand men, has lost two 
thousand. Barksdale, followed closely by several batteries, rushes 
into the open breach between Humphreys' left and Barnes' right, 
and, leaving to the troops that are to support him the task of 
striking these divisions in the rear, he still pushes forward. The 
canister thins the ranks of his soldiers, but his example sus- 
tains their courage. On his right, Woiford, following his success, 
bears to the eastward to take in flank the enemy's regiments 
that are holding Kershaw in check. It requires less than an 
hour for the Confederates to achieve this success, which changes 



174 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

the aspect of the combat; they liave two hours of daylight tc 
tiike advantage of it. 

In the centre, Hill, following strictly Lee's instructions, has- 
tens to push forward in rapid sucx?ession Anderson's three bri- 
gades, commanded l)y Wilcox, Perry, and Wriglit, against Hum- 
phreys. The lirst-mentioned commander, -who has been shown 
by the general-in-chief himself since four o'clock what direction 
to take, inclines at first to the left, in order to avoid meeting at 
the orchard McLaws' line, running almost perpendicularly to hxA 
own ; then he faces to the right in line of battle, for the purpose 
of attacking in front that portion of the Emmettsburg road 
occupied by Humphreys. The other two brigades form on his 
left. 

At the extreme left Ewell has at last put his. columns in motion 
against Gulp's Hill, whose defenders can certainly receive no fur- 
ther assistance. As Me have stated, he was to begin the attack 
as soon as he should hear the sound of Longstreet's guns ; but he 
found how imprudent it was to put any trust in such a signal : the 
contrary wind did not allow the sound of the cannonade — which 
had been in progress against the orchard since half-past three 
o'clock — to reach him. He has only heard Hill's artillery, which 
opened fire about five o'clock ; he immediately prepares for 
battle. Six batteries posted on Benner's PTill support the attack 
of Johnson's division against the slopes of Gulp's Hill. But at 
the end of one hour these guns, utterly unprotected, are silenced 
by those of the Unionists, sheltered inside of the works con- 
structed the day before ; the young and gallant IMajor Latimer, 
who commands them, is killed ; a single battery still sustains the 
fire. Johnson, finding the north and north-east fronts of Gulp's 
Hill too strongly defended, determines to attack the Federals in 
the very gorges of Rock Creek in order to turn their positions by 
the way of the south-east. He requires some time to bear to the 
left and reach these gorges. When, finally, about half-past six 
o'clock, the firing of musketry is heard among the rocks, whose 
loud echoes repeat for the first time such sounds, the battle is in 
progress along the whole front of the two armies. Between 
Johnson on the left and Anderson on the right the Gonfederate 
infantry, it is true, has not yet taken part in the combat; but 



GETTYSBURG. 175 

Ewell's and Hill's guns, encompassing the heights of Cemetery 
Hill and Ziegler's Grove on both sides, cover them with pro- 
jectiles, thus connecting the two attacks. 

Before describing Johnson's attack we must follow Long-street's 
progress. Whilst Barksdale leaves Humphreys almost behind 
him, Wilcox and Perry advapce directly against the front of the 
latter, while farther on Wright menaces his flank. It is near 
seven o'clock. Humphreys has only two brigades with him; his 
left is turned ; his right, poorly connected with the Second corps, 
Avhich Caldwell's departure has weakened, is only covered by two 
regiments of Harrow's brigade, and three strong brigades are on 
the march to attack him. lu order to anticipate them, Hum- 
phreys, like a true warrior, desires to go forward to meet them. 
But Birney, foreseeing a disaster to his own division, orders him 
to fall back, keeping hie left from participating in the movement 
and bringing his right back to the Second corps. This move- 
ment, difficult of execution in the midst of the tumultuous sounds 
of battle, is accomplished with wonderful precision : the battal- 
ions are massing in double column, and execute a backward march 
in line ; then, making a quarter-wheel without accelerating their 
pace, and, halting at the point indicated to them by their chief, 
they resume the line of battle, and open at once a well-sustained 
fire of musketry against the assailants, who are almost upon them. 
Humphreys also succeeds in taking position along the line which 
it is important above all to preserve. But the trial was a hard 
one ; he will himself acknowledge hereafter that he thought at 
one time all was lost. He has left one-half of his effective force 
upon the battlefield, and it is necessary to count the flags that are 
floating along his line in order to realize the fact that it represents 
ten regiments. The detachment from the Second corps, under 
Colonel Devereux, which covered his right, has found no less 
difficulty in retiring in good order among the wounded lying 
on the ground and stragglers wandering over the field of battle. 

The consequences of the loss of the orchard are, however, as 
fatal to Barnes as to Humphreys. Sweitzer has posted himself 
on the right of Zook in that part of the road which has just 
been recaptured from Kershaw. Tilton has again formed his 
line, farther up on the ground which the latter has already cap- 

VoL. III.— 40 



176 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMEBICA. 

tiirecl from liiin : as ou that occasion, his right wing is without 
support. It is against this wing that Wc^liord, after the cap- 
ture of the orchard, descends with all the intrepidity tliat recent 
success has given to his soldiers. Tilton's brigade, not yet 
recovered from the combat in which it has been engaged, suc- 
cumbs under their effort. Kershaw immediately takes advantage 
of it in order to resume the offensive against Sweitzer and Zook; 
Semmes joins him. Barnes' two brigades, hard pushed in front 
and in flank, are driven out of the wood. Caldwell's soldiers, 
Avho in their turn are placed in the same position, and are more- 
over menaced on the left by Hood's troops, evacuate the wood and 
the W'heat-field, the bloody soil of which is covered with the dead 
and dying. Zook is killed ; the losses are enormous. The Con- 
federates, posted in the wood, command all its approaches ; their 
artillery, descending the slopes of the hillock of the orchard, takes 
the Unionists in flank. Brooke charges it with his brigade in vain ; 
he is repulsed and seriously wounded.* The Federal line is ir- 
revocably broken, and all the forces which have until then held 
Longstreet in check on the left are unable to re-form it. Out of 
eight brigades brought into action by the commander of the First 
Confederate corps, six are making desperate attacks ujion them. 
The Union troops, most of them in complete disorder, fall back 
on the w^ooded hillocks which line the left bank of Plum Run. 

But Kershaw and Semmes, exhausted in their turn, have 
halted in the wood whence Barnes and De Trobriand have 
just been dislodged. Only two brigades have passed over the 
Millerstown road : on the left, that of Wofford pushes forward in 
order to support Barksdale on the right ; that of Anderson, who 
has just been wounded, occupies the wood beyond the road, bring- 
ing several of the enemy's guns which it has captured back of the 
Trostle house, and even tries to cross Plum Run, but in vain. 

In the mean while, Hancock, who on the news of Sickles' 
wounds has been entrusted by Meade w'ith the command of the 
Third corps, is endeavoring to unite the two parts of the 
Federal line. Humphreys has just completed his movement. 
Most of the guns attached to his division, having lost all 

* Colonel Brooke was severely bruised, but did not relinquish his com- 
mand.^ — Ed. 



GETTYSBURG. 177 

their horses, have been abandoned in the patch of ground 
behind which he has posted himself, but they remain within 
the circle of his fire as a tempting prize for the enemy. 
Bigelow's battery, having no longer a single soldier to sup- 
port it, takes position in front of the Trostle house and fires 
canister upon the Confederates, who are advancing from every 
direction against it : one after the other the gunners fill near 
their wounded chief, their pieces being sacrificed ; but they have 
succeeded in delaying the march of the enemy on the left. These 
examples of bravery would not, however, have sufficed to Save 
the Federals if at this critical moment they had not been firmly 
established on Little Round Top, the real point of support for 
all their left. Ayres, bringing the two regular brigades of 
Day and Burbank, has crossed Plum Run and occupies the 
crest of Devil's Den on the right bank with a portion of Ward's 
soldiers, who have not been dislodged from it. The retreat of 
Barnes and Caldwell uncovers his right flank, thus leaving him 
isolated in advance of the rest of the line ; but, although attacked 
on three slides by Hood's and McLaws' troops, he forces a pas- 
sage through their oblique fires. His regular troops once more 
justify their old reputation ; not a single man has left the ranks, 
and thev allow themselves to be decimated without flinching. 
Eleven hundred combatants ojily out of an effective force of two 
thousand are left standing when, falling back gradually, they 
finally take position on the right of Weed, east of Plum Run, 
along the northern base of Little Round Top. 

About an hour since we left the two parties in conflict along 
the flank opposite to this elevated position, and Law's soldiers, 
in spite of their reduced number, rushing against the Twentieth 
Maine. The firing of musketry is again heard along the whole line. 
Weed, who sets an example to all around him, is mortally wound- 
ed near Hazlett's battery, whose commander, stooping to receive his 
last words, is struck in his turn, and falls lifeless upon the body 
of his chief; nearly all the superior officers are either killed or 
wounded. But the enemy is also exhausted : in order to sur- 
round the left (>f the Federals he has prolonged his line to too 
great an extent Colonel Chamberlain takes advantage of it to 
charge the enemy in his turn. The Confederates, surprised by 



178 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

this attack, arc repulsed, leaving behind them more than three 
liuudred wounded and prisoners. It is at this moment that Gen- 
eral Ayres takes position, with his two brigades of regulars, on 
the right bank of Plum Run. Although he cannot long main- 
tain himself in this position, his presence, which closes entirely 
the gorge of the stream, is sufficient to deter the Confederates 
from making any fresh attack against Little Hound Top. At the 
very moment when he is obliged to fall back, General Crawford, 
brino;in<r McCandless' brigade on the hill that Vincent and Weed 
have saved at the cost of their lives, assists its brave defenders in 
driving back the assailants to the -other side of Plum Run. The 
remainder of this small division is not long in joining its chief. 
The latter, placing McCandless on the right of Barnes' soldiers, 
and Fisher with his second brigade on the left, forms a solid line 
on the western slope of the hill, which the regulars prolong across 
the ISIillerstown road. On this side, therefore, Plum Run sepa- 
rates the combatants. Longstreet, satisfied with the advantage he 
has obtained, does not display so much eagerness in attacking 
positions so strongly occupied by the left of the Unionists. 

But Barksdale and Woiford threaten to separate this left from 
all the rest of the Federal army, and thereby to demolish the 
defences upon which it rests. These two brigades, that have as yet 
suffered but little, advance rapidly, driving before them stragglers 
and groups of soldiers belonging to all the corps, over an open 
country which secures a vast field of action to the Confederate 
artillery. The latter has taken advantage of it : while Hill's 
guns, with a portion of those belonging to Longstreet, are endeav- 
oring to absorb the attention of the Federal pieces, the five bat- 
teries of Alexander follow the Southern infantry step by step, 
and are beginning to riddle Humphreys' weak division with balls. 
In order to fill up the gap that has been made in their line, the 
Unionists are obliged to re-form along the very positions that 
Sickles had abandoned a few hours before. If he thought thera 
unsuitable in the morning, how will they be able to maintain 
themselves in them after the check they have just experienced? 
Although commanded by the Emmettsburg road, these positions 
nevertheless present advantages of which the soldiers eagerly 
avail themselves. The little valley of Plum Run, which sepa- 



GETTYSBURG. 179 

rates them from this road, is, as has been stated, full of bushes 
and trees. The Confederates have found there a shelter agaiust 
the fire of the artillery of the Second corps, which, in proportion 
as they advance, takes them more and more in flank. In order to 
get out of the place they will have to climb an acclivity of about 
thirty feet. Although very gentle, this acclivity affords a certain 
advantage to the Federals, It is a last chance, of which they 
must avail themselves if they do not wish to see the enemy take 
possession of their communications with Baltimore. The more 
the position they have taken favors the defence so long as they 
maintain it, the more irreparable will be the loss if they happen 
jto lose it. Consequently, Hancock brings all the forces at his 
disposal to the point thus menaced. Although the Second corps 
is already deprived of Caldwell's division, which, being extremely 
weakened, has not been able to resume the place it occupied in 
the morning, as Meade had directed, he detaches two regiments 
from Hays' division for the purpose of supporting Humphreys, 
and, taking with him Willard's brigade of the same division, 
pushes it more to the left, to the very centre of the open space it 
is sought to fill. Finally, General Hunt brings forward thirty 
or forty pieces of reserve artillery, forming the brigade of IMajor 
McGilvery, v/hich, having been hastily called at the time of 
the attack upon the orchard, have not been able to arrive in time 
to defend this point, but render a still greater service by taking / 
position along the left bank of Plum Kun. This formidable/ 
battery, the centre of which faces the Trostle house, commandsV 
along a front of about six hundred yards, all the slopes of th^ 
bank, and is able to cross fire with Hancock's artillery : it covers 
the remnant of the three divisions that Longstreet has just 
driven back beyond the stream, and closes like a solid bastion 
one-half of the breach which they have left open. Meade also 
hastens forward, his abrupt departure from the central point 
where he was stationed even causing a certain panic at his 
head-quarters. In the mean while, the troops he has sum- 
moned from the right are already in motion. Williams' divis- 
ion has struck the cross-road which directly connects the Taney- 
town and Baltimore roads near tlie field of conflict: this divis- 
ion is closely followed by one of Geary's brigades under Candy, 



ISO THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

but the other strays off, and finally comes to a halt beyond 
Rock Creek. General Lockwood, who has arrived from Balti- 
more and joined the Twelfth corps with two regiments on that 
day, has gone in advance of Williams, affording a useful support 
to McGilvery's guns. More to the south, Bartlett's brigade of 
the Sixth corps is marching on the track of Crawford, and two 
other brigades, forwarded by Sedgwick, will soon follow in the 
same direction. Finally, Meade, seeing the danger increase, calls 
upon Xewton to weaken Cemetery Hill as much as possible in 
order to assist Humphreys. 

All these troops, once assembled upon the field, will be greatly 
superior in numbers to those of the assailants ; but will they< 
arrive in time to check the progress of the enemy, or will they be 
beaten in detail ? This is what Meade at half-past seven o'clock 
is anxiously asking. In the mean time, it would be the very 
moment for the Confederates to attack him simultaneously at all 
points. If the discharges of the artillery posted on Seminary Hill 
were not an obstacle to both sight and hearing, Hill and Lee 
would perceive the smoke and hear the sound of the conflict that 
Johnson is prosecuting upon Culp's Hill. Two brigades of 
Anderson's and the whole of Pender's division are only waiting 
an order to continue the attack which is progressing from the 
right to the left, and make an attempt to carry Ziegler's Grove by 
assault, the success of which would be decisive. This order is 
not given, and the troops which might perhaps achieve a victory 
remain motionless. Generals Posey and Mahone, who, being on 
the left of Wright, ought to be the first to follow him, have, as 
it appears, received instructions not to advance unless the success 
of the attack seems to them certain : they wait in vain for an 
order from Anderson, their immediate chief. Pender, being 
posted more to the left, hastens to the right of his line for the 
purpose undoubtedly of leading it against the enemy, but he is 
mortally wounded by the bursting of a shell, and General Lane, 
w^ho succeeds him, only takes command after the fight is over. 
In the mean while, the three brigades led by Anderson, seeing 
nothing but stragglers before them, and dead and wounded men 
and spiked guns around them, believe that victory is sure, and 
boldly advance to reap the fruits. In this rapid movement the 



GETTYSBURG. 181 

lines are broken and all directions confused : they follow Hum- 
phreys, and although, according to Hill's orders, they ought to 
take the right as their guide, they soon find themselves separated 
from Barksdale, whose objective point is the breach that Willard 
is endeavoring to close. These three brigades no longer march at 
the same pace. At the moment when they pass beyond the strip 
of wooded land back of which Humphreys has taken position 
their ardcu* is increased by the sight of the abandoned guns, which 
the latter has not been able to drag after him ; but Perry's 
Floridians come to a halt near these pieces, and cannot afterward 
recover their dash. Anderson's front is therefore reduced to two 

brigades ; he extends it for the purpose of forming a junction with 
that of McLaws, thus weakening it at the very moment when he 
has most need to be strengthened. The confusion over the battle- 
field increases; the contending lines become mixed amid the smoke 
which envelops them. One of Wilcox's regiments reaches Hum- 
phreys' left uuperceived : Hancock encounters it, and hurls against 
it the First Minnesota, which stops its progress, but at a great 
sacrifice. Willard, whose two wings are equally deprived of all 
support, sees his brigade decimated ; he soon falls dead among 
the corpses that surround him. Hancock prodigiously exerts 
himself in order to restore the line. More to the left, Meade 
places himself at the head of Lockwood's soldiers. These t\vo 
regiments penetrate into the wood situated north of the Millers- 
town road, on the other side of Plum Run, and attack Ander- 
son's brigade. McCandless supports them, so as to connect them 
with the rest of Sykes' troops. Finally, Bartlett's, Nevin's, and 
Eustis' brigades of the Sixth corps arrive in time to reinforce the 
line formed by the Fifth from Little Round Top to INIcGilvery's 
batteries : they take the place which Lockwood occupied on the 
right near these guns, relieve the troops that have suffered most 
on the left, assist them in repulsing the last attempts of Law, 
and protect the whole of this wing from a new attack. 

The day is waning. The sun darts its oblique rays across 
Seminary Hill and over the smoke-wrapped slopes of Cemetery 
Hill,and the Round Tops. Without feeling at all disconcerted, the 

. brigades of McLaws and Anderson, which form the left of the 
Confederate attack, make a last efibrt almost at the same moment. 



182 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Their leaders feel that it is necessary to break the new line of the 
enemy before he lui.s had time to look around him, but they are 
too much divided to strike a heavy blow. McLaws, with two 
brigades, is separated on his right from Hood, mIio can no longer 
advance, and on his left from Anderson, who is inclining north- 
wai'd. 

During this time their adversaries are rapidly re-forming and 
fortifying themselves. Chamberlain has scaled the slopes of the 
Great Hound Top with a few soldiers, and captured a squad of 
the enemy which had come to reconnoitre. Fisher's brigade 
joins him in occupying this commanding position, thus closing 
all access to the Confederates at this point. At the extreme left 
Sedgwick has placed himself behind this rocky eminence, ready to 
support the three brigades he has sent toward Plum Run. On his 
right, Williams at length strikes the Taneytown road and masses 
his troops behind McGilvery's artillery. Finally, Newton, prompt- 
ly responding to jMeade's call, has brought Doubleday's division, 
with a portion of Robinson's, to the weak point at the depres- 
sion in the ridge connecting the Round Tops with Cemetery Hill. 
He covers the right of AVillard's brigade, and gathers around him 
the batteries and scattered troops that cannot maintain themselves 
M'ithout assistance, thus forming a line capable of frustrating Mc- 
Laws' efforts. The fiery Barksdale, still young despite his long 
white hair, seems to brave death on his horse, which is plunging 
through the thickest of the fight, but he falls at last under the 
fire of one of Burling's regiments. His soldiers, who, carried 
aM^ay by his example, rush upon the Federals, are too few in 
number, and, being repulsed, leave their dying chief in the hands 
of the enemy. Wofford, who supports them on the right, cannot 
go beyond the flats of Plum Run ; Anderson's brigade is not 
within reach. Longstreet, who directs the combat in person, is 
waiting in vain for the brigades of Kershaw and Semmes, that 
have suffered too much to abandon the ground they have captured 
from Caldwell, to renew the attack. At this juncture Anderson's 
division scales at last the slopes along which Humphreys and 
Gibbon are posted. Wilcox, on the right, followed at a consider- 
able distance by Perry, is the first to make the attack. On the 
left, Wright, i*eceiving the oblique fire of several guns posted on 



GETTYSBURG. 183 

the edge of a small wood above Gibbon's front, rushes forward 
and captures them ; but AVebb's brigade emerges from its position 
to dispute their possession : a desperate struggle ensues at this 
point. 

A timely reinforcement would probably suffice to secure the 
possession of Ziegler's Grove to Anderson's two brigades, and, 
consequently, of the very centre of the Federal line. The 
remainder of Hill's corps is watching all the incidents of the 
conflict from the summit of Seminary Hill, and is anxious to 
participate in it ; Lee, Hill, and Anderson are spectators of this 
exciting scene ; and yet nobody stirs. Anderson does not summon 
Posey and JNIahone to come to him ; Hill does not give the order 
for the attack to Pender's division : he waits for the night, 
and then only causes it to advance, as if he were yielding to a 
kind of tardy and useless remorse. Finally, Lee, who for some 
time had been in the vicinity of Posey's brigade, approves of this 
inaction by his silence, and assumes all its responsibility before 
history. Wright, encouraged by the sight of the crowds that are 
encumbering the Baltimore road, and believing himself already 
master of the northern ridge of Cemetery Hill, fights w^ith des- 
perate energy ; but in the space of a quarter of an hour he loses 
nearly two-thirds of his effective force, and falls back before 
Gibbon's division, which is arrayed against him. Wilcox, taken 
in flank by McGilvery's artillery, instead of the retreating soldiers 
he was pursuing meets Humphreys in good order on one side 
and Hancock's reserves on the other, thus finding himself with- 
in a circle of fire where he leaves five hundred men out of the 
sixteen hundred which composed his command. Rather forsaken 
than vanquished, these two brigades strike once more the 
Emmettsburg road. The last effort of the Confederates against 
the Federal left wing has failed. Twilight has come ; the firing 
of musketry ceases ; that of the artillery languishes ; the smoke 
clears away. But in proportion as silence prevails there, the 
sound of the battle which is progressing along the opposite wing 
is more distinctly heard. 

We left Johnson at six o'clock preparing to attack Gulp's 
Hill throudi the fforg-es of Rock Creek. Neither of the con- 
tending parties can bring artillery to this point, which is an 

N 



184 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMKRICA. 

advantage to their respective infantry. Early and Rodcs, posted 
at the foot of the open slopes of Cemetery Hill, must wait until 
the Federal left has been broken in order to attack in their turn. 
If this movement is not effected at the same time as that of Long- 
street's, it is not a preconcerted omission, as has been pretended, 
for the purpose of making Meade strip his right, but because 
Ewell, as we have stated, has not heard the booming of the guns 
of the First corps. Perhaps- it may also be proper to attribute 
his delay to the absence of Smith's and Gordon's two brigades of 
Early's division, detached the previous evening along the York 
road for the purpose of fighting an imaginary enemy : they have 
remained during the night in their peculiar position. Ewell, hav- 
ing committed the error of believing a rumor which no doubt orig- 
inated with the movements of Kilpatrick's Federal cavalry, does 
not decide to summon Smith's and Gordon's brigades until the very 
moment he should have begun the attack, and is obliged to wait for 
them before giving Johnson the order of attack. We must, before 
all, describe in this place the ground the possession of which Ewell 
is about to dispute with the Federals, and the manner in Avhich 
it is occupied by the latter. Howard and a portion of Robinson's 
division are posted on Cemetery Hill with a numerous artillery. 
This height is connected by a continuous ridge with the rocky 
and wooded summit of Gulp's Hill, of which AYadsworth holds 
the north front : he has erected a little below the summit strong 
breastworks, composed of trunks of trees, stones, and earth. 
The culminating point of Gulp's Hill does not exceed in height 
by more than two yards that of Cemetery Hill ; it commands by 
thirteen yards the lowest point of the ridge, and by more than fifty 
the waters of Rock Greek. At the foot of this hill this stream 
winds eastwardly, then resumes its course southerly. The wooded 
and rocky slopes are gentler toward the east than toAvard the north ; 
they extend farther at the south, forming a small plateau, cleared at 
the west, intersected by a ridge, and terminating at the south-east, 
above the stream, in a steep hillock. Two small valleys descend from 
the loAvest point of this ridge — one eastwardly, toward Rock Greek, 
the other southerly. The last-mentioned crosses a field bounded 
by a stone wall, then penetrates the flank of an acclivity covered 
witli bushes, meeting with a marshy swale which descends in the 



GETTYSBURG. 185 

direction of Rock Creek from the Spangler house by following 
the base of Gulp's Hill. A fresh and shady spring, called 
Spangler's Sj^ring, spouts out at the base of the hillock, presently 
losing itself in this marsh. 

Before Meade had stripped his right, Geary's division, and 
more to the south that of INIcDougall* of tlie Twelfth corps, occu- 
pied the east front of Gulp's Hill to the right of Wadsworth, as 
far as Spangler's Spring. They have erected intrenchments 
which follow this front as far as the edge of the valley, descend- 
ing in the direction of Rock Greek, are continued on the other 
side south-eastward by skirting, for a distance of about fifty yards, 
the stone wall above mentioned, and terminate finally betM'een 
Rock Greek and the spring. On the other side of the swamp, 
which is almost impassable at this point, the Golgrove and Lock- 
wood brigades had intrenched themselves along the stream, extend- 
ing their right as far as the vicinity of the Baltimore turnpike. 
This position is a strong one, but too much extended, and too 
near "the turnpike, which it is important to defend at any cost, it be- 
ing the line of retreat of the army. At the south it is covered by 
Power's and McAllister's Hills, which are occupied by Slocum's 
artillery ; but more to the north a triangular wood, intervening 
between the marshy swale, the small valley which descends 
at the south, and a cross-road, M'ould enable the enemy to reach 
the Spangler house by surprise, and thence the road itself. At 
this juncture Lockwood's and Williams' brigades are summoned to 
the left. Two of Geary's brigades that have followed them do 
not arrive in time to participate in the fight on this side, and their 
absence is sensibly felt on tlie right, for the third, under Greene, be- 
ing left alone, cannot furnish with troops the whole line of intrench- 
ments, extending to a distance of nearly sixteen hundred yards. 

It is at the moment when nearly the whole Twelfth corps is 
abandoning this position that Johnson puts his columns in motion 
to attack it. Leaving the open slopes Avhich he occupied, he 
descends in the direction of Rock Greek, and soon finds himself 
masked by the woods that are lining the right bank : his division, 
drawn up in two lines, the left resting on the Taney house, crosses 
without opposition the numerous fords of the stream. His artil- 
* McDougall commanded iheFirfst brigade of Euger's division.— Ed. 



186 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

lery has been left ou Benuer's Hill ; the infantry penetrates the 
wood and advances in the.dircction of the plateau, Jones' brigade 
ou the riglit, followed by that of Nichols ; Steuart on the left, 
followed by Walker. The intrenchineuts constructed by McDou- 
gall from the ravine to Spangler's Spring are no longer defended 
except by the small detachments of Greene's brigade. Steuart, 
driving back the Federal skirmishers, carries all that part extend- 
ing south of the ravine ; but he is taken obliquely by the Fede- 
rals who have remained in the other portion of the works. 
Greene, seeing the right wing thus turned, prolongs the line 
which he still occupies toward the west, and posts his right on 
the other side of the ravine, which descends at the south toward 
the triangular wood. He thus affords it a point of support, cov- 
ering on the most dangerous side the approaches to the turnpike. 
He immediately asks the generals who occupy Cemetery Hill for 
reinforcements ; but his dispositions are scarcely completed when 
the Confederates advance against him on all sides at once. Steu- 
art and Walker reach the stone wall, and take possession of the 
entire southern portion of the plateau extending as far as the 
front of the small wood on which Greene's right is resting. The 
latter could not offer them any resistance ; but the approaching 
nightfall having rendered them cautious, and being ignorant of 
the proximity of the Baltimore turnpike, Steuart and Walker 
remain in the works that have been captured, exchanging from 
thence useless volleys of musketry with the enemy. Jones, sup- 
ported by Nichols, precipitates himself upon Greene's left. The 
Federals are greatly inferior to them in number, but the 
intrenchments they occupy crown a real wall of rocks : lying in 
ambush behind the highest blocks and the knotty trunks Avhose 
roots are interwoven with the stone, they firmly wait for their 
adversaries. The latter, being obliged to climb the slopes of 
Gulp's Hill in line of battle, have been unable to keep within 
their ranks among the rocks and gaping holes hidden by the 
foliage. Their efforts break down before the obstacle, from the 
summit of which their adversaries receive them with a well-sus- 
tained fire. The Federals, being completely sheltered, lose but 
few men ; the assailants, ou the contrary, make immense though 
useless saciifices. Jones is wounded ; Nichols comes to relieve 



GETTYSBURG. 187 

lus troops, despite the darkness. But Greene has been reinforced 
by one brigade from Schurz's division ; Wadsworth has extended 
his right to sustain him; finally, Kane returns in time from his 
unfortunate march over the Baltimore turnpike to check Steuart's 
skirmishers on the other side. Nichols' assault is repulsed ; all 
the efforts of the Confederates are frustrated ; and, although a fev/ 
musket-shots are still exchanged, the conflict is ended about ten 
o'clock in the evening. 

Swell's attack has not been confined to this part of the Fed- 
eral line, and if the order of the narrative obliges us to give suc- 
cessive descriptions, the reader will not forget tiiat these separate 
combats take place at the same time on the left, on the right, and 
in the centre. In fict, the commander of the Second Con- 
federate corps has scarcely seen Johnson plunge into the thick 
copse wood with which Culp's Hill is covered than he gives the 
order of attack to Early and Rodes. But again the Southern 
generals cannot execute their movements with that collective 
energy indispensable to success. Nothing is easier, apparently, 
.than to combine Early's movements with those of Rodes : the 
former has deployed his troops to the left of Gettysburg, in the 
direction of Rock Creek ; the latter is posted in the town itself; 
no obstacle intervenes either between themselves or alono; their 
front. Yet while the two brigades of Hoke and Hays are 
advancing in magnificent order on the left of the city, Rodes 
has not yet deployed his division on the other side. The lat- 
ter general has either been too slow or Early too quick, and 
the orders transmitted by Ewell to these two generals have not 
been issued or construed in the same manner. Rodes was under 
the impression that he was to use his own judgment concerning 
the opportunity for making the attack, while Early, going fully 
into a(;tion, relies upon his immediate co-operation. The result 
is that Cemetery Hill is only attacked by two brigades. Smith 
having remained on the Hanover road for the purpose of assisting 
Stuart, who has at last made his appearance : Gordon alone has 
responded to Early's summons, who keeps him in reserve. 

At seven o'clock in the evening Hoke and Avery (who is in 
command of Hays' troops) scale the eastern front of Cemetery 
Hill under a terrific fire of artillery. They are soon received by 



188 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

a brisk discharge of musketry, but uotliiiig stops their progress; 
they pierce the liues of Barlow's two small brigades. These, 
commanded by General Ames, have not yet fully recovered 
from their check of the previous day ; the assailants drive them 
back in disorder upon the iutrenchments mounted Avith cannon 
which form the second line along the ridge of the hill, and, pass- 
in": almost without anv effort in the midst of the disordered Fed- 
erals, they penetrate the works. The remainder of the Elev- 
enth cor])s, reduced to three brigades, is posted along the west 
front of Cemetery Hill, back to back with Barlow's division. 
Finding themselves thus menaced in the rear, Steinwehr 
and Sclmrz cause a portion of their troops to about-face and 
come to the assistance of this division. They find the enemy in 
possession of the northern extremity of the hill, which stretches 
toward Gettysburg, and disputing to the Union artillerists the 
works which constitute the key to the whole position. For the 
space of one hour the two Confederate brigades are stubbornly 
struggling against the Federals, who, being superior in num- 
ber, are endeavorinoc to drive them back to the foot of the hill. 
But no one comes to their assistance, while their adversaries 
receive new reinforcements. It is near nine o'clock in the even- 
ing. A short time before, Hancock, hearing the sound of Early's 
attack, has spontaneously sent two regiments of the Second corps 
to Wadsworth, with Carroll's brigade to Howard's assistance. 
The latter brigade arrives just at the moment when the issue of 
the desperate struggle that is going on around the guns seems 
exceedingly doubtful. After vainly soliciting Lane's co-opera- 
tion, Rodes has at last deployed his division ; his skirmishers 
scale the west flank of Cemetery Hill, which Steinwehr and 
Schurz have just stripped, and are already opening fire, when 
Raraseur, who commands the brigade on the right, comes sud- 
denly to a halt, thus interrupting the whole movement. 

It appears that, seeing Lane's troops, which have also got near 
the enemy, remain motionless, Ramseur has been unwilling to push 
beyond their lines without fresh instructions. During the time 
thus wasted Carroll captures the position conquered by Hoke and 
Avery; the latter is killed. Early, not finding himself supported 
by Rodes, dares not put his last brigade in jeopardy, and the 



GETTYSBURG. 189 

assailants are finally obliged to fall back. It is only then that 
Rodes is ready to take part in the combat ; but finding, in his 
turn, no one to support him, he allows himself to be overtaken 
by the night without leaving his deployed position east of Gettys- 
burg. The attack directed against the Federal centre has com- 
pletely failed, because out of seven brigades that were present on 
the field of battle two only have been engaged. 

While the two armies were thus contending, Stuart's and Kil- 
patrick's cavalry, which had been pressing close upon each other 
for some days, were getting near the field of battle. On the 
evening of the 1st, Stuart, as we are aware, has finally received 
Lee's orders in the neighborhood of Carlisle. His several detach- 
ments are at once directed upon Gettysburg from all the points 
they occupy. Kilpatrick, who has been unable to go beyond 
Berlin, guessing Stuart's intentions, hastens to Heidlersburg for 
the purpose of getting in advance of him ; but he arrives too 
late, and night overtakes him in the vicinity of this village. 
Horses and men are both in want of rest, and only start south- 
ward at a late hour the following day for the purpose of covering 
the right of the Union army, in conformity with Pleasonton's 
orders. Their route leads them in the track of Stuart, who, 
knowing himself to be pursued, has left Hampton's brigade in 
the suburb of Hunterstown in order to prevent them from falling 
upon E well's rear. About four o'clock in the afternoon Kil- 
patrick finds Hampton drawn up in line of battle back of this 
village, across the Gettysburg road : he immediately deploys his 
two brigades. Farnsworth is on the right ; Custer is forming in 
front of the enemy, and soon assumes the offensive. He is 
promptly driven back by Hampton, who, charging in his turn, 
is likewise repulsed. The Confederates, satisfied with having 
blocked the way to the Federals, do not renew the struggle, and 
the latter, having received new instructions, resume the march 
after losing about thirty men. They will arrive toward three 
o'clock in the morning at Two Taverns, whence they will go and 
take the position on the extreme left which Buford has prema- 
turely abandoned, by making the tour of the array. The last- 
mentioned general encamps on the evening of the 2d at Taney- 
town, whence he will start on the following day for Westminster. 



190 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Gregg, who commands the second division of cavalry, has left 
Huey's brigade in this village to guard the supply-trains. He 
had left Hanover, -with the other two brigades, at daybreak, and 
has already taken up the position on the right of the army Avliich 
Pleasontou had assigned to Kilpatrick. 

This position will be the scene of an important battle the 
next day; it is proper therefore to describe it in a few words. 
The space comprised between the York and Baltimore turnpikes 
forms a triangle, having Gettysburg for its apex, and for its base 
a road called the Dutch road,* which connects these t\\'0 high- 
ways at distances respectively of six and four miles from the city. 
The Hanover road divides the apex of the triangle, and crosses 
the base about three miles east of Gettysburg, near the Reever 
house. In this triangle the ridge of Benner's Hill prolongs that 
of Gulp's Hill, while the defile of E,ock Creek alone separates 
McAllister's Hill from Wolf's Hill. This eminence becomes 
more extended toward the north, forming terraces from west to 
east, of which the highest, called BrinkerhofP's Ridge, commands 
a view of Gettysburg, and even Cemetery Hill, and terminates in 
an abrupt incline studded with woods and rocks. The traveller 
who, following the Hanover road, reaches this summit, sees 
before him an undulating and cultivated plain wdiich extends 
eastward as far as the eye can reach. At his feet a narrow and 
deep valley is separated from this plain by a smaller range which 
does not intercept his view. This range and the creek which 
waters the valley bear the same name : one is called Cress' Ridge, 
the other Cress' Run. The open country situated west of these 
elevations offers an easy passage to the cavalry, and allows Stuart 
to gain the Baltimore road by concealing himself behind Brin- 
kerhoiT's Ridge. A cross-road branching off from the York 
road at about two miles and a half from Gettysburg envelops 
the extremity of this ridge, crosses Cress' Run, passes over Cross' 
Ridge, and, striking the Dutch road a little to the north of 
the Reever house, seems to be expressly built for the purpose 
of facilitating the march of his squadrons and artillery. The 
Federals understand this perfectly. • Gregg, therefore, on arriv- 
ing from Hanover, has not halted at the village of Bonaugh- 
* Its '.Dcal designation is the Low Dutch (or Salem Church) road. — Ed. 



GETTYSBURG. 191 

to^vn. He has pursued his way as far as the viciuity of the 
Reever house, situated on a hill whence a very extended view 
can be obtained : his pickets are posted on Cress' Ridge, while 
he extends his line south-west, in order to join Slocum's right 
near Rock Creek. Stuart is yet some distance ofP, but Lee, 
justly fearing that the Union cavalry, whose presence has been 
revealed at Hanover, may harass his left, has ordered Jenkins 
to cover this wing. When Johnson advances in the afternoon 
for the purpose of attacking Gulp's Hill, he is instructed to 
make a reconuoissance with his brigade as far as the summit 
of Brinkerhoif's Ridge. But Gregg, apprised of his approach 
in time, sends some of Mcintosh's cavalry to oppose him. 
The latter reach the ridge at the same time as their adver- 
saries, and after a short fight, in which Jenkins is seriously 
w^ounded, they remain masters of the position. In the mean 
time, the Confederate cavalry, so imprudently scattered by I^ee, 
are hastening from every direction — to precede him if he should 
push forward, or to cover his retreat if he should be vanquished. 
Imboden has left McConnellsburg, after destroying the bridges 
of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad ; Jones and Robertson, left 
by Lee among the defiles of the Blue Ridge, have at last been 
summoned by him, and cross the Potomac at Williamsport. They 
are all to join him in the course of the following day. 

As two electric clouds, driven by contrary winds, are attracted 
toward each other by an irresistible force until the lightning, 
flashing at the point of their contact, gives the signal of the 
approaching storm, so in the same way the two hostile armies, 
both marching somewhat at random, find themselves forcibly 
drawn toward the spot which a fortuitous encounter had desig- 
nated, and the spark ignited on the morning of the 1st of July 
near Gettysburg has speedily brought about the terrible storm of 
the 2d. We have stated the reason why the Confederates have 
not given up the aggressive role. They have acquitted them- 
selves during its performance with the courage and ardor that 
have so frequently secured victory to them. Nevertheless, they 
have not achieved the results which they thought themselves 
entitled to expect from their enormous sacrifices. The condition 
of the battlefield has been against them, and in favor of the Fed- 
VoL. III.— 41 



192 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

eruls, whose artillery and infantry, being placed on the defensive, 
have had the advantage of firing steadily, frustrating the attacks 
of the Confederates, which were frequently disconnected when 
not directed by the great Jackson, their principal element of suc- 
cess ; but it must also be acknowledged that serious faults have 
been committed — faults calculated to astonish any one who, after 
having followed the Army of Northern Virginia through all its 
great struggles, is studying the manner in which it has been 
handled at Gettysburg during the 2d of July. 

Lee's first error was in giving too excessive a development to his 
line. He justly abandons the idea of making his princijxd attack 
on the left, because Cemetery Hill is too much exposed and too 
well fortified, while Culp's Hill, too rocky, is inaccessible to 
artillery ; but he should from that moment have confined his 
efforts on that side to a simple feint, and, instead of extending 
that wing to the valley of Rock Creek, have rested it on Gettys- 
burg, in order to be able to place the most potent means of action 
in the hands of Lono;street. 

The attack made by the latter was too long delayed. If he 
had commenced sooner, he would have found the Federals not 
so well posted on the ground, not having yet located all their 
artillery nor received the reinforcements of the Sixth corps. 
After Hood's delay comes that of a portion of jNIcLaws' division : 
the position of the orchard, which the latter is to carry, is at once 
the most accessible and the most important. If he had pushed 
all his troops forward at the moment when Kershaw, single- 
handed, brought on the conflict on his right, the success achieved 
on that side would have been less, dearly bought and more 
decisive for the assailants. 

The inaction of Anderson's two brigades and of Pender's 
division has been productive of still more serious consequences 
General Hill has testified to the fact in his report, without giving 
any explanation. INIust we conclude from his silence that at the 
time of giving the order of attack to this division he finds it yet 
too much disordered from the losses of the previous day to be 
engaged in such an assault? Lane having been relieved of his 
temporary command by General Trimble on the following day, it 
may be supposed that his discontented chieftains held him respou- 



GETTYSBURG. 193 

sible for the inaction of his troops. Anderson and his two lieu- 
tenants, Posey and Mahone, have declared that their instructions 
left them full latitude to judge of the chances of an attack, and 
that they had not deemed them sufficiently favorable to justify 
them in giving the order for making it. Whoever takes into 
consideration the efforts made by their neighbors at the same time 
will no doubt look upon this excuse as insufficient, revealing, on 
the other hand, a want of harmony in the orders issued by the 
i^Lueral-in-chief. Whoever may be blamable, the error cannot 
be repaired. At last, Ewell has been enabled to secure better 
harmony in the movements of Early and Rodes ; the latter, hoAV- 
ever, has not been better able to sustain the troops fighting by his 
side til an Lane. 

In the course of this day, which should have been a decisive 
one, Lee has only brought into action seventeen brigades out of 
the thirty-seven composing his infantry. It is true that among 
the other twenty there are three of them yet absent, and fourteen 
that have been in action the day before ; but the Confederate vet- 
erans would have considered themselves insulted if they had been 
told that they could not fight two days in succession. Hood has 
scaled the slopes of Little Hound Top ; McLaws has struck the 
weakest point of the enemy's line ; Anderson has scaled Ziegler's 
Grove ; Early has disputed the possession of the intrenchments 
of Cemetery Hill to the Federal artillerists ; Johnson occupies a 
portion of Culp's Hill ; and, to use Lee's own language, the advan- 
tages gained are of sufficient magnitude to induce him to renew 
the struggle on the following day. In short, if the Confederates 
have not penetrated into the really defensive positions of the 
enemy, they have been so near proving successful that Lee can- 
not be blamed for having assumed the offensive on that day. 

In fact, the situation of IMeade at the close of the battle is 
alarming, in spite of the advantages he has obtained. Sickles' 
movement has brought on a conflict outside of the line he had 
chosen in the morning. The occupation of Devil's Den has 
undoubtedly postponed the hour when the Confederates might 
be able to strike this line, but the reinforcements that are con- 
stantly arriving in these eccentric positions have been exhausted 
without succeeding in their effiarts to preserve the orchard from 



194 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

the mniiKMit tliat Lee made a resolute attack upon it. If the 
Federals had waited for him, massed between the Round Toi)S 
and Cemetery Hill, supported by two powerful batteries of artil- 
lery, they would have inflicted upon him, on the 2d of July, the 
the check Avhich he experienced the next day. ISIeade, however, 
has taken full advantage of the condition of the ground to con- 
centrate his forces u))on the point menaced. Out of ilfty-two 
brigades, forty-two of whicli have been engaged, thirty-six of 
them seriously, the general-in-cliief cannot be blamed for having 
stripped his right so much in his anxiety to reinforce the left. 
The losses of the army are, unfortunately, very great. They 
amount to more than twenty thousand for the two days' fighting, 
witliout counting the stragglers that are crowding the Baltimore 
road and the men dispersed by the combat who have not been 
able to rejoin their commands. The enemy has not spoken his 
last word, and Meade has cause to fear that another day's fighting, 
equally as murderous, may cause his whole army literally io melt 
away. Without ordering a retreat, his duty is therefore to autici- ^ 
pate and to prepare for it. In the evening, before the combat has j 
ended on the right, he summons a council of war at his head- | 
quarters for the purpose of ascertaining the opinions of the corps | 
commanders, the condition of their troops, and taking measures \ 
for the morrow. He asks them, "1. Under existing circura- ^ 
stances is it advisable for this army to remain in its present posi- 
tion, or to retire to another nearer its base of supplies? 2. It be- 
ing determined to remain in present position, shall the army attack 
or wait the attack of the enemy ?" While maintaining certain 
mental reservations, they declare against any aggressive movement, 
impossible at this hour, and against retreat, which was alone in 
question. INIeade, while adding, it is said, that the actual position 
of the army seemed bad to him, coincides with this opinion. If 
he had found that his lieutenants inclined to the opinion that 
their troops had suffered too much to continue the struggle, he 
would undoubtedly have given the order of retreat. But it is 
of no consequence, for, whatever may be the opinion of a council 
of war, the general-in-chief, being alone responsible, should, if 
the decision is a good one, receive all the credit of it. 

Every one, therefore, is preparing for the battle that is to be 



GETTYSBURG. 195 

fought on the following day. The moon seems lo be shining 
with the same splendor as on the previous night, for the purpose 
of favoring those soldiers who are overrunning the field of car- 
nage to cany oif the wounded. The Federals are re-forming 
their ranks among the dead, too numerous to occupy their atten- 
tion at this moment. Each man takes his position in silence, for 
the exaltation of victory is not felt to cause men to forget their 
fatigue, the suffering of their comrades, and their own chances of 
being killed the next day. " I wish I were already dead," said 
the gallant Biruey, whispering to one of his lieutenants, at the 
sight of the small number of determined soldiers who surrounded 
him. In the mean while, Meade's orders are being promptly 
executed. The four brigades of the Twelfth corps, marched from 
the left to the right, reach the Baltimore turnpike about eleven 
o'clock at night, but they find the enemy in the woods they occu- 
pied before their departure. Kane's brigade, making a detour, 
goes to join Geary in the positions defended by Greene. Wil- 
liams' division, increased to three brigades by the arrival of 
Lockwood, is waiting for daylight in order to dispute to John- 
son the intrenchments in which he had planted himself, without 
striking a blow, on the previous evening. The Sixth corps sup- 
plies reserves to portions of the line that are most seriously men- 
aced, and sends Shaler's and Neill's brigades to the extreme right, 
along the east side of Rock Creek. On the left, the Fifth corps, 
which happens to be alone in the first line, extends itself so as to 
occupy the steep acclivities of the Great Round Top and to antici- 
pate any flank movement on the part of the enemy. The Third, 
which is the most disabled corps, is kept in reserve : its officers 
stop the progress of the stragglers, bringing together all isolated 
commands and picking up those that have strayed from the ranks. 
Caldwell's division has resumed its position on the left of the 
Second corps, but it is greatly weakened ; and Hancock, deprived 
of Carroll's brigade, which has remained on Cemetery Hill 
between Ames and Wadsworth, can scarcely arm the front, which 
was easily occupied in the morning with strong reserves, by deploy- 
ing all his men. The three divisions of the First corps are sepa- 
rated : Wadsworth is on the right, upon Gulp's Hill ; Robinson, 
with all his force, on Cemetery Hill, between the Eleventh and 



19G THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Second corps. Doubleday, who was posted between Gibbon and 
the Fifth corps, having been relieved during the evening by Cald- 
well, is bearing to the right, and places Stannard, who has just 
joined him Avitli a strong brigade from Vermont, between Cald- 
well and Gibbon, a little in advance of the line of the Second 
corps. He occupies the small wood in which Webb and Perry 
have been contending over a few pieces of artillery. Pleasonton's 
orders are to wait for Kilpatrick at Two Taverns. He will send 
back Custer to the right in order to form a junction with Gregg's 
division, and will go with Farnsworth's brigade to take position 
on the left, where INIerritt will join him with his regular troopers : 
once united, they wall cause much trouble by watching the right 
of the enemy. Buford remains at Westminster. 

The Confederates, on their side, are preparing to renew the 
battle. They can neither retreat — for that would be to, acknow- 
ledge themselves beaten — nor wait for the attack of the Federals 
along Seminary Ridge, as it would be necessary to abandon all 
the positions they have just secured. The flank movement is as 
impracticable on the 3d as on the 2d, but without making a flank 
march tlie Federal left wing might be outflanked. It would 
require, it is true, to contract the line of battle, to reinforce it on 
the right, which would involve the evacuation of Gulp's Hill : 
it is a sacrifice the more necessary because the army Avould thus 
abandon the concave line which has paralyzed its operations ; 
besides, any other attack would be attended by great difficulties. 
The advantages obtained on the left are more apparent than real, 
for Johnson cannot take his artillery on the plateau he is about 
to reach, and which is swept by the Federal guns. At the centre, 
from Cemetery Hill to the vicinity of Little Round Top, the 
ground is open and swept by the cross-fire of the Union artillery. 
On the right the rocks of the Round Tops are imj^regnable 
citadels M'hieh could not have been carried except by a surprise ; 
a little moi'e to the south, on the contrary, the ground, rough yet 
passable, would perfectly suit the tactics of the Confederates : 
Longstreet, master of the banks of Plum Run, could easily cross 
it below the Round Tops for the purpose of surrounding them, 
as Hood had proposed to do before the battle of the 2d. 
Although this manoeuvre would be somewhat lengtliy, all the 



GETTYSBURG. 197 

necessary forces could be brought together in order to execute it 
during the afternoon. It appears that Lee had at first adopted 
this plan, but, influenced by the advantages obtained over the 
Third Federal corps, he decided simply to resume on the 3d the 
movement he had performed the day before. A fatal and inex- 
plicable resolution ! He thus persisted in adhering to the tactics 
of a double attack by way of the two wings, without thinking 
that the more ground they gained the easier it would be for 
Meade to lead his forces from one wing to the other in order to 
repulse them successively. The instructions he gave to his lieu- 
tenants were, moreover, so vague that he seemed to leave to each 
commander the task of fighting a separate battle according to his 
own fancy. In fact, he apprised Ewell that the battle would 
commence on the right at davbreak, directing him to take the 
oifensive at the same hour, and yet it was only on the morning 
of the 3d, long after the hour specified, that Longstreet received 
the necessary orders to put his troops in motion. 

Ewell, in the mean while, is concentrating all his efforts upon 
his left. Johnson is reinforced by Smith's brigade, which has 
been detached from Early's division since the 1st ; Rodes sends 
his old brigade and Daniel's to support him on the extreme left, 
thus enabling Johnson to resume the offensive with seven bri- 
gades ; the remainder of the Second corps, thus reduced to five 
brigades, will only support him in case of his succeeding in dis- 
lodging the Federal right and turning Cemetery Hill. These 
movements have been promptly executed ; but at the other 
extremity of the line there is nothing ready for an early 
morning attack. Pickett, coming from Chambers burg by a 
forced , march, has halted at a distance from the field of battle 
on the evening of the 2d ; Longstreet, informed of his arrival, 
has given him no information regarding the operations of the 
next day ; consequently, he only comes at seven o'clock in the 
morning to announce in person the approach of his head of col- 
umn, wdiich he has forestalled. It is only at this juncture that 
Ivce issues positive orders for the attack which Longstreet is to 
dirc^,t. In or<ler that this attack might be executed by the 
extreme right, it would be necessary to reinforce the two divis- 
ions that have been so much under fire on this side the day 



198 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

before. If the gencral-iu-clncf lias thouo;ht of doing so, he 
gives up tlic idea, and designates the heights which Anderson 
has attacked on the evening of the 2d as the most favorable point 
for breaking the Federal line. Several hours of the morning 
thus pass before any measure has been adopted on the right for 
reuewiuo; i\\Q struo-^le. 

Ewell was not apprised of this delay : he has urged Johnson 
to attack as soon as he has received the three brigades that have 
been assigned to him. But even if Lee had ordered him to wait 
he could not have postponed the battle, for the darkness of the 
night alone prevents the Federals assuming the offensive on that 
side : they cannot allow the enemy to remain in the works he has 
just taken ; he must be dislodged before he discovers how near 
he is to the Baltimore turnpike. Williams, with w^hom Slocum, 
commanding the entire right wing, has left the Twelfth corps, 
plants his artillery on the Power and McAllister Hills, whence it 
sweeps the distant front of the wooded plateau occupied by John- 
son, liuger's division menaces the Confederate left by way of 
the south along the banks of Spangler's streamlet. During this 
time, Geary, resting his right on the triangular wood, strikes in 
the rear with his left that portion of the intrenchments occupied 
by the enemy. At early dawn the fire of the Union artillery demol- 
ishes these weak intrenchments, stopping at the end of a quarter 
of an hour to allow the infantry to advance. But Johnson fore- 
stalls the Federals, hurling his battalions against them. The 
Confederates come up in three lines, scarcely separated from each 
other, and attack their adversaries with vigor. They have at 
last obtained a view of the Baltimore road covered with wagons, 
troopers, and straggling infantry, who are pushing toward the 
south in crowds, seized with a foolish terror in spite of the efforts 
of several squadrons of Union cavalry to preserve order along 
this important highway. This sight stimulates their ardor. The 
shock is terrific, and a desperate struggle takes place among the 
rocks with which the ground is thickly covered. All the batteries 
of Meade's reserve that have not been summoned to the left con- 
centrate their fire upon the slopes occupied by the assailants. 
Sedgwick, south of the road, is preparing to co-operate in case 
the enemy should succeed in obtaining a foothold upon the open 



GETTYSBURG. 199 

ground wliicli extends to the right of Geary. The marshy 
stream ^vhieh runs down from the Spangler house stops Ruger's 
progress, but Lockwood, who has just been joined by the rest 
of his brigade, proceeds to assist Geary. The conflict is pro- 
longed without losing any portion of its desperate character. 
Cannon-balls and shells pour upon the Confederates, who have 
not a single gun with which to reply. The Unionists, being 
reinforced, present to them an impenetrable front on all sides. 
The hours are slipping away ; the sun, which is rising higher and 
higher, is absolutely scorching. At times the combat languishes, 
then is renewed again with fresh violence. During the intervals 
of silence Johnson tries in vain to catch the sound of Longstreet's 
attack, which would relieve him by distracting the attention of 
the enemy. He alone sustains all the brunt of the struggle — a 
terrible struggle, hand to hand, man to man, impossible to 
describe, for it is made up of incidents as numerous as the com- 
batants themselves. But Jackson's soldiers, accustomed never to 
back out, are still unwilling to give up the hope of victory. On 
the right, Jones and Nichols maintain their position Avithout gain- 
ing or losing ground. Walker has been detached at the extreme 
left on the banks of Rock Creek to watch Ruger's movements. 
Steuart and the largest part of the reinforcements sent to John- 
son occupy the position which is at once the most menacing and 
the most exposed at the entrance of the wood, for if Ruger 
becomes entirely separated from Geary they receive the cross-fire 
of artillery and musketry without shelter. Finally, after seven 
hours' fighting, the Confederates, feeling that they are wasting 
their resources in vain, make one last effort to break the right of 
Geary so as to reach the Baltimore pike. But Kane, having been 
reinforced by Shaler's brigade, is ready to receive them. Steu- 
art, wishing to outflank his right, extends his line as far as the 
stream, and after having re-formed it leads his men to the charge. 
The bravest among them would perhaps have hesitated if he had 
not set them an example, for they know that they are called to 
perform a desperate act ; but they all follow him with a rush 
into the circle of fire Avhere the enemy is awaiting them. Useless 
heroism, for the skirmishers that Ruger has thrown across the 
stream open a murderous fire of musketry against their left flank 





200 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

wliile they are fighting Geary's troops in fro)it, and after a stub- 
born resistance they are finally repulsed. linger immediately 
crosses the stream, Geary penetrating the wood with him. The 
Southerners, exhausted, cannot withstand this combined move- 
ment of the Twelfth corps; they are driven out of the in- 
trenchments thrown up on the slopes of Gulp's Hill, and pushed 
back on the left bank of Rock Creek, leaving three stand of 
colors and about five hundred prisoners in the hands of the 
enemy : the success of the Federals on the right wing is complete. 
It is eleven o'clock, and the combat is over on that side ; it has 
not yet commenced along the rest of the line. 

It is now the hottest time of day ; a strange silence reigns over 
the battlefield, causing the Federal soldiers, worn out by fatigue, 
to look upon the impending general attack, which they have 
anticipated since early dawn, as extremely long in coming. Gen- 
eral Lee says in his report that by harmonizing the action of his 
several corps he had reason to rely upon success ; but it is pre- 
cisely this concert of action that he was not able to establish. In 
fact, between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, when the 
conflict had been progressing along the left for at least four hours, 
he is still occupied in assigning places to the troops that are to 
make an attack upon Ziegler's Grove. Moreover, he does not 
even appear to have come to any positive decision regarding this 
attack ; Longstreet is endeavoring to make him resort to a flank 
movement against the extreme left of the enemy. Duri,ng the 
long examination which absorbs the attention of the two generals 
Pickett's fresh troops, which have long since reached Seminary 
Hill, and are destined to play the first rdle in the combat at 
whichever point it may be delivered, remain with their arms at 
rest, vainly waiting for their orders. It is only at ten o'clock 
that they take position in the vicinity of the orchard, a little in 
the rear of the Emmettsburg road. 

The troops engaged the day before have abandoned a large 
portion of the open space extending in front of the new position 
of the enemy. Their pickets are on the left, along the Emmetts- 
burg road ; they stretch bevond it on the right for a distance of 
a few hundred yards. Anderson occupies the South and Rogers 
houses with the commanding ground on this side of the Codori 



GETTYSBURG. 201 

house ; but, leaving only some detatcliments on the ridge, he has 
brought back the bulk of his forces to the western slope and to 
the woods, which aiford them some shelter. Longstreet's left holds 
the orchard ; Wofford, at the centre, has re-entered the wood sit- 
uated west of the wheat-field which he had abandoned the even- 
ing of the previous day ; the right joins the Millerstown road, 
resting on the Emmettsburg road, and extending along the east l)ank 
of Plum Run in front of the Round Tops, at the foot of which 
Robertson and Law have passed the night. The Confederates 
thus occupy the line along which the Third Federal corps had 
formed the day before. At daybreak Colonel Alexander places 
the six reserve batteries of the First corps along the Emmetts- 
burg road ; the rest of the artillery of this corps is presently 
posted in their vicinity by Colonel Walton, forming a slight con- 
cave line of seventy-five pieces of artillery from the orchard to 
the point which commands the road east of the Codori house, 
arming all the ridge from which Humphreys was dislodged the 
day before, at a distance of from nine hundred to thirteen hundred 
yards from the enemy's line. The batteries of Major Henry to 
the right of the orchard cross their fire with that of the rest of 
the line ; those of Alexander are ranged above this position, at 
the summit of the slope running down to the Trostle house ; on 
his left, and somewhat in the rear, is located the Washington 
Artillery, with Dearing's and Cabell's battalions. This artillery, 
thus placed ahead of the infantry, is, according to Lee's instruc- 
tion, to batter the enemy's position which he proposes to attack. 
In the mean while, all the troops that are to participate in the 
attack take position back of the ridge, so that the Federals cannot 
see them distinctly. Wilcox has been drawn up in line of battle 
since daybreak, about one hundred and fifty yards west of the 
road, above the house of H. Spangler. Pickett plants himself 
behind Wilcox in the strip of ground which separates Warfield 
Ridge from that of Seminary Hill. Kemper's and Garnett's 
brigades are deployed, the former immediately behind the ridge, 
which is crowned by artillery ; the latter on its left. Armistead 
posts himself at first still more to the left, but he is soon obliged 
to abandon this position, which is too much exposed to the fire of 
the Federal artillerv, and to take shelter behind the other two 



202 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

brigiulcs, ready to move iuto liue at the first signal. A liglit bat- 
tery of Hill's corps accoinpauies these brigades. All the artillery 
of this corps, crowning the ridges of Seminary Hill, is preparing 
to sii2>port the assault ; finally, a portion of Ewell's artillery will 
also open fire against Cemetery Hill. 

About eleven o'clock, Pickett having caused the Codori house 
and some stacks of straw which might embarrass his march to 
be set on fire,* brisk volleys of musketry are exchanged between 
the skirmishers of both sides : the artillery participates, but after 
three-quarters of an hour this useless cannonade is gradually 
brought to an end. The two armies remain immovable ; it seems 
as though both dreaded the solemn moment when victory would 
be declared in favor of one of them. 

During this time the Federal cavaliy makes its appearance 
in the rear of Hood's division. Kilpatrick, having reunited 
]Merritt's and Farusworth's brigades, has crossed Plum Run 
below the Round Tops at about eleven o'clock, has turned the 
hill situated south-west of this rocky eminence, and is emerging 
iuto^h^^^n fields extending for a long distance on this side. 
Ac^^mg^ju a contrary sense, the plan which Hood had formed 
in order to reach the Federal supply-trains, he endeavors to strike 
the Emmettsburg road, along which those of the enemy are to be 
found. At the first news of this movement. Law, who takes 
Hood's place, has detached Robertson's brigade to stop him. 
Farnsworth, stimulated by the hope of capturing from the en- 
emy a portion of the reserve ammunition and supplies that are 
so precious to him, charges the Southern infantry with three regi- 
ments, but, after crossing two stone fences in pursuit of the enemy's 
skirmishers, his bold attack breaks down before the well-sustained 
fire of their line of battle. His troopers, whom he is trying to 
retire by the right toward the Slyder house, are driven back into 
a rough piece of ground, wandering about in a state of confusion 
across the roads, barriers, and thickets, and falling at last one after 
the other under the enemy's fire. The last to arrive with their 
chief in the vicinity of Plum Run find themselves shut up within 
a network of fences, where they are either captured or killed. 
Farnsworth is among the latter. His death was a great loss to 
the Federal army. Distinguished for dashing bravery, full of 

* The 14tli Connecticut infantry claims to have set fire to the property. — Ed. 



GETTYSBURG. 203 

forethought and vigilance, he possessed all the qualities essential 
ibr a cavalry officer. 

Merritt was not more successful on the Emmettsburg road, 
"which he is following on leaving the last-mentioned village : on 
this side the supply-trains and the parks of artillery of the 
Confederates are protected by Anderson's brigade. The Federal 
regulars, having vainly attempted to turn his position, dismount 
for the purjiose of attacking it in front, but they are repulsed 
after a brisk volley of musketry. Early in the afternoon Kil- 
patrick orders Merritt back, and leads him to the left of the army 
with the remnants of Farnsworth's brigade. The losses of the 
Federals are heavy, but they have obtained an important result : 
by drawing toward them two of the enemy's brigades they have 
weakened Longstreet's right to such an extent that the latter can- 
not even attempt a diversion at the moment when the decisive 
attack is made. 

In the mean time, Lee is making the final preparations for this 
attack. After having designated since morning Pickett and his 
gallant Virginians to sustain the principal charge, he has not yet 
selected the troops that are to support him, nor settled the order in 
which the rest of the army is to take part in the combat. He 
wishes with Longstreet to examine once more the ground before 
making the attack. He seems to have relied at first upon Hood's 
and McLaws' divisions to sustain Pickett's, for no order has yet 
been given to Hill's troops, Avhich alone, in case of their failure, 
can accomplish this task.' SeveraL officers of the general staif 
have asserted that this plan was even adopted, and that Lee 
ordered Longstreet to see it carried out — an assertion which the 
latter denies in the most emphatic manner. Inasmuch as Lee 
would not have allowed his lieutenant to violate his order under 
his own eyes, we are to believe that the examination of the 
positions of the First corps and those of the enemy caused him to 
abandon this plan entirely. This supposition is the more probable 
in view of the fact that the general-in-chief, having under those 
circumstances visited the positions of Woffiard in company with 
Longstreet, asked the former if he could attack the acclivities 
which he had failed to carry the day before, and that Woffi3rd 
plainly declared the thing to be impossible. It is therefore the 



204 27//!: CIVIL WAR IN A3IERICA. 

salient point formed by the front of tlie Federal Second corps 
that it is expedient to attack in spite of the defences ^ith which 
it seems to be covered : not only does the formation itself render 
it more accessible, biit its loss would j)rove more fatal to the Fed- 
erals than that of any other portion of their line ; for if the Con- 
federates succeed in posting themselves there, they take the defenders 
of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill in the rear. But in order that 
Hood and JNIcLaws might be able to co-operate in this attack, 
they would be obliged to abandon the positions conquered with 
so much difficulty on the right, and leave the ground free to the 
extreme left of the Federal army. The sounds of the battle in 
which Robertson and Anderson are engaged near the Emmetts- 
buro; road reach Lee's ears to remind him of the danger which 
menaces him on that side. Finally, Longs^treet has since as- 
serted that the two divisions led by him the day before had suf- 
fered too much to again undertake a decisive effort. They 
might, at all events, have assigned to them a very useful and 
less perilous task than the assault on Ziegler's Grove by causing 
a portion of these two divisions to make strong demonstrations 
against the left wing of the enemy. The nature of the ground 
would have enabled troops relatively few in number to draw 
Meade's attention without compromising themselves, and thus to 
turn aside a portion of his forces from the point designated to 
Pickett. But Lee does not appear to have thought of this 
diversion. Longstreet, who disapproves of his plan, does not 
assume the responsibility of making it, and the soldiers of Hood 
and McLaws, after having fought almost alone the previous day, 
are doomed in their turn to remain inactive spectators of the pow- 
erless efforts of their comrades. 

It is to Hill that Lee applies for the force necessary to support 
Pickett. Anderson, whose division forms the right of the Third 
corps, has deployed, as w^e have stated, Wilcox's brigade above 
Pickett's line. The other four brigades are formed in the rear, in 
the same order as on the previous day : Perry, then Wright on 
the right, partly masked by the left of the latter ; Posey, next 
Mahone, on the left, along the extremity of Seminary Hill, 
occupy the positions which they did not leave during the com- 
bat of the 2d. The brio;ades of Thomas and Perrin having 



GETTYSBURG. 205 

come forward iu the course of the preceding evening, Pender's 
division finds itself formed in two lines, while its front, reduced 
by one-half, enables Hetli to take position between it and Ander- 
son. Hill's troops, however, in this deployed order could not 
effectually sustain Pickett's attack. Consequently, Lee orders 
General Trimble, Pender's successor, to bring the two brigades 
of his second line, under Lane and Scales, to the rear of Heth's 
troops, actually commanded by Pettigrew. In this way six bri- 
gades support Pickett on the left, attacking with him the Fed- 
eral positions at the same time. Wilcox, in order to protect* 
Pickett's right flank, will advance as soon as he receives the 
order. All the troops of the Third corps destined to participate 
in the attack are placed under Longstreet's command, and the 
latter is authorized, if he deems it necessary, to push Perry's and 
Wright's brigades forward. He directs Pickett to designate to 
each officer the exact place that has been assigned to him. This 
concentration no doubt weakens, but does not entirely strip, the 
defensiv-e line which the general-in-chief is obliged to preserve in 
case of a reverse : the positions which Pickett and Wilcox are 
about to abandon are covered Avith a powerful artillery. Ander- 
son, drawn up iu line of battle behind Heth and the two brigades 
of Trimble, is ready to fill the space which the latter will leave. 
This line has, from one wing to the other, a development of at 
least five miles : it is therefore weak at all points, and if the pro- 
jected assault does not succeed there is no reserve left to prevent 
a counter-attack. 

Longstreet learns at last that everything is ready ; his orders 
are awaited to open the fire which is to precede the assault. 
He has placed Colonel Alexander at the entrance of the wood 
near ^Varfield's to watch the effects of the cannonade and to apprise 
Pickett when the moment for making the charge arrives ; but, 
having no faith in the success of the attack, he writes to Alexan- 
der, advising him not to give the order unless the enemy is driven 
from his positions, or unless he deems the latter sufficiently dis- 
organized to secure the success of the attack. Alexander naturally 
declines to assume the responsibility which his chief wrongly 
desires to impose upon him ; his ammunition is limited, and he 
will not open fire unless the attack is determined upon. Long- 



206 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

street, thus driven to the necessity of declaring his intentions 
formally, sends word at last to Colonel Walton, directing him to 
give tlie signal agreed upon. Much time has been lost, for it is 
already one o'clock in the afternoon. Two cannon-shots fired on 
the right by the Washington Artillery at intervals of one minute 
suddenly break the silence which was prevailing over the battle- 
field. It means "Be on your guard !" which is well understood 
by both armies. The solitary smoke of these shots has not yet been 
dispersed when the whole Confederate line is one blaze. To the 
seventy-five pieces of cannon of the First corps are added sixty- 
three of the Third corps which Hill has placed in line, and 
which, with the exception of Poague's battery, ranged within the 
line of the former, are posted along the prolongation of Semi- 
nary Hill at d distance of about thirteen hundred yards from the 
Federals. One hundred and thirty-eight pieces of cannon there- 
fore obey Longstreet's signal. The Federals are not at all sur- 
prised at this abrupt prelude : they have had time to recover from 
the shock of the previous day, and have made good use of it, 
Meade, assisted by Hancock and his several corps commanders, 
has spent all the morning in rectifying the line ; the general dis- 
position is not changed, but the whole portion of the front which 
the enemy seems to be menacing is occupied by a stronger force. 
Stanuard's brigade of Doubleday's division is formed in first 
line in column of regiments deployed ; behind it the rest 
of the division is drawn up in the same order. Birney, 
who has reorganized the Third corps, holds the space of merely 
tAVO hundred and fifty yards which Doubleday has left vacant in 
drawing his lines closer : the three brigades of his own division 
are likewise formed in cokunns by regiments ; that of Hum- 
phreys is massed in the second line, more to the left. Two bri- 
gades of the Sixth corps, under Torbert and Nevin, have taken 
position on the right above Caldwell, so as to cover McGilvery's 
artillery on the left. General Hunt is examining and rectifying 
with untiring zeal the position of his batteries. Those of the 
reserve, engaged somewhat at random, have been consolidated. 
Those army corps which have left the largest portion of their 
supply-trains in the rear find their guns short of ammunition ; 
the reserve artillery supplies this deficiency. At the extreme left 



GETTYSBURG. 207 

hvo batteries of the Fifth corps crown the steep ridge of Little 
Round Top. ]\IcGilvery, with his eight reserve batteries, occu- 
pies the position in which he rendered such valuable service the 
day before, from the Weikert house on the left to the depression 
which separates the base of Little Round Top from that of Ceme- 
tery Hill. This depression, which affords no good positions, sepa- 
rates him from the four batteries of the Second corps, placed by 
Major Hazzard in the rear of the infantry along the rocky line 
which gradually trends northward ; one of them is placed half- 
way on the left; the other three, under Arnold, Gushing, and 
Brown, are located on the high ridge. Woodruff's regular bat- 
tery occupies Ziegler's Grove. Finally, to the right of the front 
exposed to the enemy's fire a regular battery, and eight others 
belonging to the First and Eleventh corps, form under IMajor 
Osborne an irregular line turning north-westward and northward. 
The Union artillery is thus divided into three groups : McGil- 
very on the left, with forty-four pieces, along the prolongation 
of the slopes of Little Round Top ; Hazzard in the centre, Avith 
thirty pieces, resting on Ziegler's Grove ; Osborne to* the right, on 
Cemetery Hill, w;ith about fifty pieces, a large part of which, it is 
true, do not command a view of that portion of the line that is 
chiefly menaced. Finally, five reserve batteries hold themselves 
ready to take the place of those it will be necessary to relieve. 
The Federals therefore have eighty pieces of artillery to reply to 
the enemy. In conformity with Hunt's orders, they wait a quar- 
ter of an hour before replying, in oixler to take a survey of the 
batteries upon which they will have to concentrate their fire. 
They occupy positions affording better shelter than those of the 
Confederates, but the formation of their line gives the latter the 
advantage of a concentric fire. 

]\Iore than two hundred guns are thus engaged in this artillery 
combat, the most terrible the New World has ever witnessed. 
The Confederates fire volleys from all the batteries at once, whose 
shots, directed toward the same point, produce more effect than 
successive firing. On the previous day their projectiles passed 
over the enemy ; they have rectified the elevation of their pieces 
and readily obtain a precision of aim unusual to them. The 
plateau occupied by the Federals forms a slight depression of the 

Vol. III.— 42 



208 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

ground in tlie centre, which hides their movements, but affords 
them no shelter from the enemy's fire ; the shells burst in the 
midst of the reserve batteries, supply-trains, and ambulances ; the 
houses are tottering and tumbling down ; the head-quarters of 
General ]Meade are riddled with balls, and Butteriield, his chief 
of staff, is slightly wounded. In every direction may be seen 
men seeking shelter behind the slightest elevations of the ground. 
Nothing is heard but the roar of cannon and the whistling of 
projectiles that are piercing the air. A still larger crowd of 
stragglers, Avounded, and non-combatants than that of the day 
before is again making for the Baltimore turnpike with rapid 
haste. 

INIcanwhile, the Federal inflintry, motionless under this fire, 
stands the trial with remarkable composure. The artillerists 
are sustained by the excitement of the conflict, but they are also 
the most exposed. The men who are serving the guns must be 
relieved, and presently the guns themselves are successively dis- 
mounted. The reserve batteries come to take their places, silen- 
cing the guns of the enemy, who is advancing too boldly upon 
Gettysburg for the purpose of taking Cemetery Hill by enfilade. 
During this struggle, so desperate and murderous, despite the 
distance intervening between the combatants. Nature seems 
inclined to favor the Confederates, for a slight breeze from the 
north-east, driving the smoke over their positions, covers with 
a thick veil their batteries and the valley through which they 
are advancing to the assault. This assault, as we have stated, 
is directed against the salient point occupied by Hancock. It is 
against this point, therefore, that fhe Confederates should concen- 
trate their fire, but, on the contrary, they scatter it along the 
whole extent of the enemy's line. This error was noticed with 
astonishment by the Union artillerists ; so that when, a few years 
later, peace had brought them into close contact with their adver- 
saries, General Hunt met General Long, Lee's secretary, who had 
formerly been his pupil at \Yest Point, and asked him to explain 
the cause of it. " It was owing to the interference of the gene- 
rals " (commanding the ^J^X. corps and divisions), replied Long. 
In n^ticino; this error he added: "I said to mvself that vou must 
have been entirely forgetful of the principles you had inculcated 



GETTYSBURG. 209 

upon -ttft in your teachings." The losses of the Confederates, how- 
ever, although inferior to those of the Unionists, are not the less 
severe. Longstreet's artillery has suffered greatly; Kemper's 
brigade, posted in the rear of Wilcox, loses in a few minutes more 
than two hundred men — a sacrifice that could easily have been 
avoided. Lee and Longstreet, always at the post of danger, visit 
the batteries in person under a shower of shells. The sight of 
them encourages the soldiers. They say to one another, " It is 
true that Longstreet does not approve the plan of battle, but he 
waits for the signal of attack with no less ardor." In the mean 
time, the ammunition- wagons being too much exposed, it becomes 
necessary to place them at a distance ; hence a great difficulty in 
supplying the batteries, that have scarcely more than sixty rounds 
apiece, including canister. The total amount in reserve being less 
than one hundred rounds, it becomes necessary, moreover, to econ- 
omize the ammunition in future. Consequently, Colonel Alex- 
ander, hoping speedily to silence the Union guns, intends to give 
Pickett the signal of attack after a quarter of an hour's cannon- 
ade. But time is flying; the caissons are getting empty, while 
the fire of the Federals, concentrated upon certain points by 
Hunt's orders, is still as regular and precise as at the commence- 
ment. The matter, however, must be brought to a close ; it is 
near two o'clock. Alexander writes to Pickett, saying that if he 
wishes to charge, the moment has arrived, notwithstanding the 
intensity of the enemy's fire, for he no longer hopes to be able 
to silence it. The latter calls upon Longstreet, but cannot obtain 
any instructions from this general, who is cruelly tried between 
his own convictions and the orders of his chief: he leaves him, 
stating that he is going to put his troops in motion ; Longstreet 
makes no other reply except by nodding affirmatively. On return- 
ing to his division Pickett is at all events waiting for new direc- 
tions or a favorable opportunity when an urgent message from 
Alexander decides him at last to give liis soldiers the signal of 
attack. He is informed — what he might have found out himself 
in spite of the roaring of the Confederate cannon — that the 
enemy's guns scarcely make any reply. The Federal artillery 
appears to be silenced from the lack of ammunition. The 
opportunity so long waited for has therefore at last arrived — a 



210 THE CIVIL W'AR IN AMERICA. 

mistake Avlik-li the assailants will soon lind out to their sorrow. 
In i'aet, about a quarter-past two o'clock, Meade, believing that 
enough ammunition has been expended, and wishing to provoke 
the attack of the enemy, orders the firing to cease; Hunt, who 
is watching the battlefield in another direction, issues the same 
order at the same moment, and causes two fresh batteries, taken 
from the reserve in the rear of Hancock's line, to advance. For 
a while the voice of the Confederate cannon is alone heard. 

But new actors are preparing to appear on the scene. Pickett 
has caused the object of the charge they are about to execute to 
be explained to his soldiers. As the ranks are re-forming many 
of them can no longer rise ; the ground is strewn with the dead, 
the wounded, and others that are suffering from the heat, for a 
burning sun, still more scorching than that of the day before, 
lights up this bloody battlefield. But all able-bodied men are at 
their posts, and an affecting scene soon elicits a cry of admiration 
both from enemies and friends. Full of ardor, as if it were rush- 
ing to the assault of the Washington Capitol itself, and yet march- 
ing with measured steps, so as not to break its alignment, Pickett's 
division moves forward solidly and quietly in magnificent order. 
Garnett, in the centre, sweeping through the artillery line, leaves 
Wilcox behind him, whose men, lying flat upon the ground, are 
waiting for another order to support the attack. Kemper is on 
the right ; xVrmistead is moving forward at double-quick to place 
himself on the left along the line of the other two brigades ; a 
swarm of skirmishers covers the front of the division. The 
smoke has disappeared, and this small band perceives at last the 
long line of the Federal positions, which the hollow in the ground 
where they had sought shelter had, until then, hidden from its 
view. It moves onward full of confidence, convinced that a 
single effort will pierce this line, which is already wavering, and 
feeling certain that this effort will be sustained by the rest of the 
army. Taking its loss into consideration, it numbers no more 
than four thousand five hundred men at the utmost, but the aux- 
iliary forces of Pettigrew, Trimble, and Wilcox raise the number 
of assailants to fourteen thousand. If they are all put in motion 
in time, and well led against a particular point of the Federal 
line, their effort may triumph over every obstacle and decide the 



GETTYSBURG. 211 

fate of the battle. Marching in the direction of the salient posi- 
tion occupied by Hancock, which Lee has given him as the ob- 
jective point, Pickett, after passing beyond the front of Wilcox, 
causes each of his brigades to make a half-wheel to the left. This 
manoeuvre, although well executed, is attended with serious diffi- 
culties, for the division, drawn up en echelon across the Emmetts- 
burg road, presents its right flank to the Federals to such an 
extent that the latter mistake the three echelons for three suc- 
cessive lines. 

The moment has arrived for the Federal artillery to com- 
mence firing. McGilvery concentrates the fire of his forty 
pieces against the assailants, the Federals even attributing the 
change in Pickett's direction to this fire — a wrong conclusion, for 
it is when he exposes the flank that the enemy's shots cause the 
greatest ravages in his ranks. If the thirty-four pieces of Haz- 
zard bearing upon the salient position could follow McGilvery's 
example, this artillery, which Pickett thought to be paralyzed, 
would suffice to crush him. But, by order of his immediate 
chief, Hazzard has fired oftener and in quicker succession than 
Hunt had directed, and at the decisive moment he has nothing 
left in his caissons but canister. He is therefore compelled to 
wait until the enemy is within short range. Pickett, encouraged 
by his silence, crosses several fields enclosed by strong fences, 
which his skirmishers had not been able to reach before the can- 
nonade ; then, having reached the base of the elevation he is to 
attack, he once more changes his direction by a half-wheel to the 
right, halting to rectify his line. The Confederate artillery is 
endeavoring to support him, but is counting its shots, for it is 
obliged to be sparing of its ammunition : the seven light pieces 
intended to accompany the infantry, being wanted elsewhere, 
fail to appear at the very moment when they should push for- 
ward, and no other battery with sufficient supplies can be found 
to take their place. 

But, what is still more serious, orders do not seem to have been 
clearly given to the troops that are to sustain Pickett. On the 
left Pettigrew has put his men in motion at the first order, 
but, being posted in the rear of Pickett, he has a wider space of 



212 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

ground to go over, and naturally finds himself distanced ; more- 
over, his soldiers have not yet recovered from the combat of the 
previous day : from the start their ranks are seen wavering, and 
they do not advance with the same ardor as those of Pickett. 
Covered by a line of skirmishers, the four brigades of Archer, 
Pettigrew, Davis, and Brockenbrough are deployed from right 
to left on a single line. But such a line of battle is always diffi- 
cult to maintain. The left slackens its pace ; the right, on the 
contrary, urged on by the two brigades of the intrepid Trimble, 
is endeavoring to join Pickett, whom his half-wheel conversion 
has drawn near it; the four brigades thus find themselves 
ranged en Echelon, like those of Pickett, although in an inverse 
order. Scales, on the right, in rear of Archer, with Lane 
on his left, following Pettigrew's brigade, is in second line 
abreast of the last-mentioned echelon. Presently, these troops, 
through their imposing appearance, attract a portion of the 
enemy's attention and fire, and at a distance of two hundred and 
fifty yards they stop to reply with volleys of musketry. On the 
right, Wilcox has remained inactive a considerable time, being 
probably detained by a diversity of opinion among the chieftains 
regarding the role that is assigned respectively to them. In fact, 
while Pickett, who is too much engaged to watch his movements, 
depends upon him to cover his right during the attack. Hill, his 
proper chief, does not desire to bring him into action unless the 
principal assault is successful. Finally, in pursuance of an order 
from Pickett at the moment when the latter has halted in the 
vicinity of the Codori house, Wilcox pushes his brigade forward 
in a column of deployed battalions. In order to get sooner into 
line, and thus to draw a portion of the enemy's fire, he marches 
directly on. He cannot, however, recover the distance that sepa- 
rates him from the leading assailants, the latter having disappeared 
in a hollow ; then, becoming enveloped in smoke, he loses sight 
of them, and, following alone his direction to the right, does not 
succeed in covering their flank. 

In the mean while, Pickett, causing his skirmishers to fall back, 
has again put his troops in motion, without waiting for his echelons 
to get completely into line : the artillery and infantry posted along 
the ridge he is to capture open a terrific fire of canister and mus- 



GETTYSBURG. 213 

ketiy against him at a distance of two hundred yards, -while the 
shot and shell of McGilvery take his line again in flank, causing 
frightful gaps in its ranks, killing at times as many as ten men by 
a single shot. 

Before narrating the terrible encounter that is impending we 
must give a sketch of the ground which is about to be so desper- 
ately disputed. In the prolongation at the south-west of the 
hillock properly called Cemetery Hill stands the plateau design 
nated by Lee as the objective point of the attack, which we shall 
call Ziegler's Grove, from the name of a small wood which 
descends the slope opposite to Gettysburg. The ridge of this 
plateau, the summit of which is very level, is bordered at the 
west by rocks which project from the soil, sometimes to a height 
of four or five feet, forming a wall, as on the summit of Gulp's 
Hill. The wood is defended by Woodruff's guns, posted along 
the lower edge, masking the right of the Third division of the 
Second corps, commanded by Hays. Farther on, the natural 
wall aifords the latter strong defensive positions; fifty yards south 
of the wood' above a spring called Bryan's Well, it is crowned 
for a distance of nearly three hundred yards by an ordinary 
stone wall. Back of this line is deployed the remainder of Hays' 
infantry ; two batteries are posted along the ridge. To the left 
the wall follows a Avesterly course, of about eighty yards, to form 
a junction with another ridge emerging from the soil. Gibbon's 
division, whose front is four hundred and fifty yards in length, is 
covered by another wall surmounted by a common post-and-rail 
fence. Owen's brigade, commanded by General Webb, is on the 
right, in an angle above Hays' position, Hall in the centre. 
About one hundred yards farther up the wall terminates abruptly 
behind the small wood, an iutrenchment prolonging the line of 
the fence in the direction of the level grounds which Birney occu- 
pies, and which are covered by the Federal artillery. In the 
salient angle formed by the wood Doubleday has placed Stan- 
nard's brigade. The four brigades are ranged in two lines : 
three batteries, posted along the ridge near the second line, fire 
over the first, their front being flanked by Hays on the right and 
Birney on the left. 

Seeinff their adversaries advancino; asrainst these formidable 



214 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

positions, tliose amongst the Federals who fought under Burn- 
side have the same opinion : they are at hist to be avenged for 
the Fredericksburg disaster. The assaihmts also understand the 
perils that await them. On the left, Pettigrew is yet far off; 
on the right, "Wilcox strays away from them and disappears 
amid the smoke. Pickett therefore finds himself alone with 
his three brigades. Far from hesitating, his soldiers rush for- 
ward at a double-quick. A fire of musketry breaks out along 
the entire front of Gibbon's division. The Confederate ranks 
are thinning as far as the eye can reach. Garnett, whose brigade 
has kept a little in advance, and who, although sick, has declined 
to leave the post of honor, falls dead within a hundred yards of 
the Federal line ; for an instant his troops come to a halt. They 
are immediately joined by Kemper, who at a distance of sixty 
yards in the rear has allowed their right to cover his left. The 
two brigades form a somewhat unsteady line, which opens fire 
upon the enemy. But the Confederate projectiles flatten them- 
selves by thousands upon the strata of rocks, which is soon cov- 
ered with black spots like a target, and upon the wall behind 
which the Unionists are seeking shelter. The game is too 
uneven : they must either fly or charge. These brave soldiers 
have only halted for a few minutes, allowing Armistead the 
necessary time to get into line. Encouraged by the example 
set by their chiefs, they scale the acclivity which rises before 
them : their yells mingle with the rattling of musketry ; the 
smoke soon envelops the combatants. Gibbon, seeing the enemy 
advancing with such determination, tries to stop his progress by 
a counter-charge, but his voice is not heard ; his soldiers fire in 
haste, without leaving their ranks ; the Confederates rush upon 
them. Unfortunately for the assailants, their right not being 
protected by Wilcox, their flank is exposed to the little wood 
which stretches beyond the Federal line. Stannard's soldiers, 
concealed by the foliage, have suflcred but little from the bom- 
bardment; Hancock, always ready to seize a favorable oppor- 
tunity, causes them to form en potcnce along the edge of the wood 
in order to take the enemy's line in flank. Two regiments from 
Armistead's right thus receive a murderous fire which almost deci- 
mates and disorganizes them. The remainder of the brigade 



GETTYSBURG. 215 

throws itself in the rear of the centre of Pickett's line, which, 
following this movement, momentarily inclines toward Hays in 
order to attack the Federals at close quarters. Armistead, urging 
his men forward, has reached the front rank between Kemper and 
Garnett — if it be yet possible to distinguish the regiments and 
brigades in this compact mass of human beings, which, all cov- 
ered with blood, seems to be driven by an irresistible force supe- 
rior to the individual will of those composing it — and throws 
himself like a solid body upon the Union line. The shock is ter- 
rific : it falls at first upon the brigades of Hall and Harrow, then 
concentrates itself upon that of Webb, against which the assail- 
ants are oscillating right and left. The latter general in the midst 
of his soldiers encourages them by his example ; he is presently 
wounded. The struggle is waged at close quarters; the Con- 
federates pierce the first line of the Federals, but the latter, dis- 
lodged from the wall, fall back upon the second line, formed of 
small earthworks erected on the ridge in the vicinity of their 
guns. These pieces fire canister upon the assailants. Hancock and 
Gibbon bring forward all their reserves. To the left of Webb, 
Hall, seeing his right outflanked, has rectified his line by means 
of a half-wheel to the rear, which places him on the flank of the 
assailants; farther on, HarroM^, not being directly attacked, 
advances with his left, and, in spite of the disorder inevitable 
under such circumstances, he succeeds in almost taking Pickett's 
line in reverse. The troops posted on the right and left hasten 
toward the point menaced. Humphreys sends Carr's brigade to 
the assistance of the Second corps. The regiments become mixed ; 
the commanders do not know where their soldiers are to be 
found ; but they are all pressing each other in a compact mass, 
forming at random a living and solid bulwark more than four 
ranks deep. A clump of trees, in the neighborhood of which 
Gushing has posted his guns, commanding the whole plateau, 
is the objective point that the Confederates keep in view. Arm- 
istead on foot, his hat perched on the point of his sword, rushes 
forward to attack the battery. With one hundred and fifty men 
determined to follow him unto death he pierces the mass of com- 
batants, passes beyond the earthworks, and reaches the line of guns, 
which can no longer fire for fear of killing friends and foes indis- 



216 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

criminately. But at the same moment, l)y the side of Gushing, 
his young and gallant adversary, he falls pierced with balls. They 
botli lie at the foot of the clump of trees which marks the extreme 
point reached by the Confederates in this supreme eifort. These 
few trees, henceforth historical, like a snail on the strand stru(;k 
by a furious sea, no longer possessing strength enough to draw 
back into its shell, constitute the limit before which the tide of 
invasion stops — a limit traced by the blood of some of the bravest 
soldiers that America has produced. 

In fact, if the Federals have thus seen a large number of their 
chieftains fall, and their artillery left without ammunition, the 
effort of the assailants, on the other hand, is exhausted. On 
the right Wilcox has started in great haste to cover Pickett's 
flank, but the direction he is following leads him to the low 
grounds interspersed with bushes whence Plum Pun derives its 
source, separating him from this division, to which he can no 
longer afford assistance. Pcttigrew, on the left, does his best to 
support him. His own brigade and that of Archer have reached 
Hays' line, but have failed to effect a breach. Trimble, who is 
following them closely, sustains them vigorously. Lane has 
already penetrated the first line of the Federals, drawn up, as 
it is elsewhere, at the foot of the acclivity, and, beginning to scale 
it, he dra^vs near the wall which, as we have stated, stands at this 
point about halfway from the summit. Archer and Scales, cov- 
ered on their right by the movement of Pickett, who has passed 
the same w^all at the point where it skirts the plain, have pre- 
ceded Lane by a few minutes. But Pettigrew's two brigades of 
the left, having remained in the rear, cannot or will not arrive 
in time to support them. After a combat at short range — very 
brief, but extremely murderous, in which Trimble is seriously 
wounded — his troops and those of Pettigrew retire, even before 
the two brigades under Thomas and Perrin have reached their 
position, and while Pickett is still fighting on the right. The 
regular fire of Hays' impregnable line drives the assailants from 
that point in the greatest disorder as soon as they have taken one 
step in retreat. The four brigades of the Third Confederate 
<3orps that have thus been repulsed leave two thousand prisoners 
and fifteen stands of colors in the hands of the enemy. A few regi- 



GETTYSBURG. 217 

ments of Archer's and Scales' brigades, which outflank Hays on the 
left, throw themselves on the right and unite with Pickett's soldiers, 
who are still contending with Gibbon. This reinforcement is, how- 
ever, quite insufficient for the Confederates, who thus find them- 
selves isolated, without support and without reserves, in the midst 
of the Federal line. Kemper is wounded in his turn. Out of 
eighteen field-officers and four generals, Pickett and one lieuten- 
ant-colonel alone remain unharmed : there is hardly any one left 
around them, and it is a miracle to see them yet safe and sound 
in the midst of such carnage. The division does not fall back ; 
it is annihilated. The flags which a while ago were bravely float- 
ing upon the enemy's parapets fall successively to the ground, only 
to be picked up by the conquerors. A number of soldiers, not 
daring to pass a second time the ground over which the Federals 
cross their fire, throw down their arms : among those who are 
trying to gain the Southern lines many victims are stricken clown 
by cannon-balls. The conflict is at an end. Out of four thou- 
sand eight hundred men that have followed Pickett, scarcely 
twelve to thirteen hundred are to be found in the rear of Alex- 
ander's guns ; three thousand five hundred have been sacrificed 
and twelve stands of colors lost in this fatal charge. 

In the mean Avhile, Wilcox, having lost sight of Pickett, has 
reached the foot of the acclivities along which the Third Federal 
corps is massed. After having re-formed his brigade in the low 
ground covered with bushes which borders these acclivities, he 
deploys it and resumes his march in order to support Pickett, 
whom he believes to be still fighting on his left. The Unionists, 
who from their commanding position overlook the whole battle- 
field, are astonished at the display of so much audacity, for at 
this juncture the great struggle is already ended. At a distance 
of two hundred yards from Wilcox's line, and within its compass, 
stands the wood into which Stannard has just brought back the 
troops that have performed so useful a diversion against Pickett 
on the other side. Seeing a new adversary, he causes them to go 
through the same manoeuvre in an opposite direction, pushing 
forward as far as a strong fence two regiments whose fire 
takes the whole Confederate line in flank. The latter come to a 
halt, replying to the fire of the enemy ; but they soon realize 



218 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

their isolation : tlie Federal artillery riddles tliem with shot ; the 
guns that should have sup])()rted them are silent for want of 
ammunition. They recall to mind the disaster of their comrades 
and retire precipitately, leaving two hundred of their men on the 
ground. During this time Pickett's soldiers, mixed up with 
those of Pettigrew and Trimble, have taken the shortest way to 
cross the valley, and instead of making for their point of depart- 
ure have thrown themselves more to northward, along the extrem- 
ity of Seminary Hill, not far from the spot selected by Lee for 
watching the battle. 

The combat was so quickly determined that the reinforcements 
intended for the assailants have not had time to cover their retreat. 
To the right of Pickett's old position, which is no longer occupied 
except by artillery and the remnants of Wilcox's brigade, Mc- 
Laws makes Woiford's and Barksdale's brigades, commanded by 
Colonel Humphreys, advance a little : the latter deploys a portion 
of his forces as skirmishers to the right of Wilcox, forming in 
the vicinity of the Confederate guns a barrier which would prove 
very weak, no doubt, if the Federals made a serious effort to 
pierce it. More to the left, Perry and Wright are only Avaiting 
for orders to renew the combat. But Longstreet forbids their 
advance, justly declaring that a new attack would only result 
in the useless shedding of precious blood. In fact, it is no longer 
a question of renewing the assault, but rather to put a stop to the 
disorganization of the army. Seated impassively upon a wooden 
fence, he thence directs the members of his staif, who are pro- 
ceeding in every direction, to gather, up the stragglers. In 
the midst of the latter Lee quickly mounts his horse and 
endeavors to retain them by his speech, uttering a word of 
encouragement for each, and even taking upon himself the 
whole responsibility of the disaster. 

These men, always accustomed to follow, and full of blind 
admiration for him, stop short at the sound of his voice. But 
the disorder is great ; on every side the wounded are forming sad 
processions that are pressing forward in the direction of the ambu- 
lances. The Confederate generals only succeed in rallying a small 
number of combatants, whom they range in haste close to the 
guns, against which they expect to see the enemy advance with 



GETTYSBURG. 219 

troops elated by victory. This artillery, without support, per- 
forms, it is true, prodigies of valor iu order to conceal its weak- 
ness ; and one of Henry's batteries, posted alone in advance of 
the line to the right of the orchard, continues the fight under the 
concentrated fire of the enemy's guns. 

On the side of the Federals there is great anxiety during the 
struggle. INIeade, who was on the left, has hastened to the s})ot 
at the moment of Pickett's defeat, followed by the reduced bat- 
talions of the Third corps. It is not to be believed, however, 
that Lee risked the fate of the battle in this partial attack, and 
that he will not yet make a decisive effort with all the rest of his 
army. Every one, therefore, is waiting ; the wounded are carried 
oif and the ranks re-formed. Along the front, where the struggle 
has been carried on hand to hand, the combatants, coming from 
the right and left, are all mixed up. Humphreys has massed his 
troops behind the Second corps ; a portion of Birney's division, 
which, like himself, has folloMcd Meade, has taken position on 
the left, ready to strike the enemy in flank should he attempt to 
advance farther ; the whole of Doubleday's division has marched 
toward the elevated point occupied by Stannard ; while Robinson 
arrives at the same time to reinforce the right of the Second 
corps. Two brigades of the Twelfth corps, summoned by Meade 
from the other extremity of the line, appear shortly after the ter- 
mination of the struggle. The general-in-chief confers upon New- 
ton the command of the First, Second, and Third corps, in the 
place of Hancock,* and charges him to restore order on the scene 
of the last combat. But Pickett's experience having proved how 
dangerous it was to cross the open space intervening between the 
enemy and Ziegler's Grove, Meade hastens to the left in the hope 
of taking the offensive on that side. This wing is composed of 
the Fifth corps and the largest portion of the Sixth. The for- 
mer, which is fortified on the summit of the Round Tops and at 
their bases, can reinforce Crawford's division, which has suffered 
but little as yet. Sedgwick, after leaving two brigades east of the 
Great Round Top — Shaler's near Geary, and Neill's along Rock 
Creek — has still three brigades (one under Wright and two under 
Wheaton) that have not yet been engaged, and which occupy the 
space comprised between the Fifth corps and McGilvery's artillery. 
* Who was wounded. — Ed. 



220 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Wheaton on the left and Wright on the right are formed several lines 
deep. On their right Caldwell's division, by order of Hancock, 
holds itself ready to take tlie offensive. Among the troops that 
have suffered, like it, on the previous day, there are many 
which, encouraged by the success they have just witnessed, might 
renew the combat against an enemy that has been still worse 
punished. The soldiers, although fatigued by long marches, 
are yet able to make a vigorous effort. Against which point of 
the enemy's line should this effort be directed? An English 
officer. Colonel Freemantle, who was with Longstreet, and could 
form a cool judgment of passing events, has declared that, despite 
the disorder of the infantry, the artillery would have sufficed, in 
his opinion, to put a stop to any direct attack. But it was feasible 
to manoeuvre offensively without repeating the error .committed 
by the enemy, who had only succeeded in the attacks made under 
cover of the woods and ravines adjoining Plum Run : it was 
expedient to operate in this direction. The forces arranged in 
front formed a vast semicircle, the two extremities of which rested 
on the Emmettsburg road, and whose summit touched the slopes 
of the Great Round Top : from this height one could perceive 
the six or seven brigades ranged along this long line and isolated 
from the rest of the army by the disorganization of the centre. 
It is Hood and McLavvs, therefore, who must be surprised, 
struck, and destroyed. 

Such is, no doubt, Meade's idea as he is proceeding to the left. 
But he dares not hazard a great movement, which alone could 
prove effective. Being but recently placed in command, he does 
not possess self-reliance enough to risk a great deal in order to gain 
a great deal. Where are the old colleagues whose advice might 
have inspired him with a bold determination ? Reynolds was the 
first and most illustrious victim of this great conflict; Hancock, 
the master-spirit of the defence, is wounded : he has indeed been 
able to dictate from his couch a note imploring his chief to take 
the offensive, but he is not on the spot to execute what he sug- 
gests ; Gibbon has received a serious wound in return for the 
glory he has acquired ; Sickles, who on the previous day com- 
mitted an error which may well be pardoned, but whose clear 
judgment, coolness, and irresistible ardor have so frequently fired 



GETTYSBURG. / 221 

the hearts of his conipauious-iu-arms, — Sickles, now lying muti- 
lated on his bed of sickness, is lost to the Army of the Potomac ; 
and Butterfield, although only slightly wounded, is for the pres- 
ent unfit for active service. 

Besides, nothing has been prearranged for the offensive. If 
Pleasonton, who has neither command nor responsibility on the 
battlefield, exhorts Meade to seize this opportunity to show him- 
self at one stroke a great leader, on the other hand hesitation is 
marked upon the countenances of many — a hesitation very natural, 
for some months afterward a number of general officers come for- 
ward to declare under oath before the Committee of Congress on 
the Conduct of the War that in their opinion any attack would 
have failed. 

They are under the impression of having escaped from a ter- 
rible danger, and of having done enough for the occasion. The 
invasion is repulsed ; by attempting any further eifort everything 
might be compromised. In short, they are all paralyzed by the 
common error of the Union chiefs, who believe the enemy to be 
much stronger numerically than he is in reality. The aggressive 
audacity of the Confederates has achieved the result, always so 
important in war, of deceiving the enemy regarding their real 
strength, thus protecting them at the critical moment. Under 
this impression Meade is desirous of feeling them before making 
a serious attack. He gives Sedgwick no instructions, merely 
directing Sykes to push a reconnoissance on the left over the 
ground which should have been occupied in great force, Mdthout 
even pointing out the importance of such movement. This oper- 
ation is thus entrusted to a single brigade of Crawford's division, 
Avhich, under McCandless, has held since morning that portion of 
the Trostle wood adjoining the right bank of Plum Run. Leav- 
ing Bartlett to keep guard over this wood, Crawford and McCan- 
dless advance across the wheat-field on which hundreds of dead, 
dying, and wounded soldiers have been lying since the day before. 
Without stopping to contemplate this sad spectacle, the Fed- 
erals penetrate about five o'clock into the wood situated west of 
this field. 

As we have before observed, the position of the Confederates is 
very much exposed on this side. I^aw, having sent Anderson's 



222 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

brigade to keep Kilpatrick iu check on the Emmettsburg road, 
has been obliged to deploy the remainder of his division upon a 
long, attenuated line. His old brigade (under Robertson) on the 
right faces eastward, along the lower slopes of llound Top ; Ben- 
ning occupies the hill of Devil's Den, supporting Kershaw, who 
forms the right of McLaws' division. The rest of this division 
covers the position of the orchard : Semmes and Wofford have 
their troops massed close to the houses ; Barksdale's are deployed 
as skirmishers, whose line extends as far as the positions occupied 
by Wilcox before the attack. Toward four o'clock, shortly before 
McCandless receives the order to advance. Law, who understands 
the danger to which Pickett's check exposes him, decides to bring 
his troops to the rear. The two brigades on the right fall back 
toward the Emmettsburg road without molestation. . Kershaw, 
having received a similar order from McLaws, abandons the wood 
he has captured the day before from Caldwell, and starts in the 
direction of the orchard. Benuing has misunderstood his instruc- 
tions, and instead of following this movement he prolongs his 
line to occupy the position which Kei'shaw has just left. His 
left, being thus extended, encounters INIcCandless, who after a 
short engagement captures from him about one hundred prisoners, 
compelling the whole brigade to make a speedy retreat. Kershaw 
finds himself isolated in his turn, and, believing himself already 
surrounded, in order to escape from the enemy resorts to a 
manoeuvre which we mention on account of its singularity. He 
sends the color-bearers of his regiments to plant their flags a few 
hundred yards in the right-rear, across the tributary of Plum 
Run, subsequently ordering his soldiers to break ranks and 
to re-form in this new position. An active enemy would 
not have allowed them to again get together, but ISIcCaudless, 
not daring to venture farther without support, stops before 
the ravine, satisfied with having recaptured nearly the entire 
battlefield of the previous day and picked up more than 
two hundred and fifty prisoners. The sad task of carrying 
off the large number of wounded, who had remained without 
care or assistance for the space of twenty-four hours, detains him 
at every step, and keeps him occupied until the night is far 
advanced. 



GETTYSBURG. 223 

The darkne&s which envelops the battlefield renders any serious 
undertaking henceforth impracticable. WheatoUj who has at last 
been ordered to support McCandless, advances on the right of the 
latter Avith Nevin's brigade, followed by that of Bartlett ; but it 
is too late, and he comes to a halt at a considerable distance from 
the orchard. When the information obtained by McCandless 
finally reaches Meade neither party thinks of anything but to 
calculate the results of the day's conflict. 

Before proceeding to describe the occurrences of the next day we 
must mention a cavalry coml)at which, during the great straggle, 
took place east of Gettysburg and south of the York road. Stuart, 
not being able to participate in the infantry fight, has since morn- 
ing been making preparations to take advantage of the victory 
if it should crown Lee's efforts. The latter has directed him 
to get around the Federal right, in order to strike the enemy's 
columns in flank if they should retire in the direction of West- 
minster — a well-conceived plan which would have been product- 
ive of disastrous consequences to the Federals had they been 
beaten on the heights of Gettysburg. 

At three o'clock in the morning Stuart, leaving the positions he 
has occupied to the right of Rock Creek and north of the York 
road, follows the road which leads from the York road to the 
Reever house. He thus covers the left of the Second corjDs and 
reaches the extremity of Brinkerhoif 's Ridge. Rapidly ascend- 
ing the summit of this ridge, he perceives the enemy's cavalry 
posted along the slopes upon which stands the Reever house. He 
at once proposes to separate it from the right of the Army of the 
Potomac and to strike the road to Westminster between the bridge 
over Rock Creek and that over White Run, a stream which re- 
ceives the waters of Cress' Run a little before reaching this road. 
In order to accomplish this it is necessary for him to conceal his 
movement from the enemy and detain him in the vicinity of the 
intersection of the Hanover and Dutch roads. Sheltered behind 
the high ground of Cress' Ridge, while a screen of skirmishers oc- 
cupies the edge of the woods which cover a portion of them, and at 
the same time keep off those of the enemy, the Confederate troopers 
will be able to reach the Baltimore turnpike unobserved. Without 
waiting for the issue of the great struggle, they may be able to 

Vol. III.— 43 



224 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

create a pauic in the rear of tlie Union army, the effect of Avhich 
will be decisive on the battlefield. Stuart puts Chambliss' and 
Jenkins' brigades, which are with him, on the march along the 
western slopes of Cress' Ridge. Fitzhugh I^ee and Hampton 
have remained behind, near the York road. He sends tliem an 
order to join him by following closely in his tracks, so as not to 
attract the attention of the enemy. 

The troops which Stuart has seen near the Reever house belong 
to Kilpatrick's division. After sunset of the previous day, Gregg, 
being summoned back by Pleasonton, has left this position in 
order to take another in the rear of the army. He has bivou- 
acked near the bridge over White Run on the Baltimore road ; 
but in the mean time, Kilpatrick, returning from Huuterstown 
and finding the important highway from Bonaughtown unoccu- 
pied, has left Custer's brigade there. On the morning of the 3d, 
Gregg, having been ordered to advance again, so as to cover 
the right flank of the army, has proceeded along Cress' Run, 
south of the Hanover road. He thus keeps in view the eastern 

. slopes of Wolf's Hill, on which Stuart must debouch if he passes 
beyond Brinkerhoff's Ridge. On learning of Custer's presence 
near the Bonaughtown road he sends him word to go into posi- 
tion on his right, which seems to him to be much exposed, and 
to extend his line in front of the Reever house. Although he 
lias been ordered by Kilpatrick to repair to Two Taverns, Custer 
complies with Gregg's request. Stuart thus has three brigades in 
front of him, numbering about five thousand troopers. Pie has 
himself no less than six thousand sabres in the four brigades 
placed under his command. He knows nothing of the ])osition of 
Gregg, who will doubtless soon discover the march of Chambliss 
and Jenkins. But this march is interrupted from the beginning 
by an unforeseen incident : Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, impru- 
dently showing to the enemy a portion of their forces, have 

* unmasked it. 

The Dutch road north of the highway follows a ridge but 
slightly elevated and running parallel Avith Cress' Run. The 
plain which stretches out, a little more than half a mile in width, 
between these elevations, cultivated and intersected by some 
fences, is watered by a small stream, Little's Run, the som-ce of 



GETTYSBURG. 225 

which is found in the Ruminel farmyard at the foot of Cress' 
Ridge, four hundred yards south-west of the cross-road connect- 
ing the Dutch road with the York turnpike. This cross-road 
passes through two small pieces of wood situated on either 
side of the plain — one on the slopes of Cress' Ridge, the other 
on the hillocks that the Dutch road follows. On the south the 
plain is bounded by hills adjoining Cress' Run, and which the 
Hanover road traverses near the Howard house before reaching 
the cross-road. 

Along these hills Custer has taken position. About ten o'clock 
in the morning Hampton aud Lee, following the cross-road 
beyond the point where Stuart has left it, debouch from the 
woods on Rummel's farm. Their artillery immediately opens 
fire upon Custer. The latter, menaced on his right, deploys en 
potence a portion of his brigade which he has till then kept in 
reserve, and his guns soon silence those of the Confederates. 
Hampton and Lee, finding out their mistake, speedily fall back 
behind the wood, where Custer takes good care not to follow 
them. But at the sound of the conflict Stuart, who has already 
advanced somewhat, stops : if the enemy menaces his flank he 
cannot proceed farther. He sends for Hampton and Lee to 
show them from the summit of Briukerhoff' s Ridge the lay of 
the ground and to explain his plan to them. But his messengers 
lose their way, and he Avaits for his lieutenants in vain. Mean- 
while, Custer, having received new orders from Kilpatrick, has 
set oiF to join his division on the left of the army beyond Round 
Top. Gregg has sent one of his two brigades, under Mcintosh, 
to relieve Custer. He has i-emained with the other, commanded 
by his namesake, Irvin "Gregg, in the positions taken in the 
morning. It is near two o'clock. The echoes from the hills 
which separate the two bodies of cavalry from the field of battle 
around Gettysburg have been relocating for the last hour the 
sounds of the cannonade which precedes the great attack of 
Longstreet. The Federals, who have dismounted, anxiously 
listen to the distant roar of cannon. They feel that the critical 
moment of the battle has arrived. Although they cannot take 
part in the combat, nor even follow its movements with the eye, 
this thought seems to fire their ardor. In fact, Mcintosh, scarcely 



226 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

establislicd in the position wliicli Caster has just vacated in the 
vicinity of the Howard house, determines to take the offensive — 
a happy inspiration, for lie thereby baffles Stuart's plan at the 
very moment when he is about to execute it. The Confederate 
general, equally urged on by the sound of the combat, would 
like to continue his movement with the brigades of Chambliss 
and Jenkins under the shelter of Cress' Ividge, while Plamp- 
tou and Lee detiiin the enemy north of the Hanover road. 

Mcintosh, in advancing upon Rummel's farm, has obliged these 
two last-mentioned brigades to deploy in order to hold him in 
check. General Lee is in command of both, M'hile Hampton is 
vainly endeavoring to join Stuart. He has placed his dismounted 
troopers behind a strong fence. His artillery unmasks, and ]\rc- 
Intosh stops, soon realizing the fact that he has to contend wdth 
too strong a force. 

Gregg, summoned in haste, meets Custer, and brings him back 
to the aid of his first brigade. Irvin Gregg, posted a consider- 
able distance oif, reaches the cross-roads a little later, and re- 
mains in reserve. Custer could not arrive more opportunely with 
his four splendid Michigan regiments. Stuart has seen them 
from a distance. Finding the enemy's forces, which are massing 
on his flank, increasing, he determines to send Jenkins' brigade 
against them, retaining only that of Chambliss to continue his 
movement. The sole object of this movement, however, is now 
limited to the task of turning the left flank of the Union cav- 
alry in order to assure its defeat : he is, in fact, obliged to begin 
by fighting it before striking the rear of the Army of the 
Potomac. 

In the mean time, Gregg is preparing to attack the Confeder- 
ates, although the latter, posted along the slopes of Cress' Ridge 
and within the enclosures of the Hummel farm-buildings, have 
every advantage of position. Two of Custer's regiments, the 
Fifth and Sixth jNIichigan, reinforce Mcintosh's line, which rests 
to the right on the Avoods situated along the Dutch road, and, to 
the left, on the Hanover road : the other two regiments are kept 
in reserve. The artillery is posted on the hill near the Howard 
house, and opens fire upon the Kummel farm-buildings, occupied 
by Fitzhugh Lee's skirmishers. Lee, who has vainly tried to 



GETTYSBURG. 227 

turn Mcintosh's right, has gradually brought into action the 
greater portion of his brigade. Jenkins' men are in position on 
his right, extending as far as the Hanover road. Custer's troop- 
ers, on foot, with carbine in hand, are marching in skirmishing 
order against the enemy, who is speedily dislodged from the 
farm-buildings by the Federal guns. Gregg, leaving his right 
firmly established on the wood on the Dutch road, brings his left 
toward Cress' Kidge, thus drawing near the positions occupied by 
Stuart. The greater portion of Jenkins' brigade, deployed as 
skirmishers like the Federals, soon comes forward to meet them. 
But Giving to some strange negligence it soon finds itself short of 
ammunition, and the Sixth Michigan sends it rapidly to the right- 
about. Gregg, taking advantage of its withdrawal, sends for- 
ward in the centre a portion of Mcintosh's brigade. Fitzhugh 
Lee's men, who have lost their hold on the Rummel farm- 
buildings, fall back in their turn, becoming separated from those 
of Jenkins. Stuart, finding that the latter are in great jeopardy, 
orders Chambliss to go to their assistance. The latter dismounts 
one of his regiments and directs it against the Federal centre ; 
the others hold themselves in readiness to support it. The prog- 
ress of the Unionists is stopped, but Stuart has no one left with 
wdiom to accomplish the manoeuvre he has undertaken. The 
:ombat, brought on in spite of him, is of too serious a character 
jot to engage thenceforth his whole attention. Indeed, the regi- 
ment sent out by Chambliss has found the Federals strongly 
posted behind a fence near Little's Run. The Fifth Michigan, 
armed with repeating carbines, receives it with a well-sustained fire : 
the attack of the Confederates is repulsed. Fitzhugh Lee, who, 
from his position on the left of the Rummel farm, has anxiously 
watched all the phases of the combat, thinks that the moment has 
arrived for striking a decisive blow. He orders the First Vir- 
ginia to charge mounted upon Mcintosh's right. The First New 
Jersey, whose ammunition is exhausted, has no time to retire in 
good order ; it is quickly driven back upon the side of the woods. 
Custer most opportunely hurls against the assailants the Sev- 
enth Michigan, which comes to meet them mounted, but stops 
behind a fence and opens an ineffective fire upon them ; the 
Virginia troopers reply in the same manner. During this firing 



228 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

Lee causes a portion of his men to advance on foot, who soon 
demolish the obstacles and put the Federals to a speedy retreat. 
Their centre falls back in disorder, their lefb being obliged to form 
en potencc behind a fence in order not to be taken in flank. 

But this very success ha»s exhausted the strength of the First 
Virginia. The fusillade takes it in flank, while tlie shells are 
pouring into its ranks. It falls back, dragging along with it 
beyond the Rummel house the whole of Lee's brigade. Hamp- 
ton, having returned to his command without finding Stuart, 
concludes that he can no longer remain inactive, for Cham- 
bliss on his right is as hard pressed as Lee on his left, the 
defeat of the latter having decided the Federals to resume the 
offensive along the whole line. Consequently, he orders two 
regiments, the First North Carolina and the Jeff. Davis Legion, 
to charge the enemy. The latter come up at a gallop, sabres in 
hand, and rush upon one of the Federal batteries, without allow- 
ing themselves to be staggered by its rapid and murderous dis- 
charges. But Gregg hurls against them the First Michigan, 
which has till now been kept in reserve. Custer leads it with 
spirit against the Confederates, much superior in number, but 
whose front ranks have been decimated by the Union artillery. 
The latter does not cease firing till the two bodies of cavalry 
meet almost in front of the cannons' mouths. The Southern 
column is repulsed after a bloody struggle, but it receives prompt 
assistance. Lee mounts all of his troopers that are left him and- 
gives the signal for the charge. In compliance with an order 
from one of Hampton's aides-de-camp, the brigade of the latter 
follows his example. This strong reinforcement is soon in the 
middle of the plain in which Custer continues to fight : its arrival 
gives the Confederates a momentary advantage. ]\Ieanwhile, 
before even becoming engaged, the new-comers are exposed to the 
fire of the artillery and of the Union skirmishers posted on their 
right behind the fences. Gregg and ]McIntosh call their reserves, 
remount a portion of their skirmishers, and hurl them upon 
both flanks of the Southern column.* The combat with the 

* On tlie part of Mclntosli's brigade, 'tlie Third Pennsylvania and First New 
Jersey caviilry regiments had tlie heaviest part of the fighting, and in the final 
charge assisted the First Michigan hy also charging inoiuiied with the sabre npon 
both flanks of the Confederate colinnn. These regiments suffered severely. — Ed. 



GETTYSBURG. 229 

steel becomes general ; the two columns force and repel each 
other with desperate fury, without achieving any decided success. 
Hampton, who has joined his brigade, is seriously wounded ; a 
large number of officers of both armies fall around him. At 
length the Federals fall back, but they thus unmask their artil- 
lery, which compels the Southerners to beat a still more speedy 
retreat. The ground so stubbornly disputed is abandoned by 
both parties.* The Unionists have lost 736 men, of whom 112 
are killed, 289 wounded, and 335 taken prisoners : Custer's 
brigade has suifered the most. They have, hoAvever, accom- 
plished their object and frustrated the plan of their adversaries. 
By their first attack, and subsequently by their vigorous resist- 
ance, they have interrupted Stuart's flank movement. The latter, 
it is true, watches till evening to hear the sound of the cannon 
which is to announce the defeat of the enemy. He still hopes to 
be able to strike tlie Westminster road in the midst of the flying 
Federals; but night at length comes to dissipate this pleasing 
dream. He withdraws to the York road, for it is no longer an 
object with him to destroy shattered battalions or to achieve a vic- 
tory, but rather to cover the retreat of a decimated army and long 
columns of wounded men. 

In fact, when the sun sets over this bloody field for the third 
time the decree of the God of armies has been irrevocably pro- 
nounced. The Confederates feel themselves conquered; there- 
fore, such must be the case. Their heroic efforts and the enor- 
mous losses of their adversaries have not sufficed to secure victory 
to them. The positions which the Federals have so well defend- 
ed are in a strategic point of view only of secondary importance ; 
but it having been rendered necessary for Lee to attack the 
Army of the Potomac on the spot where he met it, these positions 
have acquired a fortuitous value by enabling it to defend itself 
with advantage. In order to drive this army completely van- 

* In the official reports of Generals Pleasonton, Gregg, and Custer it is stated 
that the Union cavalry remained masters of the field of the engagement, while 
General Stuart claims in his report that tliey were driven from it. A detailed 
account of this brilliant engagement is given by Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel 
William Brooke-Rawle in The Bight F^lank at Oeitysburg. That writer, wlio was 
present, asserts that the Confederates were driven back beyond tlie Eunimel 
farm-buildings, which in the beginning of the fight had been in their posses- 
sion, and that the position was held by the Unionists until the end. — Ed. 



230 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

quishcd on the Baltimore road, it Avould have been necessary to 
conquer at least one of the three commanding points of its line 
of defence — Gulp's Hill on the right, Cemetery Hill in the cen- 
tre, or the Round Tops on the left. Everything has been tried ; 
nothing has succeeded. Since the 2d, and, still later, the next 
day, it was noticed that the troops did not go a second time into 
action with the same ardor they had displayed in the first com- 
bat, and on the evening of the 3d of July there only remained 
two brigades that had not been engaged. Moreover, the anni- 
hilation of Pickett's division, accomplished under the eyes of a 
large portion of the army, leaves a profound impression among 
all the spectators. A new hecatomb is all the advantage accruing 
to the Union army, more numei'ous and more easily recruited 
than that of Lee. In short, material considerations prevent the 
Confederates from renewing the struggle. On the one hand, they 
have to carry into Virginia all the booty gathered on the soil of 
the free States, not for the mere sake of lucre, but through a 
sagacious foresight, because the shoes, the clothes, and the cattle 
obtained in Pennsylvania through requisitions will contribute 
more to prolong the struggle than a barren victory. On the 
other hand, the infantry ammunition has greatly diminished, 
while that of the artillery is so reduced that the latter could not 
keep up for more than an hour a cannonade like that of the 
3d. Communications with Virginia are too uncertain for the 
Confederates to rely on the arrival of supply-trains sent from 
Richmond. Lee as a conqueror would have procured provisions 
at the expense of the enemy ; being repulsed, he is obliged on 
that account alone to return to Virginia ; an inexorable logic wills 
it so. One may imagine the anguish of that heart so entirely 
devoted to the cause it has espoused, and more passionately still 
to the glory of the army which it animates with its own ardor 
and which it has sustained in the midst of every trial. At the 
moment when the stragglers are surrounding the general-in-chief 
like an irresistible flood he has, so to speak, sacrificed himself in 
order to rally his soldiers by telling them that he alone was 
responsible for the disaster. But when the first emotion has 
passed away, and the fear of an aggressive movement on the 
part of the enemy has subsided, how bitter must have been his 



«!>• 



GETTYSBURG. 231 

own reflections ! Yonder, in front of him, in the midst of the 
enemy's guns, lies that small clump of trees at the foot of which 
Armistead has fallen mortally wounded ; there it is that the 
onward march of the Army of Northern Virginia came to a 
stop. Master of this point, it would undoubtedly have seen the 
enemy's army abandon the battlefield to it, and would have been 
able to cast a victorious glance over the Capitol of Washing- 
ton and the spires which overlook the city of Philadelphia. 
Peace imposed upon the government in the White House, every 
one returning to his home happy and triumphant. — all this 
brilliant vision, which he believed to be on the point of realiza- 
tion, has vanished with the smoke that enveloped the combatants. 
It has given place to gloomy prospects : the relinquishment of 
that invasion which alone could save the Confederacy; the 
avowal of defeat at the moment when Vicksburg, exhausted, is 
about to deliver the keys of the Mississippi into the hands of 
Grant ; the return to that unfortunate Virginia, unable to feed 
her children in return for the blood they have shed for her. In 
short, at the close of these trying campaigns, which have reduced 
his brilliant army to a handful of veterans, does not Lee's per- 
spicacity yet enable him to foresee as an inevitable result the 
painful capitulation which in less than two years will mark the 
fall of the Confederacy, and at the bottom of which he will be 
obliged to affix his signature, a victim to his own self-devotion ? 
Those who on that evening approach the general-in-chief may 
indeed believe th^t a prophetic glance into the future has revealed 
to him the end of the great drama, so much moral suffering is 
depicted upon his features. ]\Iay he not say to himself that this 
turn of the wheel of fortune, so rapid and irrevocable, would 
not have taken place if the movements of his army had been 
better managed, if it had not been developed on too long a line, 
and if all his lieutenants had carried out his instructions with 
their wonted zeal? 

Fortunately for them, his soldiers do not share these gloomy 
presentiments : while acknowledging their defeat, they entertain 
no doubt as to the final success of the campaign, and are satisfied 
that a new manoeuvre after Jackson's fashion will take them to 
Baltimore. But Jackson is no longer in their midst, and while 

Q 



232 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

these hopes of victory allay the agonies of the wounded, who are 
lying in all the houses of the village and the adjoining farms, 
since sunset the able-bodied soldiers have been ordered to take 
the first step in retreat. The inhabitants of Gettysburg, who have 
passed two days and a half in a terrible state of suspense, and 
who, in order to follow the progress of the battle and to guess 
on which side victory is leaning, have anxiously questioned the 
countenances of their enemies located in their midst, find them- 
selves suddenly delivered from doubt. Ewell, called back by 
Lee, quickly abandons all his positions, and before daybreak he 
has posted his three divisions north of the seminary on the Cash- 
town road. Longstreet, on his part, has fallen back to the rear 
of the orchard and the Emmettsburg road, so that on the morn- 
ing of the 4th the whole Southern army occupies from north to 
south, along the ridge of Seminary Hill, a straight line not much 
extended and very solid. Intrenchments rapidly made render it 
still stronger. Lee only seeks for temporary protection, for he 
knows full well that every day of inaction in the presence of the 
enemy will make his situation worse ; but while waiting for the 
hour of retreat he can in this position brave his adversary if the 
latter is imprudent enough to seek him there. His powerful 
artillery, which is ranged along the ridge and is resting on the 
edge of the wood, commands all the approaches ; his infantry, 
placed in the rear, is completely sheltered ; Longstreet, with his 
troops massed west of the orchard, no longer allows his right to 
be turned. The Confederate cavalry protects the two ^vings of 
the army ; Stuart, who has been obliged to make a detour north- 
ward, not having been informed in time of Ewell's retreat, covers 
the left flaiik with three brigades; Fitzhugh Lee, with the fourth, 
has gone to Cash town to guard the supply-trains assembled at 
that point ; Imboden, who, after a very useless effort at McCon- 
nellsburg, has just joined the army with one brigade of cavalry, 
a battery, and some infantry, protects on the south the extremity 
of Lnngstreet's line ; finally, Robertson and Jones, returning to 
the rear, occupy on the morning of the 4th the defiles of South 
Mountain, which the army is about to cross. 

In the mean time, as soon as nightfall has put an end to the 
conflict, the Federals have applied themselves to the task of re- 



GETTYSBURG. 233 

forming their regiments, rectifying their positions, and collecting 
the wounded : Birney about nine o'clock has made a portion of 
his soldiers, who are following the tracks of Wheaton's troops, 
advance toward the battlefield, which is still covered with their 
dead comrades. The night is cloudless, the full moon casts its 
quiet light upon the motionless forms of those who are already 
enjoying the sleep of eternity, or who, too weak to complain, are 
awaiting death as a deliverance. But in spite of the horror of 
such a spectacle this calm night is chiefly employed by the 
exhausted combatants in resting safely. Every one is waiting 
for daylight to see what the enemy is going to do. In the morn- 
ing his concentration on Seminary Ridge is noticed. On the! 
right, Slocum advances as far as the York road ; on the left, Sedg- 
wick occupies the whole battlefield of the 2d; in the centre, 
Howard, with a portion of the Eleventh corps, comes down from 
his citadel into the town of Gettysburg. The cavalry is alone 
pushed forward to feel the enemy. Buford and his first two 
brigades start from Westminster early in the morning for Fred- 
ericlv ; Merritt, with the third, leaves the battlefield to join him 
at that place, whence they proceed in the direction of Williams- 
port; Kilpatrick, taking with him Huey's brigade of Gregg's 
division, besides his own two brigades, marches upon Monterey 
by way of Emmettsburg ; Gregg's brigade watches the right, and 
presently follows the Cash town road, the terminus of which 
INIcIntosh occupies at the entrance of Gettysburg. As the day 
is advancing, the Federals are enabled to examine the position of 
their adversaries, and they soon find that, notwithstanding the 
prestige of victory, by attacking it they would expose themselves 
to as bloody a check as that which Magruder experienced when 
he hurled his troops intoxicated with success upon the slopes of 
IMalvern Hill. It is evident that, although imperceptible to 
their view at this moment, Lee is nevertheless preparing for a 
great movement. But is it a retreat or that grand flank march 
which they have been dreading for the last two days ? In the 
latter case they cannot abandon the positions whose preservation 
has cost them so dearly before seeing the enemy in motion, in 
order to surprise him in the midst of the operation. In the 
former case, however expedient it might be to get in advance of 



234 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

the Confederates along the line of the Potomac, it is still neces- 
sary, so long as they are within reach, to protect against an 
aggressive return the thousands of wounded men who are lying 
on the battlefield. If Meade had been aware of the numerical 
superiority of his army, he might, while maintaining his posi- 
tions, menace one of the enemy's flanks and thereby embarrass 
his movements, wliatcver might be their object. The Sixth 
corps, whi(;h has not suffered severely, reinforced by Crawford's 
division, might from seven in the morning operate against Leo's 
extreme right, and would thus be advantageously posted for the 
purpose of harassing him during liis retreat. 

The indications by which the instincts of a true soldier enable 
him to fathom tlie projects of his adversaries should not have left 
Meade in any kind of uncertainty regarding the impending retreat 
of the Southern army : the movements of the supply-trains of the 
enemy, and the reports of the inhabitants coming from within 
the Confederate lines, must have enlightened him : in short, he 
should have listened to the almost unanimous sentiment of his 
army, which only asked to be led forward, for in such cases the 
judgment of all is generally correct. But the Federal staff, 
attributing very different designs to the adversary, is only 
preparing against fresh attacks. Toward noon, while the two 
armies are thus watching each other, torrents of rain pour down 
upon them, breaking up the roads and fields and rendering it 
impossible for the artillery to manoeuvre with rapidity. This is 
a new source of suffering for the fatigued and ill-fed soldiers, 
and each man only thinks of securing shelter to the best of his 
ability against the storm thus suddenly let loose. 

Lee avails himself of this respite imposed by the elements to 
complete his preparations for the slow and methodical retreat 
which he has no longer any interest in delaying. All the neces- 
sary orders are issued for the army to be on the march at sunset. 
The large supply-trains, containing provisions and booty, assem- 
bled at Cashtown, are directed toward Chambersburg. The 
facility with which they again cross the chain of South JNIoun- 
tain shows that Lee did not mention the real motives of the 
attack of the 2d when he alleged the impossibility of falling 
back as far as the w^estern slope of the mountains with his sup- 



GETTYSBURG. 235 

ply-trains. There are two routes behind him — that of Chani- 
bersburg at the north, and that of Fairfield at the south : the 
latter is the shortest and covers the first. This is the one which 
the entire army will follow — Hill at the head, followed by I^ong- 
street, and the latter by Ewell, who closes the march. During 
this time the wounded who can bear transportation are crowded 
into all kinds of vehicles : with the exception of those loaded 
w4th ammunition all the wagons that have followed the aimy 
join this convoy, which starts along the Cashtown road, where 
it overtakes the remainder of the train of the army. Imboden, 
with fresh troops of both infantry and cavalry, is entrusted 
with the difficult mission of escorting through a hostile country 
this immense column comprising ten thousand beasts of burden 
and nearly sixteen miles in length : he conducts it, without any 
halt, by way of Chambersburg and Hagerstown, to the banks 
of the Potomac, crossing the river over the bridge of boats which 
the army has left at Williamsport, and brings it to Winchester. 
Lee gives him several batteries of artillery to assist in the execu- 
tion of this task, and entrusts him with his first report to President 
Davis. At four o'clock in the afternoon the head of column 
takes up the line of march westward, and when, about midnight, 
it overtakes the other supply-trains on the other side of Cash- 
town, the rear has not yet left the neighborhood of the battle- 
field. It is a terrible night for the thousands of victims whom 
a ftxlse point of honor urges forward, either willingly or unwill- 
ingly, in the track of the vanquislied army. Happy those who 
are deemed so seriously wounded as to be left in the hands of the 
enemy ! The mournful procession moves slowly along the rough 
roads in the midst of the storm, which is drowning the complaints 
of the wounded, and an intense darkness which screens their pale 
countenances from observation. There is no one near to assist 
them, for all able-bodied men have remained in the ranks ; only 
at long intervals a platoon doing guard-duty is marching silently 
alongside of the wagons wdth head bent, but musket ready, for 
some kind of surprise may be expected any moment. When the 
march is interrupted by some obstacle, the occasion is taken 
advantage of to unload the bodies of those who have just expired 
and give them a hasty burial. Another column, composed of two 



236 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

thoiisand able-bodied Federal prisoners, whom Lee cannot take 
along M'ith him, and whom he releases on paroles irregularly- 
given, is ])roeeeding at the same time in the direction of Harris- 
burg, with an escort wliich is to deliver them to the proper 
authorities at the first Union post. 

While the Confederates are thus beginning their retreat, Meade 
has summoned anotlier council of war : he wishes to consult his 
generals regarding the condition of the army and what may be 
expected from it the next day. The seven army corps, which a 
few days before the battle numbered eighty-six thousand men 
under arms, both infantry and artillery, and which had since 
received a reinforcement of four thousand, can only produce a 
total effective of fifty-one thousand five hundred and fourteen 
men on the morning of the 4th. There are therefore thirty- 
eight thousand wanting at the roll-call. Out of this number, 
about fifteen thousand are neither killed nor wounded nor taken 
prisoners : they are stragglers left along the roads during the 
late marches, deserters who have left their comrades, or men that 
have strayed and been separated from their regiments during the 
fight. They will all no doubt again join their colors, but they 
will not be present the next day to take part in any operation, 
while their number shows the disorganization of certain army 
corps. " Must we remain at Gettysburg, or, without waiting 
for the movements of the enemy, undertake to-morrow either a 
manoeuvre on his flank or make an attack against his front ? If 
he retires, must we follow him directly, or try to reach Williams- 
port in advance of him by way of the Emmettsburg road ?" Such 
are the questions put by Meade to his council. The unanimous de- 
cision is not to approach the enemy, either directly or by attack- 
ing him, if he remains in his positions, nor follow the same route 
if he retires. Opinions in regard to other points being divided, 
Meade determines to wait twenty-four hours longer, and if the en- 
emy retreats to follow him on his flank by way of Emmettsburg. 
The Confederate general does not allow him to remain long in 
suspense : on the morning of the 5th his army had ditappeared, 
Seminary R.idge was deserted, and the battle of Gettysburg ended. 

We have seen how this battle was brought about, and, without 
pretending to say that the Confederates ought to have come out 



GETTYSBURG. 237 

victorious, we have pointed out the errors which rendered their 
defeat inevitable : we will once more rapidly enumerate those 
errors. The principal cause of the defeat was the absence of 
Stuart, which produced the fortuitous encounter at Gettysburg, 
delaying the concentration of the army, and rendering it impos- 
sible for that army either to resume a defensive position along 
South ]\Iountain, where IMeade would have been obliged to attack 
it, or to manoeuvre in order to dislodge him from those he oc- 
cupied. Lee, who had four brigades of cavalry with him, failed 
to turn them to account : he left Robertson and Jones in Vir- 
ginia, and sent Imboden as far as possible from the enemy, only 
retaining Jenkins, who at the critical moment found himself in 
the rear of the infantry. After the battle of the 1st of July the 
excessive confidence which most of his lieutenants and all his 
soldiers shared with him made him forget the numerical inferior- 
ity of his army and the difficulties which the ground interposed 
against his usual tactics. This open country, affording command- 
ing positions, rendered all disguised marches and sudden attacks 
impracticable, and required a perfect harmony of action in the 
movements in order to secure success. Lee did wrong in giving 
his line too large an extension and a concave form, which ren- 
dered all communications from one extremity to the other very 
slow : he made matters worse by directing the principal attacks 
by his two wings. Desiring to strike Gulp's Hill and men- 
ace the Round Tops at the same time, he was unable to suf- 
ficiently outflank either of these two points ; then, after having 
failed in both instances, he hurled a portion of his troops, com- 
paratively so weak as to be doomed to certain destruction, against 
the centre of Lleade's line, where the latter could easily bring 
together a large portion of his army; finally, whether his orders 
were issued too late, or that he was unable to make himself under- 
stood or obeyed by his subordinates, he lost two days, the 2d and 
3d, in making useless preparations. The extreme independence 
which he encouraged among his corps commanders, and Avhich 
the division and brigade generals imitated in their turn, rendered 
the best conceived plans and the most daring efforts fruitless. 
During the day of the 2d, Longstreet, after beginning his attack 
too late, failed to engage the whole of McLaws' division in time 



238 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

to sui)port that of Hood ; Eodcs and Early, although close to 
each other, did not attack Cemetery Hill together; the Third 
corps, with the exception of three brigades, afforded no assistance 
to the troops engaged on its right and left. On the 3d, Long- 
street, while reluctantly executing the orders of his chief, did not 
give to Pickett's desperate attack the support of all the force 
placed at his disposal, and did not cause any diversion to be made 
in his favor by the two divisions under Hood and ]McLaws. 

The Army of the Potomac undoubtedly achieved a victory 
because it had the double advantage of numbers and the defen- 
sive ; but this advantage had not prevented its being beaten at 
Chancellorsville. It conquered at Gettysburg because chance 
afforded it strong positions, which Buford and Reynolds pre- 
served for it, and which Meade turned to excellent account. 
Eight days after his appointment this fortunate chieftain gave 
his soldiers a decisive victory: there was the less reason for 
begrudging him his glory because, being born on European soil, 
he could not aspire to the Presidency,* which fact prevented poli- 
ticians who were ambitious of attaining that position from harbor- 
ing jealousy toward him. He was not indebted for this victory 
either to the inspirations of genius or to the possession of extra- 
ordinary qualities. But he knew how to use all the forces under 
his command : his lieutenants, according to their own testimony, 
felt that they were at last well handled, while, on their part, hav- 
ing always entertained pleasant relations with their old comrade, 

* Gen. Meade was born Dec. 31, 1815, at Cadiz, Spain, where his parents, who 
were American citizens, temporarily resided. His father, Richard W. Meade, 
at the time held the appointment of United States Naval Agent at the port of 
Cadiz, and Gen. Meade was born under the American flag. 

Whatever question there may be as to what tlie law might have been at the 
time of Gen. Mende's birth, the reverse of what is stated in the text seems to 
have bten settled by the Act of Congress of February 10, 1855, the passage of 
which was brougiit about by a pamphlet written by the late Horace Binney in 
1853, on The AUtnigenos. of the United States. That act provides that "all chil- 
dren heretofore born .... out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, 
whose fathers were .... at the time of their birth citizens thereof, are declared to 
be citizens of tlie United States;" that is, they are declared to be naturnl-born citi- 
zens as contradistinguished from naturalized citizens, and the Constitution pro- 
vides that " no person except a natural-born citizen shall be eligible to the office 
of President." — Ed. 



GETTYSBURG. 239 

they gave him the most devoted support. If success, however, 
covered the faults committed by Meade, which may be palliated 
on account of his recent appointment, that is no reason M'hy we 
should ignore them. On the 1st of July he should have gone to 
Gettysburg himself, instead of sending Hancock there : the con- 
centration of the army would have been effected with more speed ; 
on the morning of the 2d he indicated in too vague terms the 
position which Sickles was to occupy, and on finding that this 
general considered that position bad he should have gone to 
examine it in person, without waiting to be summoned there by 
the combat ; at a later period he should not have deprived the 
right wing of Geary and his two brigades ; on the 3d, when he 
saw Pickett advancing, he had a quarter of an hour's time to pre- 
pare for his reception : he does not appear to have had the slight- 
est idea of the point where his line would be attacked, and con- 
sequently came very near having it pierced ; finally, if in the 
evening, instead of throwing a single brigade forward, he had 
launched three divisions against Longstreet's right, as he coidd 
have done, his victory would have been more decisive. 

The strength of the two armies has given rise to lively discus- 
sions. The returns, used at the North and South in similar forms, 
have been increased by some and reduced by others at their own 
pleasure. These returns were under three heads : the first rep- 
resented the total number of officers and soldiers inscribed on the 
rolls, whether absent or present ; the second represented those 
present on active duty, comprising all men who were in the 
field-hospitals, under arrest, or detached on special service ; the 
third contained the real number of combatants present under 
arms. The first head was therefore cjuite fictitious ; the second 
mentioned the number of men to be fed in the army, including 
non-combatants ; the third, the effective force that could be 
brought on the battlefield. The latter number is evidently the 
most, important to know, but, as we have observed, it varied 
greatly, for a long march in a week of bad weather was sufficient 
to fill the hospitals. In ordinary times it was from twelve to 
eighteen per cent, less than under the second head. It did not 
even always represent exactly the precise number of combatants : 
in fact, when, after a long march, the stragglers did not answer 

Vol. III.— 4i 




Hurk ( Arf'Ir.dy' I'l'-I'" 



240 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

to roll-call, tliey were not immediately set down as deserters, 
which would have caused them to lose a portion of their pay ; 
a few days' grace were granted to them, and the result was that 
thousands of soldiers separated from their commands followed the 
army at a distance, unable to take part in any battle, and yet fig- 
uring ou the returns as able-bodied combatants. In this respect 
there was much more tolerance shown in the Union army than 
among the Confederates ; on this account the falling off in the num- 
ber of combatants is a new source of mistakes and discussions. 

We have stated that this diminution amounted to thirteen thou- 
sand for the Army of the Potomac between the 10th of June and 
the 4th of July. We will spare the reader the details of our 
calculations, simply presenting the figures that have been given 
us, which we believe to be as near the truth as possible. 

The Army of the Potomac, without French's division, which 
had not gone beyond Frederick, numbered on its returns on 
the 30th of June 167,251 men, more than 21,000 of whom 
Avere ou detached service and nearly 28,000 in the hospitals. 
The number of men present with their corps was 112,988, and 
that of men under arms, 99,475; but this last figure included 
those doing duty at head-quarters, who formed a total of 2750 
men who could not be counted among the combatants. Stan- 
nard's and Lockwood's brigades having brought Meade a rein- 
forcement of about five thousand men on the 1st of July, the 
effective forces borne on the returns may be stated as follows: 

Troops taking no part in battle 2,750 

Artillery 7,000 

Cavalrv 10,500 

Infantry 85.500 

Total 105,750 

And 352 pieces of artillery. 

The artillery and infantry, which were alone seriously engaged, 
even on the battlefield of Gettysburg, form, therefore, a total of 
about ninety-one thousand men and three hundred and twenty- 
seven pieces of cannon, Meade having left twenty-five heavy 
guns in reserve at Westminster. But in order to ascertain the 
real number of combatants that the Union general could bring 
into line, it is proper to deduct from three to four thousand 
left as additional guards near the supply-trains, the batteries 



GETTYSBURG. 241 

remaining at Westminster, and for all men detached on extra 
duty, and from four to five thousand for the stragglers entered 
on the returns. The latter were the much more numerous on 
account of the fact that, the returns having only been prepared at 
the end of July, all those who joined the army after the battle 
were entered as being j^resent ; so that these rolls only represent 
the number of those absent without leave at the totally insignif- 
icant figure of 3292. This deduction makes the effective forces of 
Meade amount to from eighty-two to eighty-four thousand men. 

The Army of Northern Virginia on the 31st of May, 1863, 
contained an effective force of 88,754 officers and soldiers present, 
74,468 of whom were under arms. The latter consisted of — ■ 

General staff and infantry 59,420 

Cavalry 10,292 

Artillery 4,756 

Total 74,468 

And 206 pieces of artillery. 

During the month of June its effective force was increased by 
the return of a certain number of sick, who, thanks to the mild 
weather, had been restored to health, and those who had been 
wounded at the battle of Chancellorsville, by the arrival of 
recruits, the result of the conscription law, and by the addition 
of four brigades — two of infantry under Pettigrew and Davis, 
one of cavalry under Jenkins, and one made up of mixed troops 
under Imboden. The first was nearly four thousand strong; 
that of Davis, consisting of four regiments which are not borne 
on the returns of the 31st of May, although two of them had for- 
merly belonged to the army, numbered about twenty-two hun- 
dred men ; the other two contained each about the same effective 
force. The increase of artillery amounted to fifteen batteries, 
comprising sixty-two pieces of cannon and about eight hundred 
men. On the other hand, this effective force was diminished 
first by the absence of Corse's brigade of Pickett's division and 
one regiment of Pettigrew's brigade left at Hanover Junction, 
and three regiments of Early's division left at Winchester — 
say, about three thousand five hundred men ; then by the losses 
sustained in the battles of Fleetwood, Winchester, and Aldie, 
amounting to fourteen hundred men ; finally, by the admission 
to the hospitals of men unable to bear the fatigue of the long 



242 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

marches ■whicli the army liad to make, and by the absence of those 
who, vokmtarily or otherwise, reiiiahied beliind durhig these 
marches. It is difficult to reckon precisely the number of the 
disabled, of strag^'lcrs, and of deserters that the tirmy had lost dur- 
ing the month of June. Private information and the comparison 
of some figures lead us to believe that it was not very large, and 
did not exceed five per cent, of the eifectivc force of the army — 
say three thoasand seven hundred and fifty men in all. A^^e can 
therefore estimate the diminution of the army at about three 
thousand seven hundred men on the one hand, and its increase 
on the other hand, by the addition of three brigades and some 
artillery, at seven thousand. We believe that the difference of 
seventeen hundred between these two figures must be lessened at 
least from one thousand to twelve hundred by the return of the 
sick and wounded and the arrival of a number of conscripts; 
that, consequently, the Army of Northern Virginia arrived on 
the battlefield of Gettysburg wdth about five thousand combat- 
ants more than it had on the 31st of May, 1863 — that is to say, 
in the neighborhood of eighty thousand men. As we have done 
in regard to the Federal army in order to find out the amount of 
force really assembled on the battlefield, we will deduct the num- 
ber of mounted men, which was increased by Jenkins' and Imbo- 
den's forces, and reduced in the same proportion,* making about 
eleven thousand men ; and we may conclude that during the first 
three days of July, 1863, Lee brought from sixty-eight to sixty- 
nine thousand men and two hundred and fifty gunsf against the 
eighty-two or eighty-four thousand Unionists with three hundred 
guns collected on this battlefield. Meade had, therefore, from 
eighteen to nineteen thousand men more than his adversary — ^a 
superiority of nearly one-fourth, which, unfortunately for him, 
he was unable to turn to advantage. 

The losses on both sides were nearly equal, and enormous for 
the number of combatants engaged, for they amounted to twenty- 
seven per cent, on the side of the Federals, and more than 

* Twelve hundred cavalrymen lost in the battles of Fleetwood, A Idle, Upper- 
ville, and Hanover, two hundred maimed or sick. 

f These figures relate to the guns actually on the battlefield, deducting those 
attached to Stuart's command on the one hand and to Pleasonton's on the other. 



GETTYSBURG. 243 

thirty-six per cent, for the Confederates. Upon this point also 
the official reports are precise. The Federals lost 2834 killed, 
13,709 wounded, and 6645 prisoners — 23,186 men in all; the 
Confederates, 2665 killed, 12,599 wounded, and 7464 missing — 
22,728 men in all ; which, with the 300 men killed or wounded 
in the cavalry on the 2d and 3d, foot up their total losses at a 
little more than 23,000 men ; that is to say, precisely the same 
number as those of their adversaries. These figures, however, do 
not yet convey a correct idea of the injury the two armies had 
inflicted upon each other in these bloody battles. Thus, while the 
Federal reports acknowledge only 2834 killed, the reports made 
by the hospitals bear evidence to the burial of 3575 Union 
corpses : the number of dead in the Army of the Potomac may 
be estimated at about four thousand, one thousand or eleven hun- 
dred having died of their wounds. On the other hand, Meade has 
13,621 Confederate prisoners, but, as there are 7262 wounded 
among them, there only remains 6359 able-bodied men ; the num- 
ber of 7464 reckoned by Lee as the number of men missing must 
therefore represent, besides these able-bodied prisoners, most of 
the men seriously wounded during the attack made by Pickett 
and Heth and abandoned on the battlefield. We must therefore 
estimate the number of Confederate wounded to more than thir- 
teen thousand six hundred. It is reasonable to suppose that 
after the combat the number of their dead increased more rap- 
idly for a few days than in the Union army. 

The battle wdiich was so murderous for all was particularly so 
for those superior officers who had most gallantly exposed them- 
selves on both sides and had fallen by the hundreds. The Con- 
federates lost seventeen generals, thirteen of whom were wound- 
ed, three killed, and one captured. The Federals had ten gen- 
erals wounded, two of them slightly, two more being left in the 
hands of the enemy, without counting Schimmelpfennig, who 
remained concealed for three days in Gettysburg. Five generals 
were wounded, one of whom was a corps commander ; four col- 
onels in command of brigades were killed and one wounded — 
twenty officers in all wearing the stars of generals or performing 
the duties of that rank. The Confederates left forty-one stands of 
colors and three guns in the hands of their adversaries; a few flags 



244 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 

less and five or six guns constituted the trophies which bore evidence 
to their gallantly Avithout compensating them for their defeat. 

In the mean while, the North was anxiously waiting for the 
result of the great conflict. Uneasiness and excitement were per- 
ceptible everywhere ; terror prevailed in all those places believed 
to be witliin the reach of the invaders. Rumor and fear exag- 
gerated their number, and the remembrance of their success 
caused them to be deemed invincible. In those localities where 
devotion to the Union or the anti-slavery sentiment predominated 
all able-bodied men were arming and enlisting. But there were 
many districts whose secret sympathies w^ere in favor of the 
Secessionists: people only waited for Lee's victories to openly 
announce them. Fortunately for the Federal government, the 
most turbulent individuals had joined the Southern army at the 
beginning of the war; leaders were wanting to entice the rest. 
But this was not the case in the large cities of the East, which 
contained all the elements for a terrible insurrection. This 
insurrection was expected to break out iu New York, despite 
Lee's defeat : one may judge from this wliat it would have been 
if Lee had achieved a victory. On the 4th of July, the day 
when America celebrates the anniversary of her independence, a 
proclamation of President Lincoln, wa-itten in that simple and noble 
style of which at times he seemed to possess the secret, announced 
to the people of the North that the invasion of the free States 
had been stopped. Three days later it was learned that at the same 
hour Pemberton had capitulated with his army and the citadel of 
Vicksburg. Joy was the more keenly felt because the danger had 
been so great. The war was about to enter into a new phase. 

The South, however, on learning her disasters, did not allow 
herself to become discouraged. She had gone too far to stop, 
and still believed in her ability to tire out her adversaries. The 
latter, it is true, were very far as yet from having achieved that 
decisive success which alone could put an end to the war to their 
advantage, while the inhabitants of the North, who, in the plen- 
itude of their joy, already believed Lee's army ready to lay down 
its arms, were harboring great illusions. This compact army, 
resolute and formidable despite its losses, was destined to hold in 
check for a long time yet the conquerors of Gettysburg. 



<^ 



ADDENDA. 



Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac and Co-operathig Forces in the 
Gettysburg Campaign, June and July, 1863. 



June 5. 
The Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major-general Joseph Hooker, 
with headquarters near Falmouth, was posted on the north bank of the Rappa- 
hannock River, confronting the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, under 
General Robert E. Lee, mainly concentrated about the town of Fredericksburg, 
on the south bank of the river. The several commands of the Army of tiie 
Potomac were distributed as follows: Fii-st corps (Reynolds'), in the vicinity 
of White Oak Church; Second corps (Couch's), near Falmouth; Third corps 
(Birney's), at Boscobel, near Falmouth; Fifth corps (Meade's), in the vicinity 
of Banks', United States, and adjacent fords on the Rappahannock ; Sixth corps 
(Sedgwick's), near White Oak Church, with the Second division (Howe's) thrown 
forward to Franklin's Crossing of tlie Rappahannock, a little below Fredericks- 
burg, near the mouth of Deep Run; Eleventh corps (Howard's), near Brooke's 
Station, on the Aquia Creek Railroad; and the Twelfth corps (Slocum's), near 
Stafford Court-house and Aquia Landing. The cavalry corps (Pleasonton's, 
with headquarters at- Manassas Junction) had two divisions (Duffie's and Gregg's), 
and the cavalry reserve brigade, all under Buford, in the vicinity of Warrenton 
Junction, and one division (Davis') in the neighborhood of Brooke's Station. 
The artillerj' reserve (R. O. Tyler's) was near Falmouth. 

June 6." 
Howe's (Second) division. Sixth army corps, crossed the Rappahannock at 
Franklin's Crossing, and after a skirmish occupied the enemy's rifle-pits. 
Wright's (First) and Newton's (Third) divisions of the same corps moved to the 
same point from White Oak Church, taking position on the north bank of the 
river. 

June 7. 
Wright's (First) division. Sixth corps, was sent across the Rappahannock at 
Franklin's Crossing, relieving Howe's (Second) division, which returned to the 
north side. 

June 8. 
The cavalry corps (Pleasonton's), consisting of Buford's (First), D. McM. 
Gregg's (Third), and DufSe's (Second) divisions, and the regular reserve brigade, 
supported by detachments of infantry under Generals Adelbert Ames and David 
A. Russell, moved to Kelly's and Beverly Fords, preparatory to crossing the 
Rappahannock on a reconnoissance toward Culpeper. 

Copyright, 1886, by Porter & Coates. 

245 



246 ^ ADDENDA. 

June 9. 

Newton's (Third) division, Sixth corps, relieved Wright's (First) division on 
tlie soutii baniv of the Kappahannock at Franklin's Crossing. The cavalry 
corps, supported by Generals Ames' and Russell's infantry, crossed the Kappa- 
liannock at Kelly's and Beverly Fords, fought the enemy at or near Beverly 
Ford, Brandy Station, and Stevensburg, and recrossed the river at Kappahan- 
nock Station and Beverly Ford. 

June 10. 

The cavalry corps took position in the neighborhood of Warrenton Junction. 
Its infantry supports in the reconnoissance of the day previous rejoined their 
respective commands. Howe's (Second) division, Sixth corps, moved from 
Franklin's Crossing to Aquia Creek. 

June 11. 
The Third corps marched from Boscobel, near Falmouth, to Ilartwood Church. 

June 12. 

The First corps marched from Fitzhugh's plantation and White Oak Church 
to Deep Run ; the Third corps, from Hartwood Church to Bealeton, with llum- 
phreys' (Third) division advanced to the Rappahannock ; the Eleventh corps, 
from the vicinity of Brooke's Station to Hartwood Church ; and headquarters 
cavalry corps, fi'ora Manassas Junction to W^arrenton Junction. 

The advance of the Confederate Army skirmished with the Union troops at 
Newtown, Cedarville, and Middletown in the Shenandoah Valley. 

June 13. 
The First corps marched from Deep Run to Bealeton ; the Fifth corps, from 
the vicinity of Banks' Ford, vid Grove Church, toward Morrisville ; Wright's 
(First) and Newton's (Third) divisions, Sixth corps, from Franklin's Crossing 
to Potomac Creek ; the Eleventh , corps, from Hartwood Church to Catlett's 
Station ; the Twelfth corps, from near Stafford Court-house and Aquia Creek 
Landing en route to Dumfries ; Wyndham's brigade of Gregg's cavalry division, 
from W^arrenton Junction to Warrenton ; and the artillery reserve, from near 
Falmouth to Staflbrd Court-house. McReynolds' (Third) brigade of Milroy's 
division. Eighth army corps, marched from BeiTyville to Winchester. 

Combats: Skirmishes at "White Post, Perryville, Opequon Creek, and at Bunker Hill, and 
engagement (first day) at Winchester, Virginia. 

June 14. 
Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from near Falmouth to Dumfries ; 
the First and Third corps marched from Bealeton to Manassas Junction ; the 
Fifth corps arrived at Morrisville, and marched thence, vid Bristersburg, to Cat- 
lett's Station ; Wright's (First) and Newton's (Third) divisions. Sixth corps, 
moved from Potomac Creek to Stafford Court-house ; the Eleventh corps, from 
Catlett's Station to Manassas Junction, and thence toward Centreville; the 
Twelfth corps reached Dumfries ; and the artillery reserve moved from Stafford 



ADDENDA. 247 

Court-house to Wolf Eun Shoals. Daniel Tyler's command, of the Eighth army 
corps, fell back from Martinsburg to Maiyland Heights. 

Combats : Skirmishes at Martinsburg and Berry ville, and engagement (second day) at Win- 
chester, Virginia. 

June 15. 
Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Dumfries to Fairfax Station ; 
the Second corps (Hancock's * ) moved from Falmouth to near Aquia ; the Fifth 
corps, from Catlett's Station,' vid Bristoe Station, to Manassas Junction ; the 
Sixth corps, from Aquia Creek and Stafford Court-house to Dumfries ; the 
Twelfth corps, from Dumfries to Fairfax Court-house; the cavalry corps f 
(except Wyndham's brigade, which marched from Warrenton to Manassas 
Junction, and thence, on 16th, to Union Mills), from Warrenton Junction to 
Union Mills and Bristoe Station ; the artillery reserve, from Wolf Eun Shoals 
to Fairfax Court-house ; and the Eleventh corps arrived at Centreville. 
Milroy's (Second) division of the Eighth army corps evacuated Winchester 
and fell back to Maryland Heights and Hancock, Maryland. 

Combats : Skirmish near Williamsport, Maryland, and engagement (third day) at Winchester, 
Virginia. 

June 16. 

The Second corps marched from near Aquia, vid Dumfries, to Wolf Eun 
Shoals, on the Occoquan ; the Sixth corps, from Dumfries to Fairfax Station ; 
and the cavalry corps, from Union Mills and Bristoe Station to Manassas Junc- 
tion and Bull Eun. 

June 17. 

The First corps marched from Manassas Junction to Herndon Station ; the 
Second corps, from Wolf Eun Shoals to Sangster's Station ; the Third corps, 
from Manassas Junction to Centreville ; the Fifth corps, from Manassas Junc- 
tion to Gum Springs ; the Eleventh corps, from Centreville to Cow-Horn Ford, 
or Trappe Eock, on Goose Creek ; and the Twelfth corps, from Fairfax Court- 
house to near Dranesville. The cavalry corps moved from Manassas Junction 
and Bull Eun to Aldie. 

Combats: Action at Aldie, Virginia, and skirmishes at Catoctin Creek and Point of Rocks, 
Maryland, and at Thoroughfare Gap and Middleburg, Virginia. 

June 18. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Fairfax Station to Fairfax 
Court-house ; the Sixth corps, from Fairfax Station to Germantown ; and the 
Twelfth corps, from near Dranesville to Lecsburg. J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade 
advanced from Aldie to Middleburg, and returned to a point midway between 
the two places. 

Combats: Skirmishes at Middleburg and Aldie, Virginia. 

* General Hancock assumed command of the Second corps June 9, 1863, succeeding General 
Couch, who was assigned to the command of the Department of the Susquehanna. 

+ By orders of June 1.3, 1863, this corps was reduced from three to two divisions, commanded 
by Brigadier-generals John Buford and D. McM. Gregg. 

B 



248 ADDENDA. 

June 19. 

Tlie First corps marclied from Herndon Station to Guilford Station ; the Third 
corps, from Centreville to Giini Springs; and the Fifth corps, from Gum Springs 
to Aldie. Gregg's cavalry division, except Mcintosh's (late Wyndham's) brigade, 
advanced to Middlebnrg. Mcintosh's brigade moved from Aldie to Haymarket. 

Combats: Action at Middleburg, Virginia. 

June 20. 

The Second corps moved from Sangster's Station to Centreville, and thence 
toward Thoroughfare Gap ; the Second division (Howe's), Sixth corps, from 
Germantown to Bristoe Station. ^ 

Combats: Skirmisli at Middletown, Maryland. 

June 21. 
The Second corps arrived at Gainesville and Thoronghfare Gap. The cavalry 
corps (except Mcintosh's brigade of Gregg's division), supported by Barnes' 
(First) division, Fifth corps, marched from Aldie and Middlebvirg to Upperville. 
Mcintosh's cavalry brigade marched from Haymarket to Aldie, and thence to 
Upperville. Stahel's division of cavalry, from the defences of Wasliington, 
moved from Fairfax Court-house, vid Centreville and Gainesville, to Buckland 
Mills. 

Combats: Skirmislies at Gainesville, Tiiorouglifare Gap, and Haymarket, Virginia; Fred- 
erick, Maryland ; and engagement at Upperville, Virginia. 

June 22. 

The cavalry corps and Barnes' (First) division of the Fifth corps returned 
from Upperville to Aldie. Stahel's cavalry division moved from Buckland 
Mills, vid New Baltimore, to Warrenton. 

Combats: Skirmishes near Dover and Aldie, Virginia, and at Greencastle, Pennsylvania. 

June 23. 
Stahel's cavalry division moved from Warrenton, vid Gainesville, to Fairfex 
Court-house. 

June 24, 

Newton's (Third) division, Sixth corps, moved from Germantown to Centre- 
ville, and the Eleventh corps, from Cow-Horn Ford, or Trappe Rock, on Goose 
Creek, to the south bank of the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry. Stahel's cavalry 
division moved from Fairfax Court-house to near Dranesville. 

Combats: Skirmisli at Sharpsburg, Maryland. 

June 25. 
The First corps marched from Guilford Station, Virginia, to Barnesville, 
Maryland ; the Third corps, from Gum Springs, Virginia, to the north side of 
the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry and the mouth of the Monocacy ; the Eleventh 
corps, from Edwards' Ferry, Virginia, to Jefferson, Maryland ; and the artillery 
reserve, from Fairfax Court-house, Virginia, to near Poolesvilie, Maryland. 
These commands crossed the Potomac at I-xlwards' Ferry. The Second corps 
marched from Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville to Gum Springs. Howe's 



ADDENDA. 249 

(Second) division, Sixtli corps, moved from Bristoe Station to Centreville ; Craw- 
ford's division (two brigades) of Pennsylvania Reserves, from the defences of 
Washington, marclied from Fairfax Station and Upton's Hill to Vienna. Stan- 
nard's Vei'mont brigade, from the defences at Washington, left the mouth of the 
Occoquan en route to join the Army of the Potomac. Stahel's cavalry division 
moved from near Dranesville, Virginia, vid Yotmg's Island Ford, on the Poto- 
mac, en route to Frederick City, Maryland. 

Combats: Skirmishes at Thorouglifare Gap and Hayinarket, Virginia, and near McCounells- 
burg, PeDDsylvania. 

June 26. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Fairfax Court-house, Vir- 
ginia, vid Di-anesville and Edwards' Ferry, to Poolesville, Maryland ; the First 
corps, from Barnesville to Jefferson, Maryland ; the Second corps, from Gum 
Springs, Virginia, to the nortli side of the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry; the 
Third corps, from the mouth of the Monocacy to Point of Rocks, Maryland; the 
P'ifth corps, from Aldie, Virginia, vid Carter's Mills, Leesburg, and Edwards' 
Ferry, to within four miles of the moutii of the Monocacy, Maryland; the Sixth 
corps, from Germantown and Centreville to Dranesville, Virginia; the Eleventh 
corps, from Jefferson to Middletown, Maryland ; the Twelfth corps, from Lees- 
burg, Virginia, vid Edwards' Ferry, to the mouth of the Monocacy, Maryland ; 
and tlie cavalry corps (Buford's and Gregg's divisions), from Aldie to Leesburg, 
Virginia. Stahel's cavalry division was en route between the Potomac and Fred- 
erick City, Maryland. Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves moved from Vienna 
to Goose Creek, Virginia. 

Combats: Skirmish near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. 

June 27. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Poolesville to Frederick, 
Maryland ; the First corps, from Jefferson to Middletown, Maryland ; the Sec- 
ond corps, from near Edwards' Ferry, vid Poolesville, to Barnesville, Maryland ; 
the Third corps, from Point of Rocks, vid Jefferson, to Middletown, Maryland! 
the Fifth corps, from a point between Edwards' Ferry and the mouth of the 
Monocacy to Ballinger's Creek, near Frederick City, Maryland ; the Sixth corps, 
from Dranesville, Virginia, vid Edwards' Ferry, to near Poolesville, Maryland; 
the Twelfth corps, from near the month of the Monococy, vid Point of Rocks, to 
Knoxville, Maryland ; Buford's cavalry division, from Leesburg, Virginia, vid 
Edwards' Ferry, to near Jefferson, Maryland ; Gregg's cavalry division, from 
Leesburg, Virginia, vid Edwards' Ferry, toward Frederick City, Maryland ; and 
tbe artillery reserve, from Poolesville to Frederick, Maryland. Stahel's cavalry 
division reached Frederick City, Maryland. Crawford's Peimsylvania Reserves 
moved from Goose Creek, Virginia, vid Edwards' Ferry, to the mouth of the 
Monocacy, Maryland. 

Combatji: Skirmish near Fairfax Court-house, Virginia. 

June 28. 

The First corps marched from ]Middletown to Frederick City ; the Second corps, 
from Barnesville to Monocacy Junction ; the Third corps,* from Middletown to 

* Major-general D. E. Sickles resumed command of the Third corps, relieving Major-general 
D. B. Birney, who had been temporarily in command. 



250 ADDENDA. 

near Woodsboro' ; the Sixth corps, from near Poolesville to TTyattstown ; the 
Eleventh corps, from IMiddletown to near Frederick ; and tlieTwelftli corps, from 
Knoxville to Frederick City. Buford'8 cavalry division moved from near Jeflfer- 
son to Middlelovvn ; (iregg's cavalry division reached Frederick City, and marched 
thence to Newmarket and Kidgeville. Crawford's Pennsylvania Keserves 
marched from the mouth of the Monocacy, and joined the Fifth corps* at 
Ballinger's Cret^k. Stahel's cavalry division was assigned to the cavalry corps 
as the Third division, under Brigadier-general Judson Kilpatrick, with Brigadier- 
general Elon J. Farnsworth commanding the First brigade, and Brigadier-general 
George A. Custer commanding the Second brigade. 

Combats: Skirmishes between Oflfutt's Cross-roads and Seneca, and near Rock ville, Mary- 
land, and at Fountain Bale, Wrightsville, and near Oyster Point, Pennsylvania. 

June 29. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Frederick to Middleburg; 
the First and Eleventh corps, from Frederick City to P^mmittsburg; the Second 
corps, from Monocacy Junction, vid Liberty and Johnsville, to Uniontown ; the 
Third corps, from near Woodsboro' to Taneytown ; the Fifth corps, from Bal- 
linger's Creek, v/d Frederick City and Mount Pleasant, to Liberty ; the Sixth 
corps, from Hyattstown, vid Newmarket and Eidgeville, to New Windsor ; the 
Twelfth corps, from Frederick City to Taneytown and Bruceville ; Gamble's 
(First) and Devin's (Second) brigades, of Buford's (First) cavalry division, from 
Middletown, ind Boonsboro', Cavetown, and Monterey Springs, to near Fairfield ; 
Merritt's reserve cavalry brigade, of the same division, from Middletown to 
Mechanicstown ; Gregg's (Second) cavalry division, from New Market and 
Eidgeville to New Windsor ; Kilpatrick's (Third) cavalry division, from Fred- 
erick City to Littlestown ; and the artillery reserve, from Frederick City to 
Bmceville. 

Cdinbals : Skirmishes at Muddy Branch and Westminster, Maryland, and at McConnellsburg 
and near Oyster Point, Pennsylvania. 

June 30. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Middleburg to Taneytown ; 
the First corps, from Emmittsburg to Marsh Eun ; the Third corps, from Taney- 
town to Bridgeport ; the Fifth corps, from Liberty, vid .Tohnsville, LTnion Bridge, 
and Union, to Union Mills; the Sixth corps, from New Windsor to Manchester; 
the Twelfth corps, from Taneytown and Bruceville to Littlestown ; Gamble's and 
Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry division, from near Fairfield, vid Emmitts- 
burg, to Gettysburg; Gregg's cavalry division, from New Windsor to Westmins- 
ter, and thence to I\Lnnchester; Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Littlestown 
to Hanover ; and the artillery reserve, from Bruceville to Taneytown. Kenly's 
and Morris' brigades, of French's division, left Maryland Heights for Frederick 
City, and Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of the same division, moved from the 
Heights, by way of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, for Washington City. 

Combats: Action at Hanover, Pennsylvania, and skirmishes at Westminster, Maryland, and 
at Fairfield and Sporting Hill, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 

* Jlajor-general George G. INIeade relinquished command of the Fifth corps to Major-gen- 
eral fieorge Sykes, and assumed command of the Army of the Potomac, relieving Major-gen- 
eral Joseph Hooker. 



ADDENDA. 251 

July 1. 
The First corps moved from Marsh Kun, and the Eleventh corps from 
Emmittsburg to Gettysburg ; the Second corps, from Uniontown, vid Taneytown, 
to near Gettysburg; the Tliird corps, from Bridgeport, vid Emmittsburg, to the 
field of Gettysburg ; the Fiftli corps, from Union Mills, vi'd Hanover and McSher- 
rystown, to Bonaughtovvn ; the Sixth corps, from Manchester en route to Gettys- 
burg ; and the Twelfth corps, from Littlestown, vid Two Taverns, to the field of 
Gettysburg. Gregg's cavalry division marched from Manchester to Hanover 
Junction, whence Mcintosh's and J. I. Gregg's brigades proceeded to Hanover, 
while Huey's brigade returned to Manchester. Kilpatrick's cavalry division 
moved from Hanover, vid Abbottsville, to Berlin ; and the artillery reserve 
(Ransom's and Fitzhugh's brigades), from Taneytown to near Gettysburg. 
Stannard's Vermont brigade, from the defences of Washington, joined the First 
corps on the field of Gettysburg. W. F.Smith's (First) division, of the Depart- 
ment of the Susquehanna, marched from the vicinity of Harrisburg to Carlisle. 
Kenly's and Morris' brigades, of French's division, reached Frederick City. 
Combats: Battle of Gettysburg (first day), and skirmish at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 

July 2. 

The Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps, Lockwood's brigade from the Middle 
Department, Mcintosh's and .J. I. Gregg's brigades of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry 
division, Kilpatrick's cavalry division, and the artillery reserve reached the 
field of Gettysburg. Gamble's and Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry division, 
marched from Gettysburg to Taneytown, and Merritt's reserve brigade from Me- 
chanicstown to Emmittsburg. 

Combats: Battle of Gettysburg (second day), and skirmishes at Hunterstown and near 
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. 

July 3. 

Gamble's and Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry division, moved from 
Taneytown to Westminster; Merritt's reserve brigade, from Emmittsburg to 
the field of Gettysburg ; and Huey's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, from 
Manchester to Westminster. 

Cuinbais : Battle of Gettysburg (third day), and action at Fairfield, Pennsylvania. 

July 4. 

Gamble's and Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry division, marched from 
Westminster, and Merritt's reserve brigade from Gettysburg, en route to Fred- 
erick City ; Huey's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, from Westminster, vid 
Emmittsburg, to Monterey ; J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade, from Gettysburg to 
Hunterstown ; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Gettysburg, vid Euimitts- 
burg, to Monterey. Smith's division, of Couch's command, moved from Carlisle, 
vid Mount Holly, to Pine Grove, and the remainder of Couch's troops fi-om the 
vicinity of Harrisburg toward Shippensburg and Chambersburg. Elliott's and 
Smith's brigades, of French's division, arrived at Washington from Maryland 
Heights and moved to Tennallytown. Morris' brigade, of French's division, 
marched from Frederick City to Turner's Gap in South Mountain. 

Combats : Action at Monterey Gap, Pennsylvania, and skirmishes at Fairfield Gap, Pennsyl- 
vania, and near Emmittsburg, Maryland. 



252 ADDENDA. 

July 5. 
Leaving CJett_v.«l)iirg, the Second corj)s nuu-died to Two Taverns; the Fifth 
corps, to Marsli Kiin ; the Sixth cor{)s, to Fairfield ; the Eleventh corps, to Rock 
Creek ; the Twelfth corps, to Littlestown ; Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry- 
division, to Eniinittsbiirg ; and the artillery reserve, to Littlestown. Buford'e 
cavalry division reached Frederick City. J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade moved 
from Hnnterstown to Greenwood. Kilpatrick's cavalry division and Iluey's 
brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, marclied from Monterey, vid Smitlisburg, 
to Boonsboro'. 

Combats: Skirmishes at or lu-ar Pniithsburg, Maryland, and Green Oak, Mcrcersbiirg, Fair- 
field, Greencastle, Cunninghaiu's Cross-roads, and Stevens' Furnace (or Caledonia Iron Works), 
Pennsylvania. 

July 6. 

The First corps marched from Gettysburg to Emmittsburg; the Fifth corps, 
from Marsh Run to Moritz Cross-roads ; the Sixth corps, from Fairfield to 
Emmittsburg, except Neill's (Third) brigade, of Howe's (Second) division, 
which, in conjmiction with Mcintosh's brigade of cavalry, was left at Fairfield 
to pursue the enemy ; the Eleventh corps, from Rock Creek to Emmittsburg ; 
Buford's cavalry division, from Frederick City to Williamsport, and thence back 
to Jones' Cross-roads; Kilpatrick's cavahy division and Huey's brigade of 
Gregg's cavalry division, from Boonsboro', vid Ilagerstown * and Williamsport, 
to Jones' Cross-roads; Mcintosh's brigade, of Gi'egg's cavalry division, from 
Emmittsburg to Fairfield ; and J. I. Gregg's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry divis- 
ion, from Greenwood to Marion. Smith's division, of Couch's command, 
moved from Pine Grove to Newman's Pass. Kenly's brigade, of French's 
division, marched from Frederick City en route to Maryland Heights. Elliott's 
and Smith's brigades, of French's division, left Tennallytown, vid Washington 
and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, en, route to Frederick City. 

Combats: Actions at Hagerstown and Williamsport, Maryland. 

July 7. 
Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Gettysburg to Frederick 
City ; the First corps, from Emmittsburg to Hamburg ; the Second corps, from 
Two Taverns to Taneytown ; the Third corps, from Gettysburg, vid Emmittsburg, 
to Mechanicstown ; the Fifth corps, from Moritz Cross-roads, vid Emmittsburg, 
to Utica; the Sixth corps, from Emmittsburg to Mountain Pass, near Hamburg; 
the Eleventh corps, from Emmittsburg to Middletown ; the Twelfth corps, from 
Littlestown to Walkersville ; and the artillery reserve, from Littlestown to 
Woodsboro'. Buford's and Kilpatrick's cavalry divisions and Huey's brigade, 
of Gregg's cavalry division, moved from Jones' Cross-roads to Boonsboro'. J. I. 
Gregg's cavalry brigade was moving en route from Chambersburg to Middletown. 
Mcintosh's brigade of cavalry and Neill's brigade, of the Sixth corps, moved 
from Fairfield to Waynesboro'. Smith's division, of Coucli's command, marched 
from Newman's Pass to Altodale. Kenly's brigade, of French's division, with 
other troops forwarded by Schenck from Baltimore, reoccupied Maryland 

* Richmond's brigade, of Kilpatrick's division, remained at Hagerstown, whence it retired 
toward Boonsboro'. 



ADDENDA. 253 

Heights. Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of French's division, reached Freder- 
ick City from Washington. 

Combat.i: Skirmishes at Downsville and Funkstown, Maryland, and at Harper's Ferry 
West Virginia. 

July 8. 
Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Frederick City to Middle- 
town ; the First corps, from Hamburg to Turner's Gap in South Mountain ; the 
Second corps, from Taneytown to Frederick City ; the Third corjis, from 
Mechanicstown to a point three miles south-west of Frederick City ; the Fifth 
"corps, from Utica to Middletown ; the Sixth corps, from near Hamburg to 
Middletown ; the Eleventli corps, from Middletown to Turner's Gap in South 
Mountain, Schurz's (Third) division being advanced to Boonsboro' ; the Twelfth 
corps, from Walkersville to Jefferson ; and the artillery reserve, from Woods- 
boro' to Frederick City. J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade was moving en route from 
Chambersburg to Middletown, Smith's division, of Couch's command, moved 
from Altodale to Waynesboro'. Campbell's and Mulligan's brigades, of Kelley's 
command, Department of West Virginia, were concentrated at Hancock, whence 
they moved to Fairview, on Noi'th Mountain. 
Combats : Action at Boonsboro' and skirmish near Williamsport, Maryland. 

July 9. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Middletown to Turner's 
Gap ; the Second corps, from Frederick City to Eohrersville ; the Third corps, 
from near Frederick City to Fox's Gap in South Mountain ; the Fifth corps, 
from Middletown, vid Fox's Gap, to near Boonsboro' ; the Sixth corps, from 
Middletown to Boonsboro' ; the Twelfth corps, from Jefferson to Rohrersville ; 
and the artillery reserve, from Frederick City to Boonsboro'. J. I. Gregg's 
cavalry brigade reached Middletown from Chambersburg. Elliott's and Smith's 
brigades, of French's division, marched from Frederick City to Middletown. 

Combats: Skirmish at Benevola (or Beaver Creek), Maryland. 

July 10. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Turner's Gap to Beaver 
Creek, beyond Boonsboro' ; the First corps, from Turner's Gi\p to Beaver Creek, 
where it was joined by Kenly's brigade, of French's division, from Maryland 
Heights; the Second corps, from Rohrersville to near Tilghmanton ; the Third 
corps, from Fox's Gap through Boonsboro' to Antietam Creek, in the vicinity 
of Jones' Cross-roads, where it was joined by Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of 
French's division, which marched from Middletown, and Morris' brigade, of the 
same division, which marched from Turner's Gap ; the Fifth corps, from near 
Boonsboro' to Delaware Mills, on Antietam Creek ; the Sixth corps, from 
Boonsboro' to Beaver Creek ; the Eleventh corps, from Turner's Gap to Beaver 
C'reek ; and the Twelfth corps, from Eohrersville to Bakersville. Buford's and 
Kilpatrick's cavalry divisions moved fi'om Boonsboro' to Funkstown; Huey's 
brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, from Boonsboro' to Jones' Cross-roads, and 
Mclntosli's cavalry brigade, from Waynesboro', vid Smithsburg and Leitersburg, 
to Old Antietam Forge, and back to Waynesboro'. 

Combats : Skirmishes at or near Old Antietam Forge (near Leitersburg), Clear Spring, 
HagerstowD, Jones' Cross-roads (near Williiimsport), and Funkstown, Maryland. 



254 ADDENDA. 

July 11. 

The Second corps moved from near Tilghmanton to the neighborhood of 
Jones' Cross-roads ; tlie Twelfth corps, from Bakersville to Fairplay and Jones' 
Cross-roads ; Gamble's and Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry division, from 
Funkstown to Bakersville; J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade, from Middletown to 
Boonsboro' ; Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Funkstown to near Hagers- 
town ; the artillery reserve, from Boonsboro' to Benevola ; Neill's brigade, of 
the Sixth corps, and Smith's division, of Couch's command, from Waynesboro' 
to Leitersburg. 

Condiats: Skirmishes at or near Hagerstowu, Jones' Cross-roads (near Williainsport), and 
Funkstown, Maryland. 

July 12. 

The First, Sixth, and Eleventh corps moved from Beaver Creek to Funks- 
town ; Mcintosh's cavalry brigade, from Waynesboro', vld Leitersburg, to 
Boonsboro' ; Kilpatrick's cavalry division and Ames' (First) division. Eleventh 
corps, occupied Hagerstown ; Neill's brigade, of the Sixth corps, moved from 
Leitersburg to Funkstown, where it rejoined its corps ; Smith's division (except 
one brigade, left at Waynesboro'), from Leitersburg to Cavetown ; Dana's (Sec- 
ond) division, of Couch's command, from Chambersburg to Greencastle ; and 
Averell's cavalry brigade, Department of West Virginia, from Cumberland, en 
route to Fairview. 

Combats: Skirmislies at or near Hagerstown, Jones' Cross-roads (near Williamsport), and 
Funkstown, Maryland, and Ashby's Gap, Virginia. 

July 13. 

The Sixth corps moved from Funkstown to the vicinity of Hagerstown ; the 
artillery reserve, from Benevola to Jones' Cross-roads, two brigades remaining 
at the latter place, and the others returning to Benevola ; Smith's division, of 
Couch's command, from Waynesboro' and Cavetown to Hagerstown and Beaver 
Ci'eek. Averell's cavalry brigade joined Kelley's infantry at Fairview. 

Combats: Skirmishes at Hagerstown, Jones' Cross-roads, and Funkstown, Maryland. 

July 14. 

The First corps marched from Funkstown to Williamsport; the Second corps, 
from near Jones' Cross-roads to near Falling Waters ; the Third corps, from 
Antietam Creek, near Jones' Cross-roads, across Marsh Creek ; the Fifth corps, 
from the vicinity of Koxbury Mills, on Antietam Creek, to near Williamsport; 
the Sixth corps, from the neighborhood of Hagerstown to ^Villiamsport ; the 
Eleventh corps, from Funkstown, via Hagerstown, to Williamsport ; and Wil- 
liams' First division, of the Twelfth corps, from Jones' Cross-roads to near Fall- 
ing Waters, and thence to near Williamsport. Buford's cavalry division moved 
from Bakersville to Falling Waters ; Mcintosh's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of 
D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, from Boonsboro' to Harper's Ferry ; Huey's 
brigade, of same division, from Jones' Cross-roads, vid Williamsport, to Falling 
Waters ; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Hagerstown, vid Williamsport, 
to Falling Waters. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, marched 
from Fairview to Williamsport. 

Combats: Action at Falling Waters, Maryland, and skirmishes near 'WilUamsport, Mary- 
land, and Harper's Ferry, West Virginia. 



ADDENDA. 255 

July 15. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Beaver Creek to Berlin ; the 
First corps, from Williamsport to Rohrersville ; the Second corps, from near 
Falling Waters to near Sandy Hook-; the Tliird corps, from Marsh Creek to 
near Burnside's Bridge, on the Antietam ; the Fifth corps, from near Williams- 
port to Burkittsville ; the Sixth corps, from Williamsport to Boonsboro' ; the 
Eleventh corps, from Williamsport, vid Hagerstown, to Middletown ; and the 
Twelfth corps, from Fairplay and near Williamsport to Sandy Hook. Two 
brigades of the artillery reserve moved from Jones' Cross-roads, and, joining 
the remainder of the reserve at Benevola, the whole command marched thence, 
vid Middletown, to Berlin. Buford's cavalry division moved from Falling 
Waters to Berlin ; Mcintosh's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of D. McM. Gregg's 
cavalry division, from Harper's Ferry, vid Halltown, to Shepherdstown ; Huey's 
brigade, of same division, from Falling Waters to Boonsboro' ; and Kilpatrick's 
cavalry division, from Falling Waters, vid Williamspoit and Hagerstown, to 
Boonsboro'. Kelley's command. Department of West Virginia, marched from 
Williamsport to Indian Spring. 

Combats : Skirmishes at Halltown and Shepherdstown, West Virginia. 

July 16. 

The First corps marched from Rohrersville to near Berlin ; the Third corps, 
from Burnside's Bridge to Pleasant Valley, near Sandy Hook ; the Fifth corps, 
from Burkittsville, vid PetersviUe, to near Berlin ; the Sixth corps, from Boons- 
boro' to near Berlin ; the Eleventh corps, from Middletown, vid Jefferson, to 
Berlin ; and the Twelfth corps, from Sandy Hook to Pleasant Valley. Buford's 
cavalry division moved from Berlin to PetersviUe ; Huey's brigade, of Gregg's 
cavalry division, from Boonsboro', vid Harper's Ferry, to Shepherdstown ; and 
Kilpatrick's division from Boonsboro' to Berlin, whence De Fcu-est's (First) 
brigade proceeded to Harper's Ferry. 

Combats: Action at Shepherdstown and skirmish at Shanghai, West "Virginia. 

July 17. 
Tlie Third corps moved from near Sandy Hook, crossed the Potomac at Har- 
per's Ferry, and proceeded to a point three miles south of the ferry ; the Fifth 
corps moved from near Berlin to Lovettsville, crossing the Potomac at Berlin. 
Gregg's cavalry division marched from Shepherdstown to Harper's Ferry ; Kil- 
patrick's cavalry division, from Berlin and Harper's Ferry to Purcellville, Cus- 
ter's brigade crossing the Potomac at Berlin, and De Forest's brigade the She- 
nandoah at Harper's Ferry. Kelley's command. Department of West Virginia, 
moved from Indian Spring, Maryland, to Hedgesville, West Virginia, crossing 
tlie Potomac at Cherry Run. 

Combats : Skirmishes near North Mountain Station, West Virginia, and at Snicker's Gai), 
Virginia. 

July 18. 
Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Berlin, Maryland, to Lov- 
ettsville, Virginia ; the First corps, from near Berlin to Waterford, crossing the 
Potomac at Berlin; the Second corps, from near Sandy Hook to Hillsboro', 



256 ADDENDA. 

crossing the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers at Harper's Ferry ; the Third 
corps, from near Harper's Ferry to Hillsboro' ; the Fifth corps, from Lovetts- 
ville to near Pnrcellville; the artillery reserve, from Berlin to AVheatland; 
and Buford's cavalry division, from Petersville to Purcellville, crossing the 
Potomac at Berlin. 
Combats: Skirmishes at and near Iledgesvillo and Martinsburg, West Virginia. 

July 19. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Lovettsville to Wheatland ; 
the First corps, from Waterford to Hamilton ; the Second and Third corps, 
from Hillshoro' to Woodgrove; the Filth corps, from near Purcellville to a 
point on the road to Philomont; the Sixth corps, from near Berlin to "Wheat- 
land, and the Eleventh corps, from Berlin to near Hamilton, both corps cross- 
ing the Potomac at Berlin ; the artillery reserve, from Wheatland to Purcell- 
ville ; and the Twelfth corps, from Pleasant Valley to near Flillsboro', crossing 
the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers at Harper's Ferry. Buford's cavalry 
division moved from Purcellville, via Philomont, to near Eector's Cross-roads. 
Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, moved from Hai'per's Ferry 
toward Hillsboi'o', and Huey's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of the same division, 
from Harper's Ferry to Lovettsville. Kilpatrick's division of cavalry marched 
from Purcellville to Upperville. Kelley's command. Department of West Vir- 
ginia, fell back from Fledgesville to the Maryland side of the Potomac at Cherry 
Run. 

Combats : Skirmishes at and near Hedgesville and Martinsburg, West Virginia. 

July 20. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Wheatland to Union ; the 

First corps, from Hamilton to Middlebnrg ; the Second and Third corps, from 

Woodgrove, the former going to Bloomfield and the latter to Upperville ; the 

•Fifth corps, from a point on the Purcellville and Philomont road, vid Union, to 

Panther Skin Creek ; the Sixth corps, from Wheatland to near Beaver Dam ; 

the Eleventh corps, from near Hamilton, rid Mount Gilead, to Mountville ; the 

Twelfth corps, from near Hillsboro', vid Woodgrove, to Snickersville ; and the 

artillery reserve, from Purcellville to Union. Buford"s cavalry division moved 

from near Eector's Cross-roads to Rectortown, Gamble's brigade going thence to 

Chester Gap, Devin's brigade to Salem, and Merritt's brigade to Manassas Gap. 

Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, reached Hillsboro', and marched 

thence toward Purcellville. Huey's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of same division, 

moved from Lovettsville to Goose Creek. 

Combats : Skirmishes near Berry's Ferry and at Ashby's Gap, Virginia. 

S 

July 21. 

Huey's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, 
moved from Goose Creek to Bull Run ; Mcintosh's brigade returned to Hills- 
boro' ; Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, recrossed the Poto- 
mac from Maryland into Virginia at Cherry Run. 

Combats : Skirmishes at Manassas and Chester Gaps, Virginia. 



ADDENDA. 257 

July 22. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Union to Upperville ; the 
First corps, from Middleburg to White Plains ; the Second corps, from Bloom- 
field to Paris ; the Tliird corps, from Upperville, vid Piedmont, to Linden ; the 
Fifth corps, from Panther Skin Creek to Rectortown ; and the Sixth corps, from 
near Beaver Dam to Eectortown. Devin's brigade, of Buford's cavalry division, 
moved from Salem to Barbee's Cross-roads ; Huey's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, 
of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, from Bull Run to Broad Run ; and Kil- 
patrick's cavalry division, from Ui)perville to Piedmont. 

Combats: Skirmishes at Manassas and Chester Gaps, Virginia. 

July 23. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Upperville to Linden ; the 
First corps, from White Plains to Warrenton ; the Second corps, from Paris to 
Linden ; the Third corps, fi-om Linden to Manassas Gap ; the Fifth corps, from 
Rectortown, vid Markham Station, Farrowsville, and Linden, to Manassas Gap ; 
the Sixth corps, from Rectortown to White Plains and Barbee's Cross-roads; the 
Eleventh corjjs, from Mountville to New Baltimoi-e ; the Twelfth corps, from 
Snickersville to Ashby's Gap, and thence to Markham Station ; and the artillery 
reserve, from Union to near Rock Creek. Buford's cavalry division concen- 
trated at Barliee's Cross-roads ; Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, 
moved from Hillsboro' to Snickersville ; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division from 
Piedmont to Amissville. 

Combats : Action at Wapping Heights, Manassas Gap, and skirmishes near Gaines' Cross- 
roads, Snicker's Gap, and Chester Gap, Virginia. 

July 24. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Linden to Salem ; the Second 
corps, from Linden to Markham Station ; the First division (Wright's), Sixth 
corps, from White Plains to New Baltimore; the Second division (Howe's), 
Sixth corps, from Barbee's Cross-roads to Markham Station, and thence to 
Orleans; the third division (Bartlett's), Sixth corps, from Barbee's Cross-roads 
to Thumb Run ; and the Twelfth corps, from Markham Station to Linden, 
countermarching, vid Markham Station, to Piedmont. Huey's and J. I. Gregg's 
brigades, of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, moved from Broad Run to 
Warrenton Junction. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, ad- 
vanced from Cherry Run to Hedgesville. 

Combats: Skirmish at Battle Mountain, near Newhy's Cross-roads, Virginia. 

July 25. 
Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Salem to Warrenton ; the 
First corps, from Warrenton to Warrenton Junction, the Second division (Rob- 
inson's) going on to Bealeton ; the Second corps, from Markham Station to 
White Plains ; the Third corps, from Manassas Gap to near Salem ; the Fifth 
corps, from Manassas Gap, via Farrowsville and Barbee's Cross-roads, to Thumb 
Run ; the Sixth corps concentrated at Warrenton, Wright's (First) division 
moving from New Baltimore, Howe's (Second) division from Orleans, and 
Bartlett's (Third) division from Thumb Run ; the Eleventh corps moved from 



258 ADDENDA. 

New Baltimore to Warrenton Junction ; ami the Twelfth cor[)s, from Piedmont, 
vid Reotortown and White Plains, to Thoroughfare Gap. The artillery reserve 
readied Warrenton. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, occupied 
Martinsburg. 
Combats: Skirmish at Barbee's Cross-roads, Virginia. 

July 2G. 
The Second corps marched from White Plains to near Germantown ; the 
Third corps, from near Salem to vicinity of Warrenton ; the Fiftli corps, from 
Thumb Kun to vicinity of Warrenton, Crawford's (Third) division taking posi- 
tion at Fayetteville ; and tlie Twelfth corps, from Thoroughfare Gap, via Green- 
wich and Catlett's Station, to Warrenton Junction. Buford's cavalry division 
took position at Wan-enton and Fayetteville. Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's 
cavalry division, marched from Snickersville, vid Upperville, to Middleburg. 
Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, occupied Winchester. 

July 27. 
The Fifth corps encamped between Warrenton and Fayetteville. Mcintosh's 
brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, marched from Middleburg, vid White 
Plains, New Baltimore, and Warrenton, toward Warrenton Junction. 

July 28. 
Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, moved, vid Warrenton Junc- 
tion, to Catlett's Station. 

July 29. 
D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division moved from Warrenton Junction and Cat- 
lett's Station to Wan-enton. 

July 30. 
Kenly's (Third) division, First corps, moved from Warrenton Junction to 
Rappahannock Station ; the Second corps, from near Germantown to Elk Bun; 
D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, from Warrenton to Amissville ; and Kil- 
patrick's cavalry division, from Amissville to Warrenton, 

July 31. 

The Second corps marched from Elk Run to Morrisville ; Howe's (Second) 
division, Sixth corps, from Warrenton to near Waterloo ; the Twelfth corps, 
from Warrenton Junction to Kelly's Ford; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division, 
from Warrenton to Warrenton Junction. 

Combats: Skirmish at Kelly's Ford, Virginia. 



ADDENDA. 259 

Organization of the Army of the Potomac, Commanded by Major- 
general George G. Meade, at the Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsyl- 
vania, July IS, 1863. 

GENEKAL HEADQUAETEKS. 

COMMAND OF THE PROVOST-MARSHAL GENEKAL. 

Brig.-gen. Mabsena E. Patrick. 

93d New York Infantry* Col. John S. Crocker. 

2d Pennsylvania Cavalry Col. E. Butler Price. 

6th Pennsylvania Cavalry Company E,Capt.EmlenN. Carpenter. 

Company I, Capt. James Starr. 

8th United States Infantry * Capt. Edwin W. H. Eead. 

Detachment Eegular Cavalry. 

engineer brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Henry W. Benham. 

15th New York (battalion)* Maj. Walter L. Cassin. 

50th New York* Col. William H. Pettes. 

Battalion United States* Capt. George H. Mendell. 

guards and orderlies. 
Oneida (New York) Cavalry Capt. Daniel P. Mann. 

FIEST AEMY COEPS. 

Maj. -gen. John F. EEYNOLDS.f 
Maj.-gen. Abner Doubleday. 
Maj.-gen. John Newton. 

general headquarters. 
1st Maine Cavalry, Company L, Capt. Constantine Taylor. 

FIRST division. 

Brig.-gen. James S. Wads worth. 

First Brigade. 

(1) Brig.-gen. Solomon Meredith. % 

(2) Col. William W. Eobinson. 

19th Indiana Col. Samuel J. Williams. 

24th Michigan Col. Henry A. Morrow. 

Capt. Albert M. Edwards. 
2d Wisconsin Col. Lucius Fairchild. 

Maj. John Mansfield. 

Capt. George H. Otis. 

6th Wisconsin Lieut.-col. Eufus E. Dawes. 

7th Wisconsin Col. William W. Eobinson. 

Maj. Mark Finnicum. 

* Not engaged. AVith the exception of the Regular battalion, the Engineer brigade, whUe 
at Beaver Dam Creek, six miles north of Liberty, Maryland, on July 1st, was ordered to 
Washington, District of Columbia, where it arrived July 3d. . -. , 

t General Reynolds was killed July 1st, while iu command of the left wing of the army ; 
Major-general Abner Doubleday commanded the corps July Ist, and Major-general John 
Newton on the 2d and 3d. 

X Wounded. 



260 ADDENDA. 

Second Bri<jade. 
Brig.-gen. Lysander Cutler. 

7th Indiana Col. Ira G. Grover. 

76th New*York Maj. Andrew J. Grover. 

Ca[>t. .Joliii E. Cook. 

84th New York (14th Militia) Col. Edwifrd B. Fowler. 

95th New York Col. George H. Biddle. 

Maj. Edward Pye. 
147th New York Lieut. -col. Francis C. Miller. 

Maj. George Harney. 
56th Pennsylvania (9 companies) Col. J. William Hut'niann. 



SECOND DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. John C. Kobinson. 
First Brigade. 

(1) Brig.-gen. Gabriel R. Paul.* 

(2) Col. Samuel II. Leonard.* 

(3) Col. Adrian R. Root.* 

(4) Col. Richard Coulter.*' 

(5) Col. Peter Lyle. 

(6) Col. Richard Coulter. 

16th Maine Col. Charles W. Tilden. 

Maj. Archibald D. Leavitt. 
13th Massachusetts Col. Samuel H. Leonard. 

Lieut.-col. N. Walter Batchelder. 
94th New York Col. Adrian R. Root. 

Maj. Samuel A. Mofiett. 

104th New York Col. Gilbert G. Prey. 

107th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. James Mac Thomson. 

Capt. Emanuel D. Roath. 



Second Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Henry Baxter. 

12th Massachusetts Col. James L. Bates. 

Lieut.-col. David Allen, Jr. 

83d New York (9th Militia) Lieut.-col. Joseph A. Moesch. 

97th New York Col. Charles Wheelock. 

Maj. C^harles Northrup. 
11th Pennsylvania t Col. Richard Coulter. 

Capt. Benjamin F. Haines. 

Capt. John B. Overmyer. 
88th Pennsylvania Maj. Benezet F. Foust. 

Capt. Henry Whiteside. 
90th Pennsylvania Col. Peter Lyle. 

Maj. Alfred J. Sellers. 

Col. Peter Lyle. 

* Wounded. + Transferred on afternoon of July 1st to First brigade. 



ADDENDA. 261 

THIRD DIVISION. 

Maj.-gen. Abner Doubleday.* 

Fi7-iit brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Thomas A. Rowley. 

80th New York (20th Militia) Col. Theodore B. Gates. 

121st Pennsylvania Maj. Alexander Biddle, 

Col. Chapman Biddle. 
142d Pennsylvania Col. Robert P. Cummins. 

Lient.-col. Alfred B. McCalmont. 
151st Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. George F. McFarlaud. 

Capt. Walter L. Owens. 

Col. Harrison Allen. 

Second Brigade. 

(1) Col. Roy Stone.f 

(2) Col. Langhorne Wister.f 

(3) Col. Edmund L. Dana. 

143d Pennsylvania Col. Edmnnd L. Dana. 

Lieut.-col. John D. Musser. 
149th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Walton Dwiglit. 

Capt. James Glenn. 
150th Pennsylvania Col. Langhorne Wister. 

Lieut.-col. Henry S. Huidekoper. 

Capt. Cornelius C. Widdis. 

Third Brigade. 

(1) Brig.-gen. George J. Stannard.f 

(2) Col. Francis V. Randall. 

12th Vermont t Col. Asa P. Blunt. 

13th Vermont Col. Francis V. Randall. 

Maj. Joseph J. Boynton. 

Lieut.-col. William D. Munson. 

14th Vermont Col. William T. Nichols. 

loth Vermont t Col. Redfield Proctor. 

16th Vermont Col. Wheelock G. Veazey. 

ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 

Col. Charles S. Wainwright. 

Maine Light, 2d Battery Capt. James A. Hall. 

Maine Light, 5th Battery Capt. Greenleaf T. Stevens. 

Lieut. Edward N. Whittier. 
1st New York Light, Battery L ^ Capt. Gilbert H. Reynolds. 

Lieut. George Breck. 

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B Capt. James H. Cooper. 

4th United vStates, Battery B Lieut. James Stewart. 

* General Doubleday commanded the corps on July 1st, General Thomas A. Eowley being 
in command of the division and Colonel Chapman Biddle of the First brigade. On July 3d, 
Rowley was wounded, and Biddle assumed command of the brigade. 

t Wounded. t Not engaged; guarding trains, 

j Company E, First New York Heavy Artillery, attached. 



262 ADDENDA. 

SECOND ARMY CORPS. 
Maj.-gen. Winfield S. Hancock.* 

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 

6th New York Cavalry, Companies D and K, Capt. Riley Johnson. 

FIRST DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. John C. Caldwell. 

Fird Brigade. 

(1) Col. Edward E. Cross.f 

(2) Col. H. Boyd McKeen. 

5th New Hampshire Lient.-col. Charles E. Hapgood. 

61st New York Lieut. -col. K. Oscar Broady. 

81st Pennsylvania Col. H. Boyd McKeen. 

Lieut.-col. Amos Stroh. 
148th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Robert McFarlane. 

Second Brigade. 
Col. Patrick Kelly. 

28th Massachusetts Col. Richard Byrnes. 

63d New York (2 companies) Lieut.-col. Richard C. Bentley. 

Capt. Thomas Touliy. 
69th New York (2 companies) Capt. Richard Moroney. 

Lieut. James J. Smith. 

88th New York (2 companies) Capt. Denis F. Burke. 

116th Pennsylvania (4 companies) Maj. St. Clair A. Mulliolland. 

Third Brigade. 

(1) Brig.-gen. Samuel K. Zook.f 

(2) Lieut.-col. John Eraser. 

52d New York Lieut.-col. Charles G. Freudenberg. 

Capt. William Scherrer. 

57th New York Lieut.-col. Alfred B. Chapman. 

66th New York Col. Orlando H. Morris. 

Lieut.-col. John S. Hammell. 

Maj. Peter Nelson. 
140th Pennsylvania Col. Richard P.Roberts. 

Lieut.-col. John Eraser. 

* After the death of General Reynolds, General Hancock was assigned to the comiMnd of 
all the troops on the field of battle, relieving Cieneral Howard, who had succieded General 
Reynolds. Cieneral (Mbbon, of the Second division, assumed command of the corps. These 
assignments terminated on the evening of July 1st. .Similar changes in commanders occurred 
during the battle of the '2d, when Gener.al Hancock was put in command of the Third corps, 
in addition to that of his own. He was wounded ou the 8d, and Brigadier-general William 
Hays was assigned to the command of the corps. 

t Killed. 



ADDENDA. 263 

Fourth Brigade. 
Col. John R. Brooke. 
27th Connecticut (2 companies) Lieut.-col. Henry C. Merwin. 

Maj. .James H. Coburn. 

2d Delaware Col. William P. Baily. 

64th New York Col. Daniel G. Bingham. 

Maj. Leman W. Bradley. 

53d Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Eichards McMichael. 

145th Pennsylvania (7 companies) Col. Hiram L. Brown. 

Capt. John W. Reynolds. 

Capt. Moses W. Oliver. 

SECOND DIVISION. 

(1) Brig.-gen. John Gibbon.* 

(2) Brig.-gen. William Harrow. 

First Brigade. 

(1) Brig.-gen. William Harrow. 

(2) Col. Francis E. Heath. 

19th Maine Col. Francis E. Heath. 

Lieut.-col. Henry W. Cunningham. 
15th Massachusetts Col. George H.Ward. 

Lieut.-col. George C. Joslin. 
1st Minnesota Col. William Colvill, Jr. 

Capt. Nathan S. Messick. 

Capt. Henry C. Coates. 
82d New York (2d Militia) Lieut.-col. James Huston. 

Capt. John Darrow. 

Second Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Alexander S. Webb. 

69th Pennsylvania Col. Dennis O' Kane. 

Capt. William Davis. 

71st Pennsylvania Col. Richard Penn Smith. 

7 2d Pennsylvania Col. De Witt C. Baxter. 

Lieut.-col. Theodore Hesser. 
106th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. William L. Curry. 

Third Brigade. 
Col. Norman J. Hall. 

19th Massachusetts Col. Arthur F. Devereux. 

20th Massachusetts Col. Paul J. Revere. 

Lieut.-col. George N. Macy. 

Capt. Henry L. Abbott. 
7th Michigan Lieut.-col. Amos E. Steele, Jr. 

Maj. Sylvanus W. Curtis. 

42d New York Col. James E. Mallon. 

59th New York (4 companies) Lieut.-col. Max A. Thoman. 

Capt. William McFadden. 

Unattached. 

1st Company (Mass.) Sharpshooters Capt. William Plumer. 

Lieut. Emerson L. Bicknell. 
* Wounded. 
S 



264 



ADDENDA. 



THIRD DivisroN. 

Brig.-gen. Alexander Hays. 

First Brigade. 

Col. Samuel S. Carroll. 

14th Indiana Col. John Coons. 

4th Oliio Lieut.-col. Leonard W. Carpenter. 

8tii Oliio Lieut.-col. Franklin lawyer. 

7th West Virginia Lieut.-col. Jonathan H. Lockwood. 

Second Brigade, 

(1) Col. Thomas A. Smyth.* 

(2) Lieut.-col. Francis E. Pierce. 

14th Connecticut Maj. Theodore G. Ellis. 

1st Delaware Lieut.-col. I-Idward P. Harris. 

Capt. Thomas B. Hizar. 

Lieut. William Smith. 

Lieut. John T. Dent. 

12th New .Jersey Maj. Jolin T. Hill. 

10th New York (battalion) Maj. George F. Hopper. 

108th New York Lieut.-col. Francis E. Pierce. 



Third Brigade. 

(1) Col. George L. Willard.f 

(2) Col. Eliakim Sherrill.f 

(3) Lieut.-col. James M. Bull. 



39th New Y''ork (4 companies) 
111th New York 



12.5th New York . 
12Gth New Y'ork. 



...Maj. Hugo Hildebrandt. 
...Col. Clinton D. MacDougall. 

Lieut.-col. Isaac M. Lusk. 

Capt. Aaron P. Seeley. 
...Lieut.-col. Levin Crandell. 
...Col. Eliakim Sherrill. 

Lieut.-col. James M. Bull. 



ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 

Capt. .John G. Hazard. 

1st New York Light, Battery B Lieut. Albert S. Shelden. 

Capt. James McK. Rorty. 

Lieut. Robert E. Rogers. 

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A Capt. William A. Arnold. 

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B Lieut. T. Fred. Brown. 

Lieut. Walter S. Perrin. 
1st United States, Battery I Lieut. George A. Woodruff. 

Lieut. Tully McCrea. 
4th United States, Battery A Lieut. Alonzo H. Cushing. 

Sergt. Frederick Fuger. 

* Wounded. t Killed. 



ADDENDA. 265 



THIRD AEMY CORPS. 



^1) Maj.-gen. Daniel E. Sickles.* 
(2) Maj.-gen. David B. Birney. 

FIRST DIVISION. 

(1) Maj.-gen. David B. Birnev. 

(2) Brig.-gen, J. II. Ilobart Ward, 

First Brigade. 

(1) Brig.-gen. Charles K.Graham.* 

(2) Col. Andrew H. Tippin. 

57th Pennsylvania (8 companies) Col. Peter Sides. 

Capt. Alanson II. Nelson. 

63d Pennsylvania Maj. .John A. Danks. 

68th Pennsylvania Col. Andrew H. Tippin. 

Capt. Milton S. Davis [?] 

lOoth Pennsylvania Col. Calvin A. Craig. 

I14th Pennsylvania Lient.-col. Frederick F. Cavada. 

Capt. Edward R. Bowen. 
14l8t Pennsylvania Col. Henry J. Madill. 



Second Brigade. 

(1) Brig-gen, J. H. Hobart Ward. 

(2) Col. Hiram Berdan. 

20th Indiana Col. .John Wheeler. 

Lieut, -col. William C. L. Taylor. 

3d Maine Col. Moses B. LaUeman. 

4th Maine Col. Elijah Walker. 

Capt. P^dwin Libby. 

86th New York Lieiit.-col. Benjamin L. Iliggins. 

124tli New York Col. A. Van Home Ellis. 

Lieut„-col. Francis M. Cummins. 

99th Pennsylvania Maj. Jolm W. Moore. 

1st United States Sharpshooters Col. Hiram Berdan. 

Lieut.-col. Casper Trepp. 
2d United States Sharpshooters (8 cos) Maj. Homer R. Stoughton. 



Third Brigade. 
Col. P. R. de Trobriand. 

17th Maine Lient.-col. Charles B. Merrill. 

3d Michigan Col. Byron R. Pierce. 

Lieut.-col. Edwin S. Pierce. 

5th Michigan Lieut.-col. John Pulford, 

4Uth New York Col. Thomas W. Egan. 

UOth Pennsylvania (6 companies) Lieut.-col. David M. Jones. 

Maj. Isaac Rogers. 

* Wounded. 



266 ADDENDA. 

SECOND DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Andrew A. Humphreys. 

First Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. Joseph B. Carr. 

1st Massachusetts Lieut.-ool. Clurk R. Baldwin. 

lltli Massachusitts Lieut.-col. Porter D.Tripp. 

16th Massachusetts Lieut.-col. Waldo Merriam. 

('apt. Matthew Donovan. 

12th New Hampshire Capt. John F. Langley. 

11th New Jersey Col. Eoljcrt McAllister. 

Lieut. John Sciioonover. 
Capt. William H. Lloyd. 
Capt. iSamuel T. Slcej)er. 
Lieut. John Schoonover. 

2fith Pennsylvania Maj. Robert L. Bodine. 

84th Pennsylvania* Lieut.-col. Milton 0pp. 

Second Brigade. 
CoL William K, Brewster. 

70th New York Col. J. Egbert Farnum. 

71st New York Col. Henry L. Potter. 

72d New York Col. John S. Austin. 

Lieut.-col. John Leonard. 

73d New York Maj. Michael W. Burns. 

74th New York Lieut.-col. Thomas Holt. 

120th New York Lieut.-col. Cornelius D. Westbrook. 

Maj. John E. Tappen. 

Third Brigade. 
Col. George C. Burling. 

2d New Hampshire Col. Edward L.Bailey. 

5th New Jersey CoL William J. Sewell. 

Capt. Thomas C. (iodfrey. 

Capt. Henry H. W^oolsey. 

6th New Jersey Lieut.-col. Stephen R. Gilkyson. 

7th New Jersey Col. Louis R. Francine. 

Maj. Frederick Cooper. 
8th New Jersey Col. John Ramsey. 

Capt. John G. Langston. 
115th Pennsylvania Maj. John P. Dunne. 

ARTILLEBY BRIGADE. 

(1) Capt. George E. Randolph.! 

(2) Capt. A. Judson Clark. 

New Jersey Light, 2d Battery Capt. A. Judson Clark, 

Lieut. Robert Sims. 

1st New York Light, Battery D Capt. George B. Winslow. 

New York Light, 4th Battery Capt. James E. Smith. 

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E Lieut. John K. Bucklyn. 

Lieut. Benjamin Freeborn. 

4th United States, Battery K Lieut. Francis W. Seeley. 

Lieut. Robert James. 
* Not engaged ; guarding trains. t Wounded, 



ADDENDA. 267 

FIFTH ARMY CORPS. 
Maj.-gen. George Sykes. 

PROVOST GUARD, 

12th New York, Companies D and E, Capt. Henry W. Rider, 

FIRST DIVISION, 

Brig.-gen, James Barnes, 

First Brigade. 
Col. William S. Tilton. 

18th Massachusetts Col. Joseph Hayes. 

22d Massachusetts Lieut.-col. Thomas Sherwin, Jr, 

1st Michigan Col. Ira C. Abbott. 

Lieut.-col. William A. Throop. 
118th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. James Gwyn, 

Second Brigade. 
Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer. 

9th Massachusetts Col. Patrick R. Guiney. 

32d Massachusetts Col. George L. Prescott. 

4th Michigan Col. Harrison H. Jeflbrds. 

Lieut.-col. George W. Lumbard, 
62d Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. James C. Hull. 

Third Brigade. 

(1) Col. Strong Vincent.* 

(2) Col. James C. Rice. 

20th Maine Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain, 

16th Michigan '. Lieut.-col. Norval E. Welch. 

44th New York Col. James C. Rice. 

Lieut.-col. Freeman Conner. 
83d Pennsylvania Capt. Orpheus S. Woodward. 

SECOND DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Romeyn B. Ayres. 

First Brigade. 
Col. Hannibal Day. 

3d United States (6 companies) Capt. Henry W. Freedley. 

Capt. Richard G. Lay. 

4th United States (4 companies) Capt. .lulius W. Adams. 

6th United States (.5 companies) Capt. Levi C. Bootes. 

12tli United States (8 companies) Capt. Thomas S. Dunn. 

14th United States (8 companies) Maj. Grotius R. Giddings, 

Second Brigade. 
Col. Sidney Burbank. 

2d United States (6 companies) Maj. Arthur T. Lee. 

Capt. Samuel A. Mckee. 

7th United States (4 companies) , Cajit. David P. Hancock. 

10th United States (3 companies) Capt. William Clinton. 

11th United States (6 companies) Maj. Delancey Floyd-Jones. 

17th United States (7 companies) Lieut.-col. J. Durell Greene. 

* Mortally wounded. 



268 ADDENDA. 

Third Brujade. 

(1) Brig.-gen. Stephen H. Weed.* 

(2) Col. Kenner Garrard. 

140th New York Col. Patrick K. O'Rorke. 

Lieut. -col. Louis Ernst. 
146th New York Col. Kenner Garrard. 

Lieut.-col. David T. .Jenkins. 

91st Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. .Joscpli II. 8inex. 

155th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. John II. Cain. 

THIRD DIVISION, f 

Brig.-gen. Samuel W. Crawford. 

First Brigade. 
Col. William McCandless. 

1st Pennsylvania Reserves (9 companies) Col. William C. Talley. 

2d Pennsylvania Reserves Lieut.-col. George A. Woodward. 

6tli Pennsylvania Reserves Lieut.-col. Wellington 11. Lnt. 

13th Pennsylvania Reserves Col. Charles F. Taylor. 

Maj. William R. Hartshorne. 

Third Brigade. 
Col. Joseph W. Fisher. 

5th Pennsylvania Reserves Lieut.-col. George Dare. 

9th Pennsylvania Reserves Lieut.-col. James McK. Snodgrass. 

10th Pennsylvania Reserves Col. Adoniram J. Warner. 

11th Pennsylvania Reserves Col. Samuel M. Jackson. 

12th Pennsylvania Reserves (9 companies) ..Col. Martin D. Hardin. 

ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 

Ca^jt. Augustus p. Martin. 

Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C) Lieut. Aaron F. Walcott. 

1st New York Light, Battery C Capt. Almont Barnes. 

1st Ohio Light, Battery L Capt. Frank C. Gibbs. 

5th United States, Battery D Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett. 

Lieut. Benjamin F. Rittenhouse. 
5th United States, Battery I Lieut. Malbone F. Watson. 

Lieut. Charles C. MacConnell. 

SIXTH ARMY CORPS. 
Maj.-gen. John Sedgwick. 

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 

New Jersey Cayalrv, Company L 1 (. ^^y .^u^j^ g_ ^raft. 
Pennsylvania Cavalry, Company t± j ^ 



1st 
1st 



FIRST DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Horatio G. Wright. 

Provost Guard. 

4th New Jersey (3 companies), Capt. William R. Maxwell. 

* Killed. 

t Joined corps June 28. The Second brigade was left in the Department of Washington. 



ADDENDA. v 269 

First Brigade. 
Brig.-geii. Alfred T. A. Torbert. 

1st New Jersey Lieut.-col. William Henry, Jr. 

2d New Jersey Lieut.-col. Charles Wiebecke. 

3d New Jersey Lieut.-col. Edward L. Campbell. 

15th New Jersey Col. William H. Pem-ose. 

Second Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Joseph J. Bartlett. 

1 6th Maine Col. Clark S. Edwards. 

121st New York Col. Emory Upton. 

9oth Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Edward Carroll. 

96th Pennsylvania Maj. William H. Lessig. 

Third, Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. David A. Kussell. 

6th Maine Col. Hiram Burnham. 

49th Pennsylvania (4 companies) Lieut.-col. Thomas M. Hulings. 

119th Pennsylvania Col. Peter C. Ellmaker. 

5th Wisconsin Col. Thomas S.Allen. 

SECOND DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Albion P. Howe. 

Second Brigade. 
Col. Lewis A. Grant. 

2d Vermont Col. James H. Walbridge. 

3d Vermont Col. Thomas O. Seaver. 

4th Vermont Col. Charles B. Stoughton. 

5th Vermont Lieut.-col. John E,. Lewis. 

6th Vermont Col. Elisha L. Barney. 

Third Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Thomas H. Neill. 

7th Maine (6 companies) Lieut.-col. Selden Connor. 

33d New York (detachment) Capt. Henry J. Gifibrd. 

43d New York Lieut.-col. John Wilson. 

49th New York Col. Daniel D. Bidwell. 

77th New Y'^ork Lieut.-col. Winsor B. French. 

61st Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. George F. Smith. 

THIRD DIVISION. 

(1) Major.-gen. John Newton.* 

(2) Brig.-gen. Frank Wheaton. 

First Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Alexander Shaler. 

65th New York Col. Joseph E. Hamblin. 

67th New York Col. Nelson Cross. 

122d New York Col. Silas Titus. 

23d Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. John F. Glenn. 

82d Pennsylvania Col. Isaac C. Bassett. 

* Assumed command of First army corps July 2d. 



270 ADDENDA. 

Second Brigade. 
Col. Henry L, Eustis. 

7th Massachusetts Lieut.-col. Franklin P. Harlow. 

10th Massachusetts... Lieut.-col. .Joseph K. Parsons. 

37th Massaciiusetts Col. Oliver Edwards. 

2d lihode Island Col. Horatio Kogers, Jr. 

Third Brigade. 

(1) Brig.-gen. Frank Wheaton. 

(2) Col.' David J. Nevin. 

62d New York Lieut.-col. Theodore B. Hamilton. 

98d Pennsylvania Maj. John I. Nevin. 

9Sth Pennsylvania Maj. John B. Koliler. 

102d Pennsylvania* Col. John W. Patterson. 

139th Pennsylvania Col. Frederick H. Collier. 

Lieut.-col. William H. Moody. 

ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 

Col. Charles H. Tompkins. 

Massachusetts Light, 1st Battery (A) Capt. William H. McCartney. 

New York Light, 1st Battery Capt. Andrew Cowan. 

New York Light, 3d Battery Capt. William A. Ham. 

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C Capt. Richard Waterman. 

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G Capt. George W.Adams. 

2d United States, Battery D Lieut. Edward B. Williston. 

2d United States, Battery G Lieut. John H. Butler. 

5th United States, Battery F Lieut. Leonard Martin. 

ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS. 
Maj.-gen. Oliver O. Howard.! 

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 

1st Indiana Cavalry, Companies I and K, Capt. Abrara Sharra. 
8th New York Infantry (1 company), Lieut. Hermann Foerster. 

FIRST DIVISION. 

(1) Brig.-gen. Francis C. Barlow. J 

(2) Brig.-gen. Adelbert Ames. 

First Brigade. 

Col. Leopold von Gilsa. 

41st New York (9 companies) Lieut.-col. Detleo von Einsiedel. 

54th New York Maj. Stephen Kovacs. 

. [?] 

68th New York Col. Gottliilf Bourry. 

153d Pennsylvania Maj. John F. Frueauff. 

* Not engaged. 

t During the interval between the death of General Reynolds and the arrival of General 
Hancock on the afternoon of .Inly 1st all the troops ou the field of battle were couinianded by 
General Howard, General Schurz taking command of the Eleventh corps and General 
Schimmelfeniiig of the Third division. 

J Wounded. 



ADDENDA. 271 

Second Brigade, 

1) Brig.-gen. Adelbert Ames. 

2) Col. Andrew L. Harris. 

17th Connecticut Lieut. -col. Douglas Fowler, 

Maj. Allen G. Brady. 
25th Ohio Lieut.-col. Jeremiah Williams. 

Lieut. William Maloney. 

Lieut. Israel White. 
75th Ohio Col. Andrew L. Harris. 

. [?] 

107th Ohio Col. Seraphim Meyer. [?] 



SECOND DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Adolph von Steinwehr. 

First Brigade. 
Col. Charles R. Coster. 

134th New York Lieut.-col. Allen H. Jackson. 

154th New York Lieut.-col. Daniel B.Allen. 

27th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Lorenz Cantador. 

73d Pennsylvania Capt. Daniel F. Kelley. 

Second Brigade. 
Col. Orland Smith. 

33d Massachusetts Col. Adin B. Underwood. 

136th New York Col. James Wood, Jr. 

5oth Ohio Col. Charles B. Gambee. 

73d Ohio Lieut.-col. Richard Long. 

THIRD DIVISION. 

Maj.-geu. Carl Schurz. 

First Brigade. 

(1) Brig.-gen. A. Schimmelfennig.* 

(2) Col. George von Amsberg. 

82d Illinois Lieut.-col. Edward S. Salomon. 

45th New York Col. George von Amsberg. 

Lieut.-col. Adolphus Dobke. 

157th New York Col. Philip P. Brown, Jr. 

61st Ohio Col. Steplien J. McGroarty. 

74th Pennsylvania Col. Adolph von Hartung. 

Lieut.-col. Alexander von MitzeL 

Capt. Gustave Schleiter. 

Capt. Henry Krauseneck. 

* Captured. 



272 ADDENDA. 

Second Brigade. 
Col. W. Krzyzanowski. 

58th New York Lient.-col. August C tto. 

Ca|)t. VauU Koenig. 
119th New York Col. John T. Lockman. 

Lieiit.-col. I'dward F. Lloyd. 
82d Ohio Col. .Janios S. Kohinson. 

Lieut. -eol. David Tlioinson. 
75th Pennsylvania Col. Francis Maliler. 

Maj. August Ledig. 
26th Wisconsin Lieut.-col. Ilans IJoebel. 

Capt. John W. Fuchs. 

ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 

Maj. Thomas W. Osborn. 

1st New York Light, Battery I Capt. Michael Wiedrich. 

New York Light, l.Sth Battery Lieut. William Wlieeler. 

1st Oliio Light, Battery I '. Capt. Hubert Diiger. 

1st Ohio Light, Battery K Capt. Lewis Ilecknian. 

4th United States, Battery G Lieut. Bayard Wilkeson. 

Lieut. Eugene A. Bancroft. 

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS. 

Brig.-gen. Alpheus S. W^illiams.* 

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 

10th Maine (battalion), Capt. John D. Beardsley, 

FIRST DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Thomas H. Ruger. 

First Brigade. 
Col. Archibald L. McDongall. 

5th Connecticut Col. Warren W. Packer. 

20th Connecticut Lieut.-col. William B. Wooster. 

3d Maryland Col. Joseph M. Sudsburg. 

123d New York Lieut.-col. James C. Rogers. 

Capt. Adolphus H. Tanner. 

145th New York Col. E. Livingston Price. 

46th Pennsylvania Col. James L. Selfridge. 

Second Brigade.f 
Brig.-gen. Henry H. Lockwood. 

1st Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade Col. William P. Maulsby. 

1st Maryland, Eastern Shore Col. James Wallace. 

150th New York Col. John H. Ketchara. 

* During the battle Major-general Henry W. Sloeum, the propfer commander of this corps, 
held temporary command of the right wing of the army. 

t Unassigned during progress of battle ; afterward attached to First division as Second 
brigade. 



ADDENDA. 273 

Third Brigade. 
Col. Silas Colgrove. 

27th Indiana Lieut.-col. John E. Fesler. 

2d Massachusetts Lieut.-col. Charles R. Mudge. 

Maj. Charles F. Morse. 

13th New Jersey Col. Ezra A. Carman. 

l()7th New York Col. Nirom M. Crane. 

3d Wisconsin Col. William Hawley. 

SECOND DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. John W. Geary. 

First Brigade. 

Col. Charles Candy. 

5th Ohio Col. John H. Patrick. 

7th Ohio Col. William E. Creighton. 

29th Ohio Capt. Wilbur F. Stevens. 

Capt. Edward Hayes. 

66th Ohio Lieut.-col. Eugene Powell. 

28th Pennsylvania Capt. John Flynn. 

147th Pennsylvania (8 companies) Lieut.-col. Ario Pardee, Jr. 

Second Brigade. 

(1) Col. George A. Cobham, Jr. 

(2) Brig.-gen. Thomas L. Kane. 

(3) Col. George A. Cobham, Jr. 

29th Pennsylvania Col. William Eickards, Jr. 

109th Pennsylvania Capt. Frederick L. Gimber. 

111th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Thomas M. Walker. 

Col. George A. Cobham, Jr. 

Lieut.-col. Thomas M. Walker. 

Third Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. George S. Greene. 

60th New York.. Col. Abel Godard. 

78th New York Lieut.-col. Herbert Hammerstein. 

102d New Y'"ork Col. James C Lane. 

Capt. Lewis E. Stegman. 

137th New York Col. David Ireland. 

149th New York Col. Henry A. Barnum. 

Lieut.-col. Charles B. Eandall. 

AUTILLERY BRIGADE. 

Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg. 

1st New York Light, Battery M Lieut. Charles E. Winegar. 

Pennsylvania Light, Battery E Lieut. Charles A. Atwell. 

4th United States, Battery F Lieut. Sylvanus T. Eui 

6th United States, Battery K Lieut. David H. Kinzie 



»»• 



274 ADDENDA. 

CAVALRY CORPS. 

Maj.-gen. Alfred Pleasonton. 

■ FIR8T DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. John Buford. 

First Brigade. 
Col. William Gamble. 

8tli Illinois Maj. John L. Beveridge. 

12th Illinois (4 companies) ) ^, , ^ ^t /-,i 

3d Indiana (G companies) | Col. George H. Chapman. 

8th New York Lieut.-col. William L. Markell. 

Second Brigade. 
Col. Thomas C. Devin. 

6th New York Maj. W^illiam E. Beardsley. 

9th New York Col. William Sackett. 

17th Pennsylvania Col. Josiah H. Kellogg. 

3d West Virginia (2 companies) Capt. Seymour B. Conger. 

Reserve Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Wesley Merritt. 

6th Pennsylvania Maj. James H. Haseltine. 

1st United States Capt. Robert S. C. Lord. 

2d United States Capt. T. F. Rodenbough. 

5th United States Capt. Julius W. Mason. 

6th United States Ma,j. Samuel H.Starr. 

Lieut. Louis H. Carpenter. 

Lieut. Nicholas Nolan. 

Capt. Ira W. Claflin. 

SECOND DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. David McM. Gregg. 

Headquarters Guard. 
1st Ohio, Company A, Capt. Noah Jones. 

First Brigade. 
Col. John B. Mcintosh. 

1st Maryland (11 companies) Lieut.-col. James M. Deems. 

Purnell Legion Maryland, Company A Capt. Robert E. Duvall. 

1st Miissachusetts * Lieut.-col. Greely S. Curtis. 

1st New Jersey Maj. Myron H. Beaumont. 

1st Pennsylvania Col. John P. Taylor. 

3d Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Edward S. Jones. 

3d Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, Section 

Battery Hf Capt. William D. Rank. 

* Detached from brigade. t Serving as liglit artillery. 



ADDENDA. 275 

Second Brigade.* 
Col. Pennock Huey. 

2d New York Lieut.-col. Otto Harhaus. 

4th NeAv York Lieut.-col. Augustus Pruyn. 

6th Ohio (10 companies) Maj. William Stedman. 

8th Pennsylvania Capt. William A. Corrie. 

Third Brigade. 
Col. J. Irvin Gregg. 

1st Maine Lieut.-col. Charles H. Smith. 

10th New York Maj. M. Henry Avery. 

4th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. William E. Doster. 

16th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. John K. Kobison. 

THIRD DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Judson Kilpatrick. 
Headquarters Guard. 
1st Ohio, Company C Capt. Samuel N. Stanford. 

First Brigade. 

(1) Brig.-gen. Elon J. Farnsworth.f 

(2) Col. Nathani'el P. Kichmond. 

5th New York Maj. John Hammond. 

18th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. William P. Brinton. 

1st Vermont Lieut.-col. Addison W. Preston. 

1st West Virginia (10 companies) Col. Nathaniel P. Richmond. 

Maj. Charles E. Capehart. 

Second Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. George A. Custer. 

1st Michigan Col. Charles H. Town. 

5th Michigan Col. Russell A. Alger. 

6th Michigan Col. George Gray. 

7th Michigan (10 companies) Col. William D. Mann. 

HOKSE ARTILLERY. 

First Brigade. 

Capt. James M. Robertson. 

9th Michigan Capt. Jabez J. Daniels. 

6th New York Capt. Joseph W. Martin. 

2d tinited States, Batteries B and L Lieut. Edward Heaton. 

2d United States, Battery M Lieut. A. C. M. Pennington. 

4th United States, Battery E Lieut. Samuel S. Elder. 

Second Brigmde, 
Capt. John C. Tidball. 

1st United States, Batteries E and G Capt. Alanson M. Randol. 

1st United States, Battery K Capt. William M. Graham. 

2d United States, Battery A Lieut. John H. Calef. 

3d United States, Batteiy C Lieut. William D. Fuller. 

* Not engaged, + Killed. 



276 ADDENDA. 

ARTILLERY* 
Brig.-gen. Henry J. Hunt. 

ARTILLERY RESERVE. 

(1) Brig.-gen. Robert O. Tylcr.f 

(2) Capt. James M. Robertson. 

Fird Regular Brigade. 

Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom'. 

1st United States, Battery H Lioiit. Cliandler P. Eakin. 

Lieut. Philip D. Mason. 

3d United States, Batteries F and K Lieut. Jolin (t. Turnbull. 

4th United States, Battery C Lieut. Evan Thomas. 

5th United States, Battery C Lieut. Gulian V. Weir. 

Fir at Volunteer Brigade. 

Lieut.-col. Freeman McGilvery. 

Massachusetts Light, hxh. Battery (E) % Capt. Charles A. Phillips. 

Massachusetts Light, 9th I]attery Capt. John Bigelow. 

Lieut. Richard S. Milton. 

New York Light, 15th Battery Capt. Patrick ILirt. 

Pennsylvania Light, Batteries C and F Capt. James Thompson. 

Second Volunteer Brigade. 
Capt. Elijah D. Taft. 

1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery B ? Capt. Albert F. Brooker. 

1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery M ^ (apt. Franklin A. Pratt. 

Connecticut Light, 2d Battery Caj)t. John W. Sterling. 

New York Light, 5th Battery Capt. Elijali D. Taft. 

Tliird Vohmleer Brigade. 

Capt. James F. Huntington. 

New Hampshire Light, Ist Battery Capt. Frederick ]\[. Edgell. 

1st Ohio Light, Battery H Lieut. George W. Norton. 

1st Pennsylvania Light, Batteries F and G.X'apt. R. Bruce Ricketts. 
West Virginia Light, Battery C Capt. Wallace Hill. 

Fovrth Vohmleer Brigade. 

Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh. 

Maine Light, 6th Battery Lieut. Edwin B. Dow. 

Maryland Light, Battery A Capt. James H. Rigbv. 

New .Jersey Light, 1st Battery Lieut. Augustin N. Parsons. 

1st New York Light, Battery G Capt. Nelson Ames. 

1st New Y'^ork Light, Battery K\\ Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh. 

Train Guard. 

4th New Jersey Infantry (7 companies) Maj. Charles Ewing. 

Headquarters Guard. 

32d Massachusetts, Company C Capt. Josiah C. Fuller. 

* All organizations of artillery except the Reserve will be found in the rosters of the com- 
mands with whioh they served. 
t Disabled. 
1 10th New York Battery attached. gNot engaged. || 11th New York Battery attached. 



ADDENDA. 



277 



Eeturn of Casualties in the Anmj of the Potomac, commanded by 
Major-general George G. Meade, U. S. Armij, at the Battle 
of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, July IS, 1863.^ 





Killed. 

1 


Wounded. 


Captured 
or missing. 


V 


Command. 


u 
O 


•a 


u 




% . 

-aa 


u 



sa 



IS 

.2 <o 
■53 


£ 

< 


GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 
















Staff 






2 


2 






4 


FIRST ARMY CORPS. 












Maj.-gen. John F. Reynolds. 
M:ij.-gen. Abner Doubleday. 
Maj.-gen. John Newton. 
















GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 
















Staff 


1 


'" i 


1 


'"""2 






2 


Ist Maine Cavalry, Company L 


3 


FIRST division. 
















Brig.-gen. James S. Wadsworth. 
















First Brigade. 
















Brig.-gen. Solomon Meredith. 
Col. William W. Robinson. 
















Staff 


2 

8 
1 

2 

18 


"'25 

50 
25 

28 
28 


1 
12 
18 
11 

7 
10 


"i'ii 
201 

144 

109 

95 


"4 
3 
5 

"i 


"'"4*6 

. 88 
47 
22 
51 


1 




210 


24th Michio'an .... 


363 




233 


6th Wisconsin 


168 


7th Wisconsin 


178 


Total First brigade 


149 


54 


670 


13 


254 


1153 


Second Brigade. 
















Brig.-gen. Lysander Cutler. 


















"2 

"3 

1 


2 
30 
13 

7 

40 
13 


i'e 

6 
8 
9 
5 


5 

116 

99 

54 

125 

55 


"i 
"2 


3 
70 
99 
45 
92 
54 


10 


76th New York 


234 


84th New York (14th Militia) 

95th New York 


217 
115 


147th New York 


269 


66th Pennsylvania 


130 


Total Second brigade 


6 


105 


44 


454 


3 


363 


975 


Total First division 


19 


254 


98 


1124 


16 


617 


2128 



* Also includes losses la skirmishes July 4th. 



278 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties in the Army of the Poto)nac, etc. — Continued. 





Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured 
or luissiug. 




Command. 


o 


13 

0) 


g 

o 


1 

"3 a 


2 



•3 
.2 

= a 


a 


SECOND DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Jolin C. Kobinson. 
Staff 


"i 


...„. 

7 
12 
11 

1 
11 


1 

1 
5 
4 
6 
10 
2 
8 


1 
54 
73 
52 
81 
12 
48 


2 

11 

3 

8 
10 

"e 


1 

153 

98 
167 

82 

'"92 


1 


First Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. Gabriel R. Paul. 
Col. Samuel H. Leonard. 
Col. Adrian K. Root. 
Col. Ricliard Coulter. 
Col. Peter Lyle. 
Col. Richard Coulter. 

Staff 


5 


16th Maine 


232 


13tli Massachusetts 


185 


94th New York 


245 


104th New York 


194 




15 


107 th Pennsylvania 


165 


Total First brigade 


2 

"i 

2 
2 

"i 


49 

...„. 

4 

10 

5 

3 

7 


36 

"i 

I 

6 
3 
3 


321 

""45 
15 
27 

44 
51 

42 


40 

1 
3 

"3 

"4 

1 


593 

""59 
58 
75 
62 
45 
39 


1041 


Second Brigade. 
Staff 


1 


12th Massachusetts 


119 


83d New York (9th Militia) 


82 


97th New York 


126 




117 


88th Pennsylvania 


106 


90th Pennsylvania 


93 


Total Second brigade 


7 


32 


31 


224 


12 


338 


644 


Total Second division 


9 


31 


68 

1 


545 


52 


931 


1686 


THIRD DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Thomas A. Rowley. 
Maj.-gen. Abner Doubleday. 

Staff 


1 



* Transferred on afternoon of July 1st from the Second to the First brigade. Its losses after 
July 1st are reported with the latter brigade. 



ADDENDA. 



279 



Return of Casualties in the A 


rmy 


of the Potomac, etc 


— Continued. 




Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured 
or missing. 




Command, 


o 

o 




u 

1 




-a 





0) . 

ca 




First Brigade. 

Col. Cliapman Biddle. 
Brig.-gen. Thomas A. Rowley. 
Col. Cliapmau Biddle. 

Staff 




"32 
12 
10 
29 


1 

15 

5 

11 

7 


""96 

101 
117 
195 


"i 
1 

2 
2 


""23 

60 

68 

100 


1 


80th New York (20th Militia) 

1 21 st Pennsyl van ia 


3 

"3 

2 


170' 
179 


142d Pennsylvania 


211 


151st Pennsylvania 


335 


Total First brigade 


8 

1 
1 
2 


83 

20 
33 

27 


39 

10 
12 
10 


509 

130 
159 
141 


6 

"4 
4 


251 

91 
127 

80 


896 


Second Brigade. ■ 

Col. Roy Stone. 

Col. Langhorne Wister. 

Col. Edmund L. Dana. 

143d Pennsylvania 


252 


149th Pennsylvania 


336 


150th Pennsylvania 


264 


Total Second brigade 


4 

"i 
1 


80 

'"16 
18 
16 


32 

2 
4 
1 
5 


430 

""99 
66 
97 


8 


298 

'"io 
21 

1 


852 


Tliird Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. George J. Stannard. 
Col. Francis V. Randall. 

Staff 


2 


1 3th Vermont 


123 


14th Vermont 


107 


16th Vermont 


119 


Total Third brigade 


• 44 


12 


262 


... 


32 


351 


Total Third division 


13 


207 

'""3 

1 
2 

2 


84 

"2 

1 
1 
2 


1201 

18 
11 
14 
■8 
29 


14 


581 

1 
'""3 


2100 


ARTII.1.ERY BRIGADE. 

Col. Chas. S. Wainwright. 

Maine Light, 2d Battery 

Maine Light, 5th Battery 


18 
23 


1st New York Light, Battery L*... 
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B.. 
4th United States, Battery B 


17 
11 
36 


Total Artillery brigade 




8 


6 


80 




11 


105 


Total First army corps 


42 


551 


257 


2952 


82 


2140 


6024 



* Company E, 1st New York Heavy Artillery, attached. 
T 



280 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties in the A 


rmy 


of the Potomac, etc 


. — Continued. 




Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured 
or missing. 


« 


Command. 


o 


% . 

B S 


t 

m 





u 

m 



« a 

~ 0) 

= 5 

w 


bo 


SECO^'D ARMY CORPS. 
















Maj.-geu. WiNFiELD S. Hancock* 
















GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 
















Slaff 




"i' 


3 


" ""3 






3 


6th New Yurk C:ivalry,Cos. D and K 


4 


FIRST DIVISION. 
















Brig.-gen. John C. Caldwell. 
















F'lr^i Brigade.' 
















Col. Edward E. Cross. 
















Col. H. Boyd McKeen. 
















Staff 


i" 


"26" 

6 
5 

18 


1 

4 
6 
5 
6 


'"49 
50 
44 
95 


... 


5 


1 


oth New Ilampsliire 


80 


61st New York 


62 




1 


62 


148th Pennsylvania 


125 


Total First brigade 


2 


55 


22 


238 


... 


13 


330 


Second Brigade. 




Col. Patrick Kelly. 
















28th Massachusetts 


i 


8 
5 
5 
6 
2 


1 
1 
1 
1 


56 
9 
13 
16 
11 




35 

7 
6 
4 
8 


100 


63d New York 


23 




25 


88th New York 


28 


116th Pennsylvania 


22 


Total Second brigade 


1 


26 


4 


105 


2 


60 


198 


TJiird Brigade. 




Brig.-wen. Samuel K. Zook. 
















Litut.-col. John Eraser. 
















Staff 


1 
1 


"'"1* 
4 


3 

2 


""23 
26 




"io" 

2 


1 


52d New York 


38 


57th New York 


34 


66th New York 


2 
3 


3 
34 


5 

8 


24 
136 


i 
3 


9 

57 


44 


140th Pennsylvania 


241 


Total Third briaade 


7 


42 


18 


209 


4 


78 


358 



' See foot-note, p. 262. 



ADDENDA. 



281 



Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc. — Continued. 





Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured 
or missing. 




Command. ^ 


o 

1 

O 


•a 


o 




2 
o 


la 

eg 


a 

to 
bo 


Fourth Brigade. 

Col. John R. Brooke. 

27th Connecticut 


2 
2 
4 

"i 


8 

9 

11 

7 
9 


4 

7 

7 

11 

8 


19 

54 
57 
56 
58 


... 


4 
12 
19 

6 

8 


37 


2d Delaware. 


84 


64th New York 


98 


58d Pennsvl van ia 


80 


145th Pennsylvania 


84 






Total Fourth brigade 


9 


44 


37 


244 




49 


383 


Total First division 


19 


167 

""28 
20 
47 
42 


81 
3 

1 
11 

8 

14 
12 


796 

155 

89 
159 
120 


6 

i 


200 

■■■■4 

28 

1 

14 


1269 


SECOND DIVISION. 

Brig. -gen. John Gibbon. 
Brig.-gen. William Harrow. 

Staff 


3 


First Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. William Harrow. 
Col. Francis E. Heath. 

Staff 


"i 

3 
3 
3 


1 


19th Maine 


199 


15th Massachusetts 


148 


1st Minnesota 


224 


82d New York (2d Militia) 


192 


Total First brigade 


10 

4 
2 

2 
1 


137 

36 
19 
42 

8 


46 

8 
3 
7 
9 


523 

72 

55 

138 

45 


1 

2 
3 


47 

7 

16 

2 

1 


764 


Second Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Alexander S. Webb. 
69th Pennsylvania 


129 


71st Pennsvlvania 


98 


7 2d Pennsv 1 vania 


191 


106th Pennsylvania 


64 


Total Second brigade 


9 

2 
2 

2 


105 

7 

28 
19 
15 

6 


27 

9 
8 
3 
6 
3 


310 

52 
86 
41 
49 
25 


5 


26 

7 
3 

"■■■4 


482 


Third Brigade. 

Col. Norman J. Hall. 

1 9th IMassachusetts 


77 


20th Massachusetts 

7th Michisjan 


127 
65 


42d New Yf)rk 


74 


69th New York 


34 


Total Third brigade 


6 


75 


29 


253 




14 


377 



282 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc. — Continued. 





Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
uiissiiig. 




CosraAND. 


a) 

o 


-2 . 


S 

si 




■aa 







1 
< 


Unattached. 
1st Co. (Mass.) Sharpshooters 




2 




6 






8 


Total Second division 


25 

2 
1 


319 

6 
7 

17 
5 


105 

3 
1 

10 

1 


1092 

22 
16 
73 
40 


6 


87 

....„ 

1 

1 


1634 


THIRD DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Alexander Hays. 

First Brigade. 
Col. Samuel S. Carroll. 

14th Indiana 


31 


4th Ohio 


31 


8th Ohio 


102 


7th West Virginia 


47 






Total First brigade 


3 

i 

2 
■3 


35 

10 
9 

21 
2 

13 


15 

10 
10 
4 
... 
10 


151 

42 
44 
79 
4 
76 


"i 


4 

12 

9 


211 


Second Brigade. 

Col. Thomas A. Smyth. 
Lieut.-col. Francis E. Pierce. 

1 4th Connecticut. 


66 


1st Delaware 


77 


12th New Jei'sey 


115 


10th New York (battalion) 

lOSth New York 


6 

102 






Total Second brigade 


6 

1 
3 
2 
5 


55 

14 

55 
24 
35 


34 

3 

8 
6 
9 


245 

77 
169 

98 
172 


1 


25 

"14 

9 

10 


366 


Third Brigade. 

Col. George L. Willard. 
Col. Eliakim Sherrill. 
Lieut.-col. James M. Bull. 

39th New York 


95 


111th New York 


249 


125th New York 


139 


126th New York 


231 






Total Third brigade 


11 


128 


26 


516 




33 


714 






Total Third division 


20 


218 


75 


912 


1 


65 


1291 



ADDENDA. 



283 



Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc 


. — Continued. 




Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missiug. 




Command. 


8 
o 


.2 3 
■53 


1 





2 
8 

a 



a 2 
W 


to 
U) 

<i 


ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 

Capt. John G. Hazard. 
1st New York Light, Bat. B*... 
1st Rhode Island Light, Bat. A.. 
1st Ehode Island Light, Bat. B.. 

1st United States, Battery I 

4th United States, Battery A 


1 

"i 
"i 


9 
3 
6 
1 
5 




15 

27 
18 
23 
31 


... 


2 


26 
32 
28 
25 
38 


Total Artillery brigade 


3 

67 


24 


5 


114 




3 


149 


Total Second army corps 


729 


269 


2917 


13 


355 


4350 


THIRD ARMY CORPS. 
Maj.-gen. Daniel E. Sickles, 
Maj.-gen. David B. Birney. 

Staff 




""'9 
1 

4 

7 

8 

25 


2 

3 
9 
3 
9 
14 
1 
6 


"37' 

26 

117 

101 

85 
97 


"3 
"3 


"55 

4 

19 

9 

67 

21 


2 


FIRST division. 

Maj.-gen. David B. Birney. 
Brig.-gen. J. H. Hobart Ward. 

First Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Charles K. Graham. 
Col. Andrew H. Tippin. 
Staff 




3 


67th Pennsylvania 


2 

'3 

1 


115 


63d Pennsylvania 


34 


68th Pennsy 1 van ia 


152 


105th Pennsylvania 


132 


1 1 4th Pennsvl vania 


154 


141st Pennsylvania 


149 


Total First brigade 


6 


54 

"30 

17 

9 

10 

24 

17 

5 

5 


45 

1 
9 

2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 


463 

*io5 

57 
56 
48 
54 
77 
33 
19 


6 

"4 
1 

"i 


165 

"10 

45 

70 

3 

5 

11 

6 

14 


739 


Second Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. J. H. Hobart Ward. 
Col. Hiram Berdan. 
Staff 


1 


20th Indiana 


2 
1 
2 
1 
4 
1 
1 


156 


3d Mai ne 


122 


4th Maine 


144 


86th New York 


66 


r24th New York 


90 




110 


1st United States Sharpshooters.. 
% 2d United States Sharpshooters... 


49 
43 


Total Second brigade 


12 


117 


33 


449 


6 


164 


781 



* 14th New York Battery attached. 



284 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties in the x 


I rmy 


of the Potomac, etc. 


—Continued. 




Killed. 


Wou 


iided. 


Captured or 
missing. 




Command. 


2 

a 

O 




a 



.2 S 


1 





1 

< 


Third Brigade. 

Col. P. Kegis de Trobriand. 

17th Maine 


1 

2 
1 


17 
7 

17 
22 

8 


7 
3 
8 
4 
6 


105 
28 
78 

116 
39 




3 

7 
' 4 

7 


133 


3d Michigan 


45 


5th I\!ichigan 


109 


40th Nfew York 


150 


110th Pennsylvania 


53 


Total Third brigade 


4 


71 


28 


366 




21 


490 








22 

"l 
1 
3 
1 
3 
1 


242 
2 

.15 
22 

12 
13 
14 

29 


106 
2 

2 

8 
7 
4 
5 
9 
10 


1278 

7 

75 

89 

49 

62 

115 

166 


12 
"2 


350 

"21 

8 

13 

11 

12 

7 


2010 


SECOND DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Andrew A. Humphreys 
Stall" 


11 


First Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. Joseph B. Carr. 
Staff 


2 


1st Massarhnsetts 


120 


11th Massachusetts 


129 


Ifitli Massachusetts 


81 


12th New Hampshire 


92 


11th New Jersey 


153 


26th Pennsvlvania 


213 


Total First brigade 


10 

"]" 

"4 
"7 


105 

'20 

9 

7 

47 

12 

23 


45 

2 
8 
6 
7 

11 
6 

10 


556 

"85 
62 
72 
92 
68 

144 


2 


72 

"'4 
13 

28 
8 
3 

19 


790 


Second Brigade. 

Col. William E. Brewster. 

Staff 


2 


70th New York 


117 




91 


72d New York 


114 


73d New York 

74th New York.. 


162 

89 


120th New York 


203 






Total Second brigade 


12 


118 


50 


523 




75 


778 



ADDENDA. 



285 



Return of Casualties in the . 


Army 


of the 


Potomac, etc 


— Continued. 




Killed. 


Wouuded. 


Captured or 
missing. 


6 


Command. 




-d 




-a 


c/3 


'& 






2 
8 

So 
o 


-53 


o 




sa 

o 


■Sq 

■-a a 


bo 


Third Brigade. 
















Col. George C. Burling. 
















2d New Hnmpshire 


8 


17 


18 


119 




36 


193 


5th New Jersey 


2 


11 

1 

14 

7 
3 


5 

3 

10 

7 


60 
29 
76 
31 
18 




16 
8 

13 
2 
3 


94 


6th New Jersey 


41 


7th New Jersey 


114 


8th New Jersey 


47 


115th Pennsvlyania 


24 


Total Third brigade 


6 


53 


43 


333 ... 


78 


513 


Total Second division 


28 


278 


140 


1419 


2 


225 


2092 


ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 




Capt. George E. Eandolph. 
Capt. A. Judson Clark. 
















New Jersey Liglit, 2d Battery... 




1 




16 




3 


20 


1st New York Light, Battery D.. 








10 




8 


18 


New York Liglit, 4th Battery.... 




2 




10 




1 


13 


1st Khode Island Lioht.Batterv E. 




3 


2 


24 




1 


30 


4th United States, Battery K 




2 


1 


18 




4 


25 


Total Artillery brigade 




8 


3 


78 




17 


106 


Total Third army corps 


50 


528 


251 


2775 


14 


592 


4210 


FIFTH ARMY COEPS. 
















Maj.-gen. George Sykes. 
















FIRST DIVISION. 
















Brig.-gen. James Barnes. 
















First Brigade. 
















Col. William S. Tilton. 
















18tli Massachusetts 




1 




23 




3 


27 


22d Massachusetts 


"i 
1 


3 
4 
2 


3 
6 
3 


24 
27 
16 




1 

4 
3 


31 


1st Micliigan 


42 


llSth Pennsylvania 


25 


Total First brigade 


2 


10 


12 


90 


... 


11 


125 


Second Brigade. 




Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer. 
















9th Massachusetts 


"i 
1 

4 


1 
12 
24 
24 


"i 

9 
10 


6 
55 
55 
97 


"i 


5 

75 
40 


7 


32d Massachusetts 


80 


4th Michigan 


165 


62d Pennsylvania 


175 


Total Second brigade 


6 


61 


26 


213 


1 


120 


427 



286 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc. — Continued. 





Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured 
or missiug. 


05 


Command. 


1 

O 


T3 
V . 

"53 


1 




.- 4) 

~ 3 


(V 



= 3 
B 


bO 

2 

bO 
bO 

< 


Third Brigade. 

Col. Strong Vincent. 

Col. James C. Rice. 

Staff 




"'"29 

20 

24 

9 


1 

6 
2 
5 
3 


""85 
32 

77 
42 


, 


"""'"5 

3 
3 


1 


20th Maine 


"3 

2 
1 


125 




60 


44tli New York 


111 


83d Pennsylvania 


55 


Total Third brigade 


6 


82 


17 


236 




11 


352 


Total First division 


14 


153 

""e 

10 
4 

7 
18 


55 

"4 
2 

1 
4 
2 


539 

1 
62 
28 
39 
67 
108 


1 


142 

""{ 

""'13 
4 


904 


SECOND DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Roiueyn B. Ayres. 

First Brigade. 

Col. Hannibal Day. 

Staff 


1 


3d United States 




73 


4th United States 


40 


6th United States 

12tli United States 


i 


44 
92 


14th Unitfd States 


132 


Total First brigade 


1 

1 
1 
1 
3 
1 . 


45 

5 
11 
15 
16 

24 


13 

4 
3 
5 

7 
13 


305 

51 

42 

27 

85 

105 




18 

6 
2 
3 
9 

7 


382 


Col. Sidney Burbank. 
2d United States 


67 


7th United States 


59 


10th United States 


51 


11th United States 


120 


17th United States 


150 


Total Second brigade 


7 

1 
1 


71 

"*25 
4 
3 
6 


32 

"5 

2 
2 
2 


310 

""84 
22 
14 
11 




27 
'""18 


447 


Third Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Stei)hen H. Weed. 
Col. Kenner Garrard. 
Staff 


1 


140th New York 


133 


146tli New Y^ork 


28 


91st Pennsylvania 

155th Pennsylvania 


19 
19 


Total Third brigade 


2 


38 


11 


131 




18 


200 


Total Second division 


10 


154 


56 


746 




63 


1029 



ADDENDA. 287 

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, e<c.— Continued. 



Command. 



THIRD DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Samuel W. Crawford. 

First Brigade. 
Col. William McCandless. 



1st Pennsylvania Reserves 

2d Pennsylvania Reserves 

6tli Pennsylvania Reserves 

13th Penna. Reserves (1st Rifles).. 



Total First brigade. 



KUled. 



_ Thii-d Brigade. 

Col. Joseph W. Fisher, 

5th Pennsylvania Reserves.., 
9th Pennsylvania Reserves.. 
10th Pennsylvania Reserves, 
lltli Pennsylvania Reserves. 
12th Pennsylvania Reserves. 

Total Third brigade 

Total Third division.... 



ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 

Capt. Augustus P. Martin. 

Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C) 

1st Oliio Light, Battery L 

5th United States, Battery D 

5tli United States, Battery I 



Total Artillery brigade. 



Ambulance Corps. 



Total Fifth army corps _28 



Wounded. 



18 



23 



14 



17 



337 



129 



Captured 
or missing. 



35 
31 
21 
31 



118 



2 
5 
3 
35 
1 



46 



164 



6 

2 

6 

18 



32 



1482 






1 210 



46 
37 
24 

48 



155 



2 

5 

5 

41 

2 



55 



210 



6 

2 

13 

22 



43 



2187 



288 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties hi the A^-my 


of the Poto 


nac, etc 


. — Continued. 




Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 


9 


Command. 


o 


.a v 

"53 

w 


a 
S 

o 


r3 

.2 S 
-53 

w 


O 


r3 


to 


SIXTH ARMY CORPS. 
















Maj.-gen. John Sedgwick. 
















FIRST DIVISION. 
















B^g.-gen. Horatio G. Wright. 
















First Brigade. 
















Brig.-gen. Alfred T. A. Torbert. 
















2d New Jersey 








6 






6 


3d New Jersey 


... 






2 






2 


15th New Jersey 








3 


... 




3 


Total First brigade 








11 






11 


Second Brigade. 
















Brig.-gen. Joseph J. Bartlett. 
















121st New York 








2 






2 


9-3tli Peiinsvl vania 


... 


i 




1 






2 


9(>tli Peiinsvl vaiiia 








1 






1 


Total Second brigade 


1 




4 






5 


Tliird Brigade. 
















Brig.-gen. David A. Russell. 
















119th Pennsylvania 








2 






2 


Total Third brigade 


- 1 




2 






2 


Total First division 








17 






18 


SECOND DIVISION. 
















Brig.-gen. AUnon P. Howe. 
















Second Brigade. 
















Col. Lewis A. Grant. 
















4th Vermont 


... 






1 






1 






Total Second brigade 







1 







1 



ADDENDA. 



289 



Return of Casualties in the 


Army of the Potomac, etc 


. — Continued. 




Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 

missing. 




Command. 


2 
o 


to ^ 

■53 


g 

o 







"Ha 


a 
bo 


Third Brigade. 
















Brig.-gen. Thomas H. Neill. 
















7tli Maine 

4o(i iSew York 


"i 


""i 




6 
2 
2 
1 




""1 


6 

5 


49tli Kew York 

6lBt Pennsylvania 


2 

2 


Total Third brigade 


1 


] 




11 




2 


15 


Total Second division 


1 


1 




12 




2 


16 


THIRD DIVISION. 




Maj.-gen. John Newton. 
Brig.-gen. Frank Wheaton. 
















First Brigade. 
















Brig.-gen. Alexander Shaler. 
















65th New York 

67th New York 

122d New Y'^ork 


i 


4 

""io 


"2 
1 


5 

""36 

12 

6 




""i 

2 


9 

1 

44 


2od Pen nsy 1 vania 


14 


82d Pennsylvania 


6 


Total First brigade 


1 


14 


8 


53 




3 


74 


Second Brigade. 
















Col. Henry L. Eiistis. 
















7th Massachusetts 




2 
1 


"i 

1 


6 

3 

25 

5 




5 

19 
1 


6 
9 


37th Massachusetts 


47 


2d Ehode Island 


7 


Total Second brigade 




3 


2 


39 




25 


69 


Third Brigade. 




Brig.-gen. Frank Wheaton. 
Col. David J. Nevin. 
















B'^l New York 




1 

i 


1 
1 
2 
3 


10 
9 
9 

16 






12 


9.Sd Pennsylvania 

98th Pennsylvania 

139th Pennsylvania 


10 
11 
2C 


Total Third brigade 




2 


7 


44 






53 


Total Third division 


1 


19 


12 


136 




28 


196 



290 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casiudties in the /. 


rmy 


of the 


Putu 


nac, etc. — Continued. 




Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured 
or missiug. 




Command. 


o 

m 
o 




m 

o 


.2 a 

£2 


s 

m 



5 . 

.2i 
= 3 


g 

to 
<5 


ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 
















Col. Charles H. Tompkins. 
















New York LigJit, 1st Battery 




4 


2 


f) 






12 


Total Artillery brigade 




4 


2 


6 






12 


Total Sixth array corps 


2 


25 


14 


171 




30 


242 


ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS. 














Maj.-gen. Oliver 0. Howard. 
















GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 
















Staff 






1 








1 


Ist Indiana Cavalry, Cos. I and K.. 












3 


3 


FIRST DIVISION. 
















Brig.-gen. Francis C. Barlow. 
















Brig.-gen. Adelbert Ames. 
















Staff 






1 








1 


First Brigade. 
















Col. Leopold von Gilsa. 
















Staff 


1 
1 


""ii 

7 


9. 


"'"56 
45 


4 


"""2 
44 


1 


41st New York 


75 


54tli New York 


102 


6Sth New York 


1 


7 


4 


59 


2 


65 


138 


15.Sd Penns vl vania 


1 


22 


7 


135 




46 


211 






Total First brigade 


4 


50 


21 


289 


6 


157 


527 


Second Brigade. 




Brig.-gen. Adelbert Ames. 
















Col. Andrew L. Harris. 
















17th Connecticut 


2 
1 

2 


18 

8 

14 

23 


4 
5 

7 
8 


77 

95 

67 

103 


2 
3 
4 


94 

72 
92 

77 


197 


25th Ohio 


184 




186 


107th Ohio 


211 






Total Second brigade 


5 


63 


24 


342 


9 


335 


778 


Total First division 


9 


113 


46 


631 


15 


492 


1306 



ADDENDA. 



291 



Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, e/c— Continued. 





Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured 
or missing. 


aj 


Command. 


'2 
8 




m 





B 





C3 

to 

60 

iso 

< 


SECOND DIVISION. 
















Brig.-gen. Adolpli von Steinwehr. 
















Staff 






1 








1 


First Brigade. 




Col. Charles E. Coster, 
















134th New York 


1 


41 
1 
3 


4 
1 
3 


147 
20 
26 


2 
9 
1 


57 

169 

76 


252 


154th New York 


200 




111 


73d Pennsylvania 


3 


7 




27 






34 




52 


8 


220 


12 


302 


597 


Second Brigade. 
















Col. Orland Smith. 
















33d Massachusetts 


... 


7 
17 

6 
21 


"i 
1 
3 


38 

88 

30 

117 


"i 

1 


""2 

11 

4 


45 


136th New York 


109 


55th Ohio 


49 


73d Ohio 


145 




3 


51 


5 


273 


2 


17 


348 


Total Second division 


103 


14 


493 


14 


319 


946 


THIRD DIVISION. 
















Maj.-gen. Carl Schurz. 
















First Brigade. 
















Brig.-gen. A. Schimmelfennig. 
















Col. George von Amsberg. 
















82d Illinois 


"4 

2 

2 


4 

11 

23 

4 

8 


1 
1 
8 
6 
4 


18 
34 
158 
30 
36 


4 

14 

6 

2 
2 


85 

164 

108 

10 

58 


112 


45th New York 


224 


157th New York 


307 


61st Ohio 


54 


74th Pennsylvania 


110 


Total First brisade 


8 


50 


20 


276 


28 


425 


807 



292 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties in the Army 


of the Potomac, etc. 


— Continued. 




Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 


.• 


Command. 


V 

e 

o 


1^ 


c 


•- 2 

a " 


e 



-a 

a 3 
H 


S 

s. 

u 
to 

60 

< 


Second Brigade. 














Col. W. Krzyzanowski. 
















58th New York 


1 




1 
9 


2 

4 


13 

66 


i 


3 

58 


20 


119th New Y(.rk 


140 


82(1 Ohio 


4 


13 


14 


71 


»> 




181 


75th Pennsvlvania 


8 


16 


5 


84 




3 


111 


2(itli Wisconsin 


2 


24 


11 


118 


2 


60 


217 






Total Second brigade 


12 


63 


36 


352 


5 


201 


669 






Total Third division 


V,0 


113 


56 


628 


33 


626 


1476 


ARTILLKRY BRIGADE. 
















Major Thomas W. Osborn. 
















1st New York Lis;ht, Butterv T... 




3 


2 


8 






13 


New York Liirht, 13th Batterv... 








8 




3 


11 


1st Ohio Liiiht, Batterv 1 








13 






13 


1st Ohio Liuht, Batterv K 




2 


1 


10 




2 


15 


4th United States, Battery G 


1 


1 


... 


11 




4 


17 


Total Artillery brigade 


1 


6 


3 


50 




9 


69 


Total Eleventh army corps.. 


33 


335 


120 


1802 


62 


1449 


3801 


TWELFTH ARMY CORPS. 
















Brig.-gen. Alpiieus S.Williams 
















FIRST DIVISION. 
















Brig.-gen. Thomas H. Riigor. 
















FirHt Brigade. 
















Col. Arcliibald L. McDougall. 
















5th Connecticut 


i 


"""5 


1 


2 

22 

6 




5 
1 


7 


2()th Connecticut 


28 


3d Mar viand 


8 


128d New York 




3 

1 


1 
1 


9 

8 


1 




14 


145th New Yf)rk 


10 


46th Pennsvl vania 


1 


2 


1 


9 




1 


13 






Total First brigade 


11 


4 


56 


1 


7 


80 



ADDENDA. 293 

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc. — Continued, 





Killed. 


Wouuded. 


Captured or 
missing. 




Command. 


o 


.- a 
c - 


1 



Id 

.2 S 


'1 

C 




1 

to 


Second Brigade. 
















Brig.-gen. Henry H. Lockwood. 
















1st Md., Potomac Home Brigade. 


3 


20 


3 


77 




1 


104 


1st Maryland, Eastern Shore 




5 




IS 




2 


25 


150th New York 




7 




23 




15 


45 






Total Second brigade 


3 


32 


3 


118 




18 


174 


• Third Brigade. 




Col. Silas Colgrove. 
















27th Indiana 


2 


23 

21 

1 

.....^ 


8 
8 
3 

"i 


78 

101 

17 

2 

/ 




1 

4 


110 


2d Massachusetts 


136 


loth New Jersey 


21 


l(»7th New York 


?, 


3d Wisconsin 


10 






Total Third brigade 


2 


47 


20 


205 




5 


279 






Total First division 


6 


90 


27 


379 


1 


30 


533 


SECOND DIVISION. 




Brig.-gen. John W, Geary, 
















First Brigade. 
















Col, Charles Candv. 
















5th Ohio 


1 
"2 

"i 


1 

1 
5 

""3 
4 


1 

"3 
1 


15 
17 
31 
14 

20 
15 




"""3 


18 


7th Ohio 


18 


29th Ohio 


38 


66th Ohio 


17 


2Sth Pennsylvania 


27 


147th Pennsylvania 


20 






Total First brigade 


4 


14 


5 


112 




3 


138 


Second Brigade. 




Col. George A. Cobham, Jr. 
















Brig.-gen. Thomas L. Kane. 
















Col. George A. Cobham, Jr. 
















29th Pennsv 1 vania 


2 


13 
3 

5 


"i 


43 

6 

16 




8 
1 

9 


66 


109th Pennsylvania 


10 


111th Pennsylvania 


22 






Total Second brigade 


2 


21 


1 


65 




98 



294 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties in the Army of the Pototnac, etc. — Continued. 





Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured 
or missing. 




Command. 


u 

O 


"a 3 


^1 

1 



"53 


SB 



"s 3 
W 




Third Brigade. 
















Brig.-gen. George S. Greene. 
















60tli New York 


"2 

4 


11 

6 
2 

30 
6 


2 
1 
1 
3 
3 


39 
20 
16 
84 
43 


"i 


8 

10 

3 


52 


78th New York 


30 


102(1 New York 


29 


137tli New Y'ork 


137 


149tli New York 


55 


Total Third brigade 


6 


61 


10 


202 


1 


23 


303 


Total Second division 


12 


96 


16 


379 


1 


35 


539 


ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 




Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg. 
















Pennsylvania Light, Battery E 

4th United States, Battery F 

5th United States, Battery K 


... 






3 

1 
5 






3 
1 
5 


Total Artillery brigade 


... 






9 






9 


Total Twelfth army corps 


18 


186 


43 


767 


2 


65 


1081 


CAVALEY CORPS. 
















Maj.-gen. Alfred Pleasonton. 
















FIRST DIVISION. 
















Brig.-gen. John Buford. 
















jPtV.s< Brigade. 
















Col. William Gamble. 
















8th Illinois 


"i 


1 
4 
5 

2 


1 
3 

1 
1 


4 

7 

20 

21 




1 

6 

5 

16 


7 


12th Illinois (4 companies) 

3d Indiana (6 companies) 


20 
32 


8th New York 


40 






Total First brigade 


1 


12 


6 


52 




28 


99 


Second Brigade. 




Col. Thomas C. Devin. 
















6th New York , 




'""2 




1 
2 




8 

7 
4 
4 


9 


9th New Y'^ork..... 


11 


17th Pennsylvania 

3d West Virginia (2 companies)... 


4 
4 


Total Second brigade 




2 




3 




23 


28 



ADDENDA. 



295 



Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc. — Continued. 



Command. 



Reserve Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Wesley Merritt. 

6th Pennsyl van ia 

1st United States 

2d United States 

5th United States 

6th United States* 

Total Keserve brigade 

Total First division 



SECOND DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. David McM. Gregg. 

First Brigade. 
Col. John B. Mcintosh. 

1st Maryland 

1st New Jei-sey 

1st Pennsylvania 

3d Pennsylvania 

Total First brigade 

Third Brigade. 
Col. J. Irvin Gregg. 

1st Maine 

10th New York 

16th Pennsylvania 

Total Third brigade 

Total Second division 



THIRD DIVISION. 

Brig.-gen. Judson Kilpatrick. 

First Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Elon J. Farnsworth. 
Col. Nathaniel P. Richmond. 

Stafi' 

5th New York.... 

18th Pennsylvania 

1st Vermont ■ 

1st West Virginia 



Killed. 



Total First brigade. 



13 



27 



1 

2 

13 

2 

18 



Wounded. 



12 



7 
9 
6 
4 
23 



Captured 
or missiug. 



49 



104 



10 



19 



12 



31 



1 

4 

22 

1 

28 



= a 



2 
5 
6 
1 
203 



217 



268 



11 



27 
3 



42 



* Losses occurred at Fairfield, Pa. 
U 



12 

15 

17 

5 

242 



291 



418 



3 

7 

2 

2J_ 

33 



20 



53 



1 

6 

14 

65 

12 



98 



:96 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties in the Army of the 


Potomac, etc 


. — Continued, 


• 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 












nnssiug. 




Command. 


to ' '^ 




rs 


-rt 


a 




^ 


m a 


Ih 


M a 


2 




t 




















■a 


= a 


s 


ca 


e 


ca 


bo 




o 


a 


c 


u 


c w 


< 


Second Brigade. 
















Brig.-gen. George A. Custer. 
















1st Micliisxan 




10 


6 


37 


• .« 


20 


73 


5th Micliii^an 


i 


7 

1 

13 


1 
2 
4 


29 
24 
44 


..• 


18 

1 

39 


56 


6th Michigan 


28 


7th Michigan 


100 


Total Second brigade 


1 


31 


13 


134 




78 


257 


Total Third division 


4 


49 


19 


162 


1 


120 


355 


HORSE ARTILLERY. 




Fird Brigade. 
















Capt. James M. Robertson. 
















9th Michiijan 


■•• 


1 




4 






5 


6th New Yorlv 








1 






1 


2d United States, Battery M 






1 








1 


4th United States, Battery E 


... 


i 










1 


Total First brigade 




2 


1 


5 






8 


Second Brigade. 
















Capt. .Tohn C. Tidball. 
















1st United States, Batterv K 


... 


2 




1 






3 


2d United Stales, Battery A 








12 






12 


Total Second brigade 




2 




13 






15 


Total Cavalry corps 


5 


85 


37 


315 


8 


399 


849 


AETILLERY RESERVE. 
















Brig.-gen. Robert 0. Tyler. 
















Capt. James M. Robertson. 
















First Regulur Brigade. 
















Capt. Dunljar R. Ransom. 
















Ist United States, Batterv H 




1 


1 


7 




1 


10 


8d United States, Bats. F and K.. 


i 


8 




14 




1 


24 


4th United States, Piatterv C 




1 


1 


16 






18 


5th United States, Battery C 




2 


2 


12 






16 


Total First Regular brigade.. 


1 


12 


4 


49 




2 


68 



ADDENDA. 



297 



Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, e<c.— Continued. 



Command. 



First Voluiiieer Brigade. 
Lieut.-col. Freeman McGilvery. 

Massachusetts Light,5tli Bat.(E)* 
Massachusetts Light, yth Battci-y. 
ISTew York Light, loth^ Battery... 
Penna. Light, Bats. C and F 

Total First Volunteer brigade.. 



Second Volunteer Brigade. 

Capt. Elijah D. Taft. 

Connecticut Light, 2d Battery.... 
New York Light, 5th Battery.... 

Total Second Volunt'r brigade 



Third Volunteer Brigade. 

Capt. James F. Huntington. 

Kew Hampshire Light, 1st Bat... 

1st Ohio Liglit, Battery H 

1st Penna. Light, Bats. F and G 
"West Virginia Light, Bat. C 

Total Third Volunt'r brigade- 



Jo «.r</i Volunteer Brigade. 

Capt. Eobert H. Fitzhugh. 

INfaine Li.srht, 6th Battery 

New Jersey Light, 1st Battery.. 
1st New York Light, Battery G. 
1st New York Light, Battery Kf 

Total Fourth Volunt'r brigade 

Total Artillery reserve 



Killed. 



15 



10 



40 



Wounded. 



10 



15 



16 
16 
11 

18 



61 



5 

3 

13 

2 



23 



13 

7 
7 
7 



34 



172 



Captured or 
missing. 



"c 5 
w 



13 



21 
28 
16 

28 



93 



23 
4 



37 



13 
9 

7 
7 



36 
242 



lOth New York Battery attached, whose loss, here included, was two men killed and three 
men wounded. J 11th New York Battery attached. 



298 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc. — Concliuled. 
RECAPITULATION. 



Command. 



Killed. 






Wounded. 



Captured or 
missing. 



General Headquarters 

First ariuy cnvym 

Hecond army corps 

Third army corps 

Fifth army corps 

Sixth army corps 

Eleventh army corps 

Tvvell'th army corps 

Cavalry corps 

Artillery reserve 

Total Army of the Potomac, 



551 

729 

528 

337 

25 

335 

186 

85 

40 



2 

257 

269 

251 

129 

14 

120 

43 

37 

15 



247 



2,816 



1,137 



2 

2,952 

2,917 

2,775 

1,482 

171 

1,802 

767 

315 

172 



2,140 

355 

592 

210 

30 

1,449 

65 

399 

13 



4 

6,024 

4,350 

4,210 

2,187 

242 

3,801 

1,081 

849 

242 



13,355 



182 



5,253! 22,990 



ADDENDA. 



293 



Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, eoimnanded 
by General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, at the Battle of Gettysburg, 
Pennsylvania, July 1-3, 1863. 

Note. — Where the sum of the regimentiil losses does not tally with the brigade " totals," the 
discrepancy is due to disagreements between the detailed statement furnished by Surgeon L. 
Guild, Medical Director of the Army, and the numbers reported by brigade and other superior 
commanders. Owing to the absenoe of subordinate reports, such disagreements cannot be 
explained. In computing the "grand total" the figures supplied by bri^;ade, division, and 
corps commanders have generally beeu adopted; but whether takeu in detail or as a whole, 
the compilation can only be regarded as approximate. Several of the reports indicate that 
many of the "missing" were killed or wounded; especially is this the case with Pickett's 
division of Longstreet's corps. 



Command. 


1 


'6 

S 
3 





6 
I 

V 

to 
so 
<5 


FIEST ARMY CORPS. 

Lieut.-gen. James Longstreet. 

McLaws' Division. 

Maj.-gen. Lafayette McLaws. 

Kershaivs Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. Joseph B. Kershaw. 

2d South Carolina 


27 
18 
18 
21 
21 
10 


125 
63 
85 
79 
98 
33 


2 
2 

7 

'"is 
3 


154 


3d South Carolina 


83 


7th South Carolina 


110 


8th South Carolina , 


100 


J 5th South Carolina 


137 


3d South Carolina Battalion 


46 






Total 


115 

"""9 

10 

8 

15 


483 

1 

77 
68 
47 
72 


32 


630 


Semmes' Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Paul J. Semraes. 
Col. Goods Bryan. 
Staff 


1 




86 


50ih Georgia 

51st Georgia 


78 
55 


53d Georgia 


87 


Total 


55 

1 
28 
40 
18 
16 


284 

137 
160 

82 
87 


91 


430 


Bai-ksdak's Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. William Barksdale. 

Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys. 

Staff 


1 




165 


17th Mississippi 


200 


18th Mississippi 


100 


21st Mississippi 


103 


Total 


105 


550 


92 


747 



300 ADDENDA. 

Return of Casualties in the Army oj Northern Virginia, etc. — Contimied. 



Command. 



Wofford^s Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. W. T. \Vofibrd. 

Ifilh Georgia 

18th (ieorgia 

24tli Geoigiii 

Cobb's Georgia Legion 

Pliillips' Georgia Legion 

Total ... 

A rt 1 1 levy Battalion. 
Col. Henry C. Cabell. 

Carlton's Georgia Battery (Troiip Artillery).... 
Fraser's Georgia Battery (Pulaski Artillery)... 
McCartliy's Battery (1st Richmond Howitzers 
Manly's North Carolina Battery 

Total 

Total MeLaws' division 

Pickett's Division. 

Maj.-gen. George E. Pickett. 

Gwnetf's Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. Richard B. Garnett. 

• (?) 

Staff 

8th Virginia 

]8th Virginia 

19th Vir.iiinia 

2Sth \'iri:inia 

56 til Virgniia 

Total 

^-1 rmiatead's Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. Lewis A'. Armistead. 
Col.' W. R. Aylett. 

Staff 

9th V^irginia 

14th Virniiiia 

3Stli Virginia 

53d Virginia 

57th Virginia 

Total 



•30 



8 
313 



1 
6 
10 
10 
19 
22 

78 



17 
23 
17 
20 

88 



Ki 



192 



29 



1538 



48 
77 
34 
58 
40 



324 



71 
91 
147 
87 
95 



460 






112 



327 



539 



643 



61 
19 
36 
22 

28 



334 



7 

18 
5 

7 



37 



2178 



1 

54 
87 
44 

77 
62 



941 



1 

71 
108 
170 
104 
121 



1191 



ADDENDA. 



301 



Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, etc. — Continued. 



Command. 



* Kemper's Brigade. 

Erig.-gen. James L. Kemper. 

Col. Joseph Mayo, Jr. 

Staff........ 

1st Virginia 

3d Virginia 

7th Virginia , 

11th Virginia .. 

24th Virginia 



Total. 



Artillery Battalion. 

Maj. James Bearing. 

Blount's Virginia Battery 

Caskie's Virginia Battery (Hampden Artillery).., 
Macon's Battery (Eiclunond Fayette Artillery)..., 
Stribling's Virginia Battery (Fanqnier Artillery). 



Total* 

Total Pickett's division.. 



Hood's Division. 
Maj.-gen. John B. Hood. 



Staff. 



L'lw's Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. E. Mclver Law. 
Col. James L. Sheffield. 



4th Alabama... 
15th Alabama. 
44th Alabama. 
47th Alabama. 
48th Alabama. 



Total. 



Anderson's Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. George T. Anderson. 

Col'. W. W. White. 

Staff 

7th Georgia 

8th Georgia 

9th Georgia 

11th Georgia 

Olith Georgia 



Total.. 



16 
15 
12 

17 



58 



17 
17 
24 
10 



74 



25 
28 
32 
18 



105 



62 
51 
79 
97 
111 



356 



317 



1157 



49 

66 
64 
80 
67 



276 



1 

15 

114 

115 

162 

92 



512 



1499 



4 

64 

67 

94 

109 

128 



731 



25 

2888 



t66 
183 
tS8 
40 
t75 



146 



54 



496 



1 

15 

139 

t]43 

tl94 

fllO 



671 



* Not rei'orted in detail. 

t According to reKinicntal reports the total loss was: 4th Alabama, 87; ^^th Alabama, ]fil' 
4-lth Alabama, 94; 48th Alabama, 1U2; 'Jth Georgia, 189; Uth Georgia, 204; o'Jth Georgia, 116.' 



302 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties in the Army of Northei'n 


Virginia, etc- 


-Continued. 


Command. 


"S 




o . 


<0 

1 




3 


o 


P.3 

5" 


IS 


Roberison^s Brigade. 




. 






Brig. -gen. J. B. Kobertson. 










3d Arkansas 

1st Texas 


26 
24 
14 
23 


116 
54 
73 

86 




142 

*78 


4t h Texas ' 


87 


oth Texas 


109 


Total 


84 


393 


120 


597 


Benning's Brigade. 




Brig.-gen. Henry L. Benning. 










2d Georgia 


25 

8 

15 

21 


66 
64 
75 
83 




91 




*72 




90 


20th Georgia i 


*104 


Total 


76 


299 


122 


497 


Artillery Battalion. 




Maj. M. W. Henry. 










Bach man's South Carolina Battery (German Art.) 
Garden's South Carolina Battery ( Palmetto Lt. Art.) 
Latham's North Carolina Battery (Branch Art.)... 
Eeillv's North Carolina Battery (Kowan Art.).... 











Total t 


4 


23 




27 






Total Hood's division 


343 


1504 


442 


2289 


RESERVE ARTILLERY. 




Col. J. B. Walton.J 










Alexander'' s Battalion. 










Col. E. Porter Alexander. 










Jordan's Virginia Battery (Bedford Artillery) 

Moody's Louisiana Battery (Madison Lt. Art.) 

Parker's Virginia Battery 










Khett's Soutli Carolina Baltery (Brooks Art.) 

Taylor's Virginia Battery . 






Woolfoik's Virginia Battery (Ashland Artillery)... 




Total t 


19 


114 


6 


139 



* According to regimental reports the total loss was : 1st Texas, 93 ; 15th Georgia, 171 ; 20th 
Georgia, 121. 
t Not reported in detail. 
i Chief of corps artillery. 



ADDENDA. 303 

Return of Casualties in the Army 6/ Northern Virginia, p/c— Continued. 



Command. 


S 







1.2 

I'i 


bO 

E 

< 


Washington {Louisiana) Artillery. 

Maj. B. F. Eshleman. 

1st Company (Squires') 






















Total ^ 


3 


23 


16 


42 




22 


137 


22 


181 


Total First army corps 


910 


4336 


2290 


7536 


SECOND AKMY CORPS. 
Lieut.-gen. Eiohard S. Ewell. 

Rfnflf" 


5 
5 
8 
8 
10 


1 

31 
34 
43 
54 
39 


13 
21 
6 
13 
23 


1 


early's division. 
Maj. -gen. Jubal A. Early. 

Hay^ Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Harry T. Hays. 


49 




60 




57 




75 


9th Louisiana = 


72 


Xotal 


36 

20 
9 
6 


201 

131 

65 
20 


76. 

21 
37 
36 


313 


Hoke's Brigade. 
Col. Archibald C. Godwin. 


172 




111 


57th North Carolina 


62 


Xotal 


35 
""12 


216 

20 
78 
15 


94 

7 
10 


345 


Smith's Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. William Smith. 


27 




100 


52d Virginia 


15 


Total 


12 


113 


17 


142 



* Not reported in detail. 



304 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, etc. — Continued. 



Command. 


13 


a 



c-'a 


Aggregate. 


Gordon's Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. John B. Gordon. 

13th Georgia 


20 
2 
9 

12 
4 

24 


83 
4 
34 
51 
29 
69 


""5 

29 
5 


103 




11 




43 


38 th Georgia 


92 




38 




93 






Total 


71 
■"2" 


270 

1 
5 


89 


380 


Artillery Battalion. 
Lieut.-ool. H. P. Jones. 

Carrington's Va. Battery (Charlottesville Art.) 

Garber's Virginia Battery (Stauntini Artillery).... 

Green's Battery (Louisiana Guard Artillery) 

Tanner's Virginia Battery (Courtney Artillery)... 


""i 

7 


Total 


2 


6 




8 






Total P>arlv's division 


156 

25 
4 

29 
4 
4 

10 


806 
1 

119 

48 
127 
17 
14 
44 


226 
1 


1188 


Johnson's Division. 

Maj.-gen. Edward Johnson. 

Staff 


2 


Steuaj-t's Brigade. 
1st Marvland Battalion 


144 




52 




156 


10th V irginia 


21 


23d Virginia 


18 


37th Virginia 


54 






Total 


83 

9 

10 
14 

9 

2 


409 

30 
52 
77 
56 
36 


190 


682 


Nichollt^ Brigade. 

Col. J. M. Williams. 

1st Lou isiana 


39 


2d Louisiana 


62 


10th Louisiana 


91 


14th Louisiana 


65 


loth Louisiana 


38 






Total 


43 


309 


36 


388 



ADDENDA. 



305 



Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, (?^c.— Continued. 



Command. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


. 

f 3 


Aggregate. 


Stonewall Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. James A. Walker. 


1 

8 

5 

7 

11 


13 

78 
46 
34 
37 




14 




86 




51 




41 


33d Virginia 


48 


Tntnl 


35 

" 6 

3 

8 

3 

15 

13 


208 

2 
29 
37 
48 
14 
43 
47 


87 


330 


Jones' Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. John M. Jones. 

Lieut.-col. R. H. Dungan. 

Staff 


2 




*35 




*40 




56 




*17 




*58 


50tli Virginia 


*60 


Total 


58 

■■■■4 
5 
1 


302 

1 

12 

19 

4 

4 


61 



421 


Artillery Battalion. 
Capt. C. I. Eame. 


1 


Brown's Maryland Battery (Chesapeake Art.) 


16 

24 

5 




4 


Total 


10 


40 




50 




229 

26 
21 
46 
13 
29 


1269 

116 
126 
173 
104 
124 


375 
116 


1873 


EoDEs' Division. 
Maj.-gen. Robert E. Rodes. 

Daniel's Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. Junius Daniel. 

32d Nortli Carolina 


142 




147 




219 




117 


2d North Cai'olina Battalion 


153 




165 


635 


916 



44th 



According to regimental reports the total loss was: 21st Virginia, 50 ; 25th Virginia, 70 ; 
1 Virginia, 56 ; 48th Virginia, 7G ; oUth Virginia, 99. 



306 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern 


Virginia, etc.— 


-Continued. 


Command. 


3 


-a 
o 


u 
o . 


a 

to 


Iverson's Brigade. 

Brij^.-gen. Alfred Ivcrson. 

5th North Carolina 


31 
10 
2!) 
41 


112 
4() 
93 
93 




143 




56 




122 


2od North Carolina 


134 


Total 


130 

9 

4 

1 

10 


328 

29 
35 
11 
49 


308 

. 7 

10 

5 

9 


820 


Do/es' Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. George Doles. 


45 




49 


21st Ge(ir"'ia 


17 


44th Georgia 


68 


Total 


24 

4 
8 
5 
(i 


124 

27 
24 
37 
34 


31 

1 
24 

2 
5 


179 


Fuimsew^s Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. S. D. Eamseur. 


32 




56 




44 


30th North Carolina 


45 


Total 


23 

12 
21 
18 
13 
5 


122 

79 

109 

113 

65 

41 


32 


177 


O'Neal's Brigade. 
Col. Edward A. O'Neal. 


91 




*130 


l''th Alabama .. -. 


131 

*78 


26th Alabama 


*46 


Total 


73 


430 


193 


696 


Artillery Battalion. 

Lieut.-col. Thomas H. Carter. 

Carter's Virginia Battery (King William Artillery) 

Fry's Virginia Batterv (Orange Arlillery) 

Page's Virginia Battery (Morris Artillery) 

Eeese's Alabama Battery (Jeff. Davis Artillery)... 




Total t 


6 


35 


24 


65 


Total Eodes' division 


421 


1728 


704 


2853 



* According to regimental reports the total loss was: 5th Alabama, 209; 12th Alabama, 83 
26th Alabama, l;50. 
t Not reported iu detail. 



ADDENDA. 



307 



Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern 


Virginia, etc. - 


-Conti 


nued. 


Command. 


'6 

3 


Wounded. 


Captured or 

missing. 


Aggregate. 


Reserve Artillery. 

Col. J. Thompson Brown.* 

Broicn's Balialion. 

Capt. Willis J. Dance. 

Dance's Virginia Eattery (Powlnitan Artillery).... 

Hupp's Virginia Battery (Salem Artillery) 

Graham's Virginia Battery (Rockhridge Artillery) 

Smith's Battery (3(1 Richmond Howitzers) 

Watson's Battery (2d Eichraond Howitzers) 










Total t 


3 


19 




22 


Nelson's Battalion. 

Lieut. Col. William Nelson. 

Kirkpatrick's Virginia Battery (Amherst Art.).... 

Massie's Virginia Jjattery (Fluvanna Artillery) 

Milledge's Georgia Battery 




Total J 










Total reserve artillery 


3 


19 




22 


Total Second army corps 


809 


3823 


1305 


5937 


THIRD ARMY CORPS. 
Lieut.-gen. Ambrose P. Hill. 










Anderson's Division. 

Maj.-gen. Richard H. Anderson. 

Wilcox's Brigade. 

Brig. -gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox. 


22 
3 

13 
6 

7 


139 
55 
91 
69 
41 




161 




58 


lOlh Alabama 


104 




75 


14th Alabama 


48 


Total 


51 

'""i 

2 
1 
2 


469 

3 
12 

7 
11 
10 


257 


777 


Brig.-gen. William Mahone. 


3 




14 


16th Viro'inia 


9 




12 


61st Virginia 


12 


Total 


8 


55 


39 


102 



J Loss, if any, not reported. 



308 ADDENDA. 

Betum of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, e<c.— Continued. 



Command. 


ri 
2 


i 

"2 
S 
^ ! 




2 

a 
tc 

to 
to 


Wright's Briyade. 

Brig.-gen. A. R. Wright. 
Col. William Gibson. 
Brig.-gen. A. E. Wright. 


""21 

16 
3 


100 
75 
74 
46 





100 


22d Georgia -. 


96 
90 


2d Georo"ia Battalion.. 


49 


Tntnl 


40 

11 
12 
10 


295 

70 
63 
84 


333 


668 


Perry^s Brigade. 
Col. David Lang. 

9fl Flr»ri(l*\ 


81 


Kt\. FlnridM 


75 




94 


"Pytal 


33 

""2 

4 
6 


217 

7 

17 
23 
24 


205 


455 


Posei/'s Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Carnot Posey. 


7 




19 




27 




30 




12 

1 

2 


71 

7 
5 
9 




83 


Maj. John Lane. 


8 




7 


Conipanv C (Wingtield's) 


9 


Total 


3 


21 


6 


30 




147 


1128 
1 


840 


2115 


Heth's Division. 

Maj.-gen. Henry Heth. 
Brig.-gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew. 

Staff 


1 



ADDENDA. 



309 



Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern 


Virginia, etc.— 


-Continued. 


Command. 


"6 


'6 

•a 

a 
3 



. 



to 

< 


First Brigade. 
Brig. -gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew. 
Col. James K. Marshall. 
11th North Carolina 


50 
86 
21 
33 


159 
502 
140 
114 




209 


2(ith North Carolina 


588 




161 


62d North Carolina 


147 


Total. 


190 

4 

10 

8 

3 


915 

38 
3S 
26 
21 




110; 


Second Brigade. 
Col. J. M. Brockenbrough. 


42 




48 


65th Vii'gin ia 


34 


22d Virginia Battalion 


■ 24 


Total : 


25 

6 

■""2 

5 
3 


123 

36 
26 
40 
18 
24 




148 


2'hird Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. James J. Archer. 
Col. B. D. Fry. 

13th Alabama 


42 


5th A labama Bat tal ion 


26 


1st Tennessee (Provisional Arrav) 


42 




23 




27 






Total 


16 

49 
32 
60 
39 


144 

183 
170 
205 
159 


517 


677 


Fourth Brigade. 

Brig.-gen. Joseph R. Davis. 

2d Mississippi 


232 


11th ^lississippi 


202 


42d ilississippi 


265 


65th North Carolina 


198 


Total 


180 


717 




897 


Artillery Battalion. 

Lieut.-col. John J. Garnett. 

Grandv's Virginia Baty. (Norfolk Lt. Art. Blues).. 




Maurin's Louisiana Baty. (Donaldsonville Art.)... 
Moore's ^ irginia Battery 






Total* 




5 


17 


22 


Total Heth's division 


411 


1905 


534 


2850 



* Not reported in detail. 



310 



ADDENDA. 



Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern 


Virginia, etc.— 


-Continued. 


Command. 


'6 

3 


"? 




u 



-3 to 

£.| 

Is 


6 

a 
bo 

j; 

to 

< 


PpjNUEit's Division. 
Maj.-gen. ^\^illianl D. Pender. 
Erij^-gen. .James J I. Lane. 
Maj.-gen. Isaac K. Trimble. 
Brig.-gen. James II. Lane. 
Staff. 


1 

20 

2 

20 

31 

27 


4 

75 

9 

112 

99 
182 




5 


First Bri(j<i(h. 

Col. Abner Perrin. 

1st Rout li Carolina 


95 


1st South Carolina Rifles 


11 


12tli South Carolina 


132 


13th South Carolina 


130 


14th South Carolina 


209 






Total 


100 

5 

4 
12 
10 
10 


477 

84 
41 
92 
53 

78 




577 


Second BrigiuJe. 
Brig.-gen. James H. Lane. 
Col. C. M. Avery. 
Brig.-gen. Jamis H. Lane. 
Col. C. M. Avery. 
7th North Carolina ." 


89 


18th North Carolina 


45 


28th North Carolina 


104 


3;-»d Nortii Carolina 


63 


37th North Carolina 


88 


Total* 


41 

5 
6 

"'"'5 


348 

27 
42 
35 
32 




389 


Third Brigade. 
14th Georgia 


32 


35th Georgia 


48 


45th Georgia 


35 


49th Georgia 


37 






Total 


16 

""29 
16 
20 
16 
21 

102 


136 

1 

97 
50 
69 

48 
58 




152 


Fourth Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Alfred M. Scales. 
Lieut -col. G. T. Gordon. 
Col. W. Lee J. Lowrance. 
Staff 


1 


13th North Carolina 


126 


16th Nortli Carolina 


66 


22d North Carolina 


89 


34tli North Carolina 


64 


3Sth North Carolina 


79 






Total 


323 


110 


535 



* General Lane reports his entire loss at 660. 



ADDENDA. 



311 



Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern 


Virginia, etc.— 


-Conti 


lued. 


Command. 


i 

3 


-i 

a 





-s si 

.a 


i 

OS 


Artillery Battalum. 

Maj. William T. Poague. 

Brooks' Viro'inia Battery . ... 










Graham's North Oarolina Battery 

Ward's Mississip))! Battery (Madison Lt. Art.)... 
Wyatt's Virginia Battery (Albemarle Artillery)... 






Total* 


2 


24 


6 


32 


Total Pender's division 


262 


1312 


116 


1690 


Reserve Artillery. 
Col. R. Lindsay WalUer.f 

McIntosh^s Batt(dion. 

Maj. D. G. Mcintosh. 

Hurt's Alabama Battery (Hardaway Artillery)... 










Rice's Virginia Battery (Danville Artillery) 






Total* 


7 


25 




32 


Pef/ram\s Battalion. 

Maj. W. J. Pegram. 

Ca|)t. E. B. Brimson. 
Brander's Virginia Battery (Letcher Artillery)... 
Brunson's South Carolina Battery (Pee Dee Art.).. 

Crenshaw's Virginia Battery 

McGraw's Virginia Battery (Pnrcell Artillery) 

Marye's Virginia Battery (Fredericksburg Art.)... 




Total* 


10 


37 


1 


48 


Total reserve artillery 


17 


62 


1 


, 80 




837 


4407 


1491 


6735 


CAVALRY. 

Stu.art's Division. 
Maj. -gen. J. E. B. Stuart. 

Huinpton'!^ Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. Wade Hampton. 
Col. Lawrence S. Baker. 
Staff 


■■■"2 

1 
1 
8 
4 
1 


1 
17 
9 
6 
6 

10 
9 


■■■■4 
4 

•••■■7 
1 


1 


1st North Carolina 


23 


1st South Carolina. 


14 


2d South Carolina. ... 


7 


Cobb's Georgia Legion 


21 


Jeff Davis Legion 


15 


Phillips' Georgia Legion 


10 


Total 


17 


58 


16 


91 



* Kot reported in detail. 



t Chief of corps artillery. 



312 ADDENDA. 

Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, e<c.— Continued. 



Command. 



Fitz. Le^s Brigade. 
Brig. -gen. Fitzhvigli Lee. 



1st Virginia... 
2d Virginia... 
3d Virginia... 
4th Virginia.. 
5th Virginia* 



Total., 



IF. H. F. Lee's Brigade. 
Col. John R. Chambliss, Jr. 



2d North Carolina*. 

9th Virginia 

10th Virginia 

13th Virginia 



Total. 



Jonei Brigade. 
Brig.-gen. William E. Jones. 



6th Virginia... 
7th Virginia... 
11th Virginia 

Total 



Jenkins' Brigade. 
Col. M. J. Ferguson. 



14th Vii'ginia 

16th Virginia 

17th Virginia 

34th Virginia Battalion., 
35th Virginia Battalion.. 

Total* 



Stuart Horse Artillery. 

Breathed's Maryland Battery 

Gritfin's 2d Maryland Battery 

McGregor's Virginia Battery 

Total* 

Total Stuart's division 



12 



36 



16 



6 

9 

11 



26 



19 
21 



40 






10 
1 
1 

17 



29 



22 
5 
6 

17 



50 



12 
12 
17 



13 



140 



41 



28 
30 

58 



64 240 



* Loss, if any, not of record. 



ADDENDA. 



313 



Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, etc. — Concluded. 
KECAPITULATION. 



Command, 



First army corps 

Second army corps 

Third army corps 

Stuart's Cavalry division 

Grand total 













o . 




-% 


^a 




r3 




1 
13 


a 
o 


la 


910 


4,336 


2,290 


809 


3,823 


1,305 


837 


4,407 


1,491 


36 


140 


64 


2,592 


12,706 


*5,150 



7,536 

5,937 

6,735 

240 

20,448 



* The records of prisoners of war on file in the office of the Adjutant-general U. S. Army 
bear the names of 12,'227 wounded and un wounded Confederates captured by the Union forces 
at and about Gettysburg from July 1st to oth, inclusive. 



314 



ADDENDA. 






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^ 5 



ADDENDA. 315 

Instructions from Meade to French. 

June 29, 1863. 
Majok-Gen. French, Comdg. Harper's Feiry : 

The major-general commanding directs that you remove the property of 
the government at Maryland Heights, etc. by canal to Washington — that 
you march with your command to join this army without delay. For the 
purpose of removing and escorting the property to Washington, you will detach 
such portion of your command as may be necessary, and order them to rejjort 
to Maj.-Gen. Heintzelman. Tliis force should not exceed three thousand men, 
and of course, in your discretion, may be less tlian that. 

TJie head-quarlers of this army will be at Middieburg to-night, and the army 
are all in march for the line between Emmettsburg and Westminster. Where 
the head-qnarters will be after to-night will depend upon the information 
derived from the front of the enemy and his movements. Your maix-h must 
be as rapid as possible in view of the efficiency of your troops to join. 

You will require to carry tlie amount of ammunition and su[)plies ordered 
for the Army of the Potomac. If vour supplies do not hold out, you must 
purcliase from the people through youi- quartermaster and commissary. Some 
supplies may possibly be found at Frederick as you march through ; upon this 
you cannot count with any certainty. 

The commanding general expects to engage the enemy within -a few days, and 
looks anxiously for your command to join. 

Please acknowledge receipt of tliis order by bearer. 
Very respectfully, etc., 

Daniel Butterfield, 

Major-Oen. and Chief of Staff. 

[Confidential.'] July 1, 1863, 

Maj.-Gen. French: 

The major-general commanding encloses for yonr information the orders as to 
his disposition for an attack from the enemy, which will be understood by con- 
sulting the map of Frederick county. He directs that you will hold Frederick, 
camping your troops in its immediate vicinity ; also the Monocacy bridges, both 
rail and turnpike. You will also guard the Baltimore and Ohio R. K. from 
Frederick to a junction with Gen. Schenck, to whom you will communicate 
your instructions. 

In the event of our being compelled to withdraw and retire before the enemy, 
you will be in readiness to throw your command by rail or march, as may be 
most practicable and speedy, into the defences of Washington. 

He desires that for the present you will hold the line of communication to 
Frederick. Keep it open, and send up from Frederick all stragglers, keeping 
the town clear and in good order. 

Very respectfully, etc., 

S. Williams, 

A sst. A djuian t- Oenei al. 



OP.T 2 5 1950 



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